IR 05000315/1993007
| ML17331A057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1993 |
| From: | Paul R, Schumacher M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17331A056 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-93-07, 50-315-93-7, 50-316-93-07, 50-316-93-7, NUDOCS 9303020032 | |
| Download: ML17331A057 (7) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/93007(DRSS);
50-316/93007(DRSS)
Dockets No. 50-315; 50-316 Licensee:
Indiana Hichigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 Facility Name:
D. C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
D. C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, Hichigan Inspection Conducted:
F ary
rough 5, 1993 Inspector:
R. A. Paul Dat Approved By:
H.
C. Schumacher; Chief
~
~
iological Controls Section
Date Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Februar 2 throu h
1993 Re orts No. 50-315 93007 DRSS
.
50-316 93007 DRSS Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection of licensee's radiation protection program (IP 83750),
including audits and appraisals, contamination control, ALARA measures, review of an LER, changes, and the circumstances surrounding shipment of an empty box which had previously contained radioactive material.
Results:
Within the area inspected, two apparent violations were noted.
The first was for not ensuring that the package did not exceed allowable limits (49 CFR 173.475(i)),
and the second was for exceeding the external dose rate limits of 0.5 millirem/hr on the package (49 CFR 173.427(e)
and
CFR 173.421(b)).
The apparent root cause of these violations was an inadequate survey due to personnel error (Section 7).
9303020032 930219 PDR ADOCK 05000315
DETAILS Persons Contacted
- A. Blind, Plant Manager D. Noble, Superintendent Radiation Protection
- S. Lehrer, General Supervisor Radiation Controls
- J. Fryer, General Supervisor Radioactive Material Control
- J. Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager
- D. Loope, Superintendent Chemistry
- H. Springer, ALARA Supervisor
- D. Williams, Corporate Health Physicist (by telephone)
- D. Hartman, Resident Inspector E. Schweibinz, Senior Project Engineer, NRC The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel in various departments in the course of the inspection.
- Present at the Exit Meeting on February 5,
1993.
Audits and A
raisals IP 83750 The gA department has incorporated a special ALARA assessment into the regular gA program and the first of these assessments was reviewed during this inspection.
The audit identified several deviations concerning the ALARA committee and some recommendations for improvement.
The audit concluded that, in general, the program is effective with strong management support.
No violations or deviations were identified.
~PI 5
The health physics staff has remained stable in the past year.
The most significant changes were the appointment of the Superintendent Radiation Protection to Superintendent Chemistry and the promotion of the General Supervisor Health Physics to his position; Other organizational changes include transfer of the General Supervisor Health Physics responsibilities to the Radiation Support and Controls Group and the transfer of some of the personnel in the Radiation Support group to the Radioactive Materials Control Group.
During 1992, a professional health physicist left the company and the licensee is trying to hire two more experienced health physicists, one to replace him.
The licensee has continued to encourage the health physics staff to participate in the in-house training program for National Registry of Radiation Protection Technology (NRRPT) certification.
Currently there are seven radiation protection technicians (RPTs)
and several staff members certified; more are expected to be trained and certified in
'
1993.
Overall, health physics is sufficiently staffed with experienced and technically qualified personnel which should be strengthened by the hiring of two more professional staff members.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Facilities and E ui ment The inspector discussed the operation and calibration methodology of whole body friskers, portal monitors, and performed independent verification of detector performance on some of these instruments.
He also reviewed calibration methodology and records of the PNR-4 neutron detectors.
In the majority of tests performed by the inspector, both the whole body frisker and portal monitors alarmed at the expected set point limit.
No problems were noted with the current calibration methodology of the neutron detectors.
No violations or deviations were identified.
A~LRA
The inspector reviewed the cleanup of contaminated sludge from two waste holdup tanks performed by a contract vendor.
The projected dose for the completed job is less than 1 person-rem.
The inspector observed the cleanup in progress, discussed the job with the cognizant lead person, and noted the effective use of a robot in the cleanup project.
Also reviewed was the project involving the removal of the existing spent fuel racks and the installation of high density spent fuel storage racks.
It appeared the ALARA reviews for both jobs were adequate and that good radiological controls were employed.
