IR 05000295/1993012
| ML20046D400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1993 |
| From: | Cox C, Jickling R, Ploski T, Reidlinger T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046D398 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-93-12, 50-304-93-12, NUDOCS 9308190159 | |
| Download: ML20046D400 (23) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-295/93012(DRSS); 50-304/93012(DRSS)
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Dockets No. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. NPF-39; NPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Zion site, Zion, Illinois Inspection Conducted: July 26 - 30, 1993 Inspectors: O h)./1)'/b w 3./~,+ Lo 9}ltl9 3 (4.~Ploski
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Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Section
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Inspection Summarv
Inspection on July 26-30. 1993 (Reports No. 50-295/93012(DRSS): 50-
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304/93012(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Zion Station's i
emergency preparedness (EP) exercise, involving review of the exercise j
scenario (IP 82302), observations by six NRC representatives of key functions
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and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301) and review, ter one NRC representative, of several aspects of the operational status of the EP program (IP 82701).
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Results: No violations or deviations were identified; however, one non-cited
violation was identified regarding the failure to adequately notify the State I
of Wisconsin following an actual emergency declaration and termination
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(Section 4.a).
I Overall performance during the exercise was very good. An Inspection Follow-up item was identified regarding several incomplete plant announcements that
could have delayed the desired responses (Section 7.a).
An Inspection Follow-
up Item was identified regarding several difficulties exhibited by protective measures staff in evaluating degraded plant conditions or post-accident sample results versus offsite survey results or dose projections (Section 7.d).
Challenging aspects of the exercise scenario included:
the assembly and accounting of personnel within the protected and owner controlled areas; collection and analysis of a reactor coolant sample; deployment of offsite monitoring teams; dispatch of 26 inplant teams, including the fire brigade; use of dedicated communications links to communicate with actual and simulated NRC responders; and a wind direction shift of about 270 degrees, which included a lake breeze effect.
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' DETAILS l
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Technical Support Center (TSC)
C. Cox, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
F. Kantor, CRS, EOF H. Simons, Operational Support Center (OSC),-inplant teams T. Reidinger, OSC, inplant teams R. Jickling, offsite radiological monitoring team 2.
Persons Contacted W. Kurth, Acting Station Manager P. LeBlond, Executive Assistant j
R. Cascarano, Support Services Director l
L. Lanes, Emergency Planning Coordinator L. Holden, Corporate Emergency Planning Supervisor The above and 15 other licensee representatives attended the exit interview on July 30, 1993. The inspectors contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 82301)
(Closed) Inspection Follow Up Items 295/92013-01 and 304/92013-01:
During the 1992 exercise, the licensee failed to implement adequate measures to control simulated contamination. As a result, the Operational Support Center (OSC) would have become contaminated had l
l events been real.
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Records indicated that additional training on contamination control provisions in the OSC was provided subsequent to the 1992 exercise.
During the 1993 exercise, habitability was properly monitored in the
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OSC. Step off pads were properly set up during the activation of the OSC. Contamina+, ion control remained very good. This item is closed.
4.
Operational Status of the Emeraency Preparedness Proaram (IP 82701)
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Actual Emeraency Plan Activations Since October 1,1992, the licensee activated its emergency plan i
on two occasions. Records indicated that both emergency declarations were correct and timely. Comparisons of licensee I
records with event reports prepared by NRC duty' officers indicated that the licensee's event descriptions were adequately detailed based on the information available at the time of these notifications.
NRC was initially notified in a timely manner following both emergency. declarations and event terminations. The licensee's self-assessments of both events were very good.
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Records indicated that Illinois and Wisconsin officials were initially notified in a timely manner following an Unusual. Event declaration in January 1993 due to initiation of a reactor shutdown in accordance with a Technical Specification requirement.
At 2:05 p.m. on March 15, 1993, the Shift Engineer (SE) in charge of control room activities quickly and correctly declared an Alert-in accordance with the Emergency Action Levels due to a loss of-some control room annunciators associated with Unit 2's emergency core coolant, reactor control and electrical systems. The root cause was determined to be a blown fuse, which was replaced in about 20 minutes. After the Alert declaration, it was determined that, despite the blown fuse, annunciators remained capable of lighting to indicate a problem warranting increased operator attention. However, no audible signal would be given and a lit annunciator window could not be acknowledged. The Unit's alarm printer was not affected by the blown fuse.
