IR 05000302/1973005
| ML19319C909 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1973 |
| From: | Crossman W, Vallish E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319C894 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-73-05, 50-302-73-5, NUDOCS 8003040859 | |
| Download: ML19319C909 (21) | |
Text
- -. _. -
- - _. -
~
.O
~
>
-
.
'
b 8 '. %.
UNITED STATES
/
q ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIO.N
!
eD-
'
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
.i y
REGloNll - $UtT E 818 C
N
,[
230 PE ACHT R EE ST R E ET. NORT HwEST
'$, D
_1 T a ts e o.g: t4043 sae.asos
4rgs 0 AT1. A NT A. GEORo a A 30303
'
RO Inspection Report No. 50-302/73-5 Licensee: Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Facility Name:
Crystal River 3 Docket No.:
50-302 License No.:
CPPR-51 Category:
A2 Location:
Crystal River, Florida Type of License: B&W, PWR, 2452 Et
'
Type of Inspection: Routine, Unancounced Construction Dates of Inspection: June 12-15,1973 Dates of Previous Inspection: April 24-27, 1973
.
Responsible Inspector:
E. J. Vallish, Reactor Inspector Facilities.Section Facilities Construction Branch Accompanying Inspectors:
F. U. Bower, Reactor Inspector Engineering Section Facilities Construction Branch Other Accompanying Personnel:
A. R. Herdt, Metallurgical Engineer
,
'
Engineering Section 111 ties Construction Branch Principal Inspector:
'r
[~ 2 N 7.3 E. g Vallish, Reactor Inspector Date
)
Facilities Section Facilities Construction Branch U
p Reviewed By:
+4 j
W. A. Crossman, Senior Inspector Date
,
Facilities Section
,
Facilities Construction Branch 8003040 M.7
,
-_
_ _ _. _
_ _.
.._~....--a,-
--n..
.
.
mn.
~
.a
. ~ __ _ -> a
.
.
i
.
,
-
,
.
f_,
-
,.
'
.
.
,
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5-2-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS I.
Enforcement Action A.
Violations
-
None B.
Safety Items None II.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters A.
Violations
'
73-1/Al Decay Heat and Makeup and Purifications Systems Welding O.
Welding performed was not in accordance with the qualified welding procedure.
The licensee's evaluation of his review and additional NDT required is not yet complete; therefore, this item remains open.
(Details II, paragraph 2)
73-1/A2 Decay Heat and Makeup and Purification Systems Radiography Radiography of welds was not in accordance with the pre-scribed procedure.
The licensee's audit of radiography showed additional problems in the radiographic inspection area.
This item remains open until deficiencies in radio-graphic inspection are identified and resolved.
(Details II,
paragraph 3)
-
B.
Safety Items
-
f None
-
l
/
_. -
.
-
.-
.
-_
.. _
_
__
-
~
-
Eh I
)
'O '
.
.
-
'
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5-3-III. New Unresolved Items At the, conclusion of this inspection, 14 items remained unresolved.
73-5/1 Weld Material control The licensee is to review the main warehouse storage area to ensure adequate separation and storage of weld rod material.
This item remains open.
(Details II, paragraph 5)
73-5/2 Safety Valve Piping
Assurance is required that safety valve piping design criteria did include dynamic force reactions.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 2)
73-5/3 Control Rod Drive Motor Tube Extension Discontinuities (m T
Verification of acceptance criteria and determination if any thin wall tubes are to be installed is required.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
73-5/4 Limitorque Valve Operator Failures
'
Modification oi certain models of Limitorque valve operators installed in safety related systems is to be accomplished.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
,
73-5/5 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Undervoltage Trip Assembly Deficiency Deficiencies in design or manufacture of these trip assemblies resulted in a generic problem requiring subcontractor action for resolution.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 5)
'
73-5/6 Faulty Overcurrent Trip Delay yavice in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems Survey for installation of faulty circuit breakers of a particular model was completed.
This item is closed.
)
(Details I, paragraph 6)
-
.
a
..
_-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _
.
. __
.- __
...
.
(
\\
.
N
.
-
.
RO Rpt. N. 50-302/73-5-4-o
.
