IR 05000321/1982018
| ML20027E673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, Vogtle, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1982 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027E634 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0660, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-660, RTR-NUREG-737 50-321-82-18, 50-366-82-18, 50-424-82-14, 50-425-82-14, IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-1B, IEB-79-27, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8211150596 | |
| Download: ML20027E673 (23) | |
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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE BOARD REPORT GEORGIA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NUMBERS 50-321 AND 50-366 V0GTLE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425
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JULY 1,1980 THROUGH JUNE 30,10.
INSPECTION REPORT NUMBERS 50-321/82-18; 50-366/82-18 50-424/82-14; 50-425/82-14
'B2111505% 821014
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I.
IN1HODUCTION A formal licensee performance assessment program has been implemented in accordance with the commitments of Task I.B.2 of NUREG-0660, Volume 1, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident". This program, the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is applicable to all power reactors with operating licenses or construction permits (herein after referred to as licensees). The SALP program is an integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations of licensee performance on an annual basis and evaluate performance based on these observations.
Positive and negative attributes of licensee performance are considered.
Emphasis is placed on understanding the reasons for a licensee's performance in important functional areas, and sharing this understanding with the licensee. The SALP process is oriented toward furthering NRC's under-standing of the manner in which:
(1) the licensee directs, guides, and provides resources for assuring plant safety; and (2) such resources are used and applied. The integrated SALP assessment is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide meaningful guidance to the licensee. The SALP program supplements the normal regulatory processes used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations.
II. CRITERIA Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas depending on whether the facility has been in the construction, preoperational, or operating phase during the SALP review period.
Functional areas encompass the spectrum of regulatory programs and represent significant nuclear safety and environmental activities. Certain functional areas may not be assessed because of little or no licensee activities in these areas, or lack of meaningful NRC observations.
One or more of the following evaluation criteria were used to assess each functional area:
Management involvement in assuring quality
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Approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint
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Responsiveness to NRC initiatives
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Enforcement history
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Reporting and analysis of reportable events
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Staffing (including management)
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Training effectiveness and qualification
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The SALP Board has categorized functional area performance at one of three performance levels. These levels are defined as follows:
Category 1: Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieve.
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Category 2: NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels.
Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 3:
Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained or not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
The functional area being evaluated may have some attributes that would place the evaluation in Category 1, and others that would place it in either Category 2 or 3.
The final rating for each functional area is a composite of the attributes tempered with the judgement of NRC management as to the significance of individual items.
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS A.
Overall Utility Evaluation The corporate organization is limited in size, but has good internal communication channels. The limited corporate staff size does result, at times, in low priority items being delayed. Although the staff size is small, high quality personnel have been trained.
B.
Overall Facility Evaluation - Hatch 1 and 2
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The licensee has demonstrated a good working knowledge of regulations and requirements. Technical competence is provided by the efficient use of consultants such as Southern Services and Bechtel. The licensee's corporate staff is limited in size but good communication exists with the Hatch facility. This has resulted in prompt attention to identified safety issues.
C.
Facility Performance - Hatch 1 and 2 Tabulation of ratings for each functional area; op1 rations (Units 1 and 2)
1.
Plant Operations - Category 2 2.
Refueling Operations - Category 2 3.
Maintenance - Category 2 4.
Surveillance and Inservice Testing - Category 2 5.
Personnel, Training and Plant Procedures - Category 2 6.
Fire Protection and Housekeeping - Category 2 7.
Design Changes and Modifications - Category 1 8.
Radiation Protection, Radioactive Waste Management, and Transportation - Category 3
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Environmental Protection - Category 2 10.
Emergency Preparedness - not observed 11. Security and Safeguards - Category 2 12. Audits, Review and Committee Activities - Category 2 13. Administrative, QA, and Records - Category 2 14. Corrective Action and Reporting - Category 2 D.
Overall Facility Evaluation - Vogtle 1 and 2 No exceptionally strong or weak areas were identified. Administrative, managerial, and material problems were minor and did not detract from the licensee's ability to meet nuclear safety requirements.
