IR 05000321/1982003
| ML20041C624 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1982 |
| From: | Ang W, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041C586 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-8203, 50-366-82-03, 50-366-82-3, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8203020395 | |
| Download: ML20041C624 (4) | |
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E REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUIT'! L ',00 o,
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3030:1 s
Report Nos. 50-321/82-03, 50-366/82-03 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302 Facility Name: Hatch Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57, NPF-5 Inspection at Bechtel Power Corporr. tion, Gaithersburg, Maryland Inspector:
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Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
J. R. Costello, RIV, US RC Approved by:
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A. R. Herdt, Section Chief Date Signed l
Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division SUMMARY Inspection on January 28 - 29, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 16 inspector-hours at Bechtel Power Corporation in the area of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IEB 79-14).
Results No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. R. Jordan, Project Manager Other Organizations Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- B. J. Kanga, Manager, Division of Engineering
- A. A. Vizzi, Project Engineering Manager
- D. C. Kansal, Division QA Manager
- R. A. Glasby, Project Engineer
- R. H. Fivgrath, QA Manager Other Bechtel employees contacted included seven engineers
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 29, 1982 with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector, described the area inspected and unresolved items 321/82-03-01 and 366/82-03-01 - Pipe support / restraint operability analysis.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. New unrosolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.
5.
Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems (IEB 79-14)
An inspection was performed at Bechtel, Gaithersburg, to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-14 and IEB 79-02 requirements and licensee commitmants. Specifically, discrepant pipe supports / restraints reported on recent licensee event reports (LER) were selected and the licensee's architect / engineer's (A/E) technical evaluation and disposition were inspected for conformance with IEB 79-02 and IEB 79-14 requirements and licensee commitments.
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A.
Unit 1 LER 81-107 reported that on October 28, 1981 concrete surrounding embedded plates for recirculation suction line snubbers 1831-SSA7, SSAS, SSB7 and SSB8 showed visible spalling and surface cracks.
The failure was attributed to the snubbers being installed with as much as a 24 deviation from its designed location resulting in combined shear, tension and moment loads for which the embedded plates were not designed. To correct the discrepant condition, the licensee installed one inch plates with four wedge anchors on top of the existing plates.
The design calculations for this modification was inspected.
The inspector had no further questions regarding the modification.
However, the inspector noted that the discrepant installation of the snubbers were identified by the licensee during IEB 79-14 inspecti
.6 in April of 1981. The licensee's A/E stated that the discrepancy was forwarded to the Nuclear Steam System Supplier (NSSS)
for the IEB 79-14 system operability evaluation along with numerous other discrepancies. The NSSS response was provided on their letter G-GPC-1-186 dated August 19, 1981 concluded that a re analysis of recirculation system and main steam system was necessary.
The IEB 79-14 system operability analysis required for the recirculation and main steam systems were not available at Bechtel. The licensee and its A/E contacted the NSSS to determine the availability of this analysis but were unable to provide any further information during the inspection. Pending the inspection of the main steam and recirculation system IEB 79-14 operability analysis, this shall be identified as the first part of unresolved items 321/82-03-01 and 366/82-03-01 - IEB 79-14 di screpancies.
B.
Unit 2 LER 1981-103 reported that on November 5,1981, RHR service water pipe support 2E11-RSW-R26 had four defective welds. The failure was attributed to the tight installation of the supports
"U" bolt on the pipe resulting in axial loads on the support. An inspection of the IEB79-14 walkdown for the system revealed that the support was identified to be discrepant in that its configuration dif ferred from its design drawings. The as-found condition was identified to Bergen Patterson, the Hanger Designer, who subsequently analyzed the condition and issued drawing 'lE11-RSW-R26 Rev.1. No clearance requirement was called out between the "U" bolt and the pipe. The A/E indicated that the support was repaired and clearance between the pipe and the "U" bolt was provided. The licensee was requested to determine the generic implications of the report; i.e. are there other pipe supports that are not designed for axial loads but whose drawings do not call for clearance uetween the pipe support and the pipe, and consequently have not been inspected for this condition during IEB 79-14 inspections.
Pending licensee resolution of this question, this shall be identified as the second part of unresolved items 321/82-03-01 and 366/82-03-01.
C.
LER 81-104 reported that on October 28, 1981, a broken threaded rod for HPCI system R161D restraint 2E41-HPCI-R51 was observed. Subsequent to the A/E evaluation of the condition, the HPCI system was not declared inoperable. The restraint was restored to its original design
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configuration. On November 12, 1981 HPCI Pipe Hanger 2E41-HPCI-H30, located immediately downstream of Restraint 2E41-HPCI-R51, was observed to be bent 3 to 5 at the pipe clamp.
Both support / restraint are located on the discharge side of the HPCI pump. The licensee further stated that dynamic loads associated with a water hammer could have contributed to the failure.
An inspection of the piping and pipe support design calculation was performed.
No apparent cause for the failure could be determined.
It was noted however that water hammer loads are not analyzed for.
The licensee was requested to determine the cause of the failure and to establish its corrective action to preclude repetition.
The licensee's A/E was still evaluating the condition.
Pending inspection of the technical evaluation, determination of the cause and establishing the corrective action to preclude repetition, this will be identified as the third part of Unresolved Items 321/82-03-01 and 366/82-03-01.
No violation or deviations were identified pending resolution of the unresolved items.