IR 05000295/1993005
| ML20035B925 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035B923 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-93-05, 50-295-93-5, 50-304-93-05, 50-304-93-5, NUDOCS 9304060006 | |
| Download: ML20035B925 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Report Nos. 50-295/93005(DRP); 50-304/93005(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; OPR-48 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Zion, IL Inspection Conducted:
February 2 through March 19, 1992 Inspectors:
J. D. Smith R. J. Leemon V. P. Lougheed D. S. Butler Approved By:
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Jh/h3 M. J. Farber, Chief Dite'
Reactor Projects Section IA t
Inspection Summary Inspection from February 2 through March 19. 1993(Report Nos. 50-295/93005 (ORP): 50-304/93005(DRPI)
Areas Inspected: This was a routine, unannounced resident inspection of summary of operations; operational safety verification and engineered safr feature (ESF) system walkdowns; maintenance and surveillance observations; engineering and technical support observations; safety assessment and quality verification; and management meetings.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Operations The operating staff's performance was outstanding as demonstrated by the Unit 2 startup and operations after the refueling outage. There were only three minor (Level 4) out-of-service problem identification forms (PIFs)
during the many valve manipulations required to return systems to service.
Quick operator response to Eagle 21 and steam generator flow controller problems prevented plant transients.
9304060006 930331 PDR ADOCK 05000295 G
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Maintenance and Surveillance
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The maintenance departments are becoming more proactive regarding return-to-service of malfunctioning equipment which has caused operator work-around
problems. Although one of the last departments to fully endorse the
integrated quality effort (IQE) program, they have been active. participants during this assessment period. These and other improvements being made in the maintenance department are needed and are being driven and effectively
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implemented by the new maintenance supervisor.
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Enoineerino and Technical Sucoort The site engineering and construction department continued the reorganization
process to balance the experience levels of the station support, site
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construction and modification design groups. The support from this department
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was observed to be very good during the outage and in preparation for the dual
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unit outage. The technical engineering staff was also reorganized to move
personnel from assistant technical staff supervisor positions to group. leader
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positions which provides more experience at the first line supervisor levels.
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These moves should further strengthen these groups and improve the performance
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of the technical staff.
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Safety Assessment And Quality Verification
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The resident inspectors conducted a thorough review of a performance based SAQV production audit inspection plan of operations and maintenance f
departments. The audit plan and inspector guidance document were outstanding.
It provided excellent guidance for consistency of data among inspectors. The
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inspection team was comprised of all of the SAQV group plus others from CECO-stations and corporate. An assessment of the findings and effectiveness of-
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the audit will be performed.
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DETAILS e
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Persons Contacted
- R. Tuetken, Vice President, Zion Station-
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- T. Joyce, Station Manager D. Wozniak, Technical Services Superintendent-T. Broccolo, Operations Manager J. LaFontaine, Outage Management Manager
- M. Lohmann, Site Engineering and Construction Manager l
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T. Printz, Assistant Superintendent of Operations i
W. Kurth, Outage Planning Director
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- W. Stone, Performance Improvement Director
- R. Cascarano, Services Director l
P. LeBlond, Executive Assistant i
L. Simon, Maintenance Supervisor
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- S. Kaplan, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor i
- R. Budowle, Site Quality Verification Supervisor j
G. Ponce, Quality Control Supervisor l
R. Chrzanowski, Technical Staff Supervisor-j R. Milne, Security Administrator l
- K. Dickerson, Regulatory Assurance j
P. Cantwell, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
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W. T'Niemi, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
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K. Hansing, Unit 0 Operating Engineer
- P. Fay, Maintenance
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Whittier, Site Quality Verification
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- Indicates persons present at the exit interview on March-19, 1993.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members
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of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staffs.
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Summary of Operations
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Unit 1 f
The unit remained at approximately 100 percent power, in the load
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following mode, throughout this report period.
Unit 2
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The unit was started up and synchronized to the grid on February 22,
.l 1993, at the completion of the refueling outage.
Power ascension
- l testing was conducted and the unit reached full power on March 6, 1993.
The unit was operated in the load-following. mode for the remainder of
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the inspection period.
q No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Operational Safety Verification and Enaineered Safety Features System f
Walkdown (71707 & 71710)
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The inspectors verified that *.he facility was being operated in i
conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the i
licensee's management was effectively carrying out their
responsibilities for safe operation. During tours of accessible areas l
of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant and equipment
conditions, including control of activities in progress.
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On a sampling basis, the inspectors observed control room staffing and coordination of plant activities; observed operator adherence with
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procedures and technical specifications; monitored. control room indications for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was
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available and observed the frequency of plant and control room visits by'
station managers. The inspectors also monitored various administrative
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and operating records.
