IR 05000315/1993011
| ML17331A305 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1993 |
| From: | Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17331A304 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-93-11, 50-316-93-11, NUDOCS 9305180012 | |
| Download: ML17331A305 (21) | |
Text
U.
S..NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos.
50-315/93011(DRP);
50-316/93011(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licensee:
Indiana Hichigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 License Nos.
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, HI Inspection Conducted:
March 10 through April 30, 1993 Inspectors:
J.
A. Isom D. J. Hartland W.
H.
Dean S.
S.
Lee Approved By:
B. L.~geosen, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A ate Ins ection Summar
- Inspection from March 10 through April 30, 1993 (Report Nos.
50-315/93011(DRP);
50-316/93011(DRP) )
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors and personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) of plant operation, maintenance and surveillance, engineering and technical support, actions on previously identified items, and safety assessment/quality verification.
Results:
Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in any areas.
Two new unresolved items were identified which concerned root cause(s)
associated with the Unit 2 East HDAFW pump bearing/pump failure (para.
4a)
and adequacy of the engineering calculations to demonstrate that there were sufficient component cooling water flows to the emergency core cooling pump heat exchangers (para.
4d).
New inspector followup items were identified concerning:
modification of the CCW relief valve piping (para.
2c); effect on operator's ability to complete sections of
"Emergency Remote Shutdown" procedure with loss of two emergency lights (para.
2c);
use of CTS piping as one of two containment barriers (para.
4b);
gA audits which satisfy Technical Specification 6.5.2.8.d.
(para.
6a);
and the Operations Department program to disseminate changes to Operation's Department procedures (para.
6b).
Plant 0 erations:
The inspection disclosed strengths in the operator's response to the rod control event on March 29, 1993.
However, the inspector identified weaknesses in the Operation's Department followup of the CCW throttling event in that the on-shift operators were not informed of the new 9305i80012 9305i2 PDR ADOCK 050003iS G
operating practices associated with the.CCW system.
Also, one of their procedures which dealt with the operation of the CCW system was not revised.
Maintenance:
The licensee's performance in this area was good.
The inspector noted strengths in the quality of work performed by the craft as well as their knowledge of equipment.
En ineerin and Technical Su ort:
Overall, performance of this area was good.
Evaluation of AFW bearing problems and emergency core cooling socket weld problems were conservative and thorough.
Safet Assessment ualit Verification:
Performance in this area was mixed.
Although the quality of engineering investigations and quality assurance audits were good to excellent, there were problems with satisfactorily completing the corrective actions identified in these investigations.
~II Rf.+II (4
ee e
n UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, II LINOIS 60197 ()p'(
1 -,'=3 Docket No. 50-315 Docket No. 50-316 Indiana Hichigan Power Company ATTN:
Hr.
E. Vice President Nuclear Operations Division 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216
Dear Hr. Fitzpatrick:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by J.
A.
Isom and D. J. Hartland of this office and William M. Dean and Samuel S.
Lee of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on March 10 through April 30, 1993, of activities at the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units
and 2, authorized by NRC Operating Licenses No.
DPR-58 and DPR-74, and to the discussion of our findings with A. A. Blind and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified, during. the course of this inspection.
Two unresolved items were identified.
One unresolved item concerned the root cause(s)
of the bearing/pump damage to the Unit 2 East motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
The second unresolved item concerned engineering calculations to demonstrate sufficient component cooling water flows to the emergency core cooling pump heat exchangers.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this 'inspection.
Sincerely, B. L.
Qsen, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A Enclosure(s):
Inspection Reports No. 50-315/93011(DRP);
No. 50-316/93011(DRP)
See Attached Distribution
Indiana Hichigan Power Company
Distribution cc w/enclosure:
A. A. Blind, Plant Hanager OC/LFDCB Resident Inspector, RIII James R. Padgett, Hichigan Public Service Commission EIS Coordinator, USfPA Region 5 Office Hichigan Department of Public Health D.
C. Cook, LPH, HRR
DETAILS Persons Contacted:
- A. A.
- K. R.
- L. S.
J.
E.
B. A.
- T P
p.
F.
D. L.
L. J.
T. K.
- S. A.