73-5/7 Differential Pressure (D/P) Cell Survey The use of a certain model DP cell that has a history of J
maloperation is to be determined, and cny required corree-tive action will be initiated.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 7)
73-5/8 Failure of Valve Disk Retainers A particular model valve has had many failures concerning mechanical set points. None of this model are to be used at Crystal River 3.
This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 8)
73-5/9 Paddle-Type Flow Switches
-
The applicant is determining if any of these type switches are installed in adverse environments.
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 9)
73-5/10 yoids in Concrete Under Personnel Hatch Inspection of the finished repair indicated no further ques-tions.
This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 10)
73-5/11 Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks Masking tape placed on these tanks for special markings have been removed.
This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 11)
.
The applicant directed an audit of the NSSS supplier and
'
the report will be reviewed later.
This item is open.
(Details I, paragraph 13)
73-5/13 Reactor Vessel Incore Instrument Nozzles The redesigned incore instrument nozzles in the bottom of the reactor vessel have been installed.
Inspection indi-
-
cated no further questions.
(Details I, paragraph 14)
O l
(s_/
t l
I l
'
.
,. _.
-
-..., _
n.-.~,.---n..-..
. a... u..,- e - ~- -. ~.
.
-
m
-
'
.r
.
.
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5-5-l 73-5/14 Reactor Internals Modification i
Modification to these internals is being accomplished in j
the vendor shops prior to delivery to the site.
This item i
remains open.
(Dett.ls I, paragraph 15)
73-5/15 Quality Assurance Audits The licensee agreed that quality assurance audits should be closed promptly and will investigate and rectify the i
situation as to their deliquency.
This item remains open.
-
(Details II, paragraph 8)
'
73-5/16 Cable Installation A potential problem of space and circuit separation exists in the cable spreading area.
The licensee agreed to make a
,
detailed analysis of space needs and make an evaluation of
,
the present capabilities of the spreading room and slot layout.
This item remains open.
(Details III, paragraph 6)
,
'
IV.
Status of Previousiv Reported Unresolved Items 71-5/5 Cleanliness Procedures in Piping and Components
.
The licensee has prepared and issued two general cleaning
~
procedures, FPC W-67 and FPC W-68, and Regulatory Operations has no further questions at this time.
This item is resolved.
(Details II, paragraph 6)
72-3/5 Procedures for Final Inspection of Piping There has been no change in status.
This item remains open.
~
72-5/3 Valve Wall Thickness Requirements
There has been no change in status'.
This item remains open.
73-1/2 Suspect Lack of Material Control - Weld Filler Material B&W Topical Report BAW-1402 is being reviewed for adequacy.
'
This item remains open.
(Details I, paragraph 12)
\\
-
.
-
.
_ - -
. _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
.
_
. _
_ - - - - -
-
.
-
-
- $
.
.
d
-
-
,.
.
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5-6-
73-3/1 Radiography of Piping The licensee has reviewed Babcock and Wilcox Construction Company's radiographic procedure 9T-102A and radiographs with regard to penetrameter placement.
The licensee is still reviewing M.-W. Kellogg's radiographic procedure and evaluating their radiographs with regard to the primary
'
usage of film side penetrameters. This item remains open.
(Details II, paragraph 4)
V.
Design Changes None
.
VI.
Unusual Occurrences On June 14, 1973, a gang box containing cadwald powder caught fire and was completely burned. Minor fire damage occurred to a neighboring skid shack and office trailer.
VII. Other Significant Findings A.
Project Status Overall construction is estimated to be 76% complete.
Welding on the main coolant loop has not yet been started. Reinforcing steel is in place for the first lift of concrete in the contain-ment ring girder.
B.
Personnel Changes
'
No significant changes observed.
VIII.
,Mr la tment Interview
.
fhe a t tendees of the management interview included the following:
Florida Power Corporation M. H. Kleinman - Manager, Generation Quality and Standcrds H. L. Bennett - Director, Generation Construction
_
C. E.-Jackson - Construction Superintendant D. W. Pedrick - Quality Engineer
'
-
.
.
.
--
-
. _ _ __ _ _ -_____
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
w._,
-
-~_a-----~_
..
-
.m
.
,
N(0
.
.
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5-7-Gilbert Associates Incorporated (GAI)
S. R. Buckingham - Site Coordinator (Quality Assurance)
Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories (PTL)
G. B. Browne - Chief Inspector Babcock & Wilcox Construction t,ompany (L&W)
J. R. McGill - Q. C. Supervisor A.
The status of Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters above was discussed in detail.