The specific areas observed were:
Enaineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems
Accessible portions of ESF systems and their support systems
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components were inspected to verify operability through
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I observation of instrumentation and proper valve and electrical power alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected i
components for material conditions and found a significant
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reduction in the number cf leaking valves on Unit 2.
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Radiation Protection Controls I
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The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics' procedures and randomly examined radiation protection
instrumentation for operability and calibration.
Although
improvements in the return-to-sers ice time for inoperable
instrumentation was noted, high failure rates for installed monitoring equipment continued to be observed.
- Security
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During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were
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being implemented according to their approved security plan.
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i Housekeepino and Plant Cleanliness
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The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant
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cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related j
equipment from intrusion of foreign matter. A dedicated effort to i
recover contaminated auxiliary building rooms has been successful;
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' more roon ; accessible to personnel in street clothing than at any
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time since the mid 1970's.
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Operational Events j
On March 7, 1993, the ice melt line-up to the lake intake
structure was secured. Shortly afterwards a large number of zebra l
mussels were found in the moving screen baskets.
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determined that the zebra mussels had broken loose from the lake'
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intake piping due to the flow configuration change.
Inspections-l of the Unit I and 2 bus duct cooler strainers and the 2A emergency'
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diesel generator lube oil cooler revealed an ~ insignificant j
quantity of zebra mussel shells.
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The chlorination system, which was required to be secured in the ice melt mode, was started up on March 11, 1993.
Inspections of
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safety related coolers will be performed during the following-t month because zebra mussels die and break loose'approximately
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three weeks after the start of chlorination. The residents will
closely monitor the licensee's actions.
i Reactor Protection System Problems
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On February 11, 1993, while at 100 percent power, Unit I had a
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voltage dip on Instrument bus 111 which caused a lockup of the t
Eagle 21 protection set 1, rack 3's output. The momentary voltage
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dip on Instrument bus 111 was caused by the temporary shorting of
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the control power to a 12 weight percent boric acid pump being removed as part of the boric acid system modification. The control power had been improperly terminated. The licensee'is
investigating the root cause. Quick response by the nuclear l
system operator prevented the unit from undergoing _a transient by j
switching from auto to manual on affected controllers. The j-resident inspectors will review the conclusions from the
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licensee's investigation.
t.oss of Unit 2 Annunciators
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On March 15, 1993, at 1405 (CST), an Alert was declared due to a j
loss of annunciators for the Unit 2 emergency core cooling system
panels, the reactor control panel, and the electrical panel. The j
operators were informed of the annunciator loss when the Nuclear
Annunciator DC Supply failure Alarm came in. They tested.the l
alarms and, upon confirmation of annunciator loss, declared the
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Alert in accordance with the station's emergency plan. The Alert j
was terminated at 2:30 p.m. (CST), after a blown fuse was
identified and replaced. Operator and station response.to the i
event was prompt and appropriate. The licensee is investigating l
the root cause of the event.
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Assessment of Plant Operations
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The operating staff's performance was outstanding as demonstrated by the Unit 2 startup and operations after the-refueling outage.
There were only three minor (Level 4) out-of-service problem identification forms (PIFs) during the many. valve manipulations required to return systems to service. -Quick operator response to Eagle 21 and steam generator flow controller problems prevented plant transients.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Monthly Maintenance and Surveillance (62703 and 61726)
Routinely, station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed
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or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
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approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards,
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and in conformance with technical specifications.
- Also considered during this review were: approvals obtained prior to initiating the work and testing and that operability requirements were
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met during such activities; functional testing and calibrations i
performed prior to declaring the component operable; discrepancies
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identified during the activities resolved prior to returning the component to service; quality control records maintained;_ and activities accomplished by qualified personnel.
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Maintenance / Surveillance Related Activities
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Auxiliary Feedwater Overspeed Test
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On February 12, 1993, during an overspeed periodic test for the 2A l
auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW), the governor would not allow the i
turbine to reach the speed needed for the overspeed trip.
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governor was replaced and the pump passed the overspeed test.
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During the performance of bus drop tests on February 13, the 2A AFW pump was auto started and tripped on overspeed.
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Troubleshooting continued and the pump was declared operable on l
February 16, 1993. The overspeed problem was due to the turbine-
governors' inability to respond to the water carryover in the supply steam. The water carryover was due to malfunctioning steam line traps and the poor quality of steam obtained from reactor
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coolant pump heat.
Following reactor startup the pump was
satisfactorily tested using nuclear heat.
Dual Unit Outaae l
l The residents received a presentation on temporary system
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requirements and designs for the dual unit outage scheduled to
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start in October 1993. The designs and in-service dates for the
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systems appeared thorough and well planned.
