IR 05000295/1993019
| ML20059G157 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1993 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059G145 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-93-19, 50-304-93-19, NUDOCS 9311080021 | |
| Download: ML20059G157 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 l
Report Nos. 50-295/93019(DRP); 50-304/93019(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company f
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Executive Towers West III l
1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 l
Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 g
L Inspection At:
Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: August 31 through October 14, 1993 Inspectors:
J. D. Smith V. P. Lougheed-M. J. Miller R. B. Landsman C. Y. Shiraki i
D. E. Hills
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fr Approved By:
M. J. Far Ye
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l Reactor Projec s ection 1A Date r
Insnection Summary Inspection from August 31 to October 14. 1993 (Report No. 50-295/304-93019(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
This was a routine, resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; summary of operations; operational safety verification and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; maintenance and surveillance observation; engineering and technical support observations; safety assessment and quality verification; licensee event reports (LERs); and management meetings.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
One inspection followup item was identified 'concerning the effect of an improperly installed wire ribbon connector on the annunciators (section 6a).
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9311000021 931029 DR ADOCK 0500
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L Plant OperaMons
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Operator response'to the increased bearing temperature on the 1A condensate /
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condensate booster pump was excellent. Minor weaknesses were identified in
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l the control of scaffolding ceing erected for the outage.
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Maintenance and Surveillance i
Trouble shooting of the 0 emergency diesel generator (EDG) was acceptable; however, multiple tries were required to identify and repair the problem. The.
i diagnostic system to be installed during the dual unit outage should help rectify this problem.
Planning and scheduling for the dual unit' outage was
better than for any previous outage.
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t Enaineerina and Technical Support Progress has been made in resolving Eagle 21 issues in that better
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communications have been established between the licensee and.the vendor, and l
that problems identified at Zion have been substantiated by the vendor.
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However, there appears to be a lack of management oversight concerning
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l licensee activities, which could have avoided the parts inventory problem and
.i identified the second reversed cable in a more timely manner.
j Safety Assessment and Quality Verification The critique of the~ spent fuel rerack project was thorough and comprehensive.
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It went beyond the specifics of the rerack project itself and addressed the
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problems and benefits of the matrix organization concept.
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DETAILS-
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Persons C'ontacted t
R. Tuetken,-Vice President, Zion Station
- A. Broccolo, Station Manager
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- M. Lohmann, Site Engineering & Construction Manager-j
- P. LeBlond, Executive Assistant
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- S. Kaplan, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
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D. Woznirk, Techn'. cal Services Superintendent j
- L. Simon, Maintenance Supervisor.
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- J. LaFontaine, Outage Management Manger
T. Printz, Assistant Superintendent of Operations
- R. Cascarano, Services Director
- W. Stone, Performance Improvement Director
- W. Kurth, Outage Planning Director
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- R. Chrzanowski, Technical Staff Supervisor
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R. Milne, Security Administrator
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P. Cantwell, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
W. T'Niemi, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
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B. Whittier, Quality Verification
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- K. Dickerson, Regulatory Assurance - NRC Coordinator i
- M. Rockhurst, Station Engineering Supervisor
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- T. Simpkin, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
- G. Ponce, Quality Control Supervisor
'* Indicates persons present at the October 14, 1993 exit interviews
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel-including members
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of the operating, maintenance, security, and' engineering staff.
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i 2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findinas (92701.'92702)
j a.
(Closed) Violation 295/304-92025-01(DRS):
" Failure to Evaluate Test Results and Issue Discrepancy Reports." The appropriate
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acceptance criteria for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) rotor l
to stator air gap, the Magsense card, and the phase to phase
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winding insulation resistance were added to procedure P/E.009-2N.
i The licensee will consider including a safety. recommendation made
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recommendation to note the normal range when initial readings are.
taken to aid further engineering review. The licensee also issued'
an operating experience report and held discussions with all
electrical maintenance supervisors to emphasize thorough-l evaluation of test data and problem identification forms. (PIFs)
l issuance, when appropriate. This item is. closed.
b.
(Closed) Insp% tion Followuo Item 295/304-92025-02(DRS):
" Lack of Guidance in procedure PT-llB on the fuel Oil Transfer Pump 0ut-of-
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Services." After further review of the procedure and system, the
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inspectors determined that the fuel supply to the EDGs had two..
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separate independent trains, each with a isolation valve, which
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were tied together before entering the day tank.
Flow transducers
are located on this single supply line to the day. tank. Any back leakage through the opposite pump's check valve would reduce'the j
measured flow rate. -This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved item 295/304-92025-05(DRS):
" Implementation
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of the Station's EDG Lubrication Program.". Acceptance criteria is-f established for all lube oil chemistry. parameters except' for wear metals due to the difficulty in establishing wear metal trends.
The Cooper owners group was working on~providing guidance as to what constitutes an adverse trend on monitoring. wear metals.
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Until this guidance is available, the station lube oil t
coordinator, along with the EDG group,'will trend the EDG oil
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samples.
