IR 05000329/1980015
| ML19320C728 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1980 |
| From: | Erb C, Naidu K, Vandel T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19320C724 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-329-80-15, 50-330-80-16, NUDOCS 8007170635 | |
| Download: ML19320C728 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Reports No. 50-329/80-15; 50-330/80-16 Docket Nos. 50-329; 50-330 Licenses No. CPPR-81; CPPR-82 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Midland, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Midland site, Midland, MI Inspection Conducted: Juny 2-5, 1980
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Inspectors:
T. E. Vandel
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E C. M. Erb 6 24 84
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K. R. Na
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'R. N. Sutphink (, - 2 G - 8'O Other Accompanying Personnel:
A. Ranta-Maunus, Institute of Radiation Protection Helsinki, Finland Approved By: R.dIKnop, Chief,
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Projects Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on June 2-5, 1980 (Reports No. 50-329/80-15; 50-330/80-16)
Areas Inspected: Review records and test results of steam generator anchor bolts and pipe restraint bolts; records review of containment pressurization system tank and RPV internals; electrical components review; followup of unresolved and noncompliance items; review of licensee activity regarding I&E Bulletins and Circulars. The inspection involved a total of 92 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or de.iations were identified.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees T. Cooke, Construction Superintendent D. R. Keating, QA Group Supervisor
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B. Miller, Site Manager B. H. Peck, Construction Supervisor
- M. J. Schaeffer, QA Group Supervisor
- T. Spelman, Field Engineer
- R. G. Wollney, QA Administration Section Head D. Martin, QA Engineer G. Maden, Project Testing G. Somsel, Technical Supervisor Project Testing Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- A. J. Boos, Project Field Engineer
- P. Corcoran, Resident Engineer Assistant Project Engineer
- W. S. Driesbach, Project QA Engineer
- R. E. Davis, QA Engineer
- E. Smith, Lead QA Engineer P. Goquen, Field Engineer M. A. Dietrich, QA Engineer Y. D. Chow, Project Engineering Babcock and Wilcox Construction Company (B&W)
- R. W. Shope, Site QC Supervisor U.S.N.R.C. - RIII
- R. Cook, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
Other personnel of the licensee and contractors..ere contacted during the inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (329/79-12-03; 330/79-12-03):
Inadequate control of purchased material. The following three examples were furnished Shop inspections failed to verify and detect that wall thicknesses were a.
seasured and recorded in the documentation packages as required by the-2-e
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specifications for valves supplied by Borg Warner. As a result of this
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finding, valves for wall thickness measurements were supplied by Borg Warner and added to the documentation packages.
An audit performed, disclosed that only 123 of the 223 packages contained wall thickness measurements for Borg Warner supplied valves. The audit extended to four other vendors did not disclose this discrepancy.
b.
Seismic analysis was performed by assuming yoke material of a valve to be ASME SA105, whereas yoke was ASTM A216 casting. A revised seismic design report was submitted for ASTM A216 Gr WCB. Ten other vendor documentation packages were audited and one instance was identified where yoke clamp material SA 515 was assumed, but the drawing specified SA 36. The licensee took suitable action to correct the analysis.
c.
Receipt Inspection did not verify the receipt of nine studs, 18 bolts, and flexitallic gaskets which should have been received with the valves.
The licensee subsequently determined that the flexitallic gaskets and one of the four valve gag plugs were missing. The licensee stated that
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the B&W construction has established a mechanism to detect missing accessories.
(Closed) Noncompliance (329/79-18-02; 330/79-18-02):
Inadequate measures were established to preclude damage to installed equipment during welding operations in the near vicinity. The implementation of the corrective action outlined in the licensee's letter dated October 12, 1979 was examined and determined to be adequate. Records indicate that various electrical superintendents and subcontractors were informed of the requirements of Bechtel Field Instruction Procedures FPS-1.300 and FPG-7.000, which requires installed equipment to be protected from welding and other activities.
