IR 05000313/1982007
| ML20054J141 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1982 |
| From: | Callan L, Randy Hall, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054J135 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.K.2.09, TASK-TM 50-313-82-07, 50-313-82-7, 50-368-82-06, 50-368-82-6, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8206280190 | |
| Download: ML20054J141 (10) | |
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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Report: 50-313/82-07 Licenses: DPR-51 50-368/82-06 NPF-6 Dockets: 50-313 50-368 Licensee: Arkansas Power and Light Company Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0), Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: AN0 Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted: April 1-30, 1982 Inspectors:
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- 30/c 1 W. D. Jbhnson, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector
' Date (Paragraphs 1 - 10)
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/ Ddte L! J./pallan, Resident Reactor Inspector (Par q aphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10)
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f7h Approved:
R. E. Hall, Chief, Reactor Project Section C
/D(te Inspection Summary Inspection conducted during period of April 1-30,19d2 (Report 50-313/82-07)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection including surveillance, mainte-
nance, inspection durir.g long-tenn shutdown, and follow-up on TMI Action Plan items.
The inspection involved 85 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8206280190
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-2-Inspection conducted during period of April 1-30, 1982 (Report 50-368/82-06)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection including operational safety verification, surveillance, maintenance, follow up on TMI Action Plan items, steam generator blowdown pipe leak, reactor coolant pump seal pressure sensing line supports, and follow-up on IE Bulletin 80-06.
The inspection involved 104 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie *
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-3-DETAILS SECTION 1.
Persons Contacted J. P. O'Hanlon, AHO General Manager J. Levine, Engineering & Techniccl Support Manager B. A. Baker, Operations Manager
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T. N. Cogburn, Plant Analysis Superintendent E. C. Ewing, Plant Engineering Superintendent L. Sanders, Maintenance Manager J. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations Superintendent M. J. Bolants, Health Physics Superintendent R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent R. Wewers, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent D. Wagner, Health Physics Supervisor M. Stroud, Production Engineer L. Dugger, Special Projects Manager L. Humphrey, Administrative Manager J. Lamb, Safety and Fire Prevention Coordinator R. Turner, Electrical Engineering Supervisor D. Russell, Production Engineer C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor L. Howard, Production Engineer D. Helm, Health Physics Specialist B. Huggins, Special Projects Coordinator H. Carpenter, I & C Supervisor L. Taylor, Operations Technical Support The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
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2.
Operational Safety Verification (Unit 2)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout-records, and verified proper return-to-service of affected components.
Tours of accessible areas of the unit were conducted to observe plant equip-ment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and exces-sive vibration;and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being imple-mented in accordance with the station security plan.
The NRC inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The NRC inspec-tors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2 service water
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-4-supply to the A and B high pressure safety injection pump oil and bearing coolers, the A and B low pressure safety injection pump seal water coolers, and the A and B containment spray pump seal water coolers; the Unit 2 A, B, C, and D safety injection tanks; the B train of shutdown cooling (including components inside and outside containment); the emergency diesel generator air start and service water cooling systems; and the emergency feedwater systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification required surveil-lance testing on Channel C of the Plant Protection System, Unit 2 (Procedure 2304.37) and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Containment Coolers VCC-2C and 2D Flow Test, Unit 1
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(Procedure 1104.33)
Service Water Pump P-4B Monthly Test, Unit 1
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(Procedure 1104.29 Supp II)
Channel C Excore Instrumentation Test, Unit 2
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(Procedure 2304.102)
Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Test, Unit 1
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(Procedure 1104.36 Supp I)
Calibration of Unit 1 Containment High Range Radiation
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Monitors (Procedure 1304.133)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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-5-4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation _(Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes or standards;and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting con-ditions for operations were met,while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activ-ities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Loss of D.C. power design change for Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators,
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DCP 81-1080A (electrical J.0, 22231 and mechanical J.0. 25418)
Lockout relay - generator output breaker interlock design change for
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Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators, DCP 81-1086 (electrical J.0. 22154)
Installation of hi h point vents design change for Unit 1, DCP 80-1004F
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(1 and C J.0. 4725 Nondestructive testing of the four Unit I high pressure injection
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nozzles (J.0. 23475)
Modification of control valve circuits to prevent "flyback" after
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removal of engineered safeguards signal, DCP 82-2022 and DCP 80-2043H, FCN 23 (J 0. 22241 and 22243)
Inspect CPC cabinets for lifted leads (J.0. 24663)
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Clean containment cooling units 2VCC-2C and 2VCC-2D (J.0. 27202)
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Replace mechanical seals on P-34A, decay heat removal pump (J.0.17238)
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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-6-5.
