IR 05000317/1994032

Exam Repts 50-317/94-32OL & 50-318/94-31OL on 941019.Exam Results:Candidates Passed Exams & Were Issued Licenses

ML20149H463
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/10/1994
From:	Meyer G, Prell J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149H446	List: IR 05000317/1994032 ML20149H444
References
RTR-NUREG-1021 50-317-94-32OL, 50-318-94-31OL, NUDOCS 9411220217
Download: ML20149H463 (6)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 DOCKET / REPORT NOS: 50-317/94-32 and 50-318/94-31 (0L)

LICENSEE: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company FACILITY: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Lusby, Maryland DATE: October 19, 1994 EXAMINERS: Kent Faris, PNL CHIEF EXAMINER: ANVJ . // k es A. Prell, Sr Op'erations Engineer Dath '

R Section ivision of Reactor Safety n I APPROVED BY: N - A[ h (o I 94 Date

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/Gfsnn W. Meyer, Chief A BWR and PWR Sections (/

Division of Reactor Safety 9411220217 941110 7 j DR ADOCK 0500

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Operations: On October 19, 1994, the NRC administered retake examinations to two employees who had previously applied for SR0 licenses to operate the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, but had failed their initial simulator examinations. These retake examinations were limited to the simulator portion of the initial operating examination and were conducted in accordance with Revision 7 to NUREG-1021, "Operater Licensing Examiner Standards." Both SR0 candidates passed their retake examinations and were issued licenses. There were no problems experienced with the simulator during the validation process and exam administratio Facility management was aggressive in identifying problems associated with the initial examination administered in April 1994, and in making changes to address these problems. These changes affect both the operations and training departments and have the potential to result in operators who are better able to respond to multiple alarms and complex events and also allou them some flexibility to take actions within procedures when warrante There were two unresolved items, 50-317 & 318/93-11-01 & 02, closed during this exam. Both items related to procedural inadequacy in response to a loss of the 1Y10/2Y10 nonvital bu I l

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i DETAILS  ; INITIAL RETAKE EXAMINATION RESULTS I

There were two SR0 instant candidates who had failed the simulator portion of their operating examination that was administered in April 1994. These two i

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candidates were administered two scenario operating retake examinations, while the remaining parts of the examination were waived. Both candidates passed '

their retake examinations and were issued license .0 SIMULATOR EXAM OVERVIEW '

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The examiners assessed the candidates' performance during the simulator i

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examination to be excellent. Both candidates displayed good communication, command and control and board awareness skills. There were no weaknesses note .0 PREEXAMINATION REVIEW On October 18, 1994, the facility and NRC validated three proposed scenarios :

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to be used for the retake examination. The facility provided sufficient >

personnel to run the proposed scenarios and provide meaningful comments, including alternative success paths the candidates might take. As a result, the validated scenarios provided sufficient challenges to the candidates to i i

permit the examiners to evaluate the candidates' ability to operate the plant in a safe manne On October 6,1994, Baltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) training department .

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management met with regional personnel to discuss facility lessons learned from the April 25-29, 1994, initial examination, in which three candidates .

failed, the operational and training program problems identified as a result l of those failures, and their expectations for the upcoming examination ,

proces Based on this meeting, the examiners concluded that a common .

understanding of the examination process existed and that the self analyses i and proposed solutions to the problems identified by BG&E appeared thorough ;

and comprehensiv .0 TRAINING PROGRAM REVISIONS Facility management was aggressive in identifying problems associated with the initial examination administered in April 1994 and in making changes to address these problem In response to the three initial licensed operator failures that occurred last April, the training department performed an in depth assessment of their licensed operator training program. Several training deficiencies were identified by the facility and corrective actions l implemente Some weaknesses identified were: j The facility's written tests were not as difficult as the written tests administered by the NR . The candidates were not always confident in performing many procedural tasks, because they had had no training demonstrations of the .-

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, i 2 The candidates had difficulty in pulling together, into a unified whole, all the information they had been trained on over the past 18 month . The candidates had difficulty in recognizing and assessing situations in the control room, which they had not seen befor The facility plans on responding to these weaknesses by using more job performance measures (JPMs) in the training process; developing videotapes demonstrating how to perform specific tasks; using NRC NUREG/BR-0122,