Following the Alert declaration, a control room communicator utilized the dedicated Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS)
telephone circuit to initially notify predesignated agencies in Illinois and Wisconsin. However, the licensee's self-assessment, which included an April 5 letter from the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Govcrnment (WDEG), indicated that the State of Wisconsin was not notified of the Alert declaration or its termination by the control room communicator.
Instead, records indicated that WDEG became aware of the Alert about 45 minutes after its declaration when a representative of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) called the WDEG to discuss the event. A WDEG representative then attempted to contact several members of the licensee's corporate emergency planning staff to discuss the situation. Corporate staff were available to respond to the WDEG's messages on the following day.
The licensee's investigation indicated that the communicator inputted a numerical code when placing the NARS call which resulted in a greater number of Illinois and Wisconsin agencies responding to the initial notification call than would be procedurally required for an Alert declaration. This error was recognized by the time that the event termination call was made to agencies in both States. The licensee concluded that its communicator believed that a WDEG representative was among the parties on the event declaration and termination NARS calls.
No evidence remained available to support this belief.
Communications equ pment tests conducted on March 17 and 19 identified no operability problems with the NARS equipment at the WDEG or its backup notification point at the State Police Patrol office in Madison, Wisconsin, which is only intended for use during offhours.
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By the end of March, the licensee initiated good measures to prevent recurrence of a failure to notify an offsite agency per the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
Instructions and a form were developed and distributed which~ required that a licensee communicator call roll at the beginning and end of any NARS call. An apparent failure of a representative of any agency on the call to acknowledge either roll call would require that the licensee's communicator contact that agency immediately by commercial telephone. The agencies' parti _cipants in the NARS calls would also be documented.
Corporate emergency planning i
staff have responded to the WDEG letter by indicating a
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willingness to discuss how to improve the notification provisions t
with Wisconsin State agencies. The licensee is also considering means to save recordings of the NARS calls for evaluation before i
reuse or destruction.
j Failure to notify Wisconsin officials of any emergency declaration is a violation of the licensee Emergency Plan; however, the safety
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significance of this event is considered minor. The licensee's corrective actions are considered sufficient to prevent i
recurrence.
In accordance with Section VII.B.1 of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions",
(Enforcement Policy,10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C), the violation regarding the licensee's failure to notify the WDEG following an Alert declaration and its termination on March 15, 1993, is not being cited.
One non-cited violation was identified.
b.
Emeroency Plan and Implementina Procedures
In March 1993, NRC staff approved a revision to the Zion Station Annex to the Generating Stations Emergency Plan. This revision included changes to some of the emergency action levels utilized to classify emergency events.
Records indicated that State officials in Illinois and Wisconsin reviewed and had no concerns regarding these changes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Oraanization and Manaaement Control The individuals filling the positions of Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (Erc,) and EP Instructor (EPI) were unchanged since the last inspection. The full-time EPI was also the assistant EPC.
Both reported to the Site Vice-President through the Support Services Director.
j In mid-1992, the EPC became involved with the site's Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP). The EPC's duties included interfacing with vendor representatives, a corporate office counterpart and several onsite staff who were also involved with
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the REMP. The EPC estimated that his involvement in the REMP was largely an oversight and coordination function which lasted up to two days per calendar quarter. The EPC indicated that his REMP-l related activities did not adversely affect his fulfilling his
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responsibilities as EPC.
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Records indicated that the onsite emergency organization's i
staffing levels were excellent, with three to five persons
identified for each director and supervisor - level position.
No violations or deviations were identified, d.
Facilities and Eouipment i
Records indicated that testing of the expanded PA system in the East Service Building was completed in July 1993.
The revised system upgraded the capability to hear the site's assembly and fire siren signals in this building. The upgraded system was.used in the successful onsite accountability demonstration during the July 28 exercise.
On April 11, 1993, the licensee correctly notified the NRC of a i
one hour non-emergency event for a major loss of communications
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capability. As indicated in Event Report No. 25382, county officials could not activate the sirens in the Lake County, I
Illinois, portion of the Emergency Planning Zone. The event report was timely and adequately detailed.
