IR 05000297/1993001
| ML20034E996 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Carolina State University |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1993 |
| From: | Bassett C, Mcalpine E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034E980 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-297-93-01, 50-297-93-1, NUDOCS 9303020171 | |
| Download: ML20034E996 (14) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON l
o REGION 18 p
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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'f AT LANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-297/93-01 f
I Licensee: North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC 27695-7909 Docket No.:
50-297 License No.:
R-120 i
Facility Name: North Carolina State University PULSTAR Reactor Inspection Conducted: January 25-29, 1993
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Inspector:
b 2!9b3 Actnu
C. H. Bassett, Senior Radiation Sp' cialist Date Signed e
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Approved by:
9p' OuD s%
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E. J. McAlpin'e, Chief
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Date Signed
Radiation Safety Projects Section
Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch
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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved onsite review of the licensee's reactor operation program including:
staff organization, operating logs and records, procedures, requalification training program, surveillance i
activities, experiments, design changes, committee activities and audits, l
emergency preparedness, maintenance activities and logs, and fuel handling
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activities.
Results:
Facility staffing and the current organizational structure appeared to be adequate although one position in radiation protection area was open at
the time of the inspection. The activities of the Radiation Protection
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Council and the Reactor Safeguards Advisory Group (RSAG) were appropriate to
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monitor the activities of the reactor facility (Paragraph 2). Operating logs
and records were being maintained as required (Paragraph 3). The recent
revision of the PULSTAR Operating Manual appeared to be adequate to
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incorporate the changes made in the control room console (Paragraph 4). The
licensed operator requalification program was current with respect to i
regulatory requirements (Paragraph 5).
Surveillance activities have been
performed at the required frequencies with satisfactory results (Paragraph 6),
t No new experiments have been submitted or approved in the last two years (Paragraph 7). Design changes have been submitted for approval but did not l
constitute any unreviewed safety questions (Paragraph 8).
Emergency
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preparedness appeared to' satisfactory as demonstrated by training and drill results. The licensee has also revised the Emergency Plan which is under review by the RSAG (Paragraph 9). Maintenance was being conducted as required
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and a review of the maintenance logs indicated that no problems, other than j
those related to aging equipment, were evident (Paragraph.10).
l 9303020171 930211
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PDR ADOCK 05000297 G
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Within the areas inspected, one violation (VIO) and one deviation (DEV) were
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identified, as follows:
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VIO - Failure of the. Reactor Safety Advisory Group to meet at the
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frequency required by the Technical Specifications.
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DEV - Failure to comply with a written commitment made to
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regarding submittal of the revised Emergency Plan to the r< a.4 tion i
Protection Council by September 1, 1992.
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REPORT DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees l
- S. Bilyj, Manager, Reactor Operations
- D. Dudziak, Department Head, Nuclear Engineering
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K. Kincaid, Chief of Reactor Maintenance
- C. Mayo, Director, Nuclear Reactor Program i
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- K. Mani, Senior Reactor Health Physicist W. Morgan, Radiation Protection Officer
- P. Perez, Associate Director, Nuclear Reactor Program
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- C. Plavney, Chief Reactor Operator Other licensee employees contacted included operators, technicians, and
office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview on January 29, 1993.
2.
Organization and Management Controls (40750)
a.
Organization and Staffing
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Technical Specification (TS) Section 6.1 details the organizational structure, management responsibilities and line of authority i
involved in the safe operation of the reactor facility.
The inspector reviewed the facility organization and verified that
the current staffing 'and experience level of those in the organization met the requirements outlined.in the TS.
During an inspection in June 1992, the inspector had noted that the position of Reactor Safety Specialist was vacant. As of the date of this inspection, the licensee still had not been able to find.a
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replacement but is actively recruiting and expects to fill the t
vacancy soon.
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All of the operational activities and the majority of the routine radiation protection activities were being performed by the facility
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operations and health physics staff. Support for the radiation protection program wa; also received fra personnel from the campus
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Radiation Safety Office (RS0). These radiatit.n protection support activities included conducting routine radiation surveys and some
air sampling _in the reactor facility.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Radiation Protection Council TS Section 6.2 details the composition of the Radiation Protection Council (RPC), qualifications of its members, required documentation l
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of its responsibilities and authority, rules, and also meeting
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frequency.
The inspector reviewed the minutes of the meetings held by the RPC
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since the last NRC operations inspection.
The inspector verified-l that the RPC meetings were held as required and that issues reviewed-i and discussed were appropriate.
