IR 05000333/2002006
| ML022610694 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/2002 |
| From: | David Lew NRC/RGN-I/ORA/MID |
| To: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| References | |
| IR-02-006 | |
| Download: ML022610694 (17) | |
Text
September 18, 2002
SUBJECT:
FITZPATRICK - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 50-333/02-006
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
On August 30, 2002, the NRC completed a team inspection at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed with you and members of your staff during an exit meeting conducted by telephone on September 9, 2002.
The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the sample reviewed, the team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. However, there were two green findings identified by the inspectors which were associated with the inadequacy of operability evaluations for conditions adverse to quality. The first finding was the failure to properly evaluate the condition report (CR) written after the B emergency service water (ESW) pump failed a surveillance test. Numerous FitzPatrick personnel failed to recognize that the B ESW pump should have been declared inoperable after the pump failed the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (TSSR). The second finding was related to the failure to properly evaluate for operability suspect Agastat relays in the emergency diesel generator sequencer circuit for the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps. Testing of the relays subsequently identified that one out of four relays was outside the TSSR acceptable tolerance, which rendered the D RHR pump inoperable.
Both of these findings were determined to be violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance (Green) and because they have been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the two violations as non-cited violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny either of these non-cited violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC, 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
Mr. Theodore Sullivan-2-In accordance with 10CFR2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
David C. Lew, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.
50-333 License No.
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-333/02-006
REGION I==
Docket No:
50-333 License No:
DPR-59 Report No:
50-333/02-006 Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Northeast Post Office Box 110 Lycoming, NY 13093 Facility:
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location:
268 Lake Road Scriba, New York 13093 Dates:
August 12 - 30, 2002 Inspectors:
B. S. Norris, Senior Reactor Inspector G. V. Cranston, Reactor Inspector W. E. Holland, contractor Approved by:
David C. Lew, Chief Performance Evaluation Branch Division of Reactor Safety
ii
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000333-02-06; on August 12-30, 2002; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; biennial inspection of the identification and resolution of problems. Two violations were identified in the area of operability evaluations of identified conditions adverse to quality.
The inspection was conducted by two regional inspectors and one contractor. Two green findings of very low safety significance were identified during the inspection and were classified as non-cited violations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The NRC inspection team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The threshold for entering items into the corrective action program was low, conditions were evaluated for the appropriate corrective action, and the effectiveness of the corrective actions appeared to be adequate. Audits and self-assessments identified adverse conditions and negative trends, and the results of the self-assessments and audits were entered them into the corrective action program. There were no significant conditions identified by the inspectors that had not been already found by the auditors or self-assessments.
However, there were two green findings identified by the inspectors associated with the inadequacy of operability evaluations for identified conditions adverse to quality. Both findings were determined to be violations of NRC requirements.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green A violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, (Corrective Action), dispositioned as a non-cited violation, was identified because licensee personnel failed to identify that, during a surveillance test, the B emergency service water (ESW) pump was inoperable after the flow for the B train of ESW was below the required value in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement. During the inspection, the NRC inspectors identified that the licensee had erroneously concluded that the pump was operable based on a non-safety system cooled by the B train of ESW being tagged out of service.
This finding is greater than minor and could become a more significant safety concern because operators failed to recognize inoperable equipment during surveillance testing. The ESW system provides cooling water to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the room coolers for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps. The failure of ESW is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, because the failure of the ESW system could affect the safety function of the EDGs and/or the ECCS pumps. This finding was evaluated using the NRC Significance Determination Process, and was screened as having very low safety iii significance because the low flow condition for the B ESW pump was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function.
(Section 4OA2.b(2)(a))
Green A violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, (Corrective Action), dispositioned as a non-cited violation, was identified because FitzPatrick personnel failed to adequately evaluate the operability of the emergency diesel generator (EDG)
Agastat sequence timers controlling the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps. The RHR timers were of the same type and surveillance frequency as the core spray (CS) timers which had failed their Technical Specification required surveillance test.