" Examiner's Handbook for Developing Operation Licensing Written Examinations,"

when developing written exams; developing a series of terminal objectives that summarize the tasks performed, thus prssenting a big picture to the candidates; providing student mentors to ensure candidates are knowledgeable of all required plant operator skills; and increasing the use of static simulator exercises and classroom drills to increase candidates' diagnostic skill The facility has also formalized the NRC preexam review process to assure that all identified concerns with a proposed NRC exam are addressed and resolved prior to administering the exa Some candidates had had problems in the prior examination in satisfying the strict procedural compliance requirements imposed by the facility while taking the appropriate actions required to respond to plant conditions. In response, the operations department has developed draft administrative controls, which, when certain conditions are met, allow operators to deviate from the sequence and order of procedures to enable timely, effective actions within the procedure framework. The NRC examiner made a cursory review of these draft procedures and had no problems with them, FOLLOW UP 0F OPEN ITEMS (92901)

(CLOSED) Unresolved Item (UNR 50-317/93-11-01 & 50-318/93-11-01)

During the administration of an NRC operating examination, it was discovered that the loss of offsite power (LOP) in combination with the loss of the N emergency diesel generator resulted in a loss of power to the 1Y10/2Y10 nonvital instrument bus. The loss of power to this nonvital bus resulted in loss of control of the pressurizer heaters from the control room. The loss of control of pressurizer backup heaters could possibly delay establishing natural circulation and subsequent reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldow The facility has strengthened training lesson plans to ensure operators are aware of the affects of losing power to 1Y10/2Y10 nonvital bus and methods available for regaining control of backup heaters. E0P-2, " Loss of Offsite Power", which addresses operator response to this event, was also revised to indicate that RCS pressure control is available following loss of 1Y10/2Y10 by use of backup heater control available from IC43/2C43 (Safe Shutdown Panel).

Based upon the review of the actions taken, this item is close .-. . . . - .-_ . . - .-- - .- _

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(CLOSED) Unresolved Item (UNR 50-317/93-11-02 & 50-318/93-11-02)

During the administration of an NRC operating examination, it was discovered that the loss of offsite power (LOP) in combination with the loss of the N emergency dinel generator resulted in a loss of power to the 1Y10/2Y10 nonvital instrument bus. The loss of power to this nonvital bus resulted in a i loss of all containment temperature indication. Loss of containment temperature indication could prevent operators from applying compensating '

tables for estimating steam generator and pressurizer levels under adverse containment condition Facility training lesson plans have been strengthened to ensure operators are ,

aware of alternate methods for determining containment temperature when temperature indicators TI-5309 and TI-5311 are not available. Specifically, this variable may be conservatively approximated by converting containment pressure to temperature using saturated conditions. Additional studies (BG&E memo, 5/26/94) indicated the use of compensation tables is not necessary and the procedures may be changed to discontinue their use. The facility stated that the use of the tables would continue until such time that the procedure changes can be implemente Based upon the above, this item is close .0 SIMULATOR FIDELITY REPORT Attachment I contains the simulator fidelity report. There were, however, no problems experienced with the simulator during both the preexam revior and the l

exam administratio .0 EXIT MEETING ON OCTOBER 20, 1994 The NRC noted the support received by the training staff in the review and administration of the retake examinations and the flawless operation of the simulator. The facility made no comments regarding the examinatio :

Calvert Cliffs Personnel E. Chrzanowski Instructor-Simulator Support B. Hiestand Supervisor-Requal Training J. Macklin Supervisor-Simulator Support M. Milbradt Compliance Engineer N. Millis General Supervisor-Nuclear Training M. Navin General Supervisor-Nuclear Plant Operations R. Niedzielski Supervisor-Initial Training Unit K. Nietman Superintendent-Nuclear Operations D. Rosenbaum Senior Operations Instructor NRC Personnel K. Faris PNL Contract Examiner J. Prell Senior Operations Engineer-Lead Examiner P. Wilson Senior Resident Inspector Attachment: Simulation Facility Report l

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ATTACHMENT 1 ,

SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Facility Docket Nos: 50-317 and 50-318

Operating Tests Administered on: October 19, 1994 This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further i l

verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).

These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to thesa observation During the conduct of the simulator retake examination, there were no problems l note l l

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