These issues included approval of
experiments, reviews of the monthly reports from RSO, disposal of l
low level radioactive waste, and review of the inspection results by
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f state and federal agencies, PULSTAR reactor safety reports, correspondence with the NRC, procedure changes, design change
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requests, and results of the RSAG annual audits.
-la No violations or deviations were identified.
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c.
Reactor Safety Advisory Group (RSAG)
TS Section 6.2 also requires that a Reactor Safeguards Advisory i
Group (RSAG) be formed to provide independent appraisals of reactor l
operations and outlines the RSAG composition and the members'
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qualifications.
Section 6.2.7 requires that the RSAG meet at least
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every six calendar months and upon call of the Chairman ~ of the RPC.
i The American National Standard for the Development of Technical j
Specifications for Research Reactors, ANSI /ANS-15.1-1982, approved i
September 22, 1982, specifies that a semiannual interval should not
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exceed seven and one-half months.
The inspector reviewed the minutes of the meetings held by the RSAG
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since the last NRC inspection.
In 1991, the RSAG met on February 25
and October 7, a time interval not exceeding seven and one-half
months.
In 1992, the RSAG met on February 26 and October 28, a time
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interval of eight months.
l The licensee was informed that failure to comply with the
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requirements for holding a meeting for the RSAG at least every six calendar months was an apparent violation of TS 6.2.7 (50-297/93-01-
01).
d.
Audits and Appraisals j
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During an inspection in June 1992, the inspector had noted that a
revised audit program had been developed for use by the RSAG during l
the annual' audit of the reactor program.
Following a review of the
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RSAG meeting minutes and audit results, the inspector noted that the j
revised audit program had been used during the last audit. The
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revised audit program made use of various checklists that had been l
developed to guide / direct the auditors and ensure that all aspects i
of the TS had been reviewed during the audit. The auditors were not
only required to complete the checklists but to write up a summary i
of the findings as well, following completion of the audit. The
audits appeared to be more structured than in the past and more j
complete.
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Through discussions with the individual in charge of the audit
..ogram for the RSAG, the inspector determined that there was one
area in the audit program that was not as fully developed.as thei others. This area was that of reviewing the operation staff of the
facility.
This had been recognized by the RSAG and a more comprehensive checklist was being developed in this area. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
No violations-or deviations were identified.
j 3.
Operations Logs and Records TS 6.6 required that records and logs of normal plant operation and l
maintenance be kept in a manner convenient for review.
l The Operations Logbook was reviewed for the period from November 1990 f
through January 1993.
Particular attention was paid to entries which
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indicated reactor power.
During the period from November 1990 through June 1992, the licensee's calibration records demonstrated that a reactor power level of 1.0 megawatt-thermal '(MWth) was equivalent to a core
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temperature rise of 13.8 degrees Fahrenheit (*F) with a coolant flow rate
of 500 gallons per minute (gpm) and to 0.405 E-8' amperes (amps) reading
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on the N monitor. After the calibration in mid-1992, the reading on t
the N'8 monitor was changed to 0.415 E-8 amps.
From the review of
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Logbook, the inspector noted a few instances in which the temperatu,e i
rise appeared to be high. However, it was.also noted that the reactor pool was not in equilibrium and that the measurement was therefore not a
reliable indication of actual reactor power.
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Through comparing entries of Expected Critical Position (ECP) of the withdrawn ganged control rods with the Actual Critical Position (ACP),-
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the inspector noted only one instance when the ACP did not fall within the acceptable limits. Upon investigation of this event,-the licensee found that an incorrect ACP value had been entered and the correct value.
was within the limits estimated for the ECP. All entries of Shutdown Margin (SDM) indicated that at least twice the 15 minimum value of 400
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pcm (percent millirho [ reactivity units]) was available.
Other entries in the Operations Logbook documented scrams, typically l
caused by trainee errors or spurious electronic signals, fuel movements, power reactor operator training, calibration activities, surveillance
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activities, and responses to spurious security alarms.
I No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Procedures (40750)
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TS 6.3 required that operating procedures be written, updated
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periodically and followed for various facility-operations.
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The inspector reviewed the operating procedures for the facility and the'
I changes that had been made to the operating procedures since the last inspection. A Temporary Change (TC), 92-01, to the PULSTAR 0perating
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Manual had been signed on January 13, 1992, by the Associate Director of
the Nuclear Reactor Program to allow the facility to operate following
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upgrades to the reactor console. This was done in accordance with
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procedure and the TC was subsequently reviewed by the Radiation l
Protection Council on February 17, 1992. The TL was then extended by the j
RPC until Revision 8 to the PULSTAR Operating Manual could be reviewed
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and approved.