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E.
Facility Performance - Vogtle 1 and 2 Tabulation of recommended ratings for each functional area; construction (Units 1 and 2)
1.
Quality Assurance - not observed 2.
Site Preparation and Foundation - not observed 3.
Containment Structure - Category 2 4.
Safety-Related Structure!; - not observed 5.
Piping and Hangers - reactor coolant and others - Category 2 6.
Safety-Related Components - Category 2 7.
Electrical Systems - not observed 8.
Instrumentation aid Wire - not observed 9.
Fire Protection - not observed 10.
Preservice Inspection - not observed 11.
Corrective Actions and Reporting - Category 2 12.
Procurement - Category 2 13.
Design and Design Changes - not observed 14.
Training - not observed F.
SALP Board Members:
R. C. Lewis, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs (DPRP),
Region II, (Chairman)
P. J. Kellogg, Chief, Projects Branch 2, DPRP, Region II C. E. Murphy, Chief, Engineering Inspection Branch, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs Attendees:
R. D. Martin, Deputy Administrator, Region II R. F. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector, Hatch D. S. Price, Acting Chief, Operational Support Section, Division of Emergency Planning and Operational Support, Region II J. M. Grant, Licensing Project Manager, Division of Licensing, NRR M. B. Fairtile, Project Manager, Division of Licensing, NRR
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IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND ACTIVITIES SUMMARY A.
Hatch Units 1 and 2 1.
Plant Operations a.
Analysis Although there was one Severity Level III Violation during the SALP interval, overall plant operations have improved since the previous assessment.
Improvements have been achieved in control room formality through the use of uniforms and insignia worn by operators and support personnel. Measures taken to limit access to the control room have been effective. Operator performance has shown an upward trend during the year.
Procedures to limit excessive overtime for licensed operators have been implemented.
The most serious problem area in plant operations which became evident over the evaluation period was in the area of valve mispositioning. The licensee had four violations in this area. One violation involving the isolation of drywell pressure switches resulted in a $40,000 civil penalty proposed by the NRC. This violation was identified by the licensee.
Lack of an aggressive valve identification and labeling program and the inclusion of those valve numbers into procedures contributed to the event. The Civil Penalty was issued subsequent to the end of this evaluation period.
Valve-related problems dominated the enforcement spectrum over the past year. Until the licensee fully implements the valve control and identification program committed to the NRC, these problems can be expected to continue.
HPCI and RCIC reliability problems have decreased over the previous year as a result of the licensee's programs to upgrade these systems. Licensee efforts were in response to NRC concerns expressed during meetings held in Atlanta on June 27 and July 7, 1980 following a simultaneous failure of these systems on June 26, 1980.
Various operations, maintenance and training improvements were made and applied to both units. Licensee efforts need to continue in this area, however.
Three inspections were performed of construction activities related to the replacement of the backfill supporting safety-related piping at the intake structure.
In addition, two management meetings were held in the Region II office to discuss the backfill replacement work and work progress. Two violations were identified in the procedural are.
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Almost concurrently with the intake structure work, Hatch completed back to back refueling outages starting in November, 1980 with Unit 2 and ending in June, 1981 with Unit 1.
It was the first refueling for Unit 2.
As a result of increased levels of health-physics-related activities, several violations in these areas were noted and are discussed in section 8, below. As the SALP period ended, the licensee was making extensive preparations for the IBEW strike in July 1981. The strike included maintenance personnel and licensed operators and lasted three weeks.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
2.
Refueling Operations a.
Analysis During the SALP interval, Hatch completed back to back refueling outages starting in November, 1980 with Unit 2 and ending in June, 1981 with Unit 1.
The resident inspector observed various aspects of both refuelings during the nine month interval. The most siginficant weak area was compliance with health physics requirements by both the workers and health physics personnel.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
3.
Maintenance a.
Analysis Maintenance activities were assessed throughout the year by the resident and regional based inspectors.
Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were reviewed as a part of LER, Bullet;n, Circular, open item, and violation followup.
Significant event followup has included adequacy of maintenance efforts.
