IR 05000295/1993011
| ML20045C033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045C030 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-93-11, 50-304-93-11, NUDOCS 9306220008 | |
| Download: ML20045C033 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Report No. 50-295/930ll(DRP); 50-304/930ll(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: April 27 through June 9, 1993 Inspectors:
J. D. Smith V. P. Lougheed M. J. Miller D. E. Jones Approved By:
Y 4 /d7 M.J.Farf/er, Chief Date
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Reactor Projects Section lA
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Inspection Summar_y Inspection from April 27 through June 9. 1993 (Report No.
50-295/304-93011(DRP))
Areas Inspected: This was a routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; summary of operations; operational safety verification and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; maintenance and surveillance observation; engineering and technical support observations; safety assessment and quality verification; and management meetings.
Results: In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Plant Operations Operations management continues to improve communications.
Closer management attention to out-of-services is being provided, along with formalizing other areas to continue the improving trend.
The operator's implementation of technical specification (TS) amendment 144/133, for the first month, was without incident. This response was outstanding, considering the potential for failure to enter a limiting condition for operation as required by the new TS. During this inspection period, both units had 100 percent availability for longer than 100 days, the first time since 1989.
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Maintenance and Surveillance The superintendent of maintenance has implemented several changes to improve
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craft personnel productivity. The changes include: better preparation and t
coordination with other departments, simplification of a cumbersome administrative process, and personnel accountability.
The writing of problem
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identification forms (PIFs) by maintenance is improving, but continues to be a challenge to management.
Enaineerina and Technical suonort The reorganization of the technical staff, which moved the assistant technical staff supervisors to group leaders and the previous group leaders to senior mentors for the less experienced technical staff engineers, is starting to have positive performance results.
Troubleshooting of the Eagle 21 system sporadic alarms was good, but problems still remain with the system. Good
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coordination was observed among the various groups involved in the spent fuel rerack project, especially during removal and decontamination of the old racks.
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Safety Assessment and Quality Verification The management's overview of the implementation of TS amendment 144/133 was excellent and without incident. This illustrates excellent teamwork by
. regulatory assurance, engineering, maintenance, quality verification, and operations. Management and the staff's attention to detail has prevented significant challenges to equipment, and enhanced safe operations for several months.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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R. Tuetken,-Vice P Jent, Zion Station
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- A. Broccolo, Actin 3 atation Manager
H. Lohmann, Site Engineer & Construction Manager P. LeBlond, Executive Assistant c
- S. Kaplan, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor D. Wozniak, Technical Services Superintendent L. Simon, Maintenance Supervisor
- J. LaFontaine, Outage Management Manger T. Printz, Assistant Superintendent of Operations R. Cascarano, Services Director
- W. Stone, Performance Improvement Director R. Chrzanowski, Technical Staff Supervisor R. Milne,-Security Administrator D. Bump, Quality Verification Supervisor
- K. Dickerson, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator
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- Indicates those present at the exit interview on June 9, 1993.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members
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of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staffs.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701. 92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation 304-91002-01(DRP):
" Failure to follow
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procedures." The common unit emergency diesel generator was declared operable without properly completing PT-11, Diesel Generator Loading Test, or PT-14, Inoperable Equipment Surveillance. Management expectations and policy regarding the situation were conveyed through a letter to the operating crews dated March 5, 1991, and during the State of the Station address on April 11, 1991. A permanent procedure change to PT-11, which incorporated verification of a minimum acceptance criteria, became effective September 24, 1991..This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 304-92010-01(DRPl:
" Loss of Shutdown-Cooling and Inadvertent Spray Down of Containment." The
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unresolved item was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation, as documented in Inspection Report 92022. This item is closed.
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c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 295/304-92023-04(DRS):
"Reportability of Pressurizer Safety Valves with As-Found Setpoints Below Technical Specification Acceptance Criteria." The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE0D) reviewed the reporting requirements for these valves and determined that the failures were not reportable.
This item is closed.
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d.
(Closed) Insoection Followup Item 295/304-89023-02(DRS):
" Storage of Stationary High Pressure Cylinders In and Adjacent to Sa/ety-related Areas." The licensee addressed the potential missile hazard of high pressure cylinders used in the plant through
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procedure revisions, and mounting modifications. This item is
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closed.