- P.
G ~
- J. S.
L. H.
- G. A.
D. C.
H. L.
Blind, Plant Hanager Baker, Assistant Plant Hanager-Production Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager-Projects Rutkowski, Assist.
Plant Manager-Technical Support Svensson, Executive Staff Assistant Beilman, Maintenance Superintendent Carteaux, Training Superintendent Noble, Radiation Protection Superintendent Matthias, Administrative Superintendent Postlewait, Design Changes Superintendent Richardson, Operations Superintendent Schoepf, Project Engineering Superintendent Wiebe, Safety
& Assessment Superintendent Vanginhoven, Site Design Superintendent Weber, Plant Engineering Superintendent Loope,Chemistry Superintendent Horvath, guality Assurance Supervisor The inspector also contacted a number of other licensee and contract employees and informally interviewed operations, maintenance, and technical personnel.
- Denotes some of the personnel attending the Management Interview on May 6, 1993.
Plant 0 erations 71707 71710 42700
The inspector observed routine facility operating activities as conducted in the plant and from the main control rooms.
The in'spector monitored the performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, of Shift Technical Advisors, and of Auxiliary Equipment Operators including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, and the degree of professionalism of control room activities.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of corrective action and response to off-normal conditions.
This included compliance with any reporting requirements.
The inspector noted the following with regard to the operation of Units 1 and 2 during this reporting period:
a.
Unit 1 status:
The licensee operated the unit at full power throughout the inspection period, with no'ignificant operational problems noted.
Unit 2 status:
The licensee operated the unit at full power during the inspection period until April 2, 1993, when reactor power was reduced to 56 percent to support planned maintenance on the main feed water system and condenser water box cleaning.
Upon completion of the maintenance, the licensee returned the unit to full power on April 8, 1993.
The licensee operated the unit at full power for the remainder of the period.
On Harch 29, 1993, the licensee entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 and declared an Unusual Event after a group of shutdown rods became misaligned.
The rod group became misaligned during performance of the monthly rod exercising surveillance.
While exercising a shutdown bank which included two groups of rods, one group was inserted 4 steps into the core when the operators received a rod urgent failure alarm.
The licensee subsequently replaced a blown fuse in the rod power cabinet, returned the rod group to its fully withdrawn position, and successfully completed the surveillance on the shutdown bank before exiting the Unusual Event.
The inspector observed licensee response to the event and found it to be satisfactory.
At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was reviewing the event with the intent to rescind the notification.
The licensee had determined that the shutdown rod group was not inoperable at the time they entered TS 3.0.3.
The licensee concluded that the rod group could have been returned to its fully withdrawn position because the blown fuse only affected operation of the rod group which did not move into the core.
On April 20, 1993, the licensee made a one hour
CFR 50.72 notification after they determined that the C02 suppression systems protecting safe shutdown equipment in four zones on Unit 2 were "inoperable."
The licensee identified that a
TS change made in early 1990 that allowed conversion of the C02 systems in the four zones from automatic to manual suppression was based on incorrect information.
As immediate action, the licensee posted fire watches in the affected areas to comply with TS 3.7.9.3.
The inspector will evaluate licensee root cause determination and corrective action during review of the licensee's event report.
En ineered Safet Feature Walkdown of the Unit 1 and 2 East Com onent Coolin Water CCW S stems:
The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portion of the Unit 1 and 2 East CCW systems to verify that the valve positions in the licensee's system lineup procedure wer e consistent with the plant drawings and to identify any equipment conditions which may degrade system performance.
The inspector
found that the com onents in the East CCW s stem for both units were in satisfactor condition.
The valve lineup sheets listed in the following surveillance procedures were walked down.
- East Component Cooling Water Loop Surveillance Test **1-OHP 4030.STP.020E, Revision 3, March 15, 1991
East Component Cooling Water Loop Surveillance Test, **02-OHP 4030.STP.020E, Revision 4, March 29, 1993 All valves were found to be in their correct ositions.
During the walkdown, a leak was observed from the Unit 2 safety valve (2-SV-72E).
Licensee personnel placed a catchbag underneath it to direct the leak to the floor.