When the RHR timers were tested, the D RHR pump timer failed to meet the value listed in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement. During the inspection, the NRC inspectors identified that the FitzPatrick basis for operability failed to recognize that the surveillance frequency for the RHR timers had been extended from 6 months to 24 months, a contributing factor for the CS timers failing.
This finding is greater than minor and could have become a more significant safety concern because personnel failed to perform adequate operability determinations for suspect conditions adverse to quality. The Agastat timers are used to sequence emergency equipment and system loads onto the EDGs at pre-determined intervals, in order to minimize the potential for damage to the EDGs. The failure of an RHR Agastat timer for the EDG sequencer timer is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, because the failure of timers could result in multiple loads sequencing onto the EDG at the same time, which could affect the reliability of the EDGs or the loads supplied by the EDGs. This finding was evaluated using the NRC Significance Determination Process, and was screened as having very low safety significance because the out-of-tolerance condition for the D RHR pump timer was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function.
(Section 4OA2.b(2)(b))
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification
- (1) Inspection Scope The inspection team reviewed the procedures describing the corrective action process at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Shortly before the start of the inspection, the site converted to a new corrective action reporting system called the paperless condition reporting system (PCRS). This conversion was a consequence of the transition in ownership and operation of the plant from the New York Power Authority to Entergy Nuclear Northeast. In addition to the condition reports (CRs), the corrective action program encompassed maintenance related deficiencies, which were initiated on problem identification (PID) reports. The team reviewed a sample of CRs and PIDs to determine the threshold for identification of problems. The team reviewed shift logs, control room deficiencies and operator work-arounds, system health reports, completed surveillance tests, work requests, temporary modifications, operating experience reviews, and procedures related to specific issues. In addition, the team interviewed staff and management to determine their understanding of the corrective action program and the mechanics of the recently implemented PCRS. The specific documents reviewed and referenced during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to this inspection report.
The team reviewed a sample of quality assurance (QA) audits and surveillances, and departmental self-assessments in the areas of operations, maintenance, engineering, radiation protection, security, emergency preparedness, training, and the corrective action program itself. The review was to determine if assessment findings were entered into the FitzPatrick corrective action program, and if the corrective actions were completed to resolve identified program deficiencies. The team also conducted several plant walk-downs of safety-related, risk significant areas to verify that observable system equipment and plant material adverse conditions were identified and entered into the corrective action program.
- (2) Findings Overall, the inspectors determined that the FitzPatrick staff was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program. The threshold for identification of problems was low, as evidenced by the approximate 500 low-level items on the elective maintenance list. In addition, the self-assessments identified adverse trends, which were subsequently entered into the corrective action program. The QA audits were self-critical and consistent with the teams findings; in that, the inspectors identified no significant issues that had not already been found by the QA auditors.
b.
Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
- (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the CRs and PIDs listed in the Attachment to assess whether the licensee adequately prioritized and evaluated the identified problems. The review included the causal assessment of each issue (a root cause analysis, an apparent cause evaluation, or an estimate of the most probable cause); and for significant conditions adverse to quality, the extent of condition and determination of corrective actions to preclude recurrence. The inspectors also evaluated the documents listed in the Attachment for operability, reportability, and Maintenance Rule reliability and unavailability.
The team reviewed the backlog of maintenance and engineering issues to determine if issues were properly prioritized, and if individually or collectively they represented an increased risk due to the delay of corrective actions. The team also reviewed the status and plans to correct equipment problems identified through the system health reports and the Maintenance Rule. The team attended the daily screening and management meetings to evaluate their ability:
- (1) to assess CR significance,
- (2) to consider if a PID required a CR, and
- (3) to identify if the initial determination of operability and reportability were correct.
The team observed the onsite Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and the offsite Station Review Committee (SRC), and reviewed the minutes of past meetings, to determine if during their reviews they were critical of the sites activities.
