IR 05000302/1985037

Insp Rept 50-302/85-37 on 850817-0925.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts & Plant Startup from Mods

ML20209H589
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/29/1985
From:	Panciera V, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209H560	List: IR 05000302/1985037 ML20209H554
References
50-302-85-37, NUDOCS 8511110175
Download: ML20209H589 (12)

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1 Report No.: 50-302/85-37 Licensee: . Florida Power. Corporation 3201 34th Street, South a

St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72 Facility Name: Crystal River 3 Inspection' Dates: August 17 - September 25, 1985 Inspection at Crystal River site near Crystal River, Florida Inspector: I T. F. St(tka, Sen M- / N J / 9' T Date Signed

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RepentInspector

' Accompanying P rsonne : . E. Tedrow, Resident Inspector Approved by: .

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fAA udl w V. W. Pan 61 eta, ChieT, Project Section 28, to f2 'l V Date S~i~gned Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection involved 164 inspector-hours on site by two resident. inspectors in ti.e areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, Plant startup from modificatior.s and refueling outage, special inspection of station battery spare cells, and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations' observed. Some of these tours and observations were conducted on backshift Results: No violations or deviations were identifie .

8511110175 851030 PDR ADOCK 05000302 O PDR

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REPORT DETAILS 1.' Persons Contacte Licensee Erployees

• J. Alberdi, Manager, Site Nuclear Operations Technical Services

• G. Boldt, Nuclear Plant Operations Manager

• Breedlove, Nuclear Records Manager

• Brown,~ Nuclear Electrical /I&C Supervisor

• Clarke, Radiation Protection Manager

• Green, Nuclear Licensing Sp'ecialist

• Hernandez, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist E. Howard, Director, Site Nuclear Operations

• M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist

?*P. McKee, Nuclear Plant Manager

• V.~Roppel,. Nuclear Plant Engineering and Technical Services Manager

• W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager

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• P. Skramstad, Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection Superintendent

• R. Wittman, Nuclear Operatfor.s Superintendent

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Other' personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chem / rad and corporate personne * Attended exit-interview Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the - conclusion of the inspection on September 25, 1985. During this meeting, the' inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the

. Unresolved Item and Inspector Followup Item The licensee did'not identify

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as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/82-18-02): The licensee issued Revision 1 to- LER 50-302/82-50 in which it was stated that the motor operators of the four valves in question (EFV-3, 4, 7, and 8) would be left electrically disconnected and that the valves would be locked in an open

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position. The operation - of these valves is not necessary for proper

operation of the emergency feedwater syste (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/81-07-04)

The licensee issued

! Revision 1 to LER 50-302/81-22 to identify'the cause of the failure and to L discuss the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. The failure was l- caused by an apparent flow imbalance across the Main Steam Isolation Valve L (MSIV) due to a high differential pressure across the closed valve. To ( prevent recurrence of this failure, the licensee has installed bypass valves

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. 2 cround each of the MSIVs and slowed the opening time of the valve to assure adequate time for pressure equalization during openin (0 pen) Unresolved Item (302/85-33-02): The licensee has determined that valve FWV-158 was deleted by Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) modification MAR 80-10-66-04. The inspecto: has reviewed this modification package and is satisfied with this determination. The licensee is planning to revise the feedwater system drawing FD-302-081 to delete this valve. This item will remain open pending the licensee's revision to the drawin (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/85-04-03): The licensee replaced the original governor with a modified governor that will start controlling the turbine speed immediately upon opening of the steam emission valv This governor, thereforo, responds much faster than the original unit and will prevent turbine overspeed if the shaft is rotating prior to turbine star During the past refueling outage, this governor was removed and replaced with the original governor because a NUREG-0737 plant modification to add a parallel steam emission valve (ASV-204) negated the use of the new governo While the original steam emission valve (ASV-5) was replaced with a new valve and no steam leakage past either ASV-5 or ASV-204 presently exists, the possibility of leakage in the future is feasible. The licensee has issued a Field Problem Report (FPR) to investigate a new design that will allow use of the new governor with the current valve configuratio (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/85-11-04): The licensee has repaired the packing leak on valve SFV-20. The inspector has reviewed the work package used to replace the packing on this valve and has no adverse finding (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/85-29-06): The licensee has reviewed the discrepancies identified in Modification (MAR) 82-09-22-01 and the corrective action taken by the license The licensee has counseled the personnel involved who failed to adhere to procedure requirements, and has corrected the minor administrative mistakes made in the modification package. The licensee has also reviewed four associated MAR packages to determine if this problem was generic. After discussing of the evaluation with licensee representatives, the inspector concluded that this problem was not generic. This matter was reviewed in accordance with the current NRC enforcement policy and is considered to be a licensee identified violation in which appropriate corrective actions were taken to prevent recurrenc (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (302/84-29-02): Investigation of the relay failure problem by the licensee and the vendor that designed the system indicates that the failures may not be due to the Agastat relays. This conclusion is based upon the fact that the failures only occur on two of the four channels. As a result of this conclusion, the licensee is planning to install monitoring equipment on the affected channels with the hope that the cause of the failure can be identified. Based upon the results of this monitoring, appropriate corrective actions can be initiate I~