(Closed) Noncompliance (329/79-20-01; 330/79-20-01): Discrepancies were identified in the welding inspection records relative to the anchoring of safety related 4.16KV switchgear. The licensee's reply dated November 6, 1979 was evaluated and additional information was requested. Nonconformance Report M-01-4-9-089 was generated on August 23, 1979 reflecting the discrep-ancies in the documentation of the inspection records. The documentation review concluded that circumferential fillet welds were erroneously referred to as " plug welds". The relevant records were corrected in accordance with Bechtel QC Procedure SF/ PSP G-71.
All Quality Control Engineers including the individual involved received training in the SF/ PSP G-71 procedural requirements. Bechtel Interoffice memorandums dated July 15 and 16, 1979 document that the lead QC Document Coordinator had one hour training sessions on Procedure PSP G-7.1 Revision 5.
The NRC inspector, accompanied by licensee representatives, verified that cubicles'11, 12 and 03 in 4.16KV switchgear were anchored to embedded steel at eight places.
(Closed) Unresolved (329/78-04-01; 330/78-04-01):
It was previously reported that grounding of raceways was not on the 'Q' list. This matter was referred to HQ; HQ decided that grounding is not safety related.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (329/79-02-01; 330/79-02-01):
It was previously
reported that the inadequacies in the qualification testing of safety related equipment was documented in NCRs 1746 through 1796. This item is being reviewed separately under a 50.55(e) item and this unresolved item is considered closed.
(Open) Unresolved (329/79-12-04; 330/79-12-04):
Inadequate documentation of environmental qualifications of nonmetallic valve parts. Bechtel forwarded the licensee letters from John Crane Company, supplier of JC 187-I packing and Union Carbide supplier of graphoil stating the characteristics of the products. The licensee recognizes that these letters are not " Certificates of Conformances" and will pursue the matter further.
(Closed) Unresolved (329/79-12-10; 330/79-12-10): Licensee's audit findings on Zack were not corrected in a timely manner. Bechtel performed an audit during March 19-26, 1979. Several findings were made and Bechtel agreed to accept partial responses to the findings. Four outstanding items were closed on January 17, 1980 after Bechtel Quality Assurance verified the corrective action taken by Zack and determined it to be satisfactory. The inspector has no further questions at this time.
(Open) Unresolved (329/79-25-01; 330/79-25-01):
It was previously reported that the installation of cables identified as E0V040A, OAB6501L, DEV040B, and OBB601L did not meet the separation criteria specified in Bechtel drawing E7 (Q). NCR 2765 - SD293 was generated to document this condition. Design Change Notice No. 9 was written against drawing E-18 (Q), designating the wire way in which each channel is to be run.
Interlocks will be provided to prevent energizing motors from channels A and B simultaneously. Corrective action has not been implemented and this condition continues to exist in the Service Water Structure. This item will be closed after the cables are rerouted and after NCR 2765 is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (329/80-01-06; 330/80-01-05):
It was previously reported that paragraph 5.3.4 of Specification J-218 (Q) Revision 7 provided a formula without considering displacement
,A specification change was issued and the equation now reads L =
.c dkwhere L is the minimum required offset in feet anddi is the total disp acment in inches.
(Open) Unresolved Item (329/80-01-03; 330/80-01-04):
It was previously reported that there was no specific requirement to verify conformance with separation criteria because it was assumed that the drawings reflected the separation criteria. During the current inspection, the NRC inspector pointed out to the licensee the procedure and checklist (used to verify the installation of safety related tubing which was revised in 1977) continues to quote the wrong section of the specification J-218 (Q) and remained undetected. Pending the development of an acceptable checklist, this item remains open.
(Closed) Noncompliance (79-14-01): Failure to follow procedure in using welding purge dams. The inspector verified that corrective action was I-4-
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s initiated by issuance of three Quality Action Requests for concerns regarding:
(1) failure to issue an NCR, (2) adequate training of weldors regarding purge a
dass, and (3) 50.55(e) reportability. Resolution of all concerns, by the
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licensee, had been achieved and was considered acceptable by the inspector.
Actions taken included revision to Procedures PSP-G-6.1 and PSP-G-3.2 (Revision 4) as well as revisions to the governing Quality Control Inspection checklist, training sessions for weldors and for QC Inspectors, and a determination made that the ites was not reportable.