- (2) Findings The team noted that the majority of the CRs reviewed were properly classified as to significance level (A through D). Significant conditions adverse to quality were classified as an A and received a formal root cause analysis (RCA), and an extent-of-condition review. The RCAs reviewed were thorough, determined the root cause and contributing causes, and recommended corrective actions correlated to each identified cause; as required, corrective actions were identified to preclude recurrence. The overall backlog of issues appeared reasonable and properly evaluated for risk both individually and collectively. The majority of the CRs were for minor issues and were classified as level D CRs, usually corrected-on-the-spot and closed to trending. The remaining CRs were level B and C and received the appropriate depth of causal analysis.
Notwithstanding, the team identified two instances, related to surveillance tests (STs),where the FitzPatrick staff had not adequately evaluated conditions adverse to quality with respect to the operability of equipment required by the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications (TS).
- (a) Emergency Service Water Green. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action),was identified for failure to adequately evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding a failed surveillance test for the emergency service water (ESW) system, which resulted in the failure to declare the B ESW pump inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed CR-JAF-2001-1046, which noted that the B ESW pump failed to meet TS and inservice test (IST) acceptance criteria for flow, during a March 2001 surveillance test (ST-8Q). During review of the CR, the inspectors noted that the B ESW pump was not declared inoperable. The inspectors reviewed the completed ST-8Q, and noted the operators considering the B ESW pump to be operable based on the fact that a valve (46(70)-SWS-26) was tagged out of service for maintenance.
Step 4.7 of ST-8Q, a prerequisite for the ST, stated that the ESW system was lined-up per OP-21; the step further stated that exceptions were permitted if they did not impact the test performance. The inspectors noted that the step was signed off as complete, even though the valve was tagged out of service, and listed in the remarks section of the ST. The valve is for the control room chiller, a non-safety related load supplied by the B train of ESW. The step required interpretation by the operator and the Shift Manager as to what would affect the test. The inspectors considered this step to be a weakness in the procedure; in that it allowed for inconsistent initial conditions, which could result in inaccurate or irrelevant IST and TS surveillance requirement (TSSR) test data. There was no violation of NRC requirements. This was entered into the FitzPatrick corrective action program as CR-JAF-2002-3282.
During the March 2001 ST, the flow for the B ESW loop was measured as 1480 gpm
[gallons per minute]. This was below the TSSR value of 1500 gpm. The reactor operator (RO) and the senior reactor operator (SRO), both licensed positions, recognized that the acceptance criteria was not met; they both checked the applicable block in the Acceptance Verification section of the ST. However, neither individual recognized that the failed TS surveillance test required that the B ESW pump be declared inoperable. The shift initiated CR-JAF-2001-1046, as required by the ST, noting that the pump was operable; the CR screening committee and the management review also failed to recognize that the B ESW pump was inoperable.
This finding is greater than minor and could become a more significant safety concern if operators fail to recognize inoperable equipment during surveillance testing. The ESW system provides cooling water to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the room coolers for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps. The failure of ESW is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, in that the failure of the ESW system could affect the safety function of the EDGs and/or the ECCS pumps. This finding was evaluated using Phase 1 of the NRC Significance Determination Process (SDP), and was screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the low flow condition for the B ESW pump was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function.
10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, requires that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, in March 2001, during the performance of ST-8Q, the B ESW pump flow was less than the value specified in TSSR 3.11.D. FitzPatrick personnel did not adequately evaluate the failure to satisfy a TSSR, which resulted in the failure to declare the affected equipment inoperable.
However, because of the very low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into the FitzPatrick corrective action program as CR-JAF-2002-3279, it is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 50-333/2002-006-01)
- (b) Residual Heat Removal Agastat Timers Green. A non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action),was identified for failure to properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality regarding suspect Agastat timers in the EDG sequencer for the residual heat removal (RHR)pumps. This resulted in a failure to take timely corrective action to test the relays, which caused the licensee to fail to promptly identify that the D RHR Agastat timer was outside of the TSSR acceptance criteria.
