IR 05000315/1993025
| ML17331B231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1994 |
| From: | Burdick T, Clyde Osterholtz, Shepard D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17331B230 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-93-25, 50-316-93-25, NUDOCS 9402240040 | |
| Download: ML17331B231 (12) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-315/93025(DRS);
50-316/93025(DRS)
Docket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 License Nos.
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant Units
and
Inspection/Examination At:
Stevensville, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
January
28, 1994 Examination Conducted:
January 28, 1994 Inspectors Qp cQ>M~
ster, o tz, ea JJ/~,
spector ate
<</>>~l>> )
Approved By epar
./J ':g~P
.'M. Bur ic, C ie Operator Licensing Section
ate ate P Q
)
Ins ection Summar Ins ection conducted on Januar
28.
1994 Re ort No.
50-315 93025 DRS 50-316 93025 DRS Areas Ins ected:
Special, announced inspection of the licensed operator requalification program to include a review of training administrative procedures, requalification training records and examination material; observation and evaluation of operator performance and of licensee evaluators during requalification examination administration; an evaluation of the program controls to assure a systems approach to training, remediation training administered; and an assessment of simulator fidelity.
The inspectors used th'e guidance in Temporary Instruction (Tl) 2515/117.
Results:
Attendance at required requalification training was satisfactory (Section 2.1.2).
Job performance measures (JPMs)
and written examinations were determined to be adequate=with some written questions being identified as non-discriminating between a competent and incompetent operator (Section 2. 1.3).
Operator performance was satisfactory during in-plant JPMs (Section 2.2).
Licensee evaluators-were considered adequate with some minor deficiencies regarding cuing (Section 2.3).
The requalification program contained evidence of being based on a systems approach to training (SAT) (Section 2.4).
Remediation training administered was sufficient (Section 2.5).
9402240040 940218 PDR ADOCK 05000315
Training staff presentations, the SRO Core Alterations Program, and the tracking system for operator physical examinations were strengths (Section 2.1.1).
Meaknesses identified were an absence of a formalized plan to ensure adequate requalification training is provided, 'some lapse in training and operations management oversight, an absence of administrative procedures to prevent excessive exam overlap, and the use of additional time in written examination administration (Section 2. 1. 1).
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was implementing the licensed operator requalification training program in accordance with
CFR Part 55 requirements.
Examination Summar Examination administered on Januar
1994 Re ort No. 50-315 93025 DRS Re-take dynamic simulator operating examinations were administered to two initial operator licensing candidates, one senior reactor operator instant and one senior reactor operator upgrade.
Results:
Both candidates passed. the examinations.
However, a weakness was noted in the operators'bility to manipulate the newly installed instrument controllers.
The following are examples of deficiencies in controller operation observed during examination administration:
~
An op'erator attempted to take manual control of the
~4 steam generator feedwater regulating valve and inadvertently went to the wrong controller and opened the
~4 steam generator PORV.
~
An operator unsuccessfully attempted to control steam generator levels manually by manipulating a main feed pump speed controller.
A turbine trip signal was generated on high steam generator wa;er level.
The licensee indicated that the schedule for training on the new controllers would be reviewe REPORT DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Indiana Michi an Power Com an
+K. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
+W. Davidson, Program Administrator, Requalification Training wG. McCullough, Simulator Supervisor wR. Perrine, Operations Training wS. Richardson, Operations Superintendent
+R. Scott, Training Program Administrator
+J. Stubblefield, Operations Training Superintendent
+S. Vince, Senior Training Instructor
+J.
Wiebe, Safety and Assessment Superintendent Nuclear Re ulator Commission
+T. Burdick, Chief, Operator Licensing Section
~J.
Isom, Senior Resident Inspector
<Denotes those present at the management inspection exit meeting on January 28, 1994.
U Other persons w=re contacted as a matter of course during the inspection.
2.0 Introduction The purpose of tnis inspection was to assess the licensee's requalification program for licensed operators to determine whether the program incorporated
CFR Part 55 requirements for evaluating operator mastery of training objectives and revising the program.
The licensed operator requalification program assessment included a review of training administrative procedures, requalification training records, licensed operator physical examination tracking records, and examination material.
The inspectors conducted an evaluation of op=rator performance and the ability of licensee evaluators to administer and objectiv=-ly evaluate during requalification examinations.
In addition, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the program controls to assure a systems approach to training and remediation training was conducted.