Licensee records indicated that county officials identified the problem on the morning of April-11. The vendor responsible for maintaining ~the siren system performed equipment tests, identified the defective i
component and installed a backup system capable of activating the sirens until a replacement component was installed. The backup j
siren activation capability was in place within two hours of NRC's I
notification. The primary system for activating the 30'affected sirens was returned to service about 75 minutes later.
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Audits i
l Records of 1992 independent assessments of the Zion Station's EP program were reviewed. Audit QAA 22-92-08 satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (t).
Records indicated very good followup on the concerns identified during this audit.
Records also indicated that Nuclear Quality Programs staff monitored a variety of EP program activities on about a monthly frequency since January 1992. These activities included various drills and the associated critiques, communications equipment tests and followup on items identified during the 1992 audit.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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General An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency. Plan (GSEP) was conducted at the Zion Station on July 28, 1993. This' exercise required State and county participation; however, due to the responses of Illinois and Wisconsin agencies to flooding along the Mississippi River, only the Illinois Department of Nuclear
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Safety (IDNS) participated in the exercise. Officials in both States and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) staff rescheduled the exercise participation of other State and county agencies for a date later in 1993.
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The exercise tested the licensee's and IDNS' emergency response -
organizations' capabilities to respond to an accident scenario resulting
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in a simulated release of radioactive effluent. The attachment to this report summarizes the licensee's exercise objectives.
6.
General Observations The licensee's overall response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would l
have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and local
authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
7.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
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Control Room Simulator (CRS)
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The overall performance of the CRS crew was very good. The Shift Engineer (SE) promptly and correctly classified the Unusual Event
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(UE) and the Alert. Offsite agency notifications were very timely.
For example, the UE notifications were completed before the Alert declaration, which was only six minutes after the UE declaration. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) link was established shortly after the Alert declaration.
Transfer of command and control to the Station Director (SD) located in the i
Technical Support Center (TSC) was timely and very thorough.
The operators' use of procedures was excellent.
Annunciator Response Guides were used when required. The Unit Shift Supervisor (SS) diligently followed the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). Crew briefings were excellent.
Numerous updates were provided and inputs were solicited from all the operators. Updates were also provided to operators upon their returns from assignments outside the CRS.
The crew demonstrated good brainstorming and was quick to detect changes in the plant status. After the Loose Parts Monitor alarm, the SE directed the crew to monitor the Failed Fuel Monitor level.
Therefore the crew quickly noted when the Alert level was reached
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on the Failed Fuel Monitor. The-crew was very quick'to note and
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properly responded to the Anticipated Transient Without Scram
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(ATWS) condition.
j Communications among the crew were good. While communications
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were not always formal, no orders or information updates were
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missed. The formality of the communications greatly improved once
the scenario entered into the ATWS and the operators were i
following their E0Ps.
Information flow between the CRS and the other facilities was good.
i Several problems were noted in the plant-wide announcements. The i
Alert announcement did not state the reason for this emergency
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declaration and the associated need to activate the onsite
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emergency response facilities. The Site Area Emergency (SAE)
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announcement was premature. The associated sounding of the
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assembly siren was not followed by a statement indicating that personnel were to report to their assembly areas. Although the activation of the onsite response facilities and the site assembly
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were completed in a timely manner, the incomplete announcements
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did cause some confusion and had the potential to delay the
intended responses. The incomplete Alert announcement and the lack of a site assembly announcement will be tracked as an Inspection Follow-up Item (Nos. 50-295/93012-01 and 50-304/93012-
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Ol(DRSS)).
No violations or deviations were identified; however, one
Inspection Follow-up Item was identified.
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
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Several Health Physics staff reported to the TSC after the UE declaration in order to use computers to monitor readings from Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) in the auxiliary building and to acquire meteorological data. The remainder of the TSC staff reported to the facility following the Alert declaration. After several teleconferences with the SE and a thorough initial briefing to all TSC staff, the Station Director (SD) declared the TSC to be fully operational and himself in command of all onsite emergency response activities. The assumption of lead responsibilities occurred within one hour of the Alert declaration.