On July 22, 2002, during the performance of ST-3J, Core Spray Initiation Logic System Functional Test, FitzPatrick personnel discovered that the as-found value for the Agastat timers for sequencing the core spray (CS) pumps onto the EDG did not meet the acceptance criteria specified in the TSSR. The staff initiated CR-JAF-2002-2713 and CR-JAF-2002-2721, as required by the ST.
During the inspection, the team was discussing the CS timer failures with FitzPatrick engineering personnel. FitzPatrick staff stated that the reason for the failures was probably due to the TSSR frequency of testing the timers changed from 6 months to 24 months. This was the first time that the timers had been tested at the new frequency.
The inspectors asked if other Agastat timers had a testing interval of 24 months. They were informed that the timers for the four RHR pump start timers were the same type timer but had not yet been tested at the 24 month frequency. The inspectors requested a copy of the operability determination for the RHR timers; they were told that the issue had been discussed with the operations shift personnel the same day that the CS timers had failed, but nothing had been documented. On August 15, 2002, the team met with engineering and operations personnel to further discuss the operability of the RHR timers. FitzPatrick engineering personnel informed the team that the drift associated with the CS timers would not occur for the RHR timers because the RHR Agastat relays used a different range.
The inspectors considered the basis for operability of the RHR timers to be inadequate, based on:
- (1) both of the CS timers had failed,
- (2) this was the first time that the CS timers had been tested after the surveillance frequency was changed from 6 months to 24 months, and
- (3) the RHR timers surveillance frequency had also been extended to 24 months and had not been tested for almost 2 years. The RHR timers were scheduled to be tested in mid-September 2002; after discussions with the NRC, FitzPatrick management rescheduled the ST to August 24th; the D RHR Agastat timer was found to be outside the acceptance criteria.
This finding is greater than minor and could have become a more significant safety concern if personnel fail to perform adequate operability determinations for suspect conditions adverse to quality. The Agastat timers are used to sequence emergency equipment and systems onto the EDGs at pre-determined intervals, to minimize the potential for damage to the EDGs. The failure of an RHR Agastat timer for the EDG sequencer timer is applicable to the mitigating systems cornerstone, in that the failure of timers could result in multiple loads sequencing onto the EDG at the same time, which could affect the reliability of the EDGs or the loads supplied by the EDGs. This finding was evaluated using Phase 1 of the NRC SDP, and was screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the out-of-tolerance condition for the D RHR pump timer was not of significant magnitude to preclude the system from meeting its safety function.
10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, (Corrective Action) requires, in part, that measures be established to ensure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, FitzPatrick personnel failed to properly evaluate the condition for operability, which caused a failure to promptly test the RHR relays, which resulted in a failure to promptly identify a condition adverse to quality (the D RHR pump Agastat timer exceeding the TSSR value). However, because of the very low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into the FitzPatrick corrective action program (CR-JAF-2002-3077, -3211, and -3462), it is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 50-333/2002-06-02)c.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
- (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with the selected CRs to determine whether the actions had addressed the identified causes of the problems.
The team also reviewed the licensees timeliness for implementing the corrective actions, and their effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The team also reviewed the non-cited violations issued since the last inspection of the FitzPatrick corrective action program to determine if issues placed in their program had been properly evaluated and corrected.
- (2) Findings Overall, the inspectors determined that the corrective actions were effective for the identified condition; and as applicable, to prevent recurrence of the problem, or similar problems. The team noted that the FitzPatrick corrective action program requires effectiveness reviews for significant conditions, and includes the effectiveness review as the final corrective action on those CRs.
d. Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment
- (1) Inspection Scope During the inspection, the team interviewed plant staff to determine if conditions existed at the site which would result in personnel being hesitant to raise safety concerns to FitzPatrick management and/or the NRC.
- (2) Findings No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
a.