(Open) Noncompliance (78-17-01):
Inadequate weld repair of personnel airlocks for both units. This item ia a part of an open licensee deficiency report (50.55(e) report) with further information reported under that section of this report.
Other Inspection Areas Licensee Deficiency Reports Review (50.55(e) Items)
Reactor Pressure Vessel Anchor Bolt Problem (Unit 1)
At the time of this inspection, 41 bolts have been detensioned to the 55,000 psi level. No additional broken bolts above the three presently found were noted.
Detensioning of the Unit 2 bolts will not begin for three or four months.
Personnel Airlocks Weld Cracking Note this is also a noncompliance item in Report No. 50-329/78-17, 50-330/78-17.
A meeting was held at the site to discuss the acceptance of repair welding "as is" as well as the review of the stress analysis for the airlocks as repaired by Bechtel. The inspectors expressed concern regard;ag:
(1) repair welds where some lock stiffeners had been repaired and welded including wrap around welds around the edge of the stiffener in some instances, only partial wrap around (one bead) in other instances, and no wrap around welding in other instances; i
and (2) the original seismic stress analysis had not been reviewed sufficiently to accomodate the changed configuration of certain welds. The licensee and l
Bechtel representatives will contact the vendor and determine further action to be taken. This item will be reviewed further in the future.
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Air Filtering Units
The licensee, in a letter dated March 9,1979, reported that Mine Safety Appliances, vendor of the air filtering units informed the licensee that AWG Size 12 wire was used instead of sizes 10 and 8 wires. The filtering units OVM78A and B OVM94A and B are installed at elevations 659' and 685' respectively.
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NCR 1733 documents this condition. Management Corrective Action Request (MCAR)
No. 27 was issued on December 12, 1980.
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The NRC inspector observed that AWG Size 10 wire was substituted in filter units OVM78A and B are that AWG Size 8 wire was substituted in filter unit OVM94B. The substitution in filter unit OVM94A could not be verified because of construction obstruction.
I-E Bulletins and Circulars Review Review of Action Taken on IE Bulletins (Closed) 78-02 Terminal block qualification. The licensee in a letter Serial Number 2877, dated February 28, 1978 stated that no unqualified unprotected terminal block was used inside the containment. Management Corrective Action Report 25 was written on environmental qualifications to preclude the use of unqualified electrical equipment inside the containment.
(Closed) 78-04 Environmental Qualification of certain stem mounted limit switches inside reactor containment. The licensee in a letter, Serial No. 5169, dated Apr;l 19, 1978 states that NAMCO D2400X or EA-170-320 switches have not been used.
(Closed) 78-06 Defective Cutler Hammer relays type "M" with DC coils. The licensee in letter, Serial No. 5652, dated July 27, 1978 states that this type of relays were not used.
(0 pen) 79-01 Environmental qualification of Class IE equipment. The licensee response to this item remains open.
(0 pen) 77-01 Drift in Pneumatic Set Point in ITE Imperial relays catalog J20T3/J13P20 or J20T3/J13P30. The licensee is awaiting review by Babcock and Wilcox whether any of these relays are involved in their scope of supply.
(0 pen) 77-05 and 77-05A Electrical connector assemblies. The environmental qualifications testing on the electrical pin and socket type connectors are complete and the licensee is awaiting an amendment to the FSAR which will include this information.
(Closed) 77-07 Containment Electrical Penetrations Assemblies. The licensee committed to the following:
1.
To maintain Nitrogen pressure on the penetration assemblies prior to, during shipment, storage and installation.
2.
To conduct periodic inspections during operations.
The inspector selectively verified that electrical penetrations in Units 1 and 2 were under Nitrogen pressure above 40 psi. Though two penetrations 2Z153 and 22156 failed leak rate test, they were observed to be under pressure.
See paragraph 1 for details. Review of surveillance records indicate that positive Nitrogen pressure was maintained. Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch (RONS) is being notified to verify that periodic inspections of the penetrations will be made during operation.
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(Closed) 78-01 Flammable contact area retainers in GE type CR120A relays. The licensee, in their response dated March 17, 1978 stated that GE type CR120A relays were not used.
(Closed) 79-27 Loss of nonclass IE instrumentation and control power system bus. As requested in the IE:III cover letter dated November 30, 1979, the licensee will address this as part of the licensing process. This matter is being transferred to RONS Branch for followup.