Followup by the inspector identified that the CCW relief valve discharge piping for valves 1-SV-72E and 2-SV-72E was modified such that the relief valves discharged above the emergency lights 1-BATLIT-379 and 2-BATLIT-412 respectively.
The licensee had completed Request For Change (RFC)
1070 for Unit 1 on September 27, 1983, and part of minor modification 215 for Unit 2 on April 8, 1992, to disconnect the safety valve discharge piping from the CCW system.
The inspector's discussion with the system engineer found that because these safety valves were designed initially to relieve back into the CCW system, the licensee was concerned that the back pressure from the CCW return header might affect the safety valve lift setpoints.
The licensee issued action requests A42645 and A42646 to correct the deficiency by May 17, 1993.
The circumstances surrounding the implementation of RFC 1070 and minor modification 215 which resulted in a condition whereby safety valves discharged above the Appendix R emergency lights and the corrective actions to redirect the discharge flow away from these lights will be an
~ins actor fol 1 owu item 50-315 93011-01 50-316 93011-01 At the end of the inspection period, the inspector was pursuing the consequences of potential failures of these emergency lights (caused by lifting of the CCW relief valves) with the licensee's Appendix R engineer.
The effect of loss of these emergency lights on implementing licensee's
"Emergency Remote Shutdown" will be an ins ector followu item 50-315 93011-02 50-316 93011-02
.
Other minor discrepancies identified by the inspector were as follows:
Safety valve 2-SV-72E was leaking by its seat.
AR41744 was written to repair the leaking safety valve.
The hydraulic snubber downstream of CCW-166 was low on fluid.
Action request A42405 was requested.
- The valve label tag was missing from 1-CCW-190E, East centrifugal charging pump bearing oil cooler inlet valve.
Action request A49519, dated March 12, 1990, was still hanging on the Unit 1 North safety injection pump after the work was completed on October 22, 1992.
The action request was removed.
Fire door 363 to the Unit 2 charging pump room was found defective in that it would not stay open.
The inspector contacted the auxiliary equipment operator who initiated an action request, A42631.
- Motor-operated valve nameplate data was found off Unit
East and West CCW Suction X-tie valves.
d.
- There was verdigris on numerous valves.
En ineered Safet Feature Walkdown of the Unit 1 and 2 Containment S ra CTS S stems:
The inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CTS systems.
The inspector verified that the valve positions were consistent with the plant drawings and the procedure,
"Placing Containment Spray System in Standby Readiness,"
OHP4021.009.001.
The inspector noted that the overall material condition of the systems was good.
The inspector did not identify any condition which could affect the satisfactory operation of the containment spray system.
No violations, deviations, or unresolved items were identified.
Two inspector followup items were identified.
Maintenance Surveillance 62703 61726 42700
The inspector reviewed maintenance activities as detailed below.
The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicable.
The following activities were inspected:
'a ~
RCP UV UF Rela Maintenance Testin
The inspector observed ILC personnel during a routine surveillance activity and reviewed licensee corrective action to a deficiency that occurred during the activity.
The inspector determined that
the personnel involved were knowledgeable and that the corrective action taken was acceptable.
On March 11, 1993, while the inspector was observing lIHP4030.STP.033,
"RCP ¹2 UV Bus 1C Surveillance Test," the underfrequency (UF) annunciator for the same channel came in twice for an instant each time.
In response, I&C personnel initiated AR¹ A0038815 to investigate the problem.
I&C made an immediate operability determination of the affected channel at that time based on successful completion of the routine surveillance earlier that day.
The I&C technicians believed that the problem was caused by over-sensitivity of a UF relay associated with that channel to slight vibration caused from the UV relays.
Both the UV and UF sets of relays were located in the same cabinet.
On April 1, 1993, I&C performed a troubleshooting activity on the relays using IIHP6030. IHP.330,
"RCP Bus UF Relay Cal Channel II."
The inspector reviewed the work package and spoke with I&C personnel, who confirmed that the troubleshooting found a contact on one of the UF relays which had less than the required amount of contact gap.
I&C personnel subsequently adjusted the contact gap and successfully completed post-maintenance testing of the UF relays.