B.
The New Unresolved Items above were discussed in detail including the fact that the list includes a recap of all past open items that were in the Docket fiJe, and that all the open items, both violations (
and unresolved items, will always appear in the most recent report.
When these actions are resolved, the item will be closed out in the
current report and the item removed from future listings.
!
C.
The status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items was discussed in detail.
.
%
Y
=
D
-
_
_ _
-
_
-
.
.. -.
_.__o__
-
..
--
'
O
.
T.
(s)
-
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 I-l
-
DETAILS I Prepared By:
[ Yd-73 E.J.fallish, Reactor Date Inspector, Facilities Section, Facilities Construction Branch Da*es of Inspection: June 12-15, 1973 6!20!73 Reviewed By:'W. A. Crossman, Senior emh
/ Dale Inspector, Facilities Section, Facilities Construction Branch
-
1.
Individuals Contacted a.
Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
H. L. Bennett - Director, Generation Construction D. W. Pedrick, IV - Quality Engineer b.
Babcock and Wilcox Construction Company (B&W)
J. R. McGill - QC Supervisor 2.
Safety Valve Piping
.
As a result of a failure of the main stream line safety valve manifold at one plant, engineering at all new plants is to assure that their safety valve piping designs include considera-tion of all forces acting on these pipe systems, including the dynamic reactions. Gilbert Associates, the architect-engineer for Crystal River 3, is presently reviewing the designs of these pipe systems.
This items remains open.
(RO:II Letter to J. T. Rodgers dated December 10, 1971)
-
e b
U
.
_ _.. ~ _
...
- -.
.._.
....
...-
_ :. -- -7
_ --
_
~'
m j
.
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5-I-2
'
i 3.
Control Rod Drive Motor Tube Extension Discontinuities
<
Some B&W reactor control rod drive motor tube extensions exhibited localized variations in wall thickness and dis-continuities on the inner surface, not detected by ultra-sonic testing techniques certified to be in accordance with ASME Code,Section III. All neventy-FPC motor tube extensions were returned to B&W where they were reexamined to conform to the technical requirements specified in report BAW-10047, Revision I.
All seventy units were returned to the Crystal River site along with their inspection data packages as having been " inspected and reworked / replaced" in accordance with BAW-10047, Revision I.
FPC is now preparing to review the data packages to verify con-formation to the acceptance criteria as specified in BAW-10047, Revision I, and FPC will determine if'any thin walled tubes are to be installed, and if so, how many; and where they are located.
This item remains open.
4.
Limitorque Valve Operator Failures Directorate of Regulatory Operations Bulletin No. 72-3 of the same referenced title, identified Limitorque Models SMB-00 and SMB4000 valve operators as being used extensively on safety related systems at a number of power reactor construction sites.
.
This bulletin requested certain actions on behalf of the app 1'i-
'
cants.
FPC has been responsive to this action and changeout of the applicable operators is underway at the site.
B&W completed changeout of the operators they procured during April 1973.
FPC has contacted Limitorque to supply replacements to those, other than the B&W valve operators, and FPC Engineering is studying the implications. This item remains open.
5.
Control Rod Drive (CRD) Undervoltage Trip Assembly Deficiency
'
Recent incidents at another site indicate deficiencies in 1:he design or manufacture of these trip assemblies which result in excessive heating in the undervoltage coil and loss of tension in the trip assembly spring which opens the breaker.
Investi-gation indicated that the applicant is aware of this deficiency and B&W is acting to resolve it.
This item remains open.
-
.
'
,.,wqs
.we.
.,
r,n,m-,
,
-,a
,,, -, _ -. - -,, -,,,,,,,. -,.,,, - -.,,
,-m,-,
g, n.
-
.
- - -.. - - - - - - - - - -
-
.-;
-.
-
.
,
-
.-G.~._
_
-_-
L
--u.
- a.:-
_
,
- -
)
,
.
,
,
%
i
.
.
,
,
,
.
s T
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 I-3
,
I 6.
Faulty Overcurrent Trip Delay Device in Circuit Breakers for i
'
' Engineered Safety Systems
,
i
)
Regulatory Operations Bulletin No. 73-1 provided information on
.the subject circuit breakers. The applicant was responsive to the AEC inquiry ~on these breakers and'has determined that there-are none of this type breaker installed or to be installed at
,
Crystal River 3.