Exit Meeting Summary
On September 9, 2002, the team presented the inspection results, via telephone, to Mr. T. Sullivan, and members of his staff. No proprietary material examined during the inspection was retained by the inspectors.
Partial List of Personnel Contacted Items Opened & Closed List of Documents Reviewed List of Acronyms
1 of 5 ATTACHMENT A.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Entergy:
S. Anderson Supervisor, Balance of Plant System Engineering V. Bhardwaj Manager, Engineering Programs & Component Engineering S. Bono Manager, System Engineering B. Brunham System Engineer J.
Haley Security Manager B. Horning Plant Program Supervisor A. Khanifan Engineering Design Manager O. Limpias Director, Site Engineering F. Lukaczyk Operations Support Supervisor - CA Assessor W. Maguire Maintenance Manager A. Mitchell Design Engineering Supervisor L. Normandeau Maintenance Rule Coordinator B. OGrady General Manager, Plant Operations J.
Pechacek Fire Protection & Safety Coordinator R. Pike Senior Reactor Operator, Fix-It-Now (FIN) Team R. Plasse Regulatory Compliance Manager (acting)
K. Pushee Radiation Protection Manager R. Rottenberk Supervisor, Mechanical, FIN Team D. Ruddy Manager, CA&A P. Russell Operations Manager T. Sullivan Vice President, Operations D. Torbitt Assistant Operations Manager D. Vandermark Supervisor, Engineering D. Wallace Quality Assurance Manager A. Zaremba Director, Safety Assessment Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
D. Dempsey Resident Inspector D. Lew Branch Chief, Performance Evaluation Branch, Region I R. Rasmussen Senior Resident Inspector B.
ITEMS OPENED & CLOSED 50-333/2002-06-01 NCV Failure to identify that the B ESW pump was inoperable after results of a TS required surveillance test were less than the value in TSSR 3.11.D (Section 4OA2.b(2)(a))
50-333/2002-06-02 NCV Inadequate operability evaluation for suspect Agastat timers resulted in failure to promptly identify failed timer for the D RHR pump (Section 4OA2.b(2)(b))
(cont.)
2 of 5 C.
LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures:
Plant Operating Review Committee, Revision 14
Procedure Use and Adherence, Revision 14
Operability & Reportability Determinations, Revision 9
Temporary Alterations, Revision 0
ENN-LI-102, Supp
Corrective Action Process Desk Guide, Revision 2
Corrective Action Process, Revision 2
Assessment Process, Revision 2
Emergency Service Water, Revision 30
QAP-16.1 (J)
Processing Quality Assurance Condition Reports, Corrective
Actions, and Action Items, Revision 8
QAP-18.1 (J)
Quality Assurance Audit Program, Revision 9
QAP-18.2 (J)
Quality Assurance Surveillance Program, Revision 3
Core Spray Initiation Logic System Functional Test, Revision 31
Testing of the Emergency Service Water System (IST)*,
Revision 24
Non-Cited Violations:
NCV 2000-11-02
Failure to Identify Conditions Adverse to Quality
NCV 2000-11-03
Failure to Evaluate Conditions Adverse to Quality for Operability
NCV 2000-11-04
Failure to Take Immediate Corrective Actions and/or Actions to
Prevent Recurrence
NCV 2001-05-01
Inadequate Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurring LLRT Failures
of MSIVs
NCV 2001-07-01
Failure to Properly Implement Procedures for Personnel Entry into
NCV 2001-09-01
Failure to Perform Extent of Condition Review for Deficient Cross-
tie Hoses
NCV 2001-09-02
Inadequate Post-maintenance Tests
NCV 2001-09-03
Failure to Determine Reference Values Following Pump
Replacement
NCV 2001-09-04
Failure to Hydrostatically Test Self-contained Breathing Apparatus
Air Cylinders
NCV 2001-09-05
APRM/RBM Technical Specifications Not Followed
NCV 2001-10-01
Safety Relief Valve Setpoint Drift, Included LER 50-333/01-005-00
NCV 2001-13-01
Failure to Adequately Review a Design Change Implemented by a
NCV 2002-03-01
Inadequate Preventive Maintenance of the Startup Feedwater
Control Valve
NCV 2002-03-02
Inadequate Corrective Action for Safety-Related Temperature
Control Valves
(cont.)
