IR 05000315/1993024
| ML17331B228 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1994 |
| From: | Kropp W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17331B227 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-93-24, 50-316-93-24, NUDOCS 9402160115 | |
| Download: ML17331B228 (8) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUC LEAR REGULATORY COHH I S S I ON
REGION III
Report Nos.
50-315/93024(QRP);
50-316/93024(ORP)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 License Nos.
DPR-58:
E R-74 Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units
and
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook.Site, Bridgeman, HI Inspection Conducted:
December 8,
1993, through January 18, 1994'nspectors:
J.
A.
Isom D.,J. Hartland Approved By:
Wayne J.
pp, Chief Reactor roiects Section 2A
.Ot Ins ection Summar
- Inspection from December '8, 1993, through January 8,
1994.
(Report Nos.
50-315/93024(ORP);
50-316/93024(ORP))
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of plant operations; maintenance and surveillance; and reportable even:s.
Results:
Two violations were identified (paragraphs 4.a.
and 4.b.)
=or which no Notice of Violation is being issued based on conformance to criteri= for exercise of discretion contained in the NRC Enforcement Policy.
5I'
<<¹ completed on two 4.16 kV normal feed breakers due to ineffective communication among licensee operations and maintenance personnel.
Maintenance Surveillance:
Licensee actions to troubleshoot and repair a
failure of a'control room annunciator panel were satisfactory.
9402160ii5 940204 PDR ADOCK 050003i5
DETAILS Persons Contacted
- A. A.
- K. R.
- L. S.
- J B. A.
T.
P.
P.
F.
D.
L.
L. J.
T. K.
- S. A.
P.
G.
J.
S.
L. H.
G.= A ~
D. 0.
M. L.
Blind, Plant tlanager Baker, Assistant Plant Manager-Production Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager-Projects Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager-Technical Support Svensson, Executive Staff Assistant Beilman, Maintenance Superintendent Carteaux, Training Superintendent Noble, Radiation Protection Superintendent Matthias, Administrative Superintendent Postlewait, Site Engineering Support Manager Richardson, Operations Superintendent Schoepf, Materials Management Superintendent Wiebe, Safety 5 Assessment Superintendent Vanginhoven, Project Engineering Superintendent Weber, Plant 'Engineering Superintendent Horey, Chemistry Superintendent Horvath, guality Assurance Supervisor The inspector also contacted a number of other licensee'nd contract employees and informally interviewed operations, maintenance, and technical'ersonnel.
- Denotes the personnel in attendance for, the Management Interview on January 21, 1994.
Plant 0 erations 71707 71710 42700 The inspector observed routine facility operating activities as conducted in'he plant and from the main, control rooms.
The inspector monitored the performance of licensed Reactor Operators and Senior
.
Reactor Operators, of Shift Technical Advisors, and of Auxiliary Equipment Operators including procedure use and adherence, records and logs, communications, and the degree of professionalism of control room activities.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of corrective action and response to off-normal conditions.
This included compliance with any reporting requirements.
The inspector noted the following with regard to the operation of Units
and 2 during this reporting period:
a.
Unit 1 Status:
The licensee reduced power on the unit from 100 to 70 percent during the inspection period in preparation for the coastdown to the refueling outage scheduled to begin February 12, 1994.
The licensee did not experience any significant operational problems with the unit during the period.
b.
Unit 2 Status:
The licensee raised power on the unit from 70 to 90 percent power during this inspection period to compensate for the power reduction on Unit 1.
The licensee did not experience any significant operational problems with the unit during the period.
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspector followup items were identified.
Maintenance Surveillance 62703 61726 42700 The inspector reviewed maintenance activities as detailed below.
The focus of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; and post maintenance testing was performed as applicable.
The following activities were inspected:
a.
Annunciator Panel Failure The inspector reviewed licensee actions to troubleshoot and repair a failure of the Unit 2 Main Generator annunciator panel ¹ 221.
The inspector determined that the actions taken and root cause determination were satisfactory.
On January 4,
1994, the annunciator panel failed when all drops on the panel alarmed at the same time.
The panel did not contain any drops which required Technical Specification (TS) compensatory actions to be taken by the operators.
In addition, no other panels were affected by the failur During subsequent troubleshooting, Instrument and Control technicians determined that the root cause of the failure was shorted wires on, the panel
"bullseye."
The bullseye, a red light on top of the panel, illuminates when a drop(s)
alarms.
The short was caused by the loosening of the bullseye socket over time during bulb change-out that eventually resulted in the twisting/fraying of the wires.
The short caused the fuse to fail in the panel flasher card that resulted in all the drops alarming.
The licensee repaired the bullseye wiring and replaced the flasher card and two logic cards that were apparently damaged by the short circuit.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's annunciator circuit design and determined that the potential for such a failure to affect other panels was minimal.
The inspector noted that each panel has
a redundant power supply fed from the plant's 250V System, with safety features in each panel circuit that would isolate a failure from other panel circuits.
Maintenance on Auxiliar Feed Breakers The inspector reviewed licensee activities related to preventative maintenance on the Unit 1 normal auxiliary power feed breakers to the 4. 16 kV Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) busses.