MDAFW Pum Check Valve Ins ection:
On April 7, 1993, the inspector observed the disassembly and inspection of 1-FW-160, the
"W" HDAFW pump ELO check valve, per AR¹ C0015129.
The inspector noted that the maintenance personnel involved in the activity were knowledgeable, procedural guidance was satisfactory, and that the work was completed without incident.
The licensee performed the inspection of the check valve in response to repeated lifting of SV-169, the
"W" HDAFW pump suction relief valve, during surveillance testing of the Unit 1 TDAFP.
The two pumps shared a
common recirculation test line to the CST.
The licensee had earlier concluded that the condition was not an operability issue because the common test line was normally isolated when the pumps were in standby and would remain so in the event of an AFW system actuation.
Maintenance personnel did not detect any deficiencies during the examination of the check valve internals, which included an as-found blue check of the valve seating surface.
As part of the post-maintenance testing, the licensee ran the TDAFP and noted that SV-169 continued to chatter.
As a result, the System Engineer, who was present during the maintenance activity, initiated an AR to inspect 1-FW-159, the
"W" HDAFW pump discharge check valve.
Due to the scope of the work involved, the licensee placed the maintenance activity related to 1-FW-159 on the forced outage schedule.
c.
Non-Outa e Corrective Action Re uest AR Trend:
The inspector reviewed the non-outage corrective action requests (ARs) to determine magnitude, trend, and effect, if any, on the reliability or operation of safety-related systems.
The licensee had about 2300 action requests at the beginning of April 1993 for both Units.
Approximately 18 percent (456) non-outage corrective ARs, categorized as either priority 10s, 20s, or 30s, were associated with Unit 1 and 2 safety-related systems.
The inspector's review of computer printout associated with the pending work did not identif an AR which could be an o erational roblem with an of the safet -related s stems.
The inspector's discussion with the Planning and Scheduling Department found that bulk of the ARs, about 82 percent, were associated with non-safety related systems.
The 2300 ARs translated into about 10 weeks of work backlog for both Units.
The inspector found that the number of ARs was decreasing gradually.
The licensee was able to reduce about 120 ARs a month with the year-end goal to reduce the backlog to about 1000 ARs for both Units.
The inspector noted that currently, the licensee was able to complete about 250 ARs a week, and the total number of ARs have remained steady over the last several weeks.
No violations, deviations, unresolved or,inspector followup items were identified.
~
~
4.
En ineerin and Technical Su ort 37828
The inspector monitored engineering and technical support activities at the site and, on occasion, as provided to the site from the corporate office.
The purpose of this monitoring was to assess the adequacy of these functions in contributing properly to other functions such as operations, maintenance, testing, training, fire protection and configuration management.
a ~
AFW Pum Bearin Dama e:
At 4:00 P.H.
on April 20, 1993, while the mechanics were changing oil on the outboard thrust bearing of the Unit 2 East motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (HDAFW) pump, they found that the oil contained about 25 percent water.
Based on the amount of water found in the oil, the licensee decided to inspect the outboard bearings for damage.
They discovered that there was extensive damage to the outboard bearings in that the bearing retaining rings were found in many pieces and several bearing balls were deformed.
Also, the licensee's inspection of the pump shaft found circular grooves which required pump replacement.
The licensee made repairs to the pump and successfully demonstrated its operability within the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as required by the Technical Specifications.
The pump was declared operable at 6:08 p.m.
on April 22, 1993.
As a result of the oil sample on the Unit 2 East MDAFW pump, the inspector inquired on April 21, 1993 on the licensee's plans to sample the oil from the other auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps.
The inspector was informed on April 22, 1993 that the licensee would base their time table for taking additional samples from the remaining AFW pumps on the Unit 1 East HDAFW pump oil sample result.
The oil sample from the Unit 1 East MDAFW pump was scheduled to be taken on the following day, April 23, 1993.
Because the licensee had obtained a satisfactory oil sample from the Unit 2 West MDAFW pump on April 14, 1993, and because they had experienced a similar bearing problem on the Unit 2 East MDAFW pump on April 22, 1991, the licensee believed that the oil problem might only affect the Unit 2 East HDAFW pump.