This item is closed.
7.
Differential Pressure (D/P) Cell Survey Maloperational problems are being experienced at certain sites
'
l concerning erratic behavior of the Barton Model 386 D/P cell.
Similar models are the Models 368 and 384 which also contain the
'
element causing the problem. The use of any of these D/P cells by the applicant will be determined, and any indicated corrective action will be initiated.
This item is open.
,
8.
Failure of Valve Disk Retainers l
AEC Reactor Construction Experience Bulletin (RCE) 73-1 describes the failure of valve disk retainers in several copes-Vulcan 14-inch
motor-operated gate valves installed in safety-related piping systems
[
of reactor power plants. The subject was reviewed with the applicant who was aware of this deficiency. The applicant could find no record
,
of this type valve being procured or installed at Crystal River 3.
There are no further questions 9.
Paddle-Type Flow Switches AEC Reactor Construction Experience (RCE) 72-3 describes failures
.'
of paddle-type activating mechanisms which were immersed in the fluid flow path and pieces of which became detached and lost in
-
the plant piping systems. The applicant is determining if any
,
of this type switch is to be installed in Crystal River 3 and
.
will determine future action on that basis. This item remains
!
'
open.
.
10. Voids in Concrete Under the Personnel Hatch
'
Placement of concrete under the personnel hatch resulted in a i
void formation necessitating excavation and replacement of
'
O concrete and reinforcement steel.
Referencing CDR-32 of
'
Docket No. 50-302, and the report of repairs by the appli-j..
~ cants' letter to RO Headquarters dated January 17, 1973, and
,
,
e
'
i s lA
.
..
-
.
.
_
_
.
_.._ _ _ -_._..- _._.
-
.
-
-.
.-
. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
_
-
...-.__,_ _,.. _
_.... _ _
-
.
m x
-
m
~
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 I-4
~
RO Headquarters' letter to the applicant dated February 6, 1973, acknowledging receipt of said report.
Inspection at the plant of the final placement of concrete and patching of the contain-ment shell resulted in no discrepancies.
This item is closed.
<
11. Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks During the Region II insp : tion of May 24-26, 1972, the inspector observed green cloth masking tape being used on the tanks to iden-tify certain locations. The applicant stated that these tapes would be removed after work was completed. These tanks were inspected during this inspection and all tape had been re~ moved.
There are no further questions.
12. Suspect Lack of Material Control - Weld Filler Material B&W report BAW-1402 analyzes this problem concerning records of the weld filler material used in the steam generators. Technical details are being reviewed at AEC Headquarters.
This item remains open pend-ing AEC Headquarters action.
13. FPC Audit of B&W The applicant's representative informed the inspector that FPC's contractor,.GE-Apollo, conducted a QS management audit of the NSSS contractor, B&W. The results of the audit are in a report presently in the St. Petersburg offices of FPC.
A copy will be sent to the site in the near future. Region II will review this audit for s~ cope, depth, findings and followup during a future inspection. This item remains open.
i 14. Reactor Vessel Incore Instrument Nozzles Inspection of the subject nozzles indicated that the redesigned type nozzles have been installed in the reactor vessel bottom.
Present work consists of geometrically mapping the physical
'
locations of the free end of these nozzles for anticipated.
.
i l
mating of the incore instrumentation guide tubes from the lower j
grid assembly. This item is closed.
l 15. Reactor Internals Modifications
[
t The B&W QC Supervisor informed the inspector that the reactor internals will receive the changes described in the BAW-10051 Topical Report while they are being fabricated, and before they are sent to the field.
This item remains open pending field inspection.
I
,_
. -. -
... -
.
~
q N
-
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 II-1
,
DETAILS II Prepared By:
hm,
[w
/
4/7 y
,
(
R". Hefjlt'
gf
~'Date tallurgical Engineer Engineering Section Facilities Construction Branch Dates of Inspection: June 12-15, 1973 Reviewed By:
[
M-,,,
b !Z9
VBryhnf '
'Dat'e ' '
nior Inspector Engineering Section Facilities Construction Branch 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Florida Power Corporation (FPC)
H. L. Bennett - Director, Generation Construction C. E. Jackson - Construction Superintendent l
D. W. Pedrick - Quality Engineer L. R. Wade - Mechanical Quality Engineer b.
Contractor Organizations
-
(1) J. A. Jones Construction Company (JAJ)
J. R. Amundson - Site Quality Control Supervisor (2) Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory (PTL)
G. Maksin - NDT Supervisor G. B. Browne - Chief Inspector
.