Furthermore, subsequent to the quality verification (QV)
group findings, sample collection techniques in PT-ll'were revised
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to obtain more representative lube oil samples.
This will expedite the identification of adverse trends.
This item is t
closed.
d.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 295/304-92025-06(DRS):
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" Cancellation of Nuclear Work Requests (NWRs) Pertaining to EDG l
Overspeed Shutdown Components." NWRs Z24549 and Z24550 were
'i written for replacement of the components by the instrument
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maintenance (IM) group. The mechanical maintenance (MM) group wanted to include all the scheduled activities on the EDGs _into a-l single coordinated work package which would be more efficient than i
separate packages. The MM group attempted to incorporate these
two packages into already existing MM packages Zl9169 and Z24311
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and canceled IM packages Z24549 and Z24550. ' Subsequently. the IM
'I work was separated from the MM work and the components wr o l
replaced under the original NWRs 224549 and 224550. Thi, item is closed.
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(Closed) Violation 295/304-93002-02(DRS):
" Failure to follow ASME i
Section XI Code Requirements." The appropriate auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump procedures were revised to incorporate the.
ASME required five-minute wait period prior to data collection.
The licensee also reviewed other code-related pump system
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procedures to determine if they met ASME code' requirements.
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additional system procedures were revised. To prevent a future misinterpretation of this requirement, the in-service testing j
administration procedure was revised to highlight this five-minute requirement. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 295/304-93014-01(DRP):
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" Completion of Modification to Containment Instrumentation (M22-1(2)-91-027)." Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 90-015-01; was issued on September 7,1993, which identified additional information found since the original LER and committed to complete a modification to instrumentation 'inside containment no later than the end of the Z1(2)R14 refueling outage. The modification
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T completion will be tracked.by' the licensee's ' tracking system.
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No violations or deviations' were identified.
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3.
Summary of Operations
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Unit I
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The unit remained approximately at 100% power during the report period'
except for a load reduction to 80% due to heater drain tank discharge ;
valve problems.
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Unit 2
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The unit operated.in the load-following mode between 70 to 100% power
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for the majority of the report period.
On October 7,1993, the ' dual i
unit service water outage began when Unit 2 was taken off line at 12:32 a.m.
The unit is scheduled to return to operation in March 1994.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification and Enaineered Safety Features System l
Walkdown (71707 & 71710)
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The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the
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licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation.
During-tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors noted general plant and equipment-
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j On a sampling basis the inspectors observed control room staffing and I
coordination'of plant activities; observed operator adherence with'
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procedures and technical specifications; monitored control room
indications for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was
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available and observed the frequency 'of plant and control-room visits.by
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station managers. The inspectors also monitored various administrative and operating records.
The specific areas observed were:
Enaineered Safety Features (ESF) System : Accessible portions of l
ESF systems and their support systems components were inspected to
verify operability through observation of instrumentation and
proper valve and electrical power alignment. The inspectors also.
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visually inspected. components for material conditions.
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During this inspection period, a question was raised concerning the seismic qualification of-the scaffolding being erected for the dual unit service water outage. The inspectors reviewed-
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procedure, ZAP 920-01, Revision 01, "Use of Scaf. folding and l
Ladders;" interviewed personnel involved with scaffolding erection; and toured the auxiliary building with the cognizant engineer.
The inspectors found the procedure adequately addressed seismic considerations.
The inspectors also noted that the
licensee's corporate office had undertaken a project to provide improved engineering analysis of scaffolding designs, as ' evidenced L
through draft technical information directives. These
i improvements were considered a positive. step on the licensee's l'
part. However, the following weaknesses were noted in the
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While the A
Training of personnel was not well documented.
- L engineers appeared to be knowledgeable 'of. the ZAP
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requirements, documentation of training was limited to a
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l ZAP overview course. No training records existed for the
contract personnel actually erecting the scaffolding.
l No formal process existed to ensure that site engineering
was consulted if scaffolding could not be erected in strict
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compliance with the ZAP.
No formal review and signoff for seismic considerations. was
required before the scaffolding was accepted for use.
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During the auxiliary building tour, several scaffolds were identified as not being built in strict accordance with the ZAP.
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Additional bracing was needed to ensure seismic considerations
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were completely addressed. While the bracing enhancements were j
minor, they demonstrated the need to correct the program weaknesses.
I Radiation Protection Controls: The inspectors verified that
workers were following health physics procedures and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for operability and
calibration.
Security:
The inspectors monitored the licensee's security
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program to ensure that observed actions were being implemented
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l according to their approved security plan.
l Housekeepino and Plant Cleanliness: The inspectors monitored the
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i status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection l
and protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of
.l foreign matter.
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Operational Events Heater Drain Tank Discharae Valves: The licensee experienced a problem with the Unit I heater drain tank pump discharge valves.
On September 18, the level in the heater drain. tank started
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l valves and attempted to isolate the valves to repair them;
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however, the isolation valves would not seat.