If the oil sample from the Unit 1 East HDAFW pump was satisfactory, the licensee planned to sample each pump weekly with the last oil sample taken from the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump on Hay 11, 1993.
The inspector questioned the use of sample results from Unit 1 East HDAFW pump to determine the oil condition of the other pumps.
On April 23, 1993, the licensee found particulate in the oil from the Unit 1 East HDAFW pump.
As a result, with the exception of the Unit 2 Wes't HDAFW pump which had its oil changed on April 14, 1993, oil samples were taken and the oil changed from the remaining pumps.
The preliminary result was that there was some oil discoloration and some accelerated bearing wear associated with the outboard bearings of most of the HDAFW pumps but not the TDAFW pumps.
Oil and any bearings which showed wear were replaced.
At the end of the inspection period, a licensee team organized to determine the root causes(s)
of the bearing wear was continuing their investigation.
The investigation is scheduled to be completed on June 7,
1993.
The resolution of the root cause(s)
of the bearing/pump damage on the Unit 2 East HDAFW pump, and the implications for long-term pump operability, will be an unresolved item 50-315 93011-03 50-316 93011-03
.
Containment S ra S stem Containment CTS Inte rit
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to a containment integrity issue related to the CTS System.
The inspector determined that the licensee was in compliance with the plant's design basis.
However, the NRC's review of the containment isolation capability of the CTS was pending.
On March 26, 1993, the licensee entered a
6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> LCO on Unit 1 for containment integrity after an unisolable weld leak developed on a
CTS instrument line during routine surveillance testing.
Upon further review and just prior to initiating a TS-required plant shutdown, the licensee exited the LCO after closing some manual valves outside containment and backseating containment isolation
check valves CTS-127E and 131E with a standing head of water.
The licensee'hen'eturned to the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO for CTS pump inoperability to repair the leak.
The licensee's design basis provided for two barriers as containment integrity for the CTS system.
The first barrier was the piping system itself, which was assumed to be closed outside containment.
The second barrier was a single check valve, located inside containment, for each header.
The design basis required that these check valves provide containment isolation only in a post-LOCA scenario after a containment spray had initiated.
The analysis assumed that under these conditions that the check valves would be seated with a column water.
The column of water was not maintained during normal plant operation.
The NRC's further review of the containment isolation capability of the CTS System is an ins ector follow-u item 50-315 93011-04 50-316 93011-04
.
In response to repeated socket weld failures on ECCS instrument and equalization lines, the inspector reviewed licensee internal correspondence and noted that such failures have occurred since plant start-up and have continued up to the present time.
The inspector determined that licensee corrective action to failures through 1991 had been narrowly-based and untimely.
The inspector noted, however, that the licensee has taken adequate corrective action since then to prevent recurrence of the failures.
In response to weld failures on the RHR System in the early 1980's, the licensee initiated two separate design changes back in 1982 and 1984, respectively, that installed pipe supports only on the lines that were affected.
The licensee identified the root cause of the failures to be high frequency, low amplitude fatigue generated by flow induced vibration.
A recommendation made at the time to initiate a program to monitor the vibration level of the branch piping was never incorporated.
A recommendation by Westinghouse in 1991 to monitor piping subjected to this phenomenon was also not acted upon.
Weld failures in the RHR system continued, with the most recent occurring in February 1992 during the Unit 2 refueling outage.
These failures occurred on lines that were not included under the scope of the earli'er design changes.
As corrective action, the licensee recently completed 12-RFC-3105, which installed supports on the remainder of the branch lines on the RHR System for both units.
Additionally, two weld failures in the CTS System occurred in Hay 1992.
The licensee determined the root cause of these failures to be fatigue from high vibration of the CTS pumps.
The licensee's research revealed that two separate investigations were conducted in 1977 and 1987, respectively.
The 1987 investigation concluded
that the pump vibration levels were inherent in the design of the pump.
A spectrum analysis indicated that the pump had a peak vibration level of 7200 cpm, which was attributed to the normal operating pump speed of 1800 rpm and the four-bladed impeller.
Neither investigation included consideration of the stresses on the branch pipe welds.