No violations or deviations were identified Onsite Follow-u of Events Ne ative Trend Concernin Li uid Release Point Calculations The licensee has generated four problem reports which resulted from miscalculated setpoints for liquid releases during a nine month period in 1992.
A review of the release setpoint calculation methodology was initiated at the request of VP Nuclear Operations.
The review indicated weaknesses associated with the governing procedure, training of technicians performing the calculations, frequency and scheduling of the releases, and the supervisory review process.
Recommendations to correct these weaknesses were proposed and the chemistry department is primarily responsible for their implementation.
This matter. will be reviewed during a future inspection.
Trans ortation Event The inspector examined the circumstances surrounding the shipment of an empty container shipped to the guadrex Recycle Center in Oak Ridge,
'
Information regarding the findings and the licensee's actions was gathered through reviewing the shipping papers, surveys, interviews with the appropriate personnel, and the licensee's findings.
a ~
Event Descri tion b.
On January 26, 1993, the licensee shipped an empty container (sea van) classified as Radioactive Material, Excepted Packaging, UN2910 to the guadrex Recycle Center on an open flat bed truck.
On January 27, 1993, guadrex officials notified the licensee that on arrival surveys performed with a portable ion chamber instrument showed a maximum external reading of 180 mrem/hr over a
small area of the outside surface at the back of the sea van; all other general surface readings indicated 0.3 mrem/hr.
A survey inside the van identified the source of the radiation as a hot particle located in a crevice where the back wall and floor of the sea van meet.
This is an apparent violation of 49 CFR 173.427(e)
and
CFR 173.421(b)
requirements that radiation levels at the surface of the empty package offered for transport not exceed 0.5 millirem per hour (Violation 315/93007-01; 316/93007-01).
The licensee requested guadrex to retain the hot particle for its representative who was being dispatched to verify dose rate and perform a
gamma spectrum analysis of the hot particle.
However, upon arrival early January 29, 1993, the licensee found that the particle had been removed from the van, measured, and disposed of the previous day.
The guadrex surveys, showed about 200 mrem/hr near the surface of the particle and about 1 mrem/hr at one meter.
The licensee was unable to verify these results.
The sea van was originally shipped from guadrex to D.
C.
Cook and arrived on January 25, 1993.
It contained a highly fixed contaminated filter pump in a lead shielded wooden box which had been transported from the Three Mile Island station to guadrex where it was decontaminated before shipment to the licensee.
The only work performed by D.
C.
Cook was the removal of the box containing the pump.
No other material w'as placed back into or removed from the sea van before it was returned to guadrex.
Both incoming and departure surveys by D.'. Cook were performed using an ion chamber portable survey meter; neither survey identified the 180 mrem/hr surface hot spot or the hot particle.
Failure to identify the hot spot on the empty package is an apparent violation of 49 CFR 173.475(i) which requires that the shipper ensures the package does not exceed allowable limits on the package (Violation 315/93007-02; 316/93007-02).
Root Cause The root cause of this event was an inadequate survey of the package before shipment.
Contributing factors included use of instrumentation not conducive to identifying surface dose rates from localized discrete areas caused by a hot particl c.
Licensee Corrective Action Immediate corrective actions taken for shipments of this nature include independent measurements using other portable instrumentation coupled with an audible device to aid in identifying small area hot spots, and discussion of the matter with all RPTs emphasizing importance of thorough surveys.
Final corrective actions are being discussed.
LER No.92-008 Concernin Failure To Meet Technical S ecification Re uirements The inspector reviewed an event in which an in-place charcoal filter test on the spent fuel pool exhaust ventilation system revealed that the charcoal absorber removal efficiency was less than the required 99 percent efficiency.
When discovered, all work in the spent fuel pool was suspended.
The deficiency was cause by aging and loss of pliability of the seal material on the charcoal absorber bypass damper blade edge.
Both ESF systems passed their last in-place filter tests.
New edge material was installed on this system and on other engineered safety feature ventilation systems (ESF) to prevent similar failures.
This LER was discussed with the cognizant engineer and is considered closed.
Exit Interview The scope and findings of the inspection were reviewed with licensee representatives (Section I) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 5,
1993.
The licensee did not identify any documents as proprietary.
The inspector discussed his observations and apparent violations with the transportation event.