of 5
Quality Assurance Audits:
A01-02J
Industry Operating Experience Review Program Audit
A01-03J
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual and Radiological Effluent Technical
Specifications
A01-05J
Special Processes
A01-06J
Fitness for Duty, Access Authorization, and Personnel Access Data System
A01-07J
Entergy Nuclear QA Activities at the J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
A01-08J
JAF Physical Security Program
A01-12J
Technical Specifications, Limiting Conditions of Operations, Surveillance
Requirements, Administrative Controls, and Facility Operating License
A01-14J
Emergency Preparedness Program Audit
A01-15J
Results of Actions to Correct Deficiencies
A01-16J
Results of Actions to Correct Deficiencies
A02-01J
Training and Qualification of the Facility Staff
A02-03J
Design Control
A02-04J
Audit of Process Control Program, Radiological Effluent Technical
Specifications, and Regulatory Guide 121
Self-Assessments:
---
Quarterly Integrated Self-Assessment & Trend Reports:
4th Quarter 2001, 1st Quarter 2002, 2nd Quarter 2002
[[::JAF-02-3095|JAF-02-3095]]
Engineering Confirmation of Operability
JCA&A-02-004
Fourth Quarter 2001 Operating Experience Report
JCA&A-02-010
First Quarter 2002
Maintenance Rule Improvement Action Plan
Recirculation Flow Control System Maintenance Rule Action Plan
First Quarter 2002 Roll Up Assessment
Focused Self Assessment Report 0P.2, Conduct of Operations, Shift
Turnover
Corrective Action & Assessments Fourth Quarter 2001
Focused Self Assessment of DER Closeout Phase
JRP-02-057
First Quarter 2002 Radiation Protection Program Roll-Up
JRP-02-102
Second Quarter 2002 Radiation Protection Program Roll-Up
Emergency Service Water Maintenance Rule Action Plan
AOV Program Action Plan
System 31/35 AOVs Maintenance Rule Action Plan
Operability Reviews:
JENG-REO-1999-1666
Penetration Seals for High Energy Line Break
JENG-REO-2001-0047
Operability for RCIC EGM Control Box Capacitor
JENG-REO-2001-0050
B ESW Loop Flow Less than Required During ST-8Q
JENG-REO-2002-1606
RHRSW Keep Full Supply Check Valve Failed PWT
(cont.)
of 5
Condition Reports: (* Denotes CR generated as a result of this inspection)
1997-0284
1999-1376
1999-1377
2000-1930
2000-3195
2000-3222
2000-4862
2000-5158
2001-0470
2001-0817
2001-1255
2001-1586
2001-2002
2001-2070
2001-2150
2001-2152
2001-2153
2001-2166
2001-2167
2001-2174
2001-2223
2001-2319
2001-2331
2001-2370
2001-2381
2001-2396
2001-2661
2001-2777
2001-2779
2001-2985
2001-2986
2001-2998
2001-3026
2001-3051
2001-3053
2001-3058
2001-3062
2001-3127
2001-3131
2001-3132
2001-3156
2001-3202
2001-3210
2001-3218
2001-3224
2001-3247
2001-3259
2001-3302
2001-3319
2001-3446
2001-3467
2001-3489
2001-3521
2001-3600
2001-3644
2001-3650
2001-3655
2001-3684
2001-3761
2001-3772
2001-3793
2001-3806
2001-3816
2001-3839
2001-3848
2001-3858
2001-3882
2001-3919
2001-3927
2001-3934
2001-3999
2001-4006
2001-4008
2001-4009
2001-4010
2001-4011
2001-4012
2001-4014
2001-4015
2001-4016
2001-4017
2001-4018
2001-4019
2001-4020
2001-4021
2001-4022