Revision 8 was approved by the RPC on March 2, 1992, and
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was implemented immediately thereafter.
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'I Revision 8 to the operating manual, which affected' Sections 2, 3, 4, and 9, appears to be adequate. The current manual outlines the
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responsibilities of the various facility staff members and contains
't guidelines for operating the reactor during both routine and non-routine i
operations. Through observation of operators during tours of the
facility and during a resin change on January 26, 1993, the inspector
noted proper implementation of and adequate adherence to procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Requalification Training Program (40750)
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10 CFR 55.59 requires the licensee to have a requalification program for i
licensed operators. The-program is to be conducted for a continuous
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period not to exceed 24 months in duration.
10 CFR 55.59 also requires
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that the operators pass a comprehensive requalification written.
examination and an annual operating test.
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Through a review of the operator requalification training records for
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1991 and 1992, the inspector determined that the records were.being
maintained as required and.that requalification exams and annual
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operating tests were given. The records reflected the training the i
operators received, the tests they took covering the. material presented,-
i and the scores they received.
By procedure, if a p.rson scores less than j
seventy percent (<70%) on a test covering a certain portion of the
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requalification material, that person must receive and complete remedial
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training. The records indicated that, although that seldom happens, the
remedial training is provided when required.
Through discussions with the Chief Reactor Operator (CRO), who is in
charge of training, the inspector determined that the program is offered
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on a biennial schedule. The lectures presented to the operators are i
given approximately every other month. The CR0 indicated that, although I
the current lecture schedule is behind by one lecture, the delinquent i
lecture would be presented by the end of February. No problems were l
noted with the general timeliness of the lectures.
The training records also indicated that, through lectures or
discussions, abnormal situations and emergency procedures are reviewed by the operators and proper responses to the problems discussed.
The CR0
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also maintains a current roster listing the duty schedule for all operators and thus ensures that all maintain their active duty status as
required by the regulations.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Activities (40750)
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Section 4 of the licensee's TS stipulate the various surveillance requirements for the facility.
Surveillance activities for 1991 and 1992 were reviewed by the inspector.
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The records indicated that they had been conducted in accordance with'the frequencies and criteria specified in the TS.
E a.
Biennial Fuel Inspections
The inspector reviewed the procedure used to conduct this inspection of the reactor fuel, PS-4-07-1:B1, Fuel Inspection, Revision 2,.
dated October 1,1990, as well as the related documentation of fuel inspections and fuel movements.
Besides the procedure, the licensee also used a checklist to perform this operation, Fuel Movement'
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Checklist, dated May 5,1992.
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The records indicated that the fuel assemblies on the grid were removed to either the fuel storage pits or the storage racks. The graphite reflector assemblies 'were then removed, inspected for i
swelling or cracking, and returned to the-grid.
The fuel assemblies
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were visually inspected one-by-one and returned to the grid, The
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inspections, performed May 29, 1990, and May 6, 1992, indicated that.
- some of the fuel assemblies had some surface scratches and some of
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the graphite reflector assemblies were bowed but no problems were noted.
f b.
Annual Control Rod Reactivity Worth Measurements The inspector verified that the control rod reactivity worth
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measurements were performed annually, during August in 1990 and
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1991, and in July of 1992, and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. As noted during past inspections, the decreasing excess i
reactivity of the core due to burnup makes is impossible for the i
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core to be critical with any rod fully inserted. Therefore,-the reactivity worth of the lower portion of each rod must be determined by extrapolation based upon the shapes of earlier rod worth curve l.
determinations.
c.
Annual Drop and Drive Times of Scrammable Rods
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r The inspector reviewed the results of the tests performed'in May of 1991 and 1992.
No significant change in control rod drop times was
noted and all the times were noted to be significantly less than the l
limit specified in the TS.
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During the NRC inspection in 1990, it was noted that the procedures
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used for this activity were surveillance / maintenance procedures and
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that not all the steps in the procedures were needed-for the i
surveillance portion of the activities. However, the procedures
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were not clear as to which step must be performed during maintenance i
and which must be performed during surveillance activities. The i
licensee had agreed to annotate the procedures to indicated which
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steps were required during which activities. The inspector noted j
that the maintenance activities' had been completely separated from
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the surveillance activities and that the procedure were much clearer and easier to follow.
d.