(3) Gilbert Associates, Inc. (CAI)
S. R. Buckingham - Site QA Coordinator (4) Babcock and Wilcox Construction Comoany (B&W)
j J. R. McGill - Quality Control Supervisor
~
-
,
.
, ~
- -.,..,. -
- -,, - - -
-, ~,
-, -
-. -, -.
-
.
.
-
.
-
-
-
- -
i
'
._.w_,._.:
-..
.. ~ ~,. -
.. -. - ~. - - -
-
- - - - --
~
.i
-
.
-
i
-
~_-
.
I RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 II-2
2.
Decay Heat and Makeuo and Purification Syctem Welding
The inspector reviewed the action taken on this previcus vioiation (73-1/A1). The licensee has_ reviewed 730 completed field weld ~
data sheets-NCR 0355 dated April 19, 1973, reported that the 19
.
weldments made with 1/8-inch diameter filler metal, which was not called out by the weld procedure SS-1-TIG,.have been 100%
radiographically inspected.
The RI results showed that four welds were ' rejected and are being reworked. Thirty-four welds which were welded without the prescribed 1/16-inch diameter filler metal have been radiographed.
The licensee has not yet completed the required evaluations on this violation and agreed that the item remains open.
3.
Decay Heat and Makeup and Purification System Radiograohy The inspector reviewed the action taken on this previous violation (73-1/A2). The licensee recalled all film for review of penetrameter
i
location. Furthermore, the licensee performed an audit covering L
Procedure No. SP-2891, " Field Fabrication and Erection of Piping "
'
on May 21,1973, (Audit No. 22) on pipe welding of the waste disposal, spent fuel and reactor building spray systems. The.
.
findings of the audit showed several radiographs to be in violation of the PTL procedure for radiographic inspection, PTL-Q7, in.the following areas:
a.
Film Density - PTL Q-7, paragraph 3.3 b.
Penetrameter Placement - PTL Q-7, paragraph 4.6 c.
Film Quality - PTL Q-7, paragraph 3.4 d.
BT reports incomplete or inaccur. te - PTL Q-7, paragraph 9.1
-
The audit also revealed that several accepted field weld data sheets were incomplete and/or incorrect.
Based on the findings of this audit, PTL is reviewing all radiographs for film quality, which includes but is not limited to density requitements, penetrameter placement, and film identification.
Futhermore, PTL is reviewing all radiographs for weld interpretation, acceptance or rejection, as well as for recording of all indications
-
found durin;' radiographic interpretation of the weldments onto the radiographic interpretation report together with the disposition,
,
,
accuracy _and completeness of the report.
I
_
- -
- -
- -
.
.
__
_
..
-
.
S
<
l Y
~
T4 Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 II-3 The inspector and the licensee reviewed radiographs for velds 106 DH,
,
156 DH, 'and 320 W that had been reevaluated by PTL. This review indicated that all radiographic indications were not being recorded on the radiographic interpretation report and that the film density and density variation appeared to be marginal.
Film density and deasity variation could not be accurately measured since a correctly operating densitometer was not available onsite and film strips, even though acceptable by code, involve operator interpretation. PTL concurred that the radiographs needed another reevaluation and that a satisfactory working densitometer was required to ensure code acceptable film density and density variation.
The licensee further stated that the field weld data sheets are also being reviewed for completeness and accuracy.
The licensee is investigating and evaluating additional quality control steps to ensure satisfactory review of all radiographs and field weld data
-
sheets prior to final acceptance.
This item remains open until radiographs and the associated radio-graphic interpretation reports together with the field weld data sheets are reviewed and found to be in accordance with the appropriate procedures and specifications.
The licensee agrees that the required actions on this violation are not complete.
l 4.
Radiography of Pioing
-
The licensee has reviewed B&W radiographic procedure 9T-102A and nondestructive examination instruction 9T-RT 200 with comments being submitted to B&W. The licensee has performed an audit
!