Planning and i
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scheduling for the overall scope of this outage is complete. This
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cv includes parts, piping prefabrication and the installation of'
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conduit and piping in pr. ogress to limit the outage time. The_
residents will continue to closely follow outage preparations including inspections of the temporary' systems and the training-
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provided to operations on these systems.
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Assessment of Maintenance and Surveillance
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l The maintenance departments are becoming more proactive regarding
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return-to-service of malfunctioning equipment which caused
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operator work-around problems. Although one of the.last
.l departments to fully endorse the integrated quality effort (IQE)
j program, they have been active participants during this assessment a
period. These and other improvements being made in the
maintenance department are needed and are being driven and
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effectively implemented by the new maintenance supervisor.
No violations of deviations were identified.
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Enaineerina and Technical Support (37828)
The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
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evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities.
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accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine
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events, outage-related activities, and assigned TS surveillances; f
observing on-going maintenance work and troublesbooting; and reviewing
deviation investigations and root cause determinations.
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Enoineerina and Technical Support Events j
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Operatina licensino Examination i
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Initial and requalification examinations were conducted the week
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of January 25, 1993, and results were documented in Inspection Report 50-295/0L-93-01.
Root Cause Analysis of the December 30. 1992. Automatic Start of o
the IB Residual Heat Removal Pumo
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During the performance of Unit 1 periodic test PT-10-3, " Bus Drop i
Test," on December 30, 1992, an unexpected start of the 9 i
residual heat removal (RHR) pump occurred.
During the root cause
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analysis, the licensee identified that the Bus 148 Train B l
safeguards sequence timer did not fully reset.
In addition, the IB RHR sequencer contact (No. 2) was found to be misadjusted.
Further investigation identified the following sequencer
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anomalies.
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Bus Secuencer Train A Train B j
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147 Safety Injection Reset; some binding No problem'
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147 Shutdown No problem Reset;'some
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binding j
148 Safety Injection No problem Partially reset-
148 Shutdown Reset; some binding Reset; some
binding-l 149 Safety Injection Partially reset Partially reset-
4 149 Shutdown Reset; some binding No problem
Sequencer reset verification was performed during the refueling outage; however, verification was not required during the i
quarterly PT-10-3 surveillance.
The Unit I sequencers had been recently replaced with new units;
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these were the ones exhibiting reset binding. The licensee'
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determined that the manufacturer incorrectly set an adjustable
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collar which resulted in friction between the cam shaft, ~ cam shaft bushing, collar, and the sequencer structural frame.
Increased
cabinet temperatures, along with the collar-being pressed tightly i
against the cam shaft bushing, caused the binding to occur. The licensee reviewed the sequencer binding concern for 10 CFR Part 21 applicability and will be issuing a Part 21 notification.
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The licensee took appropriate corrective actions, including proper i'
adjustment of the cam shaft collar and procedure revisions. These actions should prevent recurrence of this event.
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Assessment of Enaineerina and Technical SuoDort The site engineering and construction department continued the
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reorganization process to balance the experience levels of the j
station support, site construction and modification design' groups.
The support from'this department was observed to be very good during the outage and in preparation for the dual unit outage.
The technical engineering staff was also reorganized to move
personnel from assistant technical staff supervisor positions to
~j group leader positions which provides more experience at the first
line supervisor levels. These moves should further strengthen
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these groups and the performance of the technical staff which is i
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already good.
No violations or deviations.were identified.
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Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification (40500)
The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight i
activities in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection was evaluated. Management and supervisory meetings involving plant status i
were attended to observe the coordination between departments. The l
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results of licensee corrective action programs were routinely monitored
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by attendance at meetings, discussion with the plant staU -miew of
- deviation reports, and root cause evaluation -reports.
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SA0V Related Events Audit Results An off-site quality verification (QV) audit of the radiological environmental monitoring program (REMP) and the radiation protection program was performed from February 8 - 22,-1993. The audit team was comprised of site and corporate QV program personnel. The team found the many deficiencies in the REMP program, identified during a 1992 audit, had been corrected and were all acceptable. The radiation protection program was also g
acceptable with only minor deficiencies identified.
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Reculation (NRR) Temporary Waiver of
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Compliances (TWOC)
Low Temperature Overoressure Protection On January 13, 1993, Commonwealth Edison Nuclear Engineering j
Department notified Zion Station personnel that the Westinghouse
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low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) analysis did not
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incorporate necessary correction factors to account for reactor j
coolant pump or residual heat removal (RHR) pump pressures, due to
the physical location of the two pressure transmitters.: Technical
Specification 3.3.2.G.I.a requires a fixed power operated relief i
valve setting of 435 psig, which is nonconservative for LTOP l
protection when the correction factors are incorporated. The.