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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (302/84-21-05): The licensee's

. . investigation determined that the -inadvertent isolation of the waste gas decay tank (WGDT) monitoring system was caused by an inadequacy in procedure CH-341, Sampling the Makeup Tank Gas Space. This procedure did not provide an adequate . return to normal following system sampling. As a result, procedure CH-341 has been revised to assure an adequate return to norma . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 5.b.(6) of this repor . Review of Plant Operations The plant started this inspection period in the hot standby mode (Mode 3).

Deboration was begun and on August 18, 1985, at 6:27 a.m., the reactor was taken critica The inspectors observed the approach to criticality and verified that required testing was completed, that technically adequate procedures were in use, and that criticality occurred within expected limit Following initial criticality and zero power physics testing, the plant began power operation (Mode 1) on August 19, at 10:40 On August 20, at 9:02 a.m. , due to a rupture of a main turbine steam drain line, the main turbine was manually tripped causing an anticipatory reactor tri Following ' drain line weld repairs, the reactor was restarted that same day at 6:44 p.m. only to experience another reactor trip due to a feedwater transient creating a high Reactor Coolant System pressure condition. (See paragraph 7 for further details of these two events.) After adjustments were made to the Integrated Control System (ICS) and repairs completed on the feedwater- system, the reactor was restarted on August 21, at 5:30 Faulty repairs to the same main turbine steam drain line contributed to a second rupture of the lin Consequently, at 7:13 a.m. , on August 22, the -

unit was shutdown to cold shutdown (Mode 5) to effect repairs to the steam drain line and replace the main turbine's governor valve The steam line ruptures are believed to be caused by the newly installed modified governor valves which were creating excess steam pipe vibration On August 28, repairs to the main turbine were completed and reactor startup was commence At 2:30 a.m. , the reactor was critical, but due to an erratic absolute position indication on a control rod, the reactar was shutdown to Mode 3 at 3:45 After the faulty rod position indication was repaired, the reactor was again taken critical at 5:40 a.m. and the

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.-plant' entered Mode.1 atL6:40 a.m. where it remained for the duration of this

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inspection period. . '-

' . Shift-Logs and Facility Records-

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-.The inspector': reviewed records and discussed various entries ' with

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operations' personnel . to verify compliance with the Technical

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l'- Specifications (TSs) and the licensee's administrative procedure The following records were reviewed:

Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's . Log; Equipment Out-of-

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' Service-Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log;

. Active Clearance Log;.. Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Work Request-

Log; Short Term Instructions (STIs); and selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Log In addition to these record . reviews, - the inspector independently o < verified clearance order tagouts.