2001-4026
2001-4027
2001-4028
2001-4035
2001-4036
2001-4056
2001-4058
2001-4078
2001-4200
2001-4203
2001-4223
2001-4254
2001-4293
2001-4294
2001-4295
2001-4296
2001-4316
2001-4408
2001-4486
2001-4495
2001-4570
2001-4596
2001-4614
2001-4683
2001-4688
2001-4710
2001-4722
2001-4822
2001-4828
2001-4906
2001-4976
2001-5003
2001-5027
2002-0030
2002-0049
2002-0083
2002-0112
2002-0132
2002-0174
2002-0189
2002-0205
2002-0210
2002-0239
2002-0241
2002-0251
2002-0253
2002-0299
2002-0331
2002-0342
2002-0398
2002-0484
2002-0492
2002-0512
2002-0551
2002-0615
2002-0630
2002-0645
2002-0717
2002-0724
2002-0729
2002-0866
2002-0953
2002-0957
2002-1014
2002-1030
2002-1031
2002-1033
2002-1114
2002-1122
2002-1146
2002-1175
2002-1187
2002-1190
2002-1203
2002-1279
2002-1326
2002-1374
2002-1471
2002-1520
2002-1558
2002-1602
2002-1606
2002-1628
2002-1650
2002-1685
2002-1687
2002-1763
2002-1765
2002-1812
2002-1858
2002-1860
2002-1866
2002-1873
2002-1880
2002-1892
2002-1896
2002-1909
2002-1934
2002-1943
2002-1958
2002-1979
2002-2030
2002-2043
2002-2049
2002-2076
2002-2713
2002-2721
2002-2998
2002-3014
2002-3044
2002-3057
2002-3060*
2002-3077*
2002-3095*
2002-3211*
2002-3279*
2002-3282*
2002-3462*
Problem Identification Reports:
PID-96347
PID-96705
PID-96708
PID-96844
PID-96947
PID-96976
PID-96977
PID-96999
PID-97028
PID-97029
PID-97030
PID-97061
PID-97097
PID-97141
PID-97180
PID-97702
PID-98527
PID-98814
PID-99595
PID-99684
PID-99715
PID-99718
PID-99753
PID-99782
PID-99784
Work Requests:
WR-1997-00814-00
WR-2000-06083-02
WR-2000-07106-00
WR-2001-10055-00
WR-2001-14160-00
WR-2002-02868-00
(cont.)
of 5
Miscellaneous Documents:
Design Basis Document - 14, Core Spray System, Revision 5
PORC Meeting Minutes, for meetings 2002-001, 2002-002, 2002-003, 2002-004,
2002-005, 2002-006, 2002-007, 2002-008, 2002-009, 2002-010, 2002-011,
2002-012, 2002-013, 2002-014, 2002-015, 2002-016
SRC Meeting Minutes, for meetings 2002-01, 2002-02
System Health Reports for Essential Service Water, Core Spray, Neutron Monitoring
Instrumentation, Residual Heat Removal, and RHR Service Water
Technical Specification Interpretation (TSI-39), Core Spray & Residual Heat Removal
Keep Full Level Switch Surveillance Requirements, Revision 0
TM-2002-022, Temporary Modification to Reroute Vacuum Priming Water Overflow
D.
ABBREVIATIONS
Corrective Action and Assessment
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CR
Condition Report
DER
Deviation/Event Report (predecessor to the CR system)
Emergency Service Water
gpm
gallon per minute
JAF
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Non-Cited Violation
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Paperless Condition Report System
Problem Identification and Resolution
Problem Identification Report
Plant Operations Review Committee
Quality Assurance
Root Cause Analysis
Reasonable Expectation of Operability
Significance Determination Process
Station Review Committee
Surveillance Test
TM
TS
Technical Specification
TSSR
Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement
Work Request