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e.
(Closed) Inspection Followuo Item 295-90017-02(DRP):
"lC-Containment Spray Pump Failures to Start". The licensee has
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completed all actions that were originally committed to regarding the 1990 diesel containment spray (CS) pump failure to start.
However, section 5.0 discusses other diesel CS pump failures to start on demand. As the original licensee actions were completed, this item is being closed.
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f.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 304-90019-02(DRP):
"2C Containment Spray Pump Failures to Start".
This item is identical to the previous one, except that it is the Unit 2 pump.
This item is also closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Followuo Item 295/304-91002-02(DRP):
" Field Verification of As-built Drawings for the Penetration Pressurization (PP) System for Units 1 and 2."
A walkdown of the entire PP system was performed on both units. The walkdown resulted in the identification of tagging discrepancies, the need for drawing revisions, and a walkdown of the nitrogen system. The
licensee is pursuing completion of these followup items. This item is closed.
h.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 295/304-91010-06(DRP):
" Environmental Qualification of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Solenoid Valves." The licensee replaced the MSIV solenoid valves on both units, and made revisions to operating procedures to ensure that the solenoid valves were deenergized within one hour of MSIV closure. The environmental qualification binder was updated to reflect the solenoid valves qualifications. This item
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is closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Summary of Operations Unit 1
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The unit load-followed from approximately 75 to 100 percent power during the report period. Towards the beginning of the inspection period, the licensee identified a tube leak on the IB steam generator of less than.
20 gallons per day. The leakage continued to decrease until it became undetectable near the end of the report period. A small steam leak was identified and repaired on the main steam reheat cold return line elbow for a main steam reheater.
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Unit 2 The unit operated in the load-follow,ag mode between 50 to 100 percent power for the entire report period.
i No violations or deviations were iJentified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification and Enoineered Safety Features System
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Walkdown (71707 & 71710)
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The inspectors verified that the facility was operated in conformance with its licenses and other regulatory requirements. The inspectors also confirmed that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation.
During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant and equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress.
On a sampling basis, the inspectors observed control room staffing and coordination of plant activities; observed operator adherence with procedures and technical specifications; monitored control room
indications for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was available; and observed the frequency of plant and control room visits by management. The inspectors also monitored various administrative and operating records.
Specific areas observed were:
Enoineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems
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Accessible portions of ESF systems and their support systems components were inspected to verify operability through observation of instrumentation and proper valve and electrical power alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected
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components for material conditions.
Radiation Protection Controls
The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for operability and calibration.
Security
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During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were being implemented according to their approved security plan.
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Housekeepina and Plant Cleanliness
The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant j
cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related i
equipment from_ intrusion of foreign matter.
a.
Operational Events On May 7,1993, the licensee implemented technical specification (TS) amendment 144/133.
This amendment permitted the operators to
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declare a component inoperable without testing the opposite train equipment to prove its operability. However, it also required the operators to enter the limiting condition for operation if a surveillance test rendered a piece of equipment inoperable. This had not previously been the practice at Zion.
In preparation for the amendment's implementation. training was given to each operating crew. Additionally, the operators were provided with a matrix listing the equipment rendered inoperable by each surveillance.
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On June 2, 1993, the operators received a " loss of DC power" signal on the "0" diesel generator.
An equipment operator, dispatched to the diesel room, found tnat the DC key jarred slightly off the "on" position. The operator returned the key to
"on" and the loss of power signal cleared.
Contractor personnel were removing scaffolding from the room at the time. The licensee speculated the key may have been accidentally bumped during the scaffolding removal.
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On June 4,1993, a decontaminated fuel rack was dropped approximately 14 feet during moving it onto a truck for shipment off site.
No contamination or radioactive release occurred.
Further rack movements were suspended until the licensee could investigate the cause of the event.
Preliminary licensee actions to prevent further rack problems included rigging improvements, as well as procedural changes. A preliminary root-cause appears to be shifting of water that was still inside the rack while it was being moved. This remains under evaluation.
b.
Emergency Preparedness Exercise On May 18, 1993, the licensee conducted a table-top emergency preparedness drill. The drill included a mixture of radiological and security issues and had several new players in key positions.