The breakers were 1A7 (Bus 1A),
1B7 (Bus 2B),
1C3 (Bus 1C),
and 105 (Bus 20).
The inspector noted that'he unit remained in an abnormal line-up for over 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> due to ineffective communication among licensee production personnel.
At about 1 a.m.,
on January 6,
1994, the licensee transferred power for the RCP busses from the normal source, which was supplied from the main generator, to the safety-related reserve source supplied from offsite power.
The licensee initiated the transfer in order to perform preventive maintenance on the normal feed breakers to each of the busses.
Licensee electricians completed work on breakers IA7, 187, 1C3, and 105 by 5 p.m. that day.
However, an electrician failed to sign-off and submit the clearance permit for breaker 1B7 to the licensee's Centralized Clearance Group (CCG) before leaving the site for the day.
Also, the clearance permit for breaker 105 that was signed-off by maintenance personnel was apparently misplaced in the CCG office.
Operations shift personnel received the clearances on breakers IA7 and 1C3 and returned the breakers to service at about 9 p.m. that night.
The shift was apparently told at turnover at 6 p.m.
by the off-going shift that Maintenance was still working on the other two breakers, which was not the case.
During the next shift turnover at 6 a.m.
on the following day, Operations became aware that work on the other breakers had been completed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> earlier.
The inspector determined that, in addition to the problems noted above, a contributing root cause was the failure of Operations shift personnel to contact Maintenance to obtain the status of the breaker work.
In addition, the inspector also noted that the licensee did not utilize the guidelines specified in PMSO. 122,
"Voluntary Removal From Service of Technical Specification Required Equipment and Vital Secondary Equipment."
PMSO. 122 provided guidelines for the voluntary removal from service of equipment that represented a jeopardy to the continued operation of the facility.
The intent of PMS0.122 was to maximize the availability of critical equipment by planning and scheduling work to ensure that the scope of work was identified and sufficient resources were staged.
Generally, the licensee
prepared a time line for these activities that identified and minimized the expected duration that the component was out of service.
The PMSO covered TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) related components, as w'ell as vital secondary equipment.
The licensee defined vital secondary equipment as
"equipment whose removal from service place the unit in a condition where a single component failure could cause a trip."
The inspector noted that with normal power out of service, a single failure to reserve power would have tripped the unit.
As corrective action, the Operations Superintendent sent a
memo to the operating shifts which emphasized the importance of maintaining cognizance of the status of vital equipment that is out-of-service in the plant.
In addition',
the licensee added the normal feed breakers to the list of non-TS related components that were required to be tracked per the requirements of PMSO. 122.
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspector followup items were identified.
Re ortable Events 92700 92720 The inspector reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) by means of direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records.
The review addressed compliance to reporting requirements and, as applicable, that immediate corrective action and appropriate action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished.
a.
(Closed)
LER 316/93001-LL: Technical S ecification Com ensator Action Not Met Due To Personnel Error After The Blockin 0 en Of A Fire Door On February 2,
1993, the licensee discovered that the fire door to the Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room was standing open with the safety pins installed in the door tracks, which made the door inoperable.
The licensee determined that the door could have been inoperable for up to five hours with no compensatory measures in place, exceeding the one hour requirement referenced in TS 3.7.10.
The licensee was unable to determine the root cause of the event, as they were unable to identify the responsible individual.
In addition, the licensee determined, that preventive measures were already in place to ensure that the door was maintained in the required position.
However, the licensee placed an article in an internal plant publication to heighten personnel awareness of the significance of events of this nature.
This event involved a violation of TS; however, the event had minimal safety significance because the plant's fire suppression
systems would have extinguished a fire in the room.
In addition, the licensee properly reported the event'nd took, appropriate corrective action.
Therefore, pursuant to the NRC enforcement policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C), the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion for this matter, and no Notice of Violation will be issued.
b.
(Closed)
LER: 316/93002-LL:
Condenser Evacuation'
stem Sam 1 in Surveillance Missed Due To Personnel Error Durin Surveillance Test Schedule Review On February 19, 1993, the licensee determined that it 'had failed to perform the Unit 2 condenser air ejector noble gas activity weekly surveillance within the time frame required by TS 4. 11.2. 1.2.
The licensee determined that the root cause of the event was personnel error.
A chemistry technician failed to apply attention to detail and self-checking during initial review of the surveillance test schedule As immediate corrective action, the licensee performed the surveillance and determined that the noble gas activity was below the detection limit specified in TS.
The licensee also reviewed daily historical printouts of the on-line radiation monitor and observed no abnormal readings.
The licensee took appropriate administrative action with regards to the individual involved in the event.
This event involved a violation of TS; however, the event had minimal safety significance.
In addition, the licensee properly reported the event and took appropriate corrective action.
Therefore, pursuant to the NRC enforcement policy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C), the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion for this matter, and no Notice of Violation will be issued.
Two non-cited violations were identified.
Mana ement Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on January 21, 1994, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
In addition, the inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.