IR 05000302/1989022
| ML19327B622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1989 |
| From: | Conlon T, Hunt M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19327B620 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-89-22, NUDOCS 8911020293 | |
| Download: ML19327B622 (7) | |
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UNIT ED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIESION,
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j 101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.
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c-AT t. ANT A. GEORGt A 30323 L
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Report No.: '50-302/89-22
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Licensee: Florida Power Corporation.
3201 34th Street, South St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection Conducted: August 28 - September 1, 1989 Inspector: b A h*bb b L--
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/f 87 M. D. Hunt u
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'Date Signed Approved by: b N.
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//Y/9fkf T. E. Conl M, Chief
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Date Signed
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, Plant Systems Section Engineering Branch-Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine announced inspection was conducted in -the areas of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) overload, e and inspector. follow-up item (IFI)quipment qualification violation closures, closures.
Two electrical problems were l
reviewed during this inspection:
failure of a safety-related transformer and
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the Class IE battery configuration / loading.
Results:
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In the areas inspected, violations-or deviations were not, identified.
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The licensee presented more than ample data to permit c' osure of the violations L
l and IFIs. The corrective actions for the EDG' indicate that efforts 'are being
- +1 made to bring the emergency power. loading into conditions ethat'will provide
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additional. assurance of Technical ' Specification compliance. ! Indications.are
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that. management awareness of the electrical problems has increased, tThis"is:
-l especiallystrue in the area of equipment qualification.J A special engineering ;
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group has been established within site nuclearJ engineering services: that.1s l
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devoted to'EQ control, records. and verification.. ~
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'During, review of the event created by. the failureioff the 4160V' to 480V step-[
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!down transformer, it was noted that the operators handled.the. situution in /
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a controlled manner.
This effort reduced the possibility of theiloss'of RCS-cooling from becoming a major excursion into an unacceptable condition.
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891102O293 892029
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PDR ADOCK 05000302
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The engineering groups appear to be more involved in the overall operation of.
the plant.
Operations personnel appear to. understand the ' involvement of.
engineering and cooperation of these organizations appeared good.
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REPORT DETAILS (
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees D. H. Beach, Supervisor Electrical /IAC
- G. A. Becker, Manager,' Site Nuclear Engineering Services-l G. L. Boldt, Vice President, Nuclear Production
A.H.Gelston, Supervisor.SiteNuclearEngineeringServices(EQ)
R. J. Marchese. Nuclear Engineer i
- V. R. Roppel, Manager, Nuclear Plant Maintenance
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- W. L. Rossfield, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- R. C. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site-Support
- M. S. Williams, Nuclear Regalatory Specialist
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- K. R. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
l NRC Resident Inspector
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- P. Holmes-Ray
- Attended exit interview
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i 2.
Failure of Engineered Safeguards Auxiliary Transformer 3A (93702)
At approximately 0237 hours0.00274 days <br />0.0658 hours <br />3.918651e-4 weeks <br />9.01785e-5 months <br /> on August 28, 1989, while ' the plant was in Mode 5, Safeguards Auxiliary Transformer 3A failed causing a loss of power
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to Engineered Safeguards Bus 3A (480V).
The loss of 480V~ Bus A. caused the loss of power to the Decay-Heat Removal Closed: Cycle Cooling Water
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J (DC) Pump 3A, Engineered Safeguards (ES) Motor Control Centers (MCC) 3A-1,
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3A-2, 3A-3, and the control complex water chiller 3A.
At the time transformer 3A failed, the plant was using the DC Pump 3A to provide the cooling source for decay heat removal.
DC Pump 3B was tagged out of service.
When the 3A DC Pump lost power and cooling water circulation stopped, the reactor coolant temperature increased to-203*F
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and the core temperature was 208'F after approximately 15 minutes. Decay l
Heat Pump 1B was returned to service approximately.19 minutes after the
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transformer failed and the incore temperatures were reduced.below 200 F.
The Safeguards Auxiliary Transformer 3A, a step-down transformer (4160V to 480V), was originally installed with the engineered safeguard Bus 3A
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(480V).
The inspector reviewed MAR 80-05-14-03 which added ESMCC 3A3 and ESMCC 3B3 to the 480V ES Buses 3A and 3B, respectively. As the result of these additional loads, the 4160V to 480V step-down transformers feeding.