Semi-annual Calorimetric Calibration of Safety and Linear Power
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Level Measuring Channels
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The calorimetric calibration of the nuclear instruments had been
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performed as required. The results had remained the same with i
respect to the N'8 monitor for a period of several years until the i
calibration performed in mid-1992. As discussed in Paragraph 3, i
following that calibration, the results changed from 0.405 E-8 amps
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to 0.415 E-8 amps for the N monitor.
The licensee noted the
change and, per procedure, changed the label on the N electrometer l
(monitor) in the control room to reflect the new value.
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Other Semi-annual' Calibrations The inspector reviewed other records to confirm that required calibrations were being conducted. The pool water temperature
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monitor, primary cooling' and flow monitor, and safety and linear power channels were being calibrated every six months as required in l
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the TS.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Experiments (40750)
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TS 6.8 required that all proposed experiments utilizing the PULSTAR l
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reactor be evaluated in writing by the experimenter and by a licensed
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Senior Reactor Operator staff member. The experiments were also to be
reviewed the' Reactor Operations Manager, and the Reactor Health Physicist i
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when appropriate.
Through discussions with licensee representatives the inspector i
determined that no new experiments had been performed in the last two
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years. The major applications of the facility continue to be in suppor:
l of student laboratories, neutron activation analyses, short-lived isotope
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production for on-campus use, and use in the power reactor operator training programs for regional utilities.
No violations or deviations were identified, l
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Design Changes (40750)
TS 6.2.2.a required the Radiation Protection Council to review any
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proposed tests and untried experiments that could constitute an j
"unreviewed safety question" pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
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Since the last operations inspection at the facility, there have been six l
design changes submitted to the RPC for review and approval. ' The -
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inspector reviewed the six design changes and noted that they all dealt with changes or upgrades to the reactor console. The documentation
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included with these changes indicated that the changes / upgrades were
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reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and in accordance i
with the licensee's administrative procedures. The changes had all been
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reviewed by the RPC and had been approved by that committee.
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associated documentation also indicated that the changes did not
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constitute any unreviewed safety questions. The reviews of the design changes appeared to be adequate and the conclusions reached appropriate.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Preparedness (40750)
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10 CFR 50.54(q) requires a licensee authorized to possess and/or-operate a research reactor to follow and maintain in effect'an
i The inspector reviewed the licensee's. Emergency. Plan.
It had last i
been revised and approved in 1985 but was under revision during the
time of the inspection (revision number 2).
A_ review of the i
emergency procedures disclosed that they had last be revised in
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November 1987. There had been a Temporary Change, TC 92-01, which was posted on August 28, 1992, to update the On-site Notification.
List, the Off-site Support Agencies list and the Notification log in i
preparation for the licensee's annual emergency drill.
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The inspector noted, during tours of the facility and discussions q
with various licensee personnel, that copies of the Emergency Plan
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and emergency procedures were readily available in the Control Room
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and in offices of the operators and management personnel.
b.
Emergency Response Training l
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Emergency Plan, Rev.1, dated Jant m v 1,1985, as well as by the
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PULSTAR Operating Manual, Rev. 8, O ad February 5,1992, required
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that emergency response personnel be trained in the proper response i
techniques for the facility.
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The inspector reviewed the training that the licensee had provided
for staff members, Radiation Protection Office personnel, members of I
E the NCSU Public Safety Department, personnel from the NCSU Life
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Safety Department, North Carolina State and county organizations,
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members of the Raleigh Fire Department,_ and representatives from. Rex
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Hospital. The training appeared to be adequate.
c.
Emergency Drills l
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TS 6.3.c. required that drills on emergency procedures be conducted
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annually.
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The inspector reviewed the records of the drills the licensee had l
conducted in 1991 and 1992. On October 8,1992, a drill and walk -
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through was conducted involving detailed discussion of actions that t
should be taken to remediate the drill conditions which was loss of pool water. The Action Drill Scenario was filled out as required by the emergency procedure and a critique was held following the drill.
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The inspector reviewed results of the drill held on August 31, 1992.
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It was held a 4:00 a.m. to test the response of staff personnel to a problem during other than normal working hours. The drill was not a
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walk through but one that required real " play". on the part of the
participants.
It involved failure of the primary system pressure
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boundary which then resulted in gradual _ loss of pool water. After being notified of the problem and upon arrival at the facility, two staff members were required to make an entry into the reactor bay to.
i determine the cause of the problem. To further test the abilities
of the response personnel, one individual was " injured" during the event and had to be cared for by staff personnel and sent to the hospital for treatment.