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Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
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4.
Surveillance and Inservice Testing a.
Analysis The licensee received six violations in these areas (four on Unit 2, two on Unit 1) during the SALP interval. Analysis of the items indicates that they were primarily administrative problems. The site continued to have problems with its records system. Records requested by the resident and visiting inspectors were routinely difficult to locate and retrieve.
A significant factor in the licensee's large number of LER's (discussed in section 14, below) was their reluctance to f
reduce the surveillance intervals of instruments or equipment which demonstrated a chronic history of setpoint drift or other problems. A firm commitment to this problem is in order if LER numbers are to be actually reduced.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
5.
Personnel, Training and Plant Procedures (
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Analysis During the SALP interval, the licensee began construction on a new training center which will contain a simulator of the Hatch BWR-4 Control Room. The center is expected to be in use by late 1982. This commitment towards the enhancement of plant specific training ability is expected to assure better qualified licensed operators in the future.
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Operator performance has continued to improve during the evaluation period, however stagnation of the nuclear
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i industry, increasing regulatory requirements, and stressful working conditions contribute to dampen job enthusiasm.
The rate of failure of operator license applicants has, in the past, been above average. However, all operator license applicants passed the most recent test in March, 1981.
The replacement and requalification training program for
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licensed operators appears to lack firm administrative con-trol. As a result of inspections of training practices over the SALP period it is evident that the licensee has no formal j
system for removing or reinstating personnel from/to licensed duties because of unsatisfactory training performance.
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Other similar problems are discussed in the appropriate inspection report.
Plant procedure control has been adequate. The licensee completely reprints and issues procedures even for minor j
changes; the reader cannot tell what was changed by the new revision. A system where only the affected pages are revised with the change identified, would be more appropriate and efficient.
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The Safety Committee reviews all procedural changes whether safety-related or not. This practice greatly overburdens this committee, diluting the attention they pay to safety significant items. The licensee needs to exclude non-safety matters from the Safety Review Committee's duties.
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Conclusion - Category 2
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Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
6.
Fire Protection and Housekeeping a.
Analysis One inspection was conducted in this area during the inspection period. The licensee had identified that his fire protection administrative procedures contained several discrepancies from the NRC guidelines. _This had resulted in 14 deviations during a January,1979 NRC inspection of the area. The inspection conducted during this review period was performed to review the licensee's corrective action on the 14 deviation items identified.
It was found that corrective action had been taken on 9 of these items but 5 deviations remained outstanding. These items involved failures to meet
commitments to the NRC in the fire protection modifications required following the 1975 Browns Ferry fire.
During this inspection, the following violations were identified:
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(1) Infraction for the failure to conduct the annual fire protection and loss prevention inspection and audit required by the Technical Specifications, i
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Infraction for the failure to provide a fire watch or equivalent monitoring for nonfunctional fire barrier penetrations as required by the Technical Specifications.
The maintenance and tests of the fire protection systems and
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the fire brigade organization and training were satisfactory.
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Plant housekeeping is adequate. Dirt, debris, and materials resulting from maintenance activities need to be cleaned up in a more expeditious manner.
The violations identified were not indicative of a programmatic breakdown in the area.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
7.
Design Changes and Modifications a.
Analysis The licensee has continued its Mark I torus modifications on both units as part of the Mark I containment program and expects to meet its commitment dates.
The licensee has conducted a continuing identification and correction sequence on IEB 79-14 items as its architect-engineer (A/E), Bechtel, conducts its reviews.
An extensive control room design change has been in progress throughout the year.
Improvements in appearance, mimic busing and sound dampning are expected when it is completed.
The plant has implemented various TMI action plan requirements during the period. Requirements were completed j
in accordance with NUREG 0737 schedules.
In general, the licensee is making progress on long term j
plant modifications, such as the Mark I torus program, the j
control rod drive scram discharge program and the fire j
protection program.
The license is usual'.y quick to implement required design changes when problems in installed equipment arise. This was evident in seismic and snubber related problems during this SALP interval.
b.
Conclusion - Category 1 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
8.