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No violations or deviations were identifie Facility Tours and Observations

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were - conducted. to L ' observe . operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some'

operations and maintenance-activity observations were conducted during backshifts. :Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings were: attended by the- inspector to observe planning and management ~

activities.

l - The'_ facility tours and . observations encompassed the ~ following areas:

!- Security Perimeter Fence; Control ' Room; Emergency Diesel Generator

' Room; Auxiliary - Building; Intermediate Building; Battery Rooms; Electrical Switchgear-Rooms; and Reactor Buildin During these tours, the following observations were made:

-(1)- Monitoring Instrumentation - The following ' instrumentation was observed to -verify that- indicated parameters were in ~accordance with.the TSs for the current operational mode:

Equipment. operating status; area, atmospheric, . and liquid radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating parameter "

'During these observations, the inspector reviewed operating _

procedure . OP-103, Plant Curve Book, figure 7.10 to determine emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tank levels. This-table compares indicated level, measured in feet and inches, to equivalent volume, measured in gallons. The table's level column

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, 5 in _ feet and inches, is designated as " Indicator"; however,'the

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numbers actually reflect a " dipstick" reading. -A note at the-bottom of this procedure specifies that the' indicated volume is a- .

. dipstick reading and that-to obtain the tank volume'using the tank level indicator, six inches ~ must' be added -to the indicator readin The ; inspector found this note confusing and, after discussions with . plant personnel, determined - that a procedure clarification was in orde The inspector noted that an appropriate resolution' was to relabel the level column as

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.. . " dipstick" in lieu of " indicator". This resolution was discussed

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with responsible -licensee representatives who acknowledged the -

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inspector's. remarks .and agreed to review OP-103 for appropriate revision Inspector Followup Item (302-85-37-01): Review of licensee

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activities to revise OP-103 to clarify the level column in Figure 7.1 (2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of the emergency diesel generator system to verify that the lineup was. in accordance with licensee requirements for system opera-

-bility and that the system drawing and procedure correctly reflect

"as-built" plant condition No violations or deviations were identifie (3)- Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control t

room operations were being conducted in an orderly and profes-sional manne In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other. pertinent plant informa--

tion during these turnover No violations or deviations were identifie (4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components and cleanliness conditions of various - areas ' throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existe No violations or deviations were identifie (5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to verify : proper identification and implementation. These obser-vations included selected licensee conducted surveys, review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and area posting. Area postings were independently verified for

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\ monitoring . instrument. The inspector also reviewed selected radiation work permits and observed personnel use of protective b

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clothing, respirators, and personnel monitoring devices to assure -

i that : the: licensee's radiation. monitoring policies were being followe '

No; violations or. deviations.were identifie ,

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-(6) Security Control Security controls were observed to verify that'

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- security barriers are' intact, guard forces are on duty,- and access

.to : Protected ~ Area (PA)- is controlled in accordance with 'the -

facility ' security plan. Personnel within the PA were observed to '

verify proper, display of badges and that . personnel requiring escort were properly escorte Personnel within vital areas were

observed to~ ensure proper. authorization.for the are During a routine tour of the bers area, the inspector noticed that the security guard usually posted at the entrance to the Reacto Buil. ding Spray Additive Tank (BST-1) room was no longer ~ statione .This post had previously been stationed in response to a violation-identified by the NRC in Inspection - Report No. 50-302/84-23 e (Item.302/84-23-01).. Upon questioning licensee representatives,

= the : inspector was informed that new compensatory measures ' to control access to this area,- consisting of door modifications and a roving security guard were instituted. .The inspector.discusse'd his observations with NRC Region II Physical Security personne :NRC' Region II 'is presently evaluating the adequacy of these compensatory' measure In the . interim,' the licensee has re-established the' security guard post at the SST-1 room. This matter remains unresolved pending completion ' of ' the NRC 'f evaluatio ~ '

Unresolved Item (302/85-37-02): Determine the adequacy of compensatory measures taken by the licensee to control access to the BST-1 roo (7) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing- and equipment ~were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operabl '

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No violations or deviations were identifie (8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment

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operability; calibrated equipment, as required, were utilized; and TS requirements were followe ,

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.- The'following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

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SP'110,LReactor Protective. System Functional Testing;

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SP-112,g C alibration of.the Reactor Protection System;

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SP-113,~ Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration;

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SP-158,~ Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Calibration;

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SP-312,; Heat Balance Calculations;

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SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;

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SP-344, NuclearfServices Cooling System Operability;

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SP-349, Emergency Feedwater System Operability Demonstration;