The SD led excellent briefings at about 30 minute intervais during-the exercise. Any TSC staff having updates or concerns were expected to speak during these briefings.
Review and revision of current priorities were an integral part of the briefings.
Status boards were effectively used to list priorities, major events and the status of inplant teams' activities.
Computer displays were mainly used to monitor and trend critical parameters.
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The SD and the Operations, Radiation Protection and Security Directors discussed the need for an onsite assembly due to j
abnormal radiation levels indicated in the auxiliary and turbine
buildings..The validity of several of these readings were
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questioned and later discounted based on the status of various i
systems. While the readings were being evaluated, an acceptable decision was made to restrict access to the auxiliary building to l
emergency workers.
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CRS staff used the PA system to announce that an ATWS had
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l key aides exhibited surprise at the SAE announcement, since the SD had emergency classificatior, responsibility. Since the need for a
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SAE declaration was obvious for an ATWS condition, the SD correctly decided not to confuse the situation further by having
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CRS staff cancel their SAE announcement and to repeat it after the SD officially made the declaration. Offsite officials were
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l initially notified of the SAE declaration in a detailed and timely
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manner.
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The SAE declaration necessitated the assembly and accounting of all onsite personnel. These actions were completed in the Protected Area and Owner Controlled Area (OCA) within 30 minutes of the sounding of the assembly siren. Meanwhile, an orderly i
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transfer of command to the Corporate Emergency Operations-l l
Facility's (CEOF's) Corporate Manager of Emergency Operations
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L (CMEO) occurred. The SD ensured that TSC and CRS staffs were
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aware of this transfer and which lead responsibilities, including i
communications with NRC, remained with the TSC with the staff.
After all onsite personnel were accounted for, TSC directors were
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given a brief amount of time before the simulated evacuation of i
nonessential onsite personnel commenced. This evacuation was l
initially delayed by reports of simulated minor contamination in a
the south parking lot following initiation of a-minor release.
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While an alternate evacuation strategy was being developed, a j
simulated wind shift towards the OCA's assembly area began and the -
simulated release rate greatly increased. The simulated evacuation of nonessentials in the OCA in an upwind direction became the top priority, since the Protected Area's assembly area had no abnormal radiation levels.
The acceptable strategy for the
. simulated evacuation of all nonessential personnel in an upwind i
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I direction was completed about an hour after the General Emergency j
(GE) declaration.
l Shortly before 11:00 a.m., TSC staff were informed of an actual, i
partial communications equipment degradation at the nearsite EOF.
TSC staff were clearly informed which communications links were affected and which alternate links remained available.
Equipment problems were not sufficient to warrant a delay in the transfer of
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various lead responsibilities from TSC or CE0F staffs to their t
'nearsite EOF counterparts.
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Following the GE declaration by the nearsite E0F's MEO, TSC staff
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were kept adequately informed of the protective actions recommended to offsite officials and those chosen for
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information was forwarded to the CRS and OSC along with the p
results of other significant decisions.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Support Center (OSC)
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Staffing of the OSC was acceptable. A PA announcement was made at 07:58 that "the plant was in an Alert condition" with no further i
directions given. Radiation protection,' operations and chemistry i
personnel quickly staffed the OSC. However, electrical,
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mechanical, and instrument maintenance personnel were slow to report to the OSC. Had the scenario required immediate dispatch of damage control and repair teams, the initial response would have been potentially delayed by the absence of these work groups.
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Activation of the OSC was accomplished in an orderly manner. OSC-personnel were proactive in setting up the OSC, including its plant procedures, status boards and dosimetry issuance area. The l
OSC Director and Supervisor conducted a good ' initial briefing and i
explained the Alert declaration and current priorities.
The OSC personnel were cognizant of the immediate need to send a search and rescue team to the auxiliary building to locate a maintenance work crew after radiation levels increased.
Later, OSC personnel were particularly efficient in identifying degraded
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Inplant team dispatch from the OSC was very good. All 26 teams J
were given thorough briefings and were dispatched in a timely manner. The excellent dispatch of the fire brigade was especially
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noteworthy.
High priority was given to dispatching this team, while related paperwork was done by administrative assistants.