Radiation Protection, Radioactive Waste Management, and Transportation
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Two inspections were performed in these areas during the evaluation period resulting in four violations. These violations were:
(1) Two Severity Level III violations and a $15,000 civil penalty for exceeding the unrestricted area radiation limits of 10 CFR 20.105 in a waste oil storage area and having an inadequate procedure for sampling waste oil drums for radioactivity prior to release to the unrestricted area. The licensee received a 25%
reduction of the Civil Penalty (the first utility to receive this) for especially prompt and extensive corrective action.
(2) Severity Level V violation for failure to post radiation
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areas, as required by 10 CFR 20.203(B), around the south
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scram discharge header in Unit 2 and near an open manhole to the sump in the Unit 1 radwaste b"ilding.
(3) Severity Level V violation for failure to follow plant procedures in:
setting the alarm set point for personnel contamination frisker; preparing radiation work permits; not performing personnel contamination surveys before leaving the radiation control area; and improperly posting contamination areas.
The Health Physics Appraisal Team inspected the facility immediately prior to the evaluation period and identified I
weaknesses in the plant's contamination control program, staffir.g within the radiation protection organization and formal on-the-job training and qualification program for health physics technicians. A follow-up inspection found that the licensee had made significant improvement in the areas identified as weaknesses and had adopted a number of recommendations of the HP appraisal team which have improved the plant's radiation protection program.
Further improvements in the plant's contamination control program are still needed.
b.
Conclusion - Category 3 l
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Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
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Environmental Protection a.
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One confirmatory measurements inspection identified two Severity Level V violations associated with the quality control program for radiochemical analyses of effluents. The licensee's program in radiochemistry is adequate; however, the plant staff lacks expertise in the radioanalytical area as evidenced by reliance on vendors to develop and maintain the measurements program. Additional training of first line supervision in the radiological measurement area is advisable.
Actual performance in this area did not appear to be adversely affected by training needs, b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
10.
Emergency Preparedness No inspections were performed during this review period. The Emergency Warning System (sirens) was operational by the required date of July 1, 1981.
11. Security and Safeguards a.
Analysis Five inspections were conducted during the evaluation period.
Security performance was additionally observed by the resident inspector during plant tours. During this period, two Severity Level V violations were identified.
The licensee security staff was responsive to the security violations and provided adequate corrective action.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
12. Audits, Review and Committee Activities a.
Analysis Six inspections were performed during the evaluation period.
Violations and weaknesses identified imply that management weaknesses exist in this area. These violations were:
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(1)
Infraction concerning the QA organization being deficient in its failure to obtain prompt corrective action. The NRC had issued five previous violations in this area and at the time of this appraisal report a total of 56 items requiring corrective action were still either greater than six months overdue (44) or beyond the completion date (12).
(2)
Infraction for the failure to conduct reaudits/ follow-up action. Three areas that should have been reaudited were not and their status was not known.
(3)
Infraction for the failure to respond to audit finding reports. A total of 12 audit findings had not only missed the thirty-day required response, but were overdue an average of approximately seventy days.
(4) Deficiency for the failure to review plant QA procedures. Forty-five QA procedures had not been reviewed during the required two year time frame.
Some procedures had gone more than five years between reviews.
Several additional items were identified which were not violations but indicated a lack of management attention in this area. The items involved a lack of independence in Safety Review Board audits of operational QA activities, closing QA items without review of objective evidence, and changes to the onsite and offsite organizctions made without approved Technical Specification changes.
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The onsite QA organization's performance in fulfilling their responsibilities is considered good.
It is the inability of management to respond appropriately in a timely manner to QA concerns which resulted in many of the problems discussed in this report.
i All of these problems were identified in a QA team inspection conducted in July, 1980. Due to the nature and number of problems, a management meeting was conducted on July 29, 1980, by the Region II office with senior Georgia Power Company officials to discuss the significcace of these findings. The licensee responded with corrective actions and commitments which adddressed each of these concerns.
Significant improvement in the Hatch operational QA program during the evaluation period was verified by a followup QA team inspection conducted in June, 1981 in which no violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 based upon the demonstrated performance improvement.