2.1 Licensed 0 erator Re uglification Pro ram Assessment 2.1.1 Program Administration The inspectors concluded that the licensee was implementing the licensed operator requalification training program in accordance with the licensee's administrative procedures and that the licensee's program was in accordance with a systems approach to training.
The inspectors identified the following strengths regarding requalification program administration:
Training staff presentations of classroom and simulator training appeared well prepared and encouraged student participation with interactive discussions of the material.
The SRO Core Alterations Program to provide requalification training for refueling operators included seminars and hands on training prior to actual refueling operations.
~
The tracking system incorporated for ensuring licensed operators receive a biennial physical examination appeared well organized, able to list the operators in the order in which their next physical is due.
The following weaknesses regarding requalification training program administration were noted:
The licensee had no formalized plan for ensuring adequate requalification training takes place.
The present training schedule appears to satisfy the training requirements of the licensed operators.
However, this plan has been changed several times without any written record to indicate when or why the changes were made, or that the required operations management approval was obtained.
This dramatically increases the probability of an operator either missing required training or having non-required training inappro'priately tracked.
The inspectors found several instances where an operator's training record inadvertently indicated non-required training was required.
Lack of formalized records pertaining to requalification training requirements could lead to operators receiving inadequate operational training.
Operations management was not conducting regular audits of training administration.
However, the licensee has revised procedure OHI-2070 to provide for training audits by operations management twice per quarter in the future.
The licensee did not provide for training management audit of the trainers'valuation techniques for conducting in plant JPHs.
The in plant JPHs require additional skills involving cuing; whereas, during simulator JPHs, the simulator provides the feedback.
Examination security was effective in preventing examination compromise.
The operators interviewed stated that examination security was not excessive or stressful.
However, the licensee's administrative procedures could allow excessive overlap between individual requali.ication examinations.
The present administrative guideline in place states that no more than 50/
overlap may exist between weekly administered quizzes
'examinations).
It is therefore possible for two individuals to receive th'e same walkthrough in successive weeks (ten JPf4s are selected per week, and five are administered to each candidate).
This guideline could lead to a violation of 10 CFR 55.49
'
(integrity of examinations and tests)
~
No evidence of examination compromise was found during a review of examination material for the current week and the last two cycles.
~
The licensee provides operators 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to complete the written portion of the requalification examination.
NUREG-1021, Rev.
7, allows three hours for written examination administration.
2.1.2 Re uglification Trainin Records Review The inspectors reviewed requalification training records for the current cycle year and concluded that the selected licensed operators had satisfied the attendance requirements for requalification training and-performed the necessary reactivity manipulations as required by their program.
2.1.3 Re uglification Examination Material Review The inspectors reviewed the in plant JPMs and written examinations to be administered during the week of January 24, 1994 'he inspectors concluded that the examinations were adequate.
The inspectors also noted that only minimal overlap existed For the written and JPM examinations.
Some ouestions from the part B written examinations administered on the week of January 24, 1994, were constructed such as to be considered non-discriminating between a competent and incompetent operator.
The following are some examples noted:
With the Unit paralleled to the system, which of the system frequency conditions below requires a manual reactor trip, if no automatic trip occurs?
Frequency decreases to:
a.
Hz momentarily and then incr eases to 59.5 Hz.
b.
Hz for 30 minutes and stabilizes.
c.
58.6 Hz for 30 minutes.
d.
58.1 Hz and stabilizes.
ANS:
d Answer "d" would have to be correct for any of the other three distractors to be correct. It therefore automatically can be concluded to be the correct answer.
PMP 2081.EPP. 104 (Security During Emergencies)
shall be implemented when the event is classified under ECC-7 (Security Threat or Compromise) at:
a.
Unusual Event or above
b.
Alert or above c.
Site Area Emergency or above d.
General Emergency only ANS:
b This question has two correct answers. If a procedure needs to be implemented at the alert level or above then it would also have to be implemented at the site area emergency level or above.
(both "b" and "c" are correct)
Given the following conditions on Unit 1:
Node
RCS pressure 425 psig Operator goes to
"OPEN" on control switch for valves IMO-128 and ICN-129, RHR pump suction valves from the RCS.
WHAT changes should the operator observe?
a
~
b.
C.
Valves IMO-128/ICN-129 open normally, pressurizing the RHR pump suction header.
Either valve INO-128 or valve ICH-129 will open fully depending on which is the first to move; the other will stay shut until RCS pressure is less than 375 psig.
Neither valve IHO-128 nor valve ICN-129 will open until RCS pressure is less than 400 psig.'NS:
d d., Neither valve INO-128 nor valve ICH-129 will open until RCS pressure is less than 375 psig.