Teams were debriefed as they returned to the OSC by the OSC Supervisor. However, the task assignment sheets were not always
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l-completed by the OSC Supervisor. Radiological surveys were thoroughly documented and properly posted by the radiation protection technicians upon their return to the OSC.
Habitability was properly monitored in the OSC. Step off pads l
were properly set up during the initial activation of the OSC.
l Contamination control was very good.
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The OSC Director and OSC Supervisor provided frequent briefings to j
OSC personnel which were generally good.
However, the briefings could have included more information regarding the reactor coolant system status..Two minor errors were made when the OSC Director i
stated that "the plant was in an emergency level" after a SAE was-declared.
It was not announced in the OSC when the CE0F took
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command and control. The announcement that a GE had been declared
was made 25 minutes after that declaration. No information was i
given to OSC staff on protective action recommendations or offsite
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radiological readings.
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Communications with the inplant teams were excellent. The
radiation protection technicians called back dose rate information
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in a timely manner. The fire brigade also provided information t
back to the OSC in'a timely manner.
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Status board availability and usage was adequate. A status board was kept current in regards to the number of task assignments and
teams briefed. However, significant events were not posted on a status board. Such a status board would be useful for' updating
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teams returning from assignments. One status board did not y
indicate the. dispatch time of teams.
In addition, the section of
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a status board denoting the facility in command and control did
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not indicate when the CEOF was in command and control.
Finally, another status board was'not always kept current following briefings on the current status of priorities or teams dispatched.
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The inspectors accompanied four inplant teams. ' The overall response of inplant teams was very good. On one occasion, the i
task assignment sheet specified protective clothin-and
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respirators. The assigned operator was cautioned tnat.he should not wear a' respirator due to his facial hair. The operator was dispatched on a top priority job and subsequently donned the respirator, ignoring the radiation protection technician's
.I warning. One other minor problem was observed in'that an operator did not obtain a ladder which was needed to complete his task.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emeraency Operations Facility (E0F)
Activation of the EOF 'in real time was not an exercise objective.
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EOF staff was pre-staged at a local hotel.
The licensee
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demonstrated the use of the Corporate Emergency Operations
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Facility (CE0F) as an interim EOF during the exercise.
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adequacy of the CEOF as an interim EOF and the timeliness of
activating any of this licensee's near-site EOFs are being i
evaluated by the NRC staff.
Once the pre-staged personnel arrived, the EOF was activated in an effective and efficient manner. The E0F's Manager of Emergency i
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i Operations (ME0) assumed command and control from his CEOF l
counterpart in a timely manner after good turnover briefings.
The ME0 demonstrated positive command and control in the EOF l
throughout the exercise. The ME0 and his key staff directors
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conducted frequent'and detailed briefings with TSC counterparts, actual or simulated State officials, and the EOF staff.
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The ME0 and his staff appropriately determined the General l
Emergency (GE) declaration was warranted based on~ the loss of two j
of three fission product barriers with potential loss of the third
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barrier. An appropriate default protective action recommendation l
(PAR) was used at the GE declaration when delays were encountered i
in completing a dose projection for the PAR determination.
A dose
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projection was completed twenty minutes later with the appropriate
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PAR developed from the dose projection. That PAR was incorrectly j
transferred on Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Form No. 6
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and transmitted to the States. However, this error was quickly
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noticed and corrected on NARS Form No. 7 with concurrences from
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both States before any inappropriate protective actions would have been initiated by offsite officials.
The protective measures group did a very good job in directing the Offsite Monitoring Teams (0MTs) and using the teams' data to j
assist in developing PARS. However, the protective measures group r
exhibited several problems in using plant status information to assist in developing or validating their dose calculations.
Examples included not using plant chemistry results to invalidate i
a miscalculated iodine release rate of 1.5 E18 microcuries per second. This delayed the dose projection at the GE declaration.
The group exhibited uncertainty in determining a reasonable release duration following the steam generator tube rupture event i
(an adequate default value of two hours was eventually chosen).
Finally, the group had difficulty in recognizing that the increasing dose rate readings close to the plant indicated a further degrade in the steam generator's status. The protective measures group's problems in using plant status information to develop dose projections and to validate or invalidate OMTs'
data will be tracked as an Inspection Follow-up Item (Nos. 50-295/93012-02 and 50-304/93012-02(DRSS)).