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Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
13. Administrative, QA and Records a.
Analysis Six inspections were performed in these areas during the evaluation period. Violations and weakneses identified imply that management weakness exists in these areas. These violations were:
(1)
Infraction concerning three examples involving failure to implement QA inspection requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion X.
(2)
Infraction concerning two examples involving failure to follow plant QC and maintenance procedures required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.
(3)
Infraction for the failure to include qualitative /
quantitative acceptance criteria for determining when an inspection activity must be accomplished.
(4) Deficiency for the failure to establish record location requirements and failure to maintain shipping damage
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inspections records.
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Several items were identified which, though not violations, tended to indicate managemert inattention to QA requirements:
Poor QA involvement in the review and approval of plant procedures; no system for tracking corporate QA audit findings; no criteria for periodic review of QA open items; lack of shelf life program; inadequate record storage and handling during changeover to naw document control system; and QA staff not given full access to certain meetings and information needed for planning purposes.
All of these problems were identified in a QA team inspection conducted in July, 1980.
Due to the nature and number of problems, a management meeting was conducted on July 29, 1980, by the Region II office with senior Georgia Power Company officials to discuss the significance of these findings. The licensee responded with corrective actions and commitments which addressed each of these concerns.
Significant improvement in the Hatch operational QA program during the evaluation period were verified by a followup QA team inspection condcuted in June, 1981 in which no
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violations or deviations were identified.
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Conclusion - Category 2 based upon the performance improvement.
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Board Coments The board concurs with the rating.
14. Corrective Actions and Reporting a.
Analysis The licensee has had a relatively good record in corrective actions in response to NRC concerns and reporting. The plant response to NRC items has been good although the plant response to Quality Assurance items tends to be slow, in general, with instances of no significant response unless prodded.
Recent improvements have been made, however.
The Hatch facility continues to submit an unusually large number of Licensee Event Reports (LER's). This is apparently because a large number of occurrences is accepted by management. No effort has been made to analyze these occurrences systematically and take management actions to reduce repetitive occurrences.
Hatch submitted 234 LER's in 1979, 276 in 1980, and 274 in 1981. Continued acquiescence by management towards this high incidence of reportable events will assure their continuance.
Plant management has indicated to the resident inspector that such a program will be implemented.
Licensee responses and license amendment change requests have exhibited an upward trend in quality and timeliness. The quality level is sufficient to evaluate the safety or environmental issue being dealt with.
Past problems with the licensee could be attributed to their i
staff being too limited in size to deal effectively with the many concurrent post-TMI actions. Presently, the licensee has these reviews under control and is better able to cope with day-to-day licensing problems.
On one complex licensing review, IE Bulletin 79-27, Loss of Instrumentation and Control Power Bus During Operation, the licensee was among the top 25% of respondants by having provided reasonable assurance that the basic concerns of the
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Bulletin were satisfied. The licensee is meeting the Task Action Plan (NUREG-0737) submittal and implementation dates.
i The licensee tends, in the event of a plant problem which may require expedited Technical Specification relief, to wait
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until the last moment before applying to the NRC for the change. The NRC has informed the licensee of the difficulties such an approach causes the NRC staff.
Otherwise, licensee performance is on an upward trend.
Also during this evaluation period, the licensee's responses to several IEB's including 79-01B and 80-11 were reviewed.
The reviews involved an examination of installed equipment and data to verify the accuracy of the licensee's response.
No problems were identified in this review.
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Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Coments The board concurs with the rating.
15. Licensee Event Reports a.
Hatch Unit 1 - 114 Unit 2 - 130 b.
Unit 1 linked events involved the out of tolerance lifting of standby liquid control (SBLC) relief valves due to setpoint dri f t.
Unit 2 linked events included:
three events concerning the hydraulic control unit accumulator not fully discharging within the time requirements; two events involving failure to sample reactor coolant for conductivity within the required time period; three events involving the failure of vacuum breaker isolation valves to open due to a differential pressure switch failure; four events involving the drywell hydrogen-oxygen analyzer being inoperative due to instrument drift; and two events involving the inter-mediate range monitor being off-scale due to deformed pins.