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licensee requested a temporary waiver of compliance (TiuC) on
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January 28, 1993, in order to permit start up of Unit 2 with an LTOP value of 435 psig or less.
On February 20, 1993, Unit 2 entered Mode 3 where TS 3.3.2.G.I.a.
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was not applicable, exiting the.TWOC before the expiration date of i
February 22, 1993. On February 22, 1993, the licensee submitted a
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TS amendment request to incorporate the necessary correction factors into the TS prior to the next shutdown for either unit.
Containment Recirculation Sumo level Instrumentation 18-Month Channel Calibration On February 25, 1993, licensee personnel identified that' TS
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Amendment 141, which was to be implemented February 26, 1993, changed the surveillance interval for the containment sump level instruments from three years to eighteen months.
In order to-l prevent a unit shutdown, the licensee requested a TWOC from NRR to
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permit continued operation until a TS amendment could be i
processed. The amendment would extend the surveillance-interval-l until the end of the next Unit I refueling outage.
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NRR granted the TWOC for a period from February 26 to June'5,
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1993, in order to allow normal processing of the amendment l
request. On March 3, 1993, the licensee submitted the required TS
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amendment request.
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'l Procram Imorovements
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The Zion Station leads all CECO sites in four pilot programs initiated at Zion and being adopted by the other stations. These-i programs are:
PRA/IPE - An IPE Implementation Committee directed the
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development of an interim IPE deployment tool to assist in
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the prioritization of planned maintenance. The committee is
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involved in the development of a computer based PRA. tool for use by operating personnel to update and display current
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operating risks. This program is scheduled to be operable t
by the end of 1993.
Shutdown Risk Manaaement
f This program was developed over the last two years and has~
I been refined into an excellent program. Quality
verification personnel monitors the shutdown risk le rels
daily, including a review of any significant proposed
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changes to the outage schedule prior to the changes. The
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shutdown risks are provided to all station personnel via TV monitors and in the Plan of the Day plant status reports. A
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Zion Administrative Procedure (ZAP) is being developed for
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implementation this year.
Intearated Reportina Proaram l
The integrated reporting program (IPE). combined all of the -
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root cause programs into one. This reduced redundancy
improved efficiency and improved confidence in the program.
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The threshold of documented and investigated items was
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significantly lowered. The program provides excellent low
tier trending for utilization by management to correct minor
problems-before they become major ones. The-success of the i
program has been due to the willingness of station personnel
to fill out problem identification forms (PIFs) without fear
i of punitive actions by management.
l Intearated Quality Effort
The IQE program provides monthly performance indicators to management. This provides management with areas to focus on
for improving and effectiveness of prior actions.
Inputs i
for the IQE program are: self-identified weaknesses by
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departments, senior management observations, nuclear quality a
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^o; and quality control group audits, 'INPO, and NRC findings,.
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and the integrated reporting (root cause) program.
This is an outstanding program which should allow Zion to continue
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its performance improvement trend.
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Assessment of SA0V i
i The resident inspectors conducted a thorough review of a-
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performance-based SAQV production audit inspection plan of j
operations and maintenance departments. The audit plan _and j
inspector guidance document was outstanding. 'It.provided
excellent guidance for consistency of data among inspectors. The
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inspection team was comprised of all of the SAQV group plus others from Ceco stations and corporate. An assessment of the findings
and effer.tiveness of the audit will be reviewed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup (92700)
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Through direct observations, discessions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following LER was reviewed to determine that
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reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate-corrective action
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was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications. The LER
listed below is closed.
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DESCRIPTION l
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295/92024 Autostart of the IB Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Due to a Binding Sequencer Timer
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In addition, the inspectors reviewed PIFs generated during the l
inspection period in order to monitor conditions related to plant or
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personnel performance for potential trends. The PIFs, and the results
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of investigations, were also reviewed to ensure that they were generated i
appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the j
applicable procedures and the quality assurance manual.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Manaaement Meetinas (30703)
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l On February 17, 1993, Mr. A B. Davis, Regional Administrator, Region i
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III; Mr. J. E. Dyer, Direc*.or - Project Directorate III; and other NRC staff met with the licensee to present the Zion SALP. Utility
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management included Messrs. J. J. O'Connor, Chief Executive Officer;
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C. Reed, Chief Nuclear Officer; M. J. Wallace, Chief Nuclear Operating Officer; R. P. Tuetken, Site Vice President; T. P. Joyce, Zion Plant Manager; and additional staff members.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview (30703)
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l The. inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph
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1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the t
inspection on March 19, 1993, to summarize the scope and. findings of the l
inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'
i comments..The inspectors also discussed the likely informational l
content of'the inspection report with regard to documents or processes L!
reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not-identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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