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l the 480V ES Buses 3A and 3B were upgraded from 1000 KVA to 1333 KVA by l
installing cooling fans, associated instrumentation, and automatic controls to start the fans at 190 C transformer core temperature. The new rating was approved by the supplier and it was the fan cooled rating for the transformer, Inspection of the faulted transformer plainly revealed that the B phase winding had failed.
It was also evident that the cooling fans had not operated for any extended _ period of time. The transformer was removed and shipped to the vendor for failure analysis.
Records indicate that high temperature alarms had not been received prior to the failure. A spare'
transformer which was certified as an cqual replacement was installed.
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The temperature sensing elements, alarm circuits and fans were all found to be in calibration / working conditions and were reinstalled.
Review of operations data indicated that the core temperature was at 208
degrees approximately 14 minutes into the event, and the incore temperature was reduced to "below 200*". approximately 7 minutes after -
decay heat pump 18 was restored to service.
It appeared that the operations personnel responded in a' knowledgeable manner that prevented an uncontrolled temperature rise.
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l Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identified.
3.
Station Battery B Profile Discrepancy (93702)
During the inspection, the licensee filed _an Event Notification, Event No.
16452, regarding the B Station Battery which was declared inoperative.
It was determined that an error existed in the assumption of the load profile
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for "B" battery.
A load study determined that the DC powered nonsafety-
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related hydrogen seal-oil pump would start much sooner than anticipated under a loss-of-offsite-power and failure of the B EDG to start.
The licensee is currently performing an analisis to ! determine what corrective action is appropriate.
.The Senior Resident Inspector and l
appropriate regional personnel are following:this situation.
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4.
ActiononPreviousInspections' Findings (92702)
(Closed) Violation 302/87-41-01, Diesel Generator (DG) Overload Due to i.
Inadequate Design Control.
The licensee submitted his letter No. 3-F0688-03 dated June 3,1987 which defined the corrective actions to be
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taken as the result of this violation.
l A total Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) loading and design basis-
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evaluation was performed.
As a result, the worst case EDG. load was reduced to less than 3300 KW for all postulated scenarios. Various loads j
were removed and other loads reassigned.
The DG vendor conducted an l
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upper piston wrist pin bushing inspection for the "A" D/G as the result of i
exceeding the cumulative 30 minute rating. A timer has been installed to i
measure the DG run time.
The testing requirements required by the j
surveillances in the Technical Specifications have been clarified.- The'
EDG ratings listed in the FSAR were clarified in Revision 10. A portion
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of the load shifts and reassignments were directed by Temporary Modifications Approval Requests (TMAR). Several loads will be restored at the completion of the EDG upgrade program.
There are numerous work requests' and MARS to be accomplished during the upcoming refueling outage
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which will provide an adequate 'means of tracking these licensee L
commitments. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 302/88-27-01 - The licensee failed to environmentally i
qualify feedwater valves FWV-33 and 36 and associated control circuity for HELB accidents.
The licensee submitted their response to this violation
by letter dated November 14, 1988..The licensee provided a qualification
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of these components by analysis along with a justification for continued operation.
Modification Approval Request (MAR)#88-06-15-01 was issued August 29, 1988, which detailed-the replacement of terminal blocks in the-terminal boxes for valves FWV-33 and FWV-36.
Work request #104007 has been issued to cover the work which is scheduled to be completed during the Refueling outaged scheduled for March 1990.
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A training course entitled "EQ Awareness training" was developed to
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provide the CR-3 personnel and craft with'a basic knowledge of the EQ program.
The training was held August 23, 24, & 25, 1989 for engineering and craft personnel.
The engineers were trained in all three of the i
following modules. The crafts received training in modules.I'& 3.
Module 1-Introduction
Definitions
Regulations
Program-Description
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Module 2-Long Term Compliance Evaluate MARS t
Replacement Equipment
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Module 3-Maintenance EQ Configurations
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Aging Degradation t
This violation is closed.
(Closed) Violation 302/88-27-02, FPC EQ Program Was Inadequate In That The Specified Instrument Accuracies Did Not Consider Error Contributions From All Components In The Loop (i.e., Cable Splices, And Penetrations) During Accident Conditions.