A preview of the text of all events identified instances where the cause or effect of events appear to be similar.
16. Licensee Activities Refueling and maintenance outages were conducted on Unit 1 from February 28 through June 4,1981, and on Unit 2 from November 1, 1980 through February 19, 1981. Major modification work included the Mark I torus program, IEB 79-14 work, and an upgrade of the intake structure support and backfill.
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Inspection Activities The routine inspection program was performed during the inspection i
period. A QA team inspection was held July 7 through 24, 1980.
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Two special reactive inspection were held on December 10 and 11, 1980 and March 23 through 27, 1981, concerning a release of contaminated material to uncontrolled areas, and inoperability of safety-related pressure switches, respectively.
18.
Investigation and Allegations Review
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No major investigative activities occurred during the review period.
19.
Escalated Enforcement Actions a.
Civil Penalties April 7,1981 - civil penalty concerning high radiation levels in a waste oil storage area and improper sampling of waste oil drums.
July 28, 1981 - civil penalty concerning isolation of high drywell pressure switches during plant operation.
b.
Confirmation of Action July 3,1980 - Confirmation of Action letter involving concerns from the HP appraisal conducted June 16-27, 1980.
July 11, 1980 - Confirmation of Concurrence letter involving the failure of the Unit 1 HPCI and RCIC systems to perform as designed.
July 29, 1980 - Confirmation of Action letter involving the failure of the scram level float switches to function properly.
March 24, 1981 - Confirmation of Action letter involving actions taken subsequent to the isolation of drywell pressure switches.
20. Management Conferences Held During Appraisal Period A conference was held on July 7, 1980 to discuss HPCI and RCIC failures and licensee corrective actions. A conference was held July 16, 1980 to discuss backfill settling adjacent to the Service Water intake structure. A conference was held on August 1, 1980 to discuss scram discharge volumne float failures. A meeting was
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held on October 20, 1980 to discuss the previous SALP findings. A conference was held on December 23, 1980 to discuss the schedule for completion of intake structure and backfill work. A conference was held on April 2, 1981 to discuss'the release of contaminated materials to unrestricted areas and the isolation of safety related pressure switches.
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B.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 I
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Quality Assurance No significant inspection activity was performed in this area during the evaluation period.
2.
Site Preparation and Foundation.
No significant inspection activity was performed in this area during the evaluation period.
3.
Containment Structure
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Analysis Four inspections of Category I concrete placement and portions of four inspections of containment liner activities l
were conducted during the review period. The licensee's work
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progress and related inspection activity is in an early stage of completion for the containment liner areas.
Two violations were identified during inspections of concrete placement activities. These were as follows:
(1) Severity Level V violation for failure to sample plastic concrete and make test cylinders at the required intervals.
(2) Severity Level V violation for improper vibration of concrete during placement operations.
I Similar violations concerning concrete vibration 'were I
identified during inspections in November, 1978 and July, 1979.
This recurring problem can be attributed to the licensee's onsite engineering staff's lack of experience in the civil engineering area. Engineering for quality control and problem identification is performed solely by the licensee.
The A/E (Bechtel) serves only as a design consultant.
During this reporting period the site activities have been slow. The licensee has recently increased the construction activities substantially and the Region's. inspection efforts will be increased accordingly. A resident inspector has also been assigned to the site.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board comments
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An increase in inspection effort in these areas is recommended due to the recurring concrete vibration problem and the expected increase in construction activity.
4.
Safety-Related Structures This area was the subject of a portion of one inspection during the evaluation period.
The licensee's construction activity in this area, and related NRC inspection activity, is in the early stages of completion.
No violations or other weaknesses were identified.
Due to the lack of significant construction and inspection activity in this area, no evaluation is made.
5.
Piping and Hangers - Reactor Coolant and Others a.
Analysis
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This area was addressed in portions of four inspections performed during the evaluation period.
The licensee's a.
construction activity in this area is in an early stage of completion.