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SP-401, Control Rod Programming Verification;

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SP-422,.RC System Heatup and Cooldown; '-

SP-425, Control Rod Drive Patch Panel Access Control;  ;

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SP-520, Weekly Batte.ry Check; and -

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SP-702, _ Reactor Coolant and Decay Heat' Daily Surveillance Program and associated procedure CH-10 ,

No violations or deviations were' identifie ,

1(9) Maintenance Activities -

The' inspector . observed maintenance l activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; Work Requests and Fire Prevention Work Permits, as '

required, were issued and being followed; Quality Contro < - personnel we're available for inspection ' activities as required; and TS requirements were being followe Maintenance was observed ~and work packages were reviewed-for the  !

following. maintenance activities:

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Troubleshooting abnormal gearbox noise from Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Pump -(SWP-1B) and pump alignment in '

accordance wi.th maintenance procedures MP-509 and MP-123,

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Repacking of. containment isolation valve CAV-7 in accordance with procedure-MP-111;

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Repscking of spent fuel system valve SFV-20; and

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Troubleshooting of -Reactor. Coolant System Pressure-Transmitter RC-38-PT-1 in accordance with procedure MP-53 No violations or deviations were identifie (10) - Radioactive Waste Controls - Selected liquid releases and solid waste compacting were observed to verify that approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were take No violations or deviations were identifie (11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed to ensure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that anchoring points were not bindin No violations or deviations were identifie . . Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrected actions appeared ' appropriat Events, which were reported -immediately, were reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TSs were satisfie LERs 84-11, 85-04, 85-09, 85-10, 85-11, 85-12, 85-13, and 85-15 were reviewed in accordance with current NRC enforcement polic LERs 84-11, 85-09, 85-10, 85-12, 85-13, and 85-15 are close LERs 85-04 and 85-11 remain open for the following reasons:

'(1) LER 85-04, .which reported the improper installation of concrete

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anchor supports for the Control Complex Heating and Ventilation (HVAC) System,'will remain open pending the inspector's review of the licensee's analysis of the remaining 34 deceit and deficient anchors to determine the adequacy of the supports as they exis (2) LER 85-11. reported the failure to verify the operability of the cable . tunnel sump pumps and remaining power source electrical lineup when the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator was out of service for maintenance as required by the TSs. The licensee's corrective actions include critiquing the event with operations personnel and implementation of appropriate procedure changes. This report will remain open pending completion of these corrective e:tion The inspector reviewed Non-Conforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to verify the following: compliance with the TSs, corrective actions as

' identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been l

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( , accomplished or fare being pursued for completion, generic items are

, identified andEreported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and . items are

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reported as required by TS All;NCORs~ were ~ reviewed in accordance with the current NRC enforcement-polic NCORs85-147,--85-160, and 85-184-reported excessive start times for the

'"A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG-3A). The licensee has replaced the

'EDG-3A . governor ~ and a fuel supply regulating relief valve (DFV-35) in an Lattempt to correct the slow starting tim These . repairs were

. completed on August 15, and although the diesel testing has been

- satisfactory after -those repairs, on September 13, another excessive start . time occurred. The inspector discussed this with licensee representatives and expressed his concern that the intermittent problem

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s of slow starting ~ times for EDG-3A may not yet be corrected. The licensee is presently performing an evaluation of1the excessive start

" time problem .and of the adequacy of corrective action already taken on EDG-3 Inspector Followup Item (302/85-37-03): Review the licensee's evaluation of the excessive start times for EDG-3A and adequacy of corrective actio Licensee Special Reports were reviewed to ensure that the information is technically . accurate, reporting requirements established in the TSs were satisfied, and corrective actions as identified in the reports-

-have been accomplished or are'being pursued for completio Special Reports 84-04, 84-05, and 85-03 were reviewed in accordance with current NRC enforcement policy and are close The issue discussed in report 85-03, regarding the calibration of the intermediate and high range channels of radiation monitors RM-Al and

.RM-A2, will continue to be tracked in accordance with NRC Inspector Followup Item (302/85-05-03).