Follow Up On Three flile Island Action Plan Requirements (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued NUREG-0737 entitled
" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements " to the licensee in a letter, dated October 31, 1980.
This document incorporated all TMI-related items approved for implementation by the NRC as of October 31, 1980, and includes a listing of requirements and implementation schedules.
The inspector is reviewing, on a continuing basis, the licensee's actions in response to the requirements of NUREG-0737.
The inspector's review of certain of the licensee's actions in this regard is summarized below. The numbering system and short titles correspond to those used in Enclosure 1 of NUREG-0737.
II.B.3.2 Post Accident Sampling System (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed portions of the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) Integrated Test (Work Plan No. 1407.022) for Unit 2.
The NRC inspector verified by observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of selected records that all precautions and prerequisites were met prior to the commencement of the integrated test.
Included in the prerequisites verified complete were the training of the personnel involved in the test, including Unit 2 operations personnel; availability of accurate prints and schematics of the PASS building and associated systems for use in the control room; a clear understanding by the test participants of the division of responsibility for the safe conduct of the test; adequacy of the health physics preparations for the initial intro-duction of reactor coolant system water into the PASS piping and sampling equipment; and the satisfactory completion of all system flushing and hydrostatic testing requirements.
The NRC inspector noted that the observed portions of the test were conducted in a controlled, professional manner.
Further, the inspector observed that the PASS integrated test procedure adequately exercised the operable components of the Unit 2 post accident sampling system.
Portions of the Unit 2 post accident sampling system that were inoperable at the time of the test, such as the boron and chloride analyzers which were in the process of being calibrated by the vendor, will be tested at the earliest opportunity following establishment of their operability.
Additionally, the licensee currently plans to perform the portions of the PASS integrated test relating to Unit 1 at the earliest opportunity following the completion of the present Unit 1 maintenance outage period.
II.E.4.2.7 Containment Isolation Dependability - Radiation Signal on Purge Valves (Unit 1)
The requirement that the purge valves close on a high radiation signal is not applicable to ANO-1,since Technical Specification 3.23 requires
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-7-thagthesevalvesbeclosedwhenthereactorcoolantsystemisabove 200 F.
This item is considered closed for ANO, Unit 1 as stated in a letter to the licensee from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), dated April 14, 1982.
II.F.1.3 Containment High Range Radiation Monitor (Unit 1)
During the current outage, the licensee replaced the Unit 1 monitors,
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RE-8060 and RE-8061, with detectors having qualified cabling.
The NRC inspector observed the calibration of these monitors. This calibration was performed in accordance with Procedure 1304.133, using a RT-11 area monitor calibration source at 10 R/Hr.
II.K.2.9 Failure Mode Effects Analysis on the Integrated Control System (Unit 1)
This item is considered resolved for ANO, Unit 1 as stated in a letter to the licensee from NRC (NRR), dated February 25, 1982.
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6.
Inspection During Long-Term Shutdown (Unit 1)
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The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during this t
inspection period.
The inspector verified that surveillance tests required l
during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified
applicability of containment integrity. Tours of accessible areas, including exterior areas, were made to make independent assessments of equipment con-di.tf ons, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements; and to verify that maintenance requests had been
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initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The NRC inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors, i
i by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify that there (
were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and verified the implementation
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of radioactive waste system controls. The NRC inspectors witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
a.
Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Systems Flowmeter Not Calibrated During a tour of the Unit 1 control room on April 20, 1982, the NRC inspector noted that the flowmeter for the standby "A" DHR system l
indicated a flowrate of 400-500 gpm (the operating "B" DHR system l
indicated a flowrate of approximately 1100 gpm). The NRC inspector
brought this condition to the attention of the control room operators l
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-8-who were unaware of the problem.
The operators confirmed that actual flow did not exist through the "A" DHR system, and J.0. 26853 was processed to calibrate the flow transmitter (PDT 1401).
This item will remain open until the NRC inspector confirms the transmitter is properly calibrated.
(313/8207-01)
b.
High Pressure Injection (HPI) Nozzles During the current outage, the licensee performed nondestructive examination of the four HPI nozzles, safe-ends, and thermal sleeves.
These examinations were observed, in part, by the resident NRC inspectors and by an inspector from NRC Region IV. The results of these examinations were reported in Licensee Event Report 313/82-009/
OlT-0 and in NRC Inspection Report 313/82-06.
Defects were found in the thermal sleeves in the "A," "B," and "D" nozzles.
