IR 05000297/1986001

Insp Rept 50-297/86-01 on 860414-18.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Biennial Research Reactor Insp,Including Logs & Records,Review & Audit, Requalification Training & Procedures

ML20198K037
Person / Time
Site:	North Carolina State University
Issue date:	05/14/1986
From:	Burnett P, Jape F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198K031	List: IR 05000297/1986001 ML20198K026
References
50-297-86-01, 50-297-86-1, NUDOCS 8606030297
Download: ML20198K037 (6)

Text

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0 UNITED STATES

># H0,#'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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AT LANTA, GEORGI A 30323

'+9.....,o-Report No.:

50-297/86-01 Licensee: North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC 27607 Docket No.:

50-297 License No.:

R-120 Facility Name: PULSTAR Reactor Inspection Conducted: April 14-18, 1986 Inspector:

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h na nu P. T. Burnett

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Date' Signed

Approved by:

C//V/ d F. Jape, Section Chief g/

Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety

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S'JMMARY Scope:

This routine, unannounced inspection was on site in the area of biennial research reactor inspection.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• P. J. Turinsky, Head - Department of Nuclear Engineering

• B. W. Wehring, Director - Nuclear Reactor Program

• G. D. Miller, Associate Director - Nuclear Reactor Program

• T. C. Bray, Reactor Operations Manager D. W. Morgan, Radiation Protection Officer S. J. Bilyj, Chief of Reactor Maintenance S. M. Grady, Chief Reactor Operator Other licensee employees contacted included Nuclear Engineering Department faculty, reactor operators, health physics technicians, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 18, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. The following inspector followup item was identified by the inspector and committed to by the licensee:

Inspector followup item 297/86-01-01: Establish a program for trending unidentified primary system water loss by October 18, 1986 - paragraph 5.e.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4.

Unresolved Items No unresolved item was identified during this inspection.

5.

Biennial Inspection Items (40750)

a.

Logs and Records Operations logs for the periods June 13 to August 24, 1984 and January 20 to March 29, 1986 were reviewed.

Over the many startups performed, the agreement between estimated critical position (ECP) and actual critical position (ACP) satisified the acceptance criterion of

+/- 200 percent millirho (pcm) in each case.

Maximum power as

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indicated by the N-16 monitor was always within the license limit of 1000 KW.

Pool water purity was consistently high as evidenced by resistivity values ranging from 5 to 6 megohms.

Run sheets, the records of irradiations and reactor usage, were reviewed for the periods given above.

All reactor usage was routine with no new experiments requiring special review or consideration.

The startup and shutdown checklists for the above periods were reviewed and found to be complete and in order. The unscheduled scram and snutdown log was reviewed for the period December 2, 1983 to April 15, 1986.

During that period, there were 52 unscheduled shutdowns and scrams. The overwhelming majority were from operator ranging errors on the linear nuclear instrument channel, which generates a scram at full scale on every scale.

Others came from loss of commercial power and instrument drift.

Recognizing that all scrams come frome single rather than coincident scrams, as on power reactors, the scram rate does not appear excessive.

The maintenance log was reviewed for the 1985 calendar year.

None of the maintenace appeared to be of safety significance. However, the log and history reports were not filled out as completely as necessary to describe fully the the corrective action taken or when the maintenance was completed.

At the exit interview, the licensee agreed to review the practice in that area.

b.

Review and Audit The Reactor Safety Advisory Committee (RSAG), a subcommittee of the Radiation Protection Council (RPC), met semi-annually between December 1983 and December 1985 to appraise the activities of the nuclear operations program.

The most recent appraisal made use of the new Reactor Operations Checklist.

The minutes and checklists completed by the individual committee members reflected far more than pro forma interest and review, which appears to resolve a concern identified in inspection 83-02.

Another concern raised in inspection 83-02 was the use of advance changes to procedures based upon the approval of the nuclear operations administrator prior to review by the RPC.

That practice has been abandoned.

c.

Requalification Traie,ing An active requalification training program was confirmed by review of posted lecture schedules, the on-the-job log of operator and checklist performance, and discussions with licensed personne.

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d.

Procedures The Pulstar Operations Manual (POM) was reviewed along with the procedures for startup and shutdown of the reactor.

Special emphasis was placed upon review of procedures for calculating the estimated critical position (ECP) and shutdown margin (SDM).

It was confirmed that these procedures used up-to-date information for the calculations.

The basic data come from the Pulstar Data Summary, Volume II for which revision 19, issued on September 4,1985, included the results of rod worth measurements on August 5,1985.

The summary also provides the values of the reactivity worths of the experimental facilities.

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Surveillance Tests The following completed surveillance tests were reviewed:

(1)

PS-4-01-2, PS-4-02-2, PS-4-03-2, and PS-4-04-2 were performed on July 12, 1984 to satisfy the requirement of Technical Specifica-tion 4.2.C to visually inspect the control rods biennialy.