(Audit No.19 dated May 4,1973) covering B&W pipe welding and i
radiographs of core flood, decay heat and makeup and purification
}
systems.
The B&W radiographs were acceptable with regard to penetrameter
.
placement (source vs. film side) in accordance with ASME B&PV Code,Section III. However, deficiencies, including wrong size penetrameter and not enough exposure, were found. B&W is reviewing all film, field weld data sheets and other appropriste documentation to ensure
-
l that it is correct and accurate.
The licensee is reviewing M. W. Kellogg's (MWK) Radiographic Procedure
ES-403 and evaluating their radiographs with regard to the primary
,
usage of film side penetrameters since the procedure states that (M)
the film side penetrameter will be used only when physically
!
.
}
.
.
. _.
.
-. -__
_ _.___
_
_...
.
~
.
.
.
s
~
RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 II-4
impossible to use a source side penetrameter.
Radiographs on.
-s'
main steam weld No. 41 and decay heat weld No.127, seam A,
,
are examples of the use of a film side penetrameter in lieu of -
,
source side, even though the' radiographic source was placed in the inside diameter of the pipe.
The licensee is to discuss with MWK the reasons a source side penetrameter was o.ot used.
,
The licensee concurred that this item is to remain open until
,
{
resolution with MRK is obtained.
5.
Weld Material Control
'
The inspector performed a walk-through inspection of control of welding materials in order to verify adequate implementation of FPC W-21,
" Weld Rod Control," and B&W Procedure 9A-158, " Storage, ' Handling, and
Issuing of Welding Materials for Nuclear Contracts." The inspector observed and reviewed the main warehouse storage area, weld rod issue stations, the stainless steel fabrication shop, the weldors
in the field welding of core spray piping and the reactor building area.
The inspector found, in the stainless steel fabrication shop, stainless steel filler wire that could not be traced to a heat number. -The licensee immediately destroyed this weld rod. The main warehouse storage
.
'
area had accepted weld rod material next to incoming, not yet accepted, j
'
weld rod material.
In a locked area, he had accepted and hold weld rod material adjacent to each other., Even though there were correct tags
"
associated with the material, there is a possibility that a mixup of
,
accepted and not yet accepted, or hold, weld rod material could occur.
'
The licensee concurred that this was a possibility and agreed to
investigate this situation to ensure adequate separation and storage of weld rod material. This item will be examined during the next
inspection.
l 6.
Cleaning Procedures
'
l.
The licensee has prepared and issued two general cleaning procedures,
,
'
!
FPC W-67, " Procedure for Removing Rust and Other Surface Contaminants from Stainless Steel Surfaces," and FPC W-68, " Cleaning of Stainless l'
Steel Prior to Thermal Insulation." The inspector reviewed these
'
'
general cleaning procedures and found them satisfactory. The licensee
agreed that other cleaning procedures will.be written as the need is defined. The inspector considers this item resolved.'
.
$
.
!
l.
.
-
..
.
.
.
- -. - -
-.. -. - -...
.
-.-
,
~
,
.
"
,
.
RO'Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5-II-5
.
7.
Class I Piping
.
a.
Followup Record Review of Velding
-
There was no welding record review performed on field welds since all field weld data sheets, both from Livsey and Company and B&W, are being reviewed for accuracy and completeness. This is a result of the audits performed by FPC (Audit Nos.19 and 22)
which uncovered errors and omissions in field weld documentation.
b.
Followup Observations of Welding The inspector observed the welding of core flood field weld 24 along with the field weld documentation and weld rod control identification.
The weld procedure was available at the work site and appropriate visual inspections were performed and signed off. The inspector visually inspected the partially comoleted weld of core flood field weld No. 24 and the completed weld on decay heat weld No. 164 in weld profile, arc strikes, weld
'
splatter, contour, undercut and uniformity of weave. The welds appea' red 6f adequate quality with no evidence of are strikes or weld splattar.
There were no deficiencies or violations identified j.
in this area.
i c.
Followup Record Review of Piping
The inspector reviewed records and welds for spool pieces,
i decay heat No.127 and main steam Nos. 41 and 29.
Material certification records for' chemical composition and mechanical properties were reviewed. The records indicated that the piping met material specifications. The nondestructive testing records and radiographic film were reviewed. The only deficiency noted was the penetrameter placement on
.INI 127, suam A, weld and MS-41 previously discussed in paragraph 4.