(Closed) 79-25 Failures of Westinghoose relays type BFD. The licensee in a letter, Serial Number 8094, dated December 18, 1979 stated that this type of relays was not used.
(Closed) 79-28 Possible malfunction of NAMCO Model EA180 limit switches at elevated temperatures. Examine if the four digits fall between 02-79 and 08-79; if they do, repisce the top gasket of the switch. The licensee, in a letter, Serial Number 8255, dated January 24, 1980 states that this type of limit switches is not used.
(Closed) 80-06 Engineered Safety Features Reset Control. As stated in the IE:III cover letter dated March 13, 1980, the licensee is not required to respond.
Review of Action Taken on IE Circulars (Closed) 77-03 Fire inside a Motor Control Center. The licensee developed Procedure GPE-09 which in Item 10.15 requires the tester to follow ITE's recommendations for aligning the bus in Appendix C if any cells have been completely removed from the Motor Control Center (MCC), the manufacturer of the MCC's.
(0 pen) 78-18 Underwriter's Laboratories fire test. This circular is open.
(Open) 78-09 Arcing of General Electric Size 2 contactors. The licensee's action on this circular is incomplete.
(Open) 79-05 Moisture leakage in stranded wire conductors. The licensee's action on this circular is incomplete.
(0 pen) 80-01 Service advice for General Electric Induction Disc Relays type 1AC, IAV, ICR, or IJCV. Number should be less than 50 and first letter follwed by "IKL and M or AN, BN CN, DN, EN, DG, EG, FG, GG.
The licensee is awaiting
response from Bechtel, the AE on the exact number of relays involved.
Electrical Penetrations The licensee initiated Management Corrective Action No. 26 to identify that in some instances the lugs in Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA) supplied
by Amphenol Sams Division of Bunker Ramo have not been properly cr : ped. The
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supplier concluded that an inexperienced employee inadvertently used the in-correct portion of a crimping tool; the top die accepts 14AWG and 16AWG lugs while the bottom die accepts 10AWG and 12AWG. Documents indicate that during April 30, 1979 through May 3,1979, a Bunker-Ramo representative performed a 100% inspection of 74 of the 92 EPA's.
All defective connections were recrimped.
The NRC inspector selectively verified that the corrective action was completed in 22113 and 22115 at 635 elevation in Unit 2 containment.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected Details of functional or program areas inspected are discussed in Sections I and II of this report.
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C Section 1 Prepared by K. R. Naidu Reviewed by D. W. Hayes 1.
Review of Quality Records The inspector observed that penetrations identified as 2Z153 and a.
2Z156 were leaking. Review of the records indicates the following:
(1) On October 4, 1978, Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. 1576 identified that the leak rates of the penetrations were excessive.
(2) On November 3, 1978 Field Engineering recommended tests to determine the cause of leak.
(3) On October 13, 1979 (approximately one year later) Project Engineering concurred with the recommended field tests.
(4) On July 7, 179, a conditional release was granted to pull and terminate cable on outboard side of penetration based on the premise that corrections or removal could be made without causing damage or " contamination" to " associated plant equipment or structure". The licensee stated that the delay in the leak rate tests were because modules may have to be added. The inspector stated he had no further questions at this time.
b.
The inspector reviewed NCR-01-5-0-039 dated May 20, 1980 which identifies that Class IE electrical conduits identified as 2AJF010, 209,2AJB033,034 and a pullbox are located directly under the west stairwell in the auxiliary building at elevation 634'. Corrective action recommended was to either upgrade the stairway to meet seismic category I requirements or relocate the Class IE conduits and pull box.
The nonconforming condition was identified by the licensee's Quality Engineering Electrical Group Supervisor, based on information provided by the NRC from findings at another facility.
c.
The inspector reviewed Audit Report No. M01-55-0 which documents an audit performed during April 21 through May 2, 1980. The purpose of the audit was to evaluate the adequacy and implementation of Bechtel's quality-related programs. The audit identified 14 findings, i
9 unresolved items, and two observations. Corrective action taken to resolve the findings will be pursued during a subsequent inspection
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and is identified as an open item (329/80-15-01; 330/80-16-01).