In response to the two CTS weld failures, the System Engineer issued a design change request in September 1992 to install supports on CTS System branch lines.
The System Engineer also issued a change request at that time to install supports on the charging system.
The inspector noted that there was no record of any weld failures on the SI System and two failures on the charging system.
The two failures were on the same instrument line and a support had subsequently been installed on that branch line.
Due to two more recent weld failures on the CTS System which occurred in April 1993, the licensee was currently processing the CTS design change request on a priority basis.
d.
Flow to ECCS Heat Exchan er:
During CCW walkdown of both units (see paragraph 2.c), the inspector questioned the licensee on how they ensured that sufficient CCW flows were available to each of two parallel ECCS heat exchangers, using only a single flow meter.
The inspector was informed by the system engineer that although they have not measured flow to each individual heat exchanger in the past, they planned to do so during the next refueling outage in 1994.
The inspector requested engineering calculations which would verify that 'sufficient CCW flows would be available to each of the heat exchangers under design load condition.
Pending the inspector's review of the calculations, to determine acceptable flowrates have been maintained, this matter is considered an unresolved item 50-315 93011-05'0-316 93011-05
.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Two unresolved items and one inspector followup item were identified.
Actions on Previousl Identified Items 92701 92702
(Closed)
UNR 315/92018-01; 316/92018-01:
Licensee's Res onse to Failure to Identif Low EDG Lube Oil Level This unresolved item is being administratively closed.
The NRC has taken enforcement action on the matter.
Licensee corrective action will be tracked in conjunction with the escalated enforcement action taken'n response to the findings documented in Inspection Report 50-315/92022(DRP);
50-316/92022(DRP).
No violations, deviations, unresolved or inspector followup items were identified.
~
~
a 6.
Safet Assessment ualit Verification 40500
a.
NSRDC Meetin Review of Cor orate A Audits:
The inspectors conducted an evaluation of the licensee's self-assessment capability through observation of an offsite Nuclear Safety and Design Review Committee (NSROC) meeting on April 13, 1993, and through selected review of the licensee's self-assessment audits.
The inspector reviewed the audits to determine whether they contributed to the prevention of problems by monitoring and evaluating plant performance, providing assessments and findings, and communicating and following up on corrective action recommendations.
The inspectors concluded that the ualit of the audits of the subcommittee activities and the audits performed by the corporate guality Assurance (gA) organization on a variety of issues was a
strenctth.
In particular, the inspector's selected review of the gA audits 92-02, 92-05, 92-07, and 92-07 found that the licensee had identified some potentially substantive issues.
Examples included:
not including the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System in the initial review of Generic Letter 89-13,
"Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" Justification/references were incomplete, provided references only or did not sufficiently support the response to the screening question for 15 of the safety screening documents recurring erosion of ESW piping elbow from cavitation on the ESW return from the CCW heat exchanger The inspectors found all but a few of the recommendations from the audits were corrected.
The few which still required further corrective actions were:
Documentation of the completion of required reading by,.the Operators for revised operating procedures which were implemented before the classroom training can be conducted Tracking of recurring performance problem relating to personnel leaving names on the greaseboard The inspectors considered these deficiencies to have minor safety significance and did not detract significantly from the quality of the corrective actions overall.
The inspector did have a question on an audit performed by NSRDC to satisfy a requirement of paragraph 6.5.2.8.d.
of Technical Specifications (TS).
This audit covered review of performance of
activities required by the guality Assurance Program to meet the criterion of Appendix "B" of 10 CFR 50.
The inspector's review of audits in 1992 did not appear to meet this requirement.
Near the end of the inspection period, the licensee provided additional information on the inspector's concern.
Review of this additional information and whether the licensee's NSRDC audits were performed to meet the requirement of TS paragraph 6.5.2.8.d. will be an ins ector followu item 50-315 93011-06.
50-316 93011-06
.
The inspector's discussion with the corporate gA manager found that the gA organization started to focus on assessment audits in 1992.
Consequently, the inspectors focused their review of the gA audits which were performed in 1992.
Further, the inspectors found the NSRDC meeting to be well conducted and thorough.