No construction deficiencies were reported in this area. Seven violations were identified. The violations i
did not appear to be indicative of programmatic breakdowns; although three of the seven represented procedural violations these were unrelated occurrences.
This may indicate a weakness in training or the verification of proper work performance and is due in part to the early stage of activity. The seven violations were:
(1) Severity Level V violation for the failure to properly identify and control a nonconforming heat of welding material in accordance with procedural requirements.
(2) Severity Level V violation for the failure of a welder to follow welding procedure purge requirements.
i (3) Severity Level V violation for welder qualification procedure deficiencies.
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Severity Level V violation for failing to establish procedures for the inspection of rigging slings or chokers.
(5) Severity Level V violation for incorrectly performed stud welding.
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(6) Severity Level VI violation for the failure to properly store piping in accordance with procedural requirements.
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(7) Severity Level VI violation for improperly maintaining and disposing of welding electrodes.
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Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
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Safety-Related Components a.
Analysis Inspection efforts of safety-related components were performed as they related to receipt, storage and maintenance of these items. No significant problems were identified.
b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
7.
Electrical Systems No electrical system inspections for the Vogtle nuclear plants were performed during this review period. The electrical phase of
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the construction program has not yet commenced at Vogtle.
8.
Instrumentation and Wire Inspection in this area was not performed during the review period due to the early stage of facility construction.
9.
Fire Protection The construction site fire protection program was not inspected during this evaluation period.
i 10.
Preservice Inspection No activity has been performed by the licensee in this area.
11.
Corrective Actions and Reporting a.
Analysis
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i A total of twelve inspections have been performed at Vogtle during this evaluation period. These inspections identified
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eleven violations, seven of which were cited against both units 1 and 2.
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Twelve potentially reportable deficiencies.were reported during the review period. Five of these were applicable to unit 1 only and seven were applicable to both units 1 and 2.
The licensee determined by evaluation that six of the twelve were reportable construction deficiencies.
The number of violations did not indicate a trend that would be indicative of a breakdown in the construction program.
The licensee's responses and corrective actions to the violations have been adequate and timely. The licensee has exercised care in evaluating CDR's and the reports have been acceptable.
The licensee was requested by the NRC to respond to and submit information on environmental and safety matters regarding fish impingement studies and a Construction Permit amendment to remove the Enclosure Building.
Sufficient information for the Staff to review and evaluate these items was submitted in a timely and efficient manner. The licensee is very receptive to the staff's need for complete, concise submittals required to expedite reviews. Whenever additional information has been required, the licensee has been available for both conference calls or meetings and has submitted requested information without delay, b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments
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The board concurs with the rating.
12.
Procurement
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a.
Analysis During this evaluation period one major inspection of site procurement, receiving, storage and maintenance was performed.
Site storage and maintenance activities were examined to a lesser degree during three additional site inspections. Two violations were identified during the major site procurement inspection. These violations were:
(1) Severity Level V
violation for a
lack of maintenance / storage inspections.
(2) Severity Level VI violation for food and drinks being consumed in the main warehouse storage area.
These violations were not indicative of a breakdown in the licensee's QA programs.
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b.
Conclusion - Category 2 c.
Board Comments The board concurs with the rating.
13.
Design and Design Changes There was no specific inspection effort expended relative to design and design changes during this evaluation period.
14.-
Training
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There was no specific inspection effort expended relative to training during this evaluation period.
15.
Reports Data
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a.
Construction Deficiency Reports
Unit 1 - 6 Unit 2 - 5 b.
Part 21 Reports Unit 1 - 1 Unit 2 - 1 16.
Licensee Activities Continued progress in the construction of the plants occurred during the review period.
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17.
Inspection Activities The routine inspection program was performed during the review
period.
18.
Investigations and Allegations Review No major investigative activities occurred during the review period.
19.
Escalated Enforcement Actions i
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No escalated Enforcement Actions occurred during the evaluation
period.
20.
Management Conferences Held During Appraisal Period
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A conference was held on October 20, 1980 to discuss the previous SALP findings.
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b