A critique was held after the drill and i
various items were identified for followup.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
l 10. Maintenance Logs and Records (40750)
TS 6.6 required that records and logs of normal plant operation and
maintenance be kept in a manner convenient for review.
i The inspector reviewed the maintenance records and log for the period
from December 1990 through January 1993. The maintenance load appeared
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to be increasing slightly but no major problems or trends were noted.
l Through discussions with licensee representatives the inspector
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determined that many of the present minor problems were due to the age of the equipment and instruments at the facility. These problems had been
or would be corrected by replacing individual pieces of equipment or-i electrical components.
This was possible because of funds made available by the Department of Energy (DOE) for upgrading non-power reactor
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equipment.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Identified Problems i
a.
Gang Rod Worth Inaccuracies i
i During a review of the previous week's Operations Logbook by the licensee on January 14, 1993, an operator noted that the ACP was
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20.2 inches on January 7, 1993. This was well within the limits for operation which had been established, i.e. ECP 200 pcm. However, when the gang integral rod worth curve was checked, there should not have been sufficient excess reactivity to have achieved full power
on January 7.
A subsequent check of the individual integral rod worth curves demonstrated that there was an error in the gang integral rod worth curve and the licensee stopped operations and began an investigation into the problem.
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The licensee determined that, in the past, the gang integral worth curve was calculated from the shim rod differential worth i
measurements. That practice equated the differential reactivity I
(Ao) increments of the shim rod to the gang (but negative in sign).
The differential gang rod position (ot) increments were then used to
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obtain the gang differential rod worth curve (Ao/AL).
The licensee found that, during the generation of the gang integral rod worth curve in 1991 and 1992, the differential shim rod position
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increments had been used in the aana differential rod worth calculation instead of the differential aang rod position
increments.
Since the incremental shim rod position values were greater than the gang's, this led to underestimating the total worth of the gang from 18.1 to 24.0 inches.
A new curve was subsequently generated and, on January 15, 1993, the
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curve was tested. The corrected curve predicted the reactor period as a function of change in reactivity and the power defect very well.
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Through discussions with the licensee, the inspector determined that the discrepancy did not impact reactor operations because the error
was only non-conservative above 20 inches. Also, all estimated critical position (ECP) calculations were well within the 200 pcm window; the Shutdown Margin (SDM) was calculated using individual
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rod worth as opposed to the gang rod worth; and, experiment worths calculated using the in:orrect gang worth curve were conservative up to an ACP of about 21.1 inches.
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It was also noted that rod worth measurements were performed during July 20 & 21, 1992, in accordance with procedure.
The curves generated compared very well with the previous set of curves and met
the surveillance acceptance criteria.
The surveillance failed to identify the error because the gang was not part of the surveillance. Historically the gang had not been subject to the
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same criteria as the four rods.
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I As further corrective actions, the licensee has decided to:
1) write a surveillance' procedure for the gang, 2) test the rod'
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worth curves immediately following the measurements, and.3) place
the Reactor Engineer in the review process as the approver.
b.
Linear and Safety Channel Setpoints During a review of the historical records. for the nuclear
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instrumentation system, the licensee found that there were errors in the Linear and Safety Channel calibration data' points. Many of the
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data points failed to meet the three percent (3%) deviation from true on the "5" scale acceptance criteria. The licensee determined that most of the errors had occurred following the design change (DC 79-1) which introduced graphite reflectors in row "A" of the grid.
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The addition of the reflectors reduced the neutron leakage and resulted in a lower detector current output. The design change approved the reduction of the current required for full ' scale indication in order to address the lower detector current, i
i in order to correct for the lower detector current, the range' switch
knob was rotated one scale counter-clockwise. This change produced the desired effects and fixed the full power current at 66.07
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microamps.
The modification of the resistor positions in the range switch caused an inherent change in the measured calibration points.
The licensee determined that the impact of the change-apparently
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appeared as an amplification of uncertainty, most noticeable in the
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"5" scale.
Further review of the historical data showed that the 80% of range
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(1.2 MW) data points on the 1.5 MW ranges were never out of tolerance. Also, during most of the reactor operating history, the ranges in question (SW, 50W, 500W, SkW, 50kW, and 500kW) were
typically only selected long enough to transition to the next range.
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In addition, power was always leveled off and maintained on the 1.5 scale with excellent agreement with the remaining Nuclear
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Instrumentation and N'
power channel.