Low CCW Flow to ECCS Heat Exchan er:
E The inspector reviewed the licensee's resolution to problem report 92-1721 which identified unacceptable component cooling water (CCW) flowrates to mechanical seals and lube oil coolers for the east/west centrifugal charging pumps, the north/south safety injection pumps, the east/west residual heat removal pumps, and the east/west containment spray pumps.
The licensee was concerned that the reduced CCW flowrates could possibly have prevented the pumps from performing their intended safety functions.
The licensee's investigation found the root cause of the problem to be Operations Department procedures which instructed the operators to throttle flows to the ECCS pump heat exchangers after the flow were set during the flow balancing surveillance,
- THP 4020 STP.248.
The inspector found that the licensee correctly identified the cause of the problem, but their corrective actions to prevent recurrence had some weaknesses.
The licensee's Nuclear Design Department evaluation on the as-found CCW flow condition concluded that the reduced CCW flows would not have prevented the respective pumps from performing their intended safety functions in the event of an accident.
The licensee revised the 4030 surveillance procedures associated with the Inservice Testing of the pumps and the 5030 operator tour guides as part of their corrective actions to have all CCW valves, which could be used to throttle flow to the heat exchangers, fully open.
In order to ensure that the increased flowrate would not cause problems with ECCS pump performance, the licensee contacted the manufacturers of the ECCS pumps to determine whether increased CCW flow to the ECCS pumps during normal operation would adversely affect them.
The licensee was informed by the manufacturers that the increased flow would not adversely affect pump performance provided that the CCW temperature was not below 60 degrees Fahrenheit for an extended period of time.
Because there are annunciators which alarm in the control room when CCW temperatures
out of the CCW heat exchanger fall below 60 degrees Fahrenheit, the licensee concluded that extended ECCS pump operation with CCW temperatures below 60 degrees Fahrenheit would not be a problem.
The inspector's review of the licensee's corrective actions found that the licensee still needed to revise "Operations of the Component Cooling Water System During Reactor Startup and Normal Operation" procedure OHP 4021.016.003 for both units.
This procedure provides initial conditions, precautions, and operating instructions for operation of the CCW pump during reactor startup/shutdown and power operation.
The inspector's review of the procedure found that section 6.8 still required operators to adjust CCW flows to within the design limits listed in attachment 1.
The licensee indicated that the CCW operation procedures would be revised.
The inspector also discussed with the Operations Department on what was done to inform the shift operators on the change to operation of the CCW system at power.
The inspector was informed that the department would typically issue an "Operations Memorandum" to discuss the problem and to inform the operating shift of the new requirements.
The inspector requested a copy of the "Operating Memorandum" which discussed the new operating requirements for the CCW system.
The inspector was informed that an "Operations Memorandum" was not issued due to an oversight.
However, discussion with the Operations Superintendent found that because there were several electronic mail messages to which the operators had access, they were generally sensitive to problems with throttling the CCW valves.
Also, because the surveillance and the tour guides were already revised, the Operations Superintendent believed that chances of operators mispositioning CCW valves would be small until the "Operating Memorandum" could be issued.
I The inspector also asked whether the Operations Department had any process which is used to inform staff about important changes to operations philosophy or practices, and also which verified that all operators received that information.
The inspector was informed that currently for such topics, an Operation Memorandum would be written and required to be read by the oncoming shift.
However, under this system, the inspector noted that verification of operators receipt of such information was not possible because they were not required to acknowledge having read the memorandum.
The inspector considered the lack of a program in the Operations Department to disseminate and confirm operator acknowledgement of important changes to Operations philosophy and procedures to be a
programmatic weakness.
The inspector's discussion with the Operations Superintendent indicated that he is reviewing a way such important information is captured and disseminated to the shifts.
The inspector's review of the Operations Department program scheduled to be implemented later in the year will be an ins ector followu item 50-315 93011-07 50-316 93011-07
.
No violations, deviations, or unresolved items were identified.
One inspector followup item was identified.
Ins ector Followu Items Inspector Followup Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed fur ther by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Inspector followup items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 2c (two items),
4b, 6a and 6b.
Unresolved Items Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4a and 4d.
Mana ement Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in paragraph
on Hay 6, 1993, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
In addition, the inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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