No violations or deviations were identified; however, one Inspection Follow-up Item was identified.
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Offsite Monitorina Teams (0MTs)
Two OMTs were formed, adequately briefed and dispatched from the OSC following the Alert declaration per procedures.
The teams proceeded to their assigned vehicles and efficiently checked their supplies and tested their radiological monitoring equipment.
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The teams were appropriately deployed by environs staff in the TSC
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and EOF as wind direction and plant conditions changed.
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Communications between the teams and those directing them were _
frequent, detailed and properly documented.
Environs staff kept-i the OMTs advised of changing wind direction conditions postulated
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by the scenario, as well as changing release status. At one point, the teams were advised of simulated high dose rate areas
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reported by the IDNS' OMTs.
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An inspector accompanied one OMT. Team members demonstrated.
excellent contamination control techniques for themselves, their
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equipment and the samples they collected. Handling, labeling and documentation of samples was very good. Team members periodically
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monitored their simulated exposures and reported this information
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to those directing their activities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Ob.iectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
The exercise's scope and objectives and the exercise scenario were i'
submitted to NRC within the proper timeframes. No significant concerns were identified during the scenario review process.
Challenging aspects of the scenario included: the assembly and j
accounting of about 800 personnel within the site's protected and owner
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controlled areas; collection and analysis of a reactor coolant sample; deployment of offsite monitoring teams; dispatch of 26 inplant teams of various types, including the fire brigade; use of dedicated communica-tions links in the CRS, TSC and E0F to communicate with actual and simulated NRC responders; and a wind direction shift of about 270 degrees, which included a lake breeze effect.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exercise Control and Critiaues Exercise control was very good. There were sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel to control the exercise.
No noteworthy instances of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which they might not otherwise hav: taken, were observed. 'One instance of over simulation was noted when an inplant team was allowed to simulate obtaining a ladder needed to complete a task.
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with participants immediately following the exercise.
These critiques were detailed. The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary evaluation of performance strengths and weaknesses prior to the exit interview.
The licensee's evaluation was in overall very good agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
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Exit Interview i
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The' inspectors held _an exit interview on July 30, 1993,'with those i
i licensee representatives--_ identified in Section 2 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none'
of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
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Attachment:
Exercise Objectives l
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ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1993 GSEP EXERCISE
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JULY 28, 1993
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PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:
Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to implement the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of the public health and safety in the event of a major accident at one of its Nuclear Power Stations.
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:
NOTE: An EOF designation includes all EOFs and the CEOF if activated as a Backup EOF. A CEOF designation weight new weighted is for activation of the CEOF as an initerim EOF ractor score score only.
- Denotes critical objectives 1)
Assessment and Classification j
a. Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions which warrant declaring a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) minutes.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to determine the highest Emergency Action Level (EAL) applicable for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minutes.
c. Demonstrate the ability to determine the most appropriate EAL(s) for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minutes.
2)
Notification and Communications a. Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out
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the NARS form for conditions presented in the i
scenario.
b. Demonstrate the ability to notify appropriate State and local organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of an Emergency classification or significant changes in NARS information.
c. Demonstrate the backup means of offsite notifications if the NARS network fails.
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d. Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC q
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1mmediately after the State notifications and J
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within one (1) hour of the: Emergency j
classification using the Event Notification
Worksheet as appropriate.
I
- (CR,_TSC, EOF)
e. Demonstrate the ability to provide information l
. updates to the States at least hourly and
within thirty (30) minutes of significant q
changes in conditions reported on the State
Agency Update Checklist.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to contact appropriate support organizations such as INPO, ANI, General i
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Electric or Westinghouse the Fuel Vendor, or Teledyne, for assistance during the Exercise.
g. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line I
of communication with the NRC on the Emergency-l Notification System (ENS) upon request.
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j h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain-an open-line i
of communication with the NRC on the Health
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Physics. Network (HPN) upon request.
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1. Demonstrate the ability to provide information
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updates using the Event Notification Worksheet i
i as appropriate to the NRC within thirty (30)
minutes of changes in' reportable conditions
when an open-line of communication (ENS) is not j
maintained.