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Section II Prepared by C. M. Erb Reviewed by D. H. Danielson 1.
Records on Trial Fit of Internal Core Support Assembly - Unit 1 Completed procedure No. 132 for the above operation was examined.
Supplementary procedures or specifications were also noted as follows:
9CP-101, Revision 1; 9CP-100, Revision 0; WIN-119-1, Revision 4; 9WG-106, Revision 2; 9QPP-108, Revision 4.
The various assembly operations were signed off by Quality Assurance and cleanliness precautions had been taken.
No items of noncomplience or deviations were identified.
2.
Records on In-Core Tubing and Supports and Setting Steam Generator - Unit 2 a.
The incore stub tubes extending below the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel are welded to the stainless tubing terminating in the in-core instrument removal tank.
Procedure 9-QQ-P-108 with supplements M-351 and M-352 had been followed. Records indicated that QC checks in identification and location had been performed. The welding procedure and welders were qualified to ASME Section IX and the nondestructive tests had been performed in accordance with code requirements.
The eight neutron flux monitor detector pipes which are mounted around, but outside the reactor vessel wall, are being installed.
Records show the following procedures and specifications were used when setting the steam generators:
9-QPP-108, Revision 8 9-QPP-104, Revision 2 WIN-101-1, Revision 1 Drawing C376, Revision 7 The elevation, benchwork, and grouting contact were inspected and signed off by QC inspectors. Sole plates were checked carefully and an NCR was issued against the "B" generator because of cracked grout. Records indicate a satisfactory repair was made.
b.
Independent hardness checks of installed steam generator bolts re-vealed that some bolts were above the specified hardness range. No l
NCR for the condition could be found. The licensee is evaluating l
this matter. This is at unresolved item.
(329/80-15-02; 330/80-16-02)
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Records on Setting Pressurizer The pressurizer was set and leveled to the following procedures and specifications:
C-378, Revisica 4, Drawing 150178E, Revision 8, Verticality Requirement
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9-QQ-P-104, Revision 2, Procedure 9-QQ-P-108, Revision 4, Procedure - Sole Plates WIN-101-1, Welding-and NDE No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Pressurized Water Storage Tanks - Unit 1 and Unit 2 There are two taa'as in parallel for each unit. These tanks furnish demineralized water to pressurize containment penetrations to 64 psi under certain conditions. QC records and the tanks were examined to ascertain whether they were code tanks. These tanks were manufactured by Richmond Engineering Company (RECO) and are made of Type 316 stainless steel.
The following information appears on the ASME plate:
Ident.
National Bd.
Dwg. No.
S/N Stamp IT-41A 76276 D-77-504 2414.1.0 N2 The certifications for materials, welding, NDT, and performance test meet the Code requirements. This tank was built to the requirements of ASME
Section III, 1974 Edition, Winter 1976 Addenda.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Pipe Restraint Bolts (50.55(e) Item >
d The licensee discovered low strength bolts in 2 lots of 1-1/8" and 1-1/4" diameter fasteners used for pipe restraints. Further investigation revealed 1-1/8" bolts marked SA-154H and 5795 were procured to A-540, B23, CL3 which should be AISI 4340 steel but proved to be AISI 1030.
The 1-1/4" bolts marked R-251 were procured to ASTM A-490 and while indicating proper chemistry were low in strength, which could mean lack of or improper heat treatment.
The inspector noted defective heads in two bolts in Unit 1 and two in Unit 2 as well as 2 cases of insufficient thread engagement of the nuts.
NCR-2988 did not cover defects other than the low strength problem.
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The inspector noted that since NPS and Southern Bolt furnished the low
strength items, a plan for checking acceptability of not only the bolts but also the washers and nuts should be initiated. This is an unresolved item. (329/80-15-03; 330/80-16-03)
Unresolved Items An unresolved item is a natter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an cceptable item, an item of noncompliance, a failure to meet a licensee commitment, or a deviation. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section I, paragraph 1.C and Section II, paragraphs 2.b and 5.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in the Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 5, 1980.
The inspectors summarized the scope an] findings of the inspection.
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