There were no other deficiencies or violations identified in this arer.
'
8.
Quality Assurance Audits
,.
The inspector reviewed GAI's audits in the welding and nondestructive
testing areas. _ GAI last performed an audit in these areas in
- -
December 1972 with the audit correspondence and outstanding items completed on June 4,1973.
It is to be noted that there was no formal followup to assure-that the required action has been completed ON and has been performed. During this review, the inspector noted that l
a majority of the -audits are still open and are more ths.n twelve mcnths I
old.
An example of this is Audit Report No. 30 dated January 1972 on-weld rod control.
-_
_
_
_ _ _ _
_
, _ _.. ~ _ _.-
_
-
O
.
,
h RO Rpt. No. 50-302/73-3 II-6
-
Surveillacce audits average once every four months in the nondestructive testing area and once every six months in the welding area.
The licensee agreed that audits should be closed promptly and will rectify this situation. This area will be examined in subsequent inspections.
9.- Implementation of Quality assurance Program For Safety and Relief Valve Sys tems The FPC quality assurance function remains primarily one of quality surveillance. FPC and GAI have onsite QA field representatives and audits are performed in accordance with the quality assurance manual and its established procedures.
Discussions with FPC/B&W/JAJ/GAI QA/QC and construction personnel indicate chat onsite personnel are knowledgeable and understand the engineering and QA/QC requirements.
The field QC documents provide control measures that, if properly implemented, should -
provide reasonable assurance that engineering requirements in system installation are met.
'
The inspector extmined the site QA/QC program and procedures as they apply to and provide implementation of the applicable QA criteria.
Findings made, commensurate with the status of the project, were satisfactory. Subsequent inspections will be performed for assessment of initial and continued implementation of each criterion.
.
%
m a
f
.
.
-,,
'. _._. -. m.
- -..
A
.
\\j
-
RO'Rpt. No. 50-302/73-5 III-l
-
'26 )i DETAILS III Prepared By:
e
.w
<7
'
g U. Borfer, Reactor Date (/ Inspector, Engin'eering Section, Facilities Construction Branch Dr es of Inspectio : June 12-15, 1973 Reviewed By:
.i ) be,u[
///') 3
'
.C. ~Brynnt,','; Senior Date
/Inspecter, Engineering
,
Section, Facili:les
Construction Branch
_ctsons Contacted P
c.
Florida Power Corporation GPC)
R. C. Bonner - Electrical Engincer G. Walker - Electrical Enginect R. A. Jorgensen - Quality Surveillance
-
D. W. Pedrick - Qualicy Engineer C. E. Jackson - Construction Manager.
M. Robinson - Instrucet: Engineer Supervisor J. Peebles - Instrument Engineer J. C. Hobbs - Mechanicci, Electrical Superintendent
.
b.
Contractor Organizations E. C. Ernst Company F. G. Parry - Supervisor, QC Engineering A. Brewton - Electrical Supervisor (cables)
f 2.
E/I Construction Progress Electrical construction is reported to be approximately 40% complete.
l This figure includes all such work and is not truly'significant when l
the project is broken down into its component parts, since l
most of this figure represents work performed in the turbine l
building and " balance of plant" installations.
For all practical
!
considerations, none of the E/I work has started in the reactor building.
!
-
The instrumentation system installation has not commenced in the areas of interest of RO.
Cable installation is being tracked daily and was estimated to be 15% complate.
Termination of conductors has just
I.
,
, _.
. -
. - - _, -
--
-
,
-
- _ _ _
.
- w
.
m
'
'
f
- started and is 3% complet'e.
Discussion with site personnel ru A
j that approximately 16,000 cables _have been identified for the tocu project for an expected 3,000,000 total feet. At the time of this
'
. inspection, 3219 cables were reported as pulled, 182 of which were-I safety related. Five hundred and eighty-five thousand feet of cable have been pulled with an average of 50,000 feet presently being i
installed each week.
-l
'1 3.
Orgaaization and Personnel l
The electrical work force was reported to average a total of 350 crafts-men working two shifts. Approximately 50 of these people are engaged in the cable pulling program.
The electrical QC group consists of six inspectors and a supervisor.
QC inspection results were found to be documented, indicating the per-formance of this activity as required.
'
'
The audit function is performed by both the A-E and the licensee's site staff. Audit results are being documented and corrective actions taken as required.