The licensee submitted his acknowledgement of this violation on November 18, 1988, and committed to have instrument loop accuracy
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and loop insulation resistance calculations for safety-related instrument loops prepared and placed in the EQ files.
These calculations are on site and a sample was examined by the inspector.
The system component evaluation sheets (SCEW) were modified. to reference the calculation number for the loop in which the component is installed.
The calculation sheet has. the SCEW sheet number listed to provide the cross referencing. This item is closed.
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InspectorFollowupItems(IFI)92701 (0 pen) IFI 302/88-19-01, No Specific. Identification For Instrumentation On The Control Boards.
Discussions with the operations personnel were held regarding the identification of Post Accident Monitoring Indications as identified by RG 1.97 categories 1 and 2.. The licensee reenforced his stand not to use any unique identifier for the RG 1.97 indicators based on the following information issued August 31, 1989 entitled " Main Control Board Indicator Identification of R.G 1.97 Instruments" RG 1.97, Revision 3, dated May 1983, states that RG 1.97 variables located in the main control room should be uniquely identified.
Specifically, Table 1, under Equipment Identification, states that
" type A, B, and C instru"!ents designated as categories 1 and 2 should l
be specifically identified with a consnon designation on the control panels so that the operator can easily discern that they are intended-
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for use under accident conditions."
RG 1.97 is a guide and not a legal requirement unless specifically endorsed.
FPC's position was reviewed and a detennination made to consciously not mark RG 1.97 indicators on the main control' board.
Our procedures are symptom oriented and do not specify which l
indicators the operators are to use.
The operators are trained to use the best available indications for~ particular situations.
Marking instruments for other special requirements such as' Appendix R etc would cause additional identification markings to be placed on
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control board instruments.
These markings add additional clutter to l
the control board.
Human factors guidelines suggests that multiple
color coded markings to indicators create too many uses for.the same i
color and therefore add confusion to the meaning of the' color
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definitions on the control board.
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Therefore FPC took exception to the RG 1.97 guidance to physically i
mark the control board indicators to identify RG 1.97 instruments.
This information will be forwarded to NRR for evaluation.
(Closed)
IFI 88-19-02, Verify That Containment Atmospheric Temperature Recorder is Located Preperly.
The, inspector discussed the fact that this recorder is located on the back panel of the main
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l control board with NRR personnel who advised that this location is
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It should be noted that i
the operator can trend or call for a print out of the containment temperatures as an additional method of monitoring this parameter, This
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item is closed.
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(Closed) IFI 88-19-03,- Verify Adequacy of. Emergency Power Source Indication.- Discussions with the operations personnel were held'regarding
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how the operators can verify that adequate power is available from-inverters 3A 3B, 3C and 3D; 250 VOC Batteries 3A and 3B; 4160 volt bus 3A
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and 3B and 480 volt Bus 3A and.38.
In addition to the indicating lights.
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there are annunciators to indicate failures of the listed equipment.
The annunciator signal is received from a different source.
It is felt that i
this provides the operator with adequate and reliable information in this-regard. This item is closed.
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(Closed) IFI 89-09-09, Operability of Reactor Coolant Inventory Tracking System (RCITs).
The inspector reviewed calculations for the. insulation
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resistance (IR) of the Weidemuller terminal blocks when 'used in harsh
environtents at CR-3. The IR values used for the calculation are based on data obtained for Weidmuller type SAK 4 terminal block qualification reports as follows:
Wyle Laboratories Report Number 58687, Revision A, dated August 5, 1982; Loss of Coolant Accident Testing of Five Wiedmuller Terminal Blocks for Washington Public Power Supply System, FRC File No.
W179-3TR-002.
FRC Final Report F-C5205-3 dated October 1979 " Qualification Test Programs for Terminal Blocks, FRC File No. W179-3TR-001.
I One conclusion stated is " The IR is at least three orders of magnitude I
greater than the wire resistance and lead length compensation, and in l
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general has only a second order effect in measurement accuracy".
Therefore the IR value of 3.2X10 ohms can be used for Wiedmuller terminal blocks at temperatures of 300*F and below.
Additionally, MAR 89-05-01-02 was developed to modify the terminal boxes by drilling drain holes.
This item is closed.
6.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 1,'1989,
.with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed above.
Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information
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is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee, l
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