I Unit 1 operated at about 90% power, with the emergency overflow -
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valve partially open to maintain heater drain tank level while the
licensee developed an action plan. The licensee concluded that decreasing the input into the heater drain tank and allowing an.
j extraction steam to the 16 feed water heaters could be isolated,
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l increase in power without the overflow valse being open.
Repairs
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to the discharge valves and isolation valves have been incorporated into the outage schedule.
l Condensate / Condensate Booster Pump Trio:
Excellent operator action was observed on September 23, when the Unit I nuclear station operator (NS0) noticed increasing bearing temperatures on
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the 1A condensate / condensate booster pump. An auxiliary operator
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was sent to investigate, but before he arrived, the NSO told him
to stand clear.
The NSO tripped the 1A pump and started the i
standby pump before the pump failed and the standby pump automatically started.
Subsequent investigation showed that an Amertap ball was placed in the bearing oil reservoir of the.1A '
condensate / condensate booster pump. There is no physical connection between the condenser hotwell, where these balls normally keep the condenser tubes clean, and the bearing oil reservoir. The licensee is investigating the incident.
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Assessment of Plant Operations Operator response to the increased bearing temperature on the 1A condensate / condensate booster pump was excellent. Minor weaknesses were identified in the control of scaffolding being erected for the outage.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance and Surveillance (62703 and 61726)
Routinely, station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were also considered during this review: approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work and testing and that operability requirements were met during such activities; functional testing and calibrations were performed prior to declaring the component operable; discrepancies identified during the activities were resolved prior to returning the component to service; quality control records i
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were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified.
personnel.
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Maintenance / Surveillance, Related Activities'
EDG Overspeed Trio: On September 21, during a routine run of the
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O EDG, the engine tripped on overspeed. This placed Zion in a 72
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hour limiting condition for operation (LCO).
The licensee replaced an air solenoid valve and repaired a leaking air ferrule.
However, when an engine run was attempted, the engine _again i
tripped. Trouble shooting continued and the AMOT. valve was found i
to be malfunctioning. After it was replaced and the post j
maintenance and surveillance testing was completed, the' 0 EDG was
declared operable, about 53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> into the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO. During the dual unit outage, a diagnostic system will be installed on the lA, 2A and 0 EDGs to provide better information to aid in l
correcting problems.
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Assessment of Maintenance and Surveillance l
Trouble shooting of the 0 EDG was acceptable; however, multiple tries were required to identify and repair the problem. The diagnostic system to be installed during the dual unit outage.
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should help rectify this problem.
Planning and scheduling for the
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dual unit outage was better than for any previous outages.
No violations of deviations were identified.
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6.
Enaineerina and Technical Sucoort (37828_).
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The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
'i evaluations were integrated into_ daily plant activities.
This was i
accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement.in non-routine
events, outage-related activities, and assigned TS surveillances;
observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing i
deviation investigations and root cause determinations.
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Engineering and Technical Support Events
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l Eaale 21 Sooradic Alarms:
The sporadic alarms of the Eagle-21 l
process protection system for both units continued through the l
report period.
The Eagle 21 vendor has been able to duplicate the
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problem at their facility with both a licensee supplied data link handler (DLH) board and a vendor _ supplied DLH board. ' The vendor has been consulting with the micro-processor vendor to identify
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the probable cause of the alarms and determine a suitable
solution.
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A meeting was held on September 9, between the licensee and the.
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Eagle 21 vendor to discuss the continuing problems with the Eagle
t 21 system and the concern that engineering has with the system and its reliability. Through this meeting a greater understanding of
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the is' sues was established within both organizations and more'
effective communications were initiated.
On September 1,' the power distribution panel for Unit 1, Protection Set I failed and required replacement. The only identified replacement part was determined to be at the vendor site and required 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> for the part to be delivered and installed.
During this period, the bistables for Set I remained in a tripped condition as required following the failure.
This condition left the unit with a higher probability of being tripped inadvertently. The station later identified that two spare power distribution panels had been in the store room but had not been given a stores identification (SI) number. Without the SI number, the parts were not listed on the computerized parts inventory list.
The station has identified approximately 90 additional Eagle 21 major components that have been in stores since February 1993 and have not been assigned SI numbers.
In addition, 60 assorted Eagle 21 parts of various quantities (hardware items, such as cables, jumpers, nuts, and bolts) have also been found.
The technical staff has created a complete inventory of these parts and was in the process of assigning SI numbers to the parts.
On September 11, Unit 1, Protection Set I received several high steam flow bistable trips that came in and then cleared. The problem was believed to be in an analog input board and trouble shooting was continuing.
On September 24, diagnostic erasable read-only-memory integrated -
circuits (EPROMs) were installed in Unit 2, Protection Set 3, Rack 11 and 12 test sequence processors (TSP). The protection set was returned to service and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> later Rack 12 sporadic alarms began. These alarms were similar to the ongoing problem with Eagle 21; however, the time between' alarms was significantly reduced. On September 25, an attempt was made to reseat the