The licensee concluded that the error was a result of incorrectly
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applying the acceptance criteria to the measured data points. Their practice had been to compare the surveillance results to the previous set of values rather than to calculate the deviation.
Also, the forms used in the calibration further contributed to the error by only listing the calibration setpoint without the
acceptable range. The licensee also concluded that, despite the error, the reactor was operated safely.
I To correct the problem, the licensee expects to replace the Linear
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and Safety Channels with new equipment designed specifically for reactors. This should take place in 1993 due to the funding j
provided by DOE.
In the interim, the licensee anticipates
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submitting a design change to the RPC to request that the acceptance
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criteria remain at 12% on the full power range (1.5MW) and be changed to 10% on all other ranges.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(0 pen) Violation 50-297/92-01-02: Failure to have the Emergency Plan reviewed by the Radiation Protection Council biennially as required by the Plan.
During an inspection in June 1992, the inspector noted that the Emergency
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Plan was required to be reviewed by the Radiation Protection Council l
(RPC) on a biennial frequency. Review of the_ Emergency Plan indicated
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that it had last been revised, reviewed, and approved in 1985. Although
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the Plan was under revision at the time of the June 1992 inspection, review of the minutes of the RPC meetings did not disclose any biennial
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review of the Emergency Plan subsequent to the review in 1985.. This was cited as a violation.
In the response to the violation, dated August 27, 1992. the licensee indicated that a revision to the Emergency Plan would be sent to the Radiation Protection Council by September 1, 1992, stipulating that the Plan was to be reviewed biennially by the Reactor Safety Advisor Group during their independent appraisal of reactor operations.
As a result of this inspection, during the period from January 25-29, 1993, the inspector determined that the revision to the Emergency Plan,
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Revision 2, was not sent to the RPC until October 1,1992.
The revision was delayed because input and corrections to the Plan were not received from off site sources such as the state and county emergency response agencies until the end of September. The RPC did not review the revision to the Emergency Plan until November 1992 and the action taken was to refer the review to the RSAG. As of the date of the insper' ion, the RSAG had not met to formally review and approve the revised Emergency Plan.
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The licensee was informed that failure to submit the revised Emergency Plan to the RPC by September 1,1992, was an apparent deviation to comply
with a written commitment made to the NRC (50-297/93-01-02).
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(Closed) Violation 50-297/92-01-03:
Failure to have the m.nufacturer or an approved vendor perform the total system performance checks on the
SCBA annually as required by procedure.
j In the response to the above violation, dated August 27,1992, the
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licensee indicated that the problem corresponded to a particular point in'
t time when personnel changes had occurred and the individual who had been in charge of ensuring that the SCBAs were checked out had left the facility. ' The licensee subsequently obtained a maintenance contract with
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an approved vendor who sends the licensee reminders that the maintenance
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is due. Also, a log sheet was attached to the cases containing the SCBAs showing the date the last maintenance was performed and the due date of
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the next maintenance. The inspector reviewed the documentation of the
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contract with the vendor for maintaining and checking the SCBAs. The inspector also observed the log sheets attched to the SCBA cases. These_
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corrective actions appeared to be adequate.
10. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 29, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The adequacy of the _
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licensee's organization and staffing was discussed as were~the. activities
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of the RPC and the RSAG. Operating logs and records were being maintained as required. The recent revision of the PULSTAR Operating i
Manual appeared to be adequate to incorporate the changes made in the control room console. The licensed operator requalification program was i
current with respect to regulatory requirements. Surveillance activities
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were being performed at the required frequencies with satisfactory results.
No new experiments had been submitted or approved in the last two years. Design changes had been submitted for approval but did not constitute any unreviewed safety questions.
Emergency preparedness appeared to satisfactory as demonstrated by training and drill results and the Emergency Plan had been revised but was still under review by the
RSAG. Maintenance was being conducted as required and a-review of the maintenance logs indicated that no problems, other than those related to
aging equipment, were evident. The high degree of cleanliness and organization of facility equipment and materials was noted.
I Licensee management was also informed that problems had been noted in the areas described below. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this.
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inspection.
Item Number Description and Reference
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50-297-93-01-01 V10 - Failure of the Reactor Safety Advisory l
Group to meet at the frequency required by the Technical Specifications (Paragraph 2.c).
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50-297-92-01-02 DEV - Failure to comply with a written l
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commitment made to the NRC regarding submittal of the revised Emergency Plan to the Radiation
Protection Council by September 1, 1992, l
(Paragraph 12).
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