4.
Reactor Coolant Flow Transmitters b
The four transmitters selected for sample review are identified as
>
\\
RC14A-D/PT4, RC14B-D/PT4, RC14A-D/PT3 and RC14B/D/PT3.
These and the other four units of identical flow instruments are to be grouped in sets of two in each of the four reactor coolant flow lines.
Each set will provide duplicate signals for inputs to the four redundant reactor protective systems.
The four units listed above will become
'
components in protective channels D and C, respectively.
These items were procured by B&W from the Bailey Meter Company by
,
PO 29277Z. The procurement specification listed a'" standard item" as manufactured by Bailey Meter with minor detailed exceptions.
[
The QC record, examined at the site, contained documentation of
'
all manufacturing QC milestones as required by the procurement.
specification.
Receiving inspection results were reported on forms j
No. 10841 and 10657.
~
i The instruments were examined as stored in the warehouse.
Installa-tion of these items is not anticipated before the end of the year.
No deficiencies were identified during the record review for these components; however, a problem of document retrieval was encountered.
Discussions with the licensee indicated that this was _a problem pre-viously encountered by the licensee and that action had been initiated 2 -
to correct the problem. The documents in the QC file are to be
.
entered into'an EDP system.
During this process, the files will be
[
reworked to a system making document retrieval more efficient.
s
!
l l
.,,. _ _.. _ _
. m
_
.. _ _ _
_
,
. _, _, _.,, -,
. _,... _.. -. _. _ _, _.
-
.
S lD
.
~
- Seismic documentation for all Bailey Meterisupplied components-is
,
.
'
presently reported in the process of assembly and will be transmitted to the site when complete.
The indication is that this information should be available for examination within a few weeks.
5.
5 kv Safeguards Buses - 3A and 3B
.
The procurement, receiving and installation inspection records and
!
the physical installation of the subject equipment was examined.
The buses were purchased by GAI from the ITE Company.
The record file, examined at the site, contained documents attesting to in-spection and test activity during the manufacturing process.
The file contained completed " certification of inspection" from both the GAI source inspector and the ITE QC manager.
Receiving-inspection reports were in the file and stated that the units were completed and acceptable as received.
Installation inspections were performed by the E. C. Ernst QC unit and documented on checklist form No. Q-039.
This form is not yet com-plete since outstanding inspection check points include electrical connection, which is still in work.
The installed equipment was inspected by this inspector for such factors as structural connections, workmanship, cleanliness, equip-
ment protection and the quarantine of deficient components.
l No deficiencies were identified.
.1
!
6.
Cable Installation
,
.
Eleven cables were selected from among.those that had been installed i
as a sample group.
The cables selected included 5 kv power cables, 484 v power cables and 125 v d.c. Control cables.
No instrument cables have been installed.
Identification of cables examined is as follows:
MTM-ll3, MIM-117, DPC-1, DPC-2, DPC-3, VBC-1. VBC-2, VBC-3, VBC-4, MTM-65 and ESH-310.
'
This group includes redundant pairs required to meet the single failure i
criteria.
Both records and installed cables were examined to determine-j that such factors as separation, protection, hostile environment, work-manship, identification, cleanliness, ampacities, test, and other installa-tion and inspection requirements had been suitably considered.
The QC records contained documentation for all of the above events indicating that the QC program has been dutifully implemented.
Examination of the materials as installed did not reveal deficiencies.
One potential problem was identified and, as visualized, results from O
the configuration and size of the cable spreading room and the very
!
limited cable access afforded by the slots through the floor above j
into the control room cabinets.
The licensee has agreed to make l
l
,,
,--
-
-,
_-
_
.
..
_
. _ _ _
_ _ - -. _.-__--_
,_;_.-
- - _.
--
._
.
..
~
.
.
,.
a detailed analysis of space'needs and to make an evaluation of the present capabilities of the spreading room tray and slot layout'.
Any. indicated action arising from this analysis and evaluation will be promptly initiated by the licensee through his consuls..ats i
and contractors.
.
e
.
e
!
<
',
i
'
i t'
m n
?
.
'
-
.
.1
l
-
.. - - - -.
.
_ _. -,
.. - -
.
.
_
. _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _ _ _,, _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _. _ _, _ _ _ _ _ _