The licensee mimicked control room responses as well as the operational support center function.
Immediately following the drill completion, a drill critique was held with all players. The only critique finding was that communications could be improved.
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Assessment of Plant Operations
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Operations management continues to improve communications. Closer management attention to out-of-services is being.provided, along with formalizing other areas to continue the improving trend. The operator's implementation of TS amendment 144/133 for the.first month was without incident. This response was outstanding,
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considering the potential for failure to enter a limiting condition for operation as required by the new TS.
During this inspection period, both units had 100 percent availability for longer than 100 days, the first time since 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintcaance and Surveillance (62703 and 61726)
Station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed or reviewed to assure that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and TS. Also considered during the review were: approvals-being obtained prior to initiating the work and testing, operability requirements being met, functional testing.and calibrations being performed prior to declaring the component operable, discrepancies being resolved prior to returning the component to service, retention of quality control records, and activities being accomplished by qualified personnel.
a.
Maintenance / Surveillance Related Activities Containment Soray Pumo On May 27, 1993, during performance of Periodic Test (PT)-6C-ST, the diesel driven CS pump started up from battery bank 2, but tripped off line before reaching rated capacity and speed.
In accordance with the pumps designed starting logic, battery bank 1 cranked and the pump successfully started. The pump was successfully started three additional times.
Technical staff personnel were monitoring the test performance and ruled out any electrical problems. They are presently pursuing the possibility of the fuel solenoid being defective such that fuel does not reach the engine.
Similar CS diesel starting.
problems have been experienced in the past; these previous starting problems have been traced to either the diesel batteries or the fuel injection system.
Because of the apparent recurrent nature of the diesel CS pump starting failures, monitoring of the l
pump performance is considered an inspection followup item (295/304-93011-01(DRP)).
b.
Assessment of Maintenance and Surveillance The superintendent of maintenance has implemented several changes to improve craft personnel productivity. The changes include:
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better preparation and coordination with other departments,
simplification of a cumbersome administrative process, and
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personnel accountability. The writing of problem identification forms (PIFs).by maintenance is improving, but continues to be a
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challenge to management.
l No violations of deviations were identified.
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Enaineerina and Technical Suonort (37828)
The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
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evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities. This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine
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events, outage-related activities, and assigned TS surveillances;
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observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing deviation investigations and root cause determinations.
a.
Engineering and Technical Support Events Eaale 21 Sooradic Alarms
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The Eagle 21 process protection system for Unit I has experienced sporadic alarms which cleared before the cause of the alarm could be identified.
Through the use of a high speed digital data
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recorder, the technical staff was able to determine the specific racks within particular protection sets where the alarms were generated; however, the cause of the sporadic alarms could not be found because the equipment operated on a 100 millisecond cycle while the problem would exist for less than one cycle and then clear. This short time duration was insufficient-for the man-machine interface to identify the cause of the alarm in the form of an error code.
In addition, this interface was not designed to store error codas once a condition cleared. A temporary alteration was made to incorporate modified EPROMs (erasable programmable read only memory integrated circuit) which would allow the error codes to be printed to a dedicated printer.
The temporary alteration was installed on only one rack of one protection set at any given time. Through this process, a problem with a specific card was identified and corrected on Protection Set I.
Sporadic alarms, not attributable to maintenance activities, for that protection set have ceased. The temporary alteration was moved to Protection Set III to continue troubleshooting.
Unit 1 Steam Leak On May 22, 1993, operators noticed water on the turbine building floor near the main condenser. An investigation revealed that the water was coming from an elbow in a steam line leading from the high pressure turbine to the moisture-separator reheater. The-steam line pressure was approximately 150 psig with a temperature of 375'F.
Immediate licensee investigation was hampered by the
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need to remove asbestos insulation in order to locate the leak.
On Tuesday, May 25, the licensee completed insulation removal and confirmed that there was a small leak in the elbow. The licensee performed ultrasonic testing on the elbow in the' vicinity of the leak, and identified a number of other areas where the wall thickness was below the minimum code allowable. The licensee fabricated a 0.375 inch thick repair plate to restore wall
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thickness to the pipe. Welding of the plate was completed May 28.