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j. Demonstrate the ability to provide informational announcements over the plant PA system in-(CR)
1.
l accordance with procedures and policies.
3)
Radiological Assessment and Protective Actions j
a. Demonstrate the ability to collect. document and use radiological surveys for conditions presented i
in the scenario.
- (OSC)
_3_
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b. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate onsite
radiological information for conditions presented in-the scenario.
3~
c. Demonstrate the ability to provide appropriate radiological protection (including clothing and respiratory equipment) for onsite personnel in accordance with procedures and policies.
d. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and brief personnel for entry into a High Radiation Area in accordance with procedures.and policies.
- (OSC)
e. Demonstrate the ability to 1ssue and administratively control dostmetry in the OSC in accordance with procedures and policies.
- (OSC)
_3_
f. Demonstrate the ability to perform habitability surveys in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policies.
_2_
g. Demonstrate the-ability to establish and' maintain i
radiological controls in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policies.
h. Demonstrate the ability to control personnel exposure per 10CFR20 emergency exposure limits in accordance with procedures and policies.
1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document radiation exposure to inplant operations and maintenance teams in accordance with
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procedures and policies.
_3_
j. Demonstrate the ability to respond to and perform decontamination of radioactively r
l contaminated individual (s) in accordance with procedures and policies-.
- (OSC)
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k. Demonstrate the ability to identify appropriate Protective Action Recommendations:(PARS) in-accordance with procedures and policies within fifteen (15) minutes.
1. Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude of the-source term of-a release.
_3_
m. Demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections in accordance with emergency procedures.
n. Demonstrate the ability to establish the relationship between effluent monitor-readings and onsite and offsite exposures / contamination
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for given meteorological conditions.
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o. Demonstrate the ability to obtain a meterological
[
forecast.
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e p. Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude-of a release' based on plant system parameters and
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effluent monitors.
_3_
i q. Demonstrate the ability to calculate release
!
rate / projected doses with primary assessment l
instrumentation ~offscale or inoperable.
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_3_
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r. Demonstrate the ability to collect and analyze
RCS and Containment Atmosphere samples using High Radiation Sampling System equipment in
accordance with HRSS procedures and health physics controls.
_3_
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s. Demonstrate the ability to estimate core damage in accordance with emergency procedures.
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t. Demonstrate the ability of the Environs Director to initially brief the Field Teams and keep them
~
aware of critical information.
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u. Demonstrate the ability to develop effective'
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sampling strategy and effectively direct the Field
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Teams'to' assess the components of a radioactive
^ release to the environment.
_3_
's v. Demonstrate the ability to collect and count field
'i samples in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.
.
- (OSC/ FIELD TEAMS)
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w. Demonstrate the ability to document field samples--
,
in accordance with Environmental Sampling j
procedures.
- (OSC/ FIELD TEAMS)
_3_
l x. Demonstrate the ability to perform dose rate measurements in the environment.
- (OSC/ FIELD TEAMS)
_3_
l y. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate field sample results in accordance with procedures and policies.
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_3_
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z. Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Field Teams within forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field samples.
i
1 aa. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and direct i
Field Team activities in accordance with
,
procedures and policies.
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bb. Demonstrate the ability to monitor Field Team activities.
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- (CEOF)
i cc. Demonstrate the ability to transfer control of
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Field Team activities in accordance with l
procedures and policies.
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_3_
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4.
Emeraency Facilities I
a. Demonstrate the ability to establish minimum staffing in the TSC and OSC within thirty (30)
minutes of an Alert or higher Classification
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during a daytime event [within sixty (60) minutes
}
of an Alert or higher Classification during an-j off hours event] in accordance with GSEP Section 4.
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d. Demonstrate the ability to augment the Control' Room
staff within thirty (30) minutes of an Alert or
._
~
higher Emerge'ncy Classification-in accordance with
GSEP Section 4.
_3__
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- (CR)
i e. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and
,
Control authority from the Control Room to the TSC in accordance with procedures and policies.
l-(CR, TSC)
_3__
l f. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and
,
Control authority from the TSC to the EOF /CEOF in
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accordance with procedures and policies.
_3__
i g. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the CEOF to the EOF in
'
accordance with procedures and policies.