It would be impossible for di :ractor "c" to be correct without distractor
"d" being correct.
This eliminates distractor "c" as a possibility and directs attention to the correct ans>>=r ("d").
Following the declaration of an "Emergency Plan" accident classified as an Unusual event, the SEC must notify the Berrien County sheriff's office within:
a.
10 minutes b.
15 minutes c.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> d.
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
ANS:
b This question is a direct look-up, memory recall type of question.
No information concerning the candidate's judgment or ability to manipulate procedures is gained here.
Unit 2 is in an emergency condition, and the control room operators have initiated RCS bleed-and-feed heat removal because of a loss of secondary heat sink.
The operators are preparing to terminate bleed-and-feed because secondary heat sink has been restored and verified. The operators check if a charging pump can be stopped.
They are unable to stop a charging pump because RCS subcooling is less than required.
Although RCS subcooling is insufficient when this step is first encountered, subcooling will=begin to incr ease as RCS pressure increases due to subsequent:
a.
Closing of the PRZ PORV's.
b.
Stopping of an SI pump.
c.
Establishment of normal charging flow.
d.
Closing of the PRZ spray valves.
ANS:
a The question asks for a distractor that will cause a pressure increase.
Oistractor "b" is therefore automatically eliminated. It is reasonable to assume that even an incompetent operator would not conclude that securing a
safety injection pump would cause an increase in RCS pressure.
Additionally, the question states that operators are "...unable to stop 'a charging pump...".
This automatically eliminates distractor "c" as a possibility.
2.2 0 erator Performance Evaluation The inspectors evaluated the operators'erformance during the in-plant job performance measures (JPNs).
The inspectors concluded that operator performance was satisfactory.
2.3 Evaluation of Licensee Evaluators The NRC inspectors and the licensee evaluators agreed on the overall assessment of operator performance.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee evaluators could adequately administer the requalification examinations and objectively evaluate the performance of the operators.
The following are examples of some minor cuing deficiencies noted during in-plant JPH administration:
Evaluators did not always cue actual plant conditions (meter readings, control light indications)
when possibl '
Evaluators did not require the candidates to locate the nearest communication line to the control room from the task location.
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An evaluator cued an operator that he was on a radiation work permit when in fact he was not.
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An evaluator conducted system training after concluding a
JPM.
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An evaluator told an operator
"very good" upon concluding a JPM.
2.4 S stem A
roach to Trainin Controls The inspectors reviewed the process for students to provide feedback to training.
A student critique form can be filled out by individuals to express a'y concerns or suggestions regarding the training program.
Comments are tracked and reviewed by the training staff and any suggestions are incorporated as appropriate.
Presently, the student critique forms are anonymous.
There is therefore no mechanism in place which would allow operators to receive individual replies to specific comments.
The facility indicated that a signature block was going to be added to the student critique form to provide for individual feedback.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program had controls in place to revise the training program as needed based on facility and industry events as
~
well as system and procedure modifications.
2.5 Remediation Trainin The -inspectors reviewed the remed.iation training provided to a crew dynamic simulator failure.
The crew displayed a deficiency in the ability to identify a steam leak.
The remediation included simulator training concentrating on indications that would be received over a spectrum of steam leaks at varying levels.
The inspectors concluded that the training sufficiently provided the operators with adequate remediation.
2.6 Simulator Fidelity Simulator discrepancies were identified during the re-take dynamic simulator operating examinations.
These discrepancies are noted in Enclosure 2.
3.0 Exit Meetin The inspectors conducted an exit meeting on January 28, 1994, with the training staff and plant management to discuss the major areas reviewed during the inspection, the strengths and weaknesses observed, and the inspection results.
Licensee representatives in attendance at the exit meeting are documented.in Section 1.0 of this report.
The team also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any documents or processes as proprietar SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
DC Cook Nuclear Power Station Facility Licensee Docket Numbers:
50-315, 50-316 Operating Tests Administered On:
DC Cook Plant Specific Simulator This form is to be used only to report observations.
These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation fac.ility other than to provide information that may be used in future evaluations.
No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
ITEN DESCRIPTION Plant Process Computer The plant process computer was not running properly during the requalification training.
Two trend recorders did not work and four alarms were incorrect.
The problem was corrected for the, re-take
'xaminations.
Step Counters During one scenario of the re-take examinations, the candidate at the reactor
.
operator panel recognized that the step counters for one control bank were at 107 steps vice the required 0.
The facility simulator instructor reset the counter to 0 steps.