(2)

PS-4-07-1(Revision 1), Fuel Inspection, was performed on July 12, 1984, to satisfy the biennial fuel inspection requirement of Technical Specification 4.1.a.

(3)

PS-3-01-4:S1 (Revision 1), Calormetric Power Calibration, was last performed on December 3,1985, to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 4.3.C.

Prior to performing this test PS-1-10 (Revision 1), Calibration of Temperature Measuring Channels, and PS-2-03:S1, Calibration of Flow Measuring Channel, were completed.

A review of the records sir:e May 1983 confirmed that these tests were performed, in each case, three to 15 days in advance of the power calibration.

For the flow calibration a calibrated orifice is used.

The RTDs were calibrated in water baths against a standard thermometer.

It was confirmed that the standard current source used to calibrate the nuclear channels was routinely calibrated by a standards laboratory, which issued a certificate of calibration.

A primary water log is maintained and water additions are recorded and plotted.

However, that activity does not lead to any conclusion on primary system integrity, which prudence dictates should be monitored, although not required by the Technical Specifications.

At the exit interview, the licensee committed to establish a program to monitor and trend unidentified water loss by comparing inventory changes with known losses such as pump seal leakage and water sampling and calculable losses such as evaporation to arrive at a periodic loss rate.

That program is to be in place within six months. This commitment will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 297/86-01-01, Establish a program for trending unidentified primary system water loss by October 18, 1986.

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f In general, the surveillance procedures lacked detail in method and acceptance criteria and, hence, appeared to require a high degree of skill to perform.

After this issue was raised, the licensee demonstrated that these procedural weaknesses had been recognized, and corrective action was in progress.

Drafts of several expanded procedures had been completed or were in active preparation.

f.

Experiments Currently authorized experiments are identified and described in the Projects Book.

Nineteen different projects are or have been approved by the RPC.

The Radiation Protection Officer issues letters identifying authorized project users by name and project number.

g.

Radiation Protection The inspection confirmed that the fifteen fixed reactor building area monitors are calibrated annually.

The calibrations were last performed in the _ period March to April 1985.

They were scheduled to begin the week of April 21, 1986, which is within the allowed 15-month period.

A monthly radiation survey of the reactor building, dated March 21, 1986, was posted on the doorway from the control room to the reactor bay.

Contamination surveys of the reactor bay are performed three to four times per week.

Six station dosimetry badges were read monthly by an independent contractor.

The contractors evaluation of deliberately exposed badges was within 10% of prediction in all cases in 1985.

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A review of the personal dosimetry records for ten persons, six operators, two users, and two health physicists, indicated that for 1985, the maximum monthly exposure was about 40 mrem, and the maximum annual dose was less than 200 mrem, h.

Emergency Plan, Training, and Drills The Pulstar Emergency Plan (Revision 1), which was issued on January 1,

1985 and approved by the NRC on May 1,1985, was reviewed for familiarization.

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Memoranda in the files confirmed that the emergency evacuation horns were activated five times (approximately hourly) on both September 16 and 17,1985 and again on January 22 and 23,1986, to acquaint all

current users of the facilities with the sound of the horn.

An unannounced emergency drill was conducted on August 27, 1985.

A review of the critiques of the drill showed it to be successful.

It, like most of those that preceded it, simulated a spill of radioactive material.

Considering the nature of the facility, a spill is the most likely emergency, but is far from the limiting event.

It was suggested

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to the licensee that some drill in the near future should simulate the design basis accident. The licensee stated that such a drill was being planned.

From June 11, 1985 to November 27, 1985, there were ten emergency training sessions conducted for 60 people from seven responding organizations.

These included the state police, a local hospital, the fire department, the university public safety office and Wake County Emergency Management Office as well as the campus radiation protection office and the nuclear reactor program.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Plant Tour A tour of the facility revealed all areas to be clean, uncluttered, and free of extraneous material.

Access to all areas was well controlled.

The conduct of several operators was observed on several occasions, and all were attentive to their duties.

7.

Witnessing of an Experiment An experimental demonstration of reactivity coefficients for a class of utility operators was witnessed.

The reactor was made critical at 100 KW with forced convection cooling (500 gpm).

A pair of thermocouples to measure inlet and outlet temperature was installed through one pair of coolant holes in a fuel assembly.

The primary pump was tripped, and the operator maintained power at 100 KW by withdrawing control rods in gang.

Inlet and outlet temperature were monitored as flow reversed from downward forced convection to upward natural convection.

After natural convection flow had stabilized, forced downward convection was re-established without further operator intervention.

Power rapidly increased and stablized below the license limit.

This latter action was a well-controlled simulation of the cold water accident.

All aspects of the demonstration appeared to be well-planned and well-controlled.

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