- (EOF, CEOF)
_3__
l h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain current and l
accurate information on Status Boards by
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updating at least every thirty (30) minutes.
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_2_
-l 1. Demonstrate the ability to maintain information on the Electronic Status Board in accordance with procedures and policies.
j. Demonstrate the ability to exchange data and technical information between the Emergency
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Response Facilities in accordance with procedures i
and policies.
- (CR, OSC, TSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC, OSC/ FIELD TEAMS)
5)
Emeroency Direction and Control j
a. Demonstrate the ability of the Directors and Managers to provide leadership in their respective
areas of responsibility as specified in GSEP and i
position-specific procedures.
(CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC)
b. Demonstrate the ability to prioritize resources for Inplant Team activities in accordance with Station procedures.
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c. Demonstrate.the ability to assemble, dispatch and brief Inplant Teams in accordance with Station-l
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procedures.
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d. Demonstrate the ability of in-plant. teams t'o
'
perform their assigned functions.
- (OSC)
q e. Demonstrate the ability of the OSC Staff and team members to conduct a thorough debriefing following the completion of assigned tasks.
- (OSC)
_3__.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to acquire and transport Emergency equipment and supplies necessary-to
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i mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant -
conditions.
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_3__
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g. Demonstrate the ability of the Acting Station Director, Station Director, OSC Director and MEO
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to provide briefings and updates concerning plant
status, event classification, and activities in progress at least every sixty (60) minutes.
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h. Demonstrate the ability to provide cccess.for the
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NRC Site Team in accordance with Access Control ll procedures.
_3__
1. Demonstrate the ability to provide an initial briefing to the NRC Site Team.
- (CR, TSC)
_3_
j. Demonstrate the ability to provide the NRC Site Team with adequate and timely information pertaining to critical emergency response activities.
_3_
k. Demonstrate the ability of individuals in the Emergency Response Organization to use position specific procedures.
- (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC, OSC/ FIELD TEAMS)
_3_
1. Demonstrate the ability to assemble and account for on-site personnel within thirty (30). minutes of announcing the assembly.
_5_
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o. Demonstrate the ability to perform search and
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rescue for personnel not accounted for.
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-(TSC)
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n. Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-essential personnel within thirty (30) minutes after completion of Site Accountability.
- (TSC)
_3_
p. Demonstrate the ability to explain the evacuation route, brief personnei knd arrange for traffic control prior to initiating site evacuation.
_3_
6)
Recovery a. Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to enter a Recovery classification in accordance with procedures and policies.
_3_
b. Demonstrate the ability to generate a Recovery Plan which will return the plant to normal operations in accordance with procedures and policies.
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l c. Demonstrate the ability to determine long-term
L recovery staffing requirements.
i d. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate recovery actions with the State.
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7)
SECURITY a. Demonstrate the ability of the Security force to respond to an emergency situation in accordance with procedures and policies.
_3_
c. Demonstrate the ability to establish access control to Emergency Response Facilities.
- [(TSC, EOF, JPIC (remote only)]
_3_
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I W2ight Raw Weight".d rcet:r se:ra sc.re t
d. Demonstrate the ability of the Safeguards
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Specialist / Security Director to coordinate
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emergency response action with appropriate offsite
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agencies. (e.g., evacuation routes with County Sheriff, NRC Safeguards personnel).
_3_
8)
PUBLIC INFORKATION a Demonstrate the ability to activate the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) within sixty (60)
minutes of EOF activation.
- (JPIC)
b. Demonstrate the ability to respond ta Media requests within sixty (60) minutes in accordance with policies and procedures.
- (JPIC)
c. Demonstrate the ability to prepare accurate Press Releases within ninety (90) minutes of a significant event while in a Site or General Emergency.
- (JPIC)
d. Demonstrate the ahi?ity to present accurate media briefings within ninety (90) minutes of significant events while in a Site or General Emergency.
- (JPIC)
e. Demonstrate the ability to use visual aides to support media briefings in accordance with procedures and policies.
_2_
- (JPIC)
f. Demonstrate the ibility to maintain a CECO representative lit the JPIC at all times.
- (JPIC)
g. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with Non-CECO JPIC representatives for media briefings in accordance with procedures and policies.
- (JPIC)
)
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