17. 'Nonroutine Event Followup s

' At l9:02 a.m. on August 20, 1985, a reactor trip occurred from 21% of full power due to a rupture of a 2-inch-drain line on the main turbine high pressure crossover line. The operators tripped the main turbine to isolate the ruptured .line which also resulted in an anticipatory reactor tri Following repairs to the drain line, a reactor restart was - attempte However, at 6:44 p.m. , the reactor tripped from approximately 20% power. This -trip was caused by sluggish control of the feedwater control valves that resulted in excessive plant

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temperature and pressure oscillations with a subsequent automatic

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reactor trip' on high reactor coolant system pressure.

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'The inspector. reviewedf the ' plant's parameters,l conditions, and the licensee's post trip. evaluation and has no - further questions. on the

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02 ?a.m.~ : trip. The -inspector has' not completed his review of -the -

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Llicensee'sLpost trip evaluation for-the 6:44 p.m. tri Inspectoro Followup Item '(50-302/85-37-04); Review the licensee's post trip . evaluation ' for the reactor ' trip which occurred at 6:44 p.m. on

August 20,,198 _ . At~6:00 p.m....on August'30, the licensee declared an Unusual Event upon

' notification of a hurricane _ warning by the National Weather-Servic 'The licensee closed watertight flood control doors' and augmented the -

plant staff with additional operations and maintenance personne The inspector arrived. on site early the next morning and verified the status of the plant, ' availability of safety systems, compliance with Lthe facility's ~ TSs, and~ ensured that appropriate adverse weather procedures were being followed. The inspector periodically toured the facility checking the . licensee's tracking of the path of the hurricane and that meteorologica1' instrumentation was functioning properly and '

being : monitore The unusual event was exited on September 1, upon termination of the ' hurricane warning. The plant remained in . thel operating mode (Mode 1) for the duration of this event and no plant damage was. sustained by the stor At14:59 a.m. , on September 19, a Reactor Coolant System pressure transmitter (RC-38-PT-1) failed high. This caused the "B" Heactor Protection System (RPC) channel to trip, the pressurizer spray valve RCV-14 to open, the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)

~RCV-10 to open, and' pressurizer heaters to turn of The' tripping of only one RPS channel and prompt operator actions prevented a reactor trip. .The operators shut the PORV' block valve and t spray valve, and placed the pressurizer ~ heaters in manual to regain

~ plant contro The inspectors reviewed this event and noted that the plant experienced a pressure transient of approximately 90 psig and that no other plant-abnormalities occurred. The inspectors have no further questions on

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this even . Station Battery Spare Cell Storage

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's storage and maintenance practices of

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station battery spare cells to determine if these activities were sufficient to ensure that these cells 'were available if needed to replace a station battery cel j

- The' licensee had six spare cells in storage. All cells were stored wet and four of the cells are connected to a battery charger. The licensee checks i'

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the four cells connected to the battery charger on a weekly basis in accordance with surveillance procedure SP-52 During this review, the inspector noted that the two unconnected cells were stored in their shipping boxes in the "A" battery room. Labels on these boxes read that the cells were due for charging by December 198 Discussions with and subsequent research by plant personnel indicated that these cells had never been charged. As a result of this discussion, these two cells were discarde Review of the weekly data from SP-520 for the remaining four cells indicated that the cell voltages had degraded below the procedure required 2.15 volts to 2.06 volts though this voltage degradation was not reflected in the cell specific gravity results (they were within specification). Subsequent reviews of this data by supervisory plant personnel failed to identify the degraded conditions. It appears that this degradation occurred during the week of August' 19 and continued until the data was reviewed by the inspecto When notified of these conditions by the inspector, the licensee began an investigation. This investigation revealed that the spare cell battery charger voltage setting had been inadvertently lowered and that procedure SP-520 was inadequate to ensure that spare cell degraded conditions would be identified and correcte The licensee has reset the battery charger voltage to bring the spare cell voltage into specification and will revise procedure SP-520 to ensure that the spare cell condition will be adequately monitore Inspector Followup Item (302/85-37-05): Review the licensee's activities to correct spare cell voltages and to revise SP-520 to ensure that spare battery cells are properly monitored.

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