No degradation of the RCS pressure boundary was identified.
The thermal sleeve defects were corrected by replacement of the nozzle safe-end and thermal sleeves for the "A" and "D" nozzles and by rolling the "B" thermal sleeve. The repair procedures were reviewed by an inspector from NRC Region IV, and the findings were documented in NRC Inspection Report 313/82-08.
7.
Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) Seal Pressure Sensing Line Supports (Unit 2).
During a containment tour on April 22, 1982, the NRC inspector noted the following discrepancies in the pipe supports for the "A" RCP seal pressure sensing lines:
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Lower - Two pipe clamps with loose or missing nuts and bolts
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Upper - One pipe clamp with loose or missing nuts and bolts and
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one guide broken These discrepancies were identified to the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor, and he initiated J.0. 26668 to perform the necessary repairs and inspections on similar lines from the other RCP's.
The failure history of the supports on the RCP seal pressure sensing lines indicates a need for a design review and modification. This item will remain open pending development and implementation of the necessary design change.
(368/8206-01)
8.
Steam Generator Blowdown' Pipe Leak (Unit 2)
A shutdown and cooldown of the unit was commenced on ' April 15,1982, due to a leak from the'".B" steam generator 4-inch' blowdown pipe. The leak was inside containment on the short section of. pipe between 2CV-1065 and the containment penetration. During the outage, the defective pipe section-was replaced.
Inspection of the removed _ pipe section indicated that the
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-9-r inner wall of the pipe had been eroded due to the past practice of throttling the upstream gate valve. The blowdown stop valves from both steam generators were disassembled and inspected. To avoid future throttling of the gate valves, a manual globe valve and a manual gate valve were installed in series on each of the two blowdown lines near the blowdown tank.
The NRC inspectors observed, in part, the inspection, repairs, and modifications mentioned above.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
IE Bulletin 80-06 (Unit 2)
NRC Inspection Report 368/82-05 discussed the licensee's failure to per-form the testing required by IE Bulletin 80-06, entitled " Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls." This problem and its safety implications were discussed by licensee and NRC Region IV management in a meeting in the NRC Region IV office on April 8,1982. A letter from NRC Region IV to the licensee, dated April 9,1982, confirmed the conrnitments made by licensee management at this meeting and during a subsequent telephone conservation. The licensee's letter to the NRC, dated April 16,'1982, reported the results of the engineering reviews and of the safety evalua-tions performed as committed. This letter has been forwarded to NRR for technical review.
During the~ outage which commenced on April 15, 1982, the licensee perfonned Work Plan 2409.14 " Engineering Safety Features System Test per IE Bulle-tin 80-06."
The NRC inspector observed portions of this test and reviewed the completed test. No discrepancies were identified. This testing met the requirement of Action Statement 2 of IE Bulletin 80-06.
The licensee's engineering reviews identified 13 ESF actuated valves which would "flyback" upon the removal of the actuation signal and which required modification to increase safety margins. The following valve control cir-cuits were modified during the outage which commenced on April 15, 1982:
Design Change Valve Number Valve Name
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DCP 80-2043H, FCN23 2SV-5633-1 PASS Containment Isolation DCP 80-2043H, FCN23 2SV-5633-2 PASS Containment Isolation DCP 80-2043H, FCN23 2SV-5634-1 PASS Contai_nment Isolation DCP 80-2043H, FCN23 2SV-4534-2 PASS _ Containment Isolation DCP 82-2022 2CV-1001 Main Steam Atmospheric Dump DCP 82-2022 2CV-1051-Main Steam Atmospheric Dump DCP 82-2022 2rbl016-1 Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation DCP 82-2022 2CV-1066-1 Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation DCP 82-2022 2CV-4820-2 Letdown Line Stop Valve DCP 82-2022 2CV-5123-1 LPSI Recirc DCP 82-2022 2CV-5124-1 LPSI Recirc DCP 82-2022 2CV-5612-1 Spray Header Isolation DCP 82-2022 2CV-5613-2 Spray Header Isolation
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These design changes were performed so that the valves would remain in their emergency positions following reset of an engineered safeguards (ES)
signal; and operator action would be required to-reposition the. valves following ES signal reset..These design change packages were' reviewed by the NRC inspector. The installation of these changes was observed, in part, by the NRC inspector.
The licensee successfully. tested the opera-tion of the affected valves after completion of the design' changes.
No violations or ' deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (Plant General Manager)
and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of various segments of this inspection. At these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the fir. dings. The NRC inspectors were informed that Mr. J. M. Levine would relieve Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon as ANO General Manager on April 29, 1982.