Ultrasonic testing was performed on three similarly orientated elbows on both units. Some pitting on the other Unit 1 elbow was detected; however, no locations were below minimum wall thickness.
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Neither of the Unit 2 elbows had any indications below nominal wall thickness.
Removable insulating blankets were installed on the other Unit 1 elbow to allow for further monitoring of the pitting.
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Unit 1 Uraent Rod Control Alarms Unit I rod control power cabinets have had several urgent rod failure alarms this year.
These alarms could be reset; however, the actual cause could not be identified.
Initial troubleshooting identified a problem that may have caused multiplexing errors, which contributed to the urgent rod failure alarms. The multiplexing errors were suspected to be caused by a faulty
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circuit card. Several cards were replaced on May 24, 1993, and the. problem was corrected. Thermography identified a potentially loose wire and two failed open resistors. These problems would not contribute to the urgent rod failure alarms; however, work requests have been written to repair them. The resistors protect the thyristors from lightning strikes.
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During the dual unit outage, the station plans to have
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Westinghouse perform enhanced maintenance on the Unit I rod control system. This maintenance was accomplished on Unit 2 rod
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control system during the last outage, and no new urgent rod failures have occurred on Unit 2.
The licensee is reviewing the results of the Salem May 28 and June 4 rod control events. The
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residents will monitor any changes resulting from the licensee's I
review.
Spent Fuel Pool Rerack Progress The licensee is reracking the spent fuel pool to extend the pool's
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offload capacity to approximately the year 2005. Currently, the licensee is approximately 40 percent completed with a mid-August scheduled completion. The inspectors observed removal and decontamination of an old rack and subsequent moving of the rack i
to a horizontal position.
Changing the rack's position allows-
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water drainage prior to the rack being loaded into a shipping cask for offsite shipment.
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b.
Assessment of Engineering and Technical Support The reorganization of the technical staff, which moved the assistant technical staff supe'rvisors to group leaders and the previous group leaders to senior mentors for the less experienced technical staff engineers, is starting to have positive performance results. Troubleshooting of the Eagle 21 system sporadic alarms was good, but problems still remain with the system. Good coordination was observed among the various groups
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involved in the spent fuel rerack project, especially during i
removal and decontamination of old racks.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500)
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The effectiveness of management controls, verification and oversight activities in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection were
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evaluated. Management and supervisory meetings involving plant status
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were attended to observe the coordination between departments.
The results of licensee corrective action programs were routinely monitored by attendance at meetings, discussions with the plant staff, review of deviation reports, and root cause evaluation reports.
a.
SAQV Related Events a
NRC Bulletin Number 93-02, Debris Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers, was issued on May 11, 1993.
In response to the bulletin, the licensee reviewed documentation and
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determined that there was no fibrous air filter material in the i
containments that was not designed to withstand a loss of coolant accident. Containment entries into both units outside the missile barriers were made at power to identify and remove any other sources of fibrous material. Materials removed included small amounts of safety tape, nylon rope, valve tag holders (nylon tie wraps), radiation survey tags on gang boxes, and inspection /
maintenance tags on fire protection equipment and on battery
operated emergency lights. A separate equipment tracking system
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will be implemented to replace the removed equipment tags.
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Inspections inside the missile barrier will be made during the next shutdown of the units.
b.
Assessment of SAQV
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The management's overview of the implementation of TS amendment.
144/133 was excellent and without incident. This illustrates excellent teamwork by regulatory assurance, engineering,
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maintenance, quality verification, and operations. Management and the staff's attention to detail has prevented any significant challenges to equipment, and enhanced safe operations for several months.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Manaaement Meetinas (30703)
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Zion Review Team Site Visit On May 25-through May 27, 1993, the Zion Review Team conducted its tenth site. visit. The team examined station performance in.the areas of operations, engineering and technical support, maintenance, radiation
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protection and chemistry, planning and scheduling, and the management action program. An improving trend was noted in all areas with no deficiencies or concerns identified. A review of Diagnostic Evaluation Team issues indicated a good assessment of the root causes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Inspection Followup Items Inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed with the
licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some-action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An Inspection followup item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.a.
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 9, 1993, to summarize the. scope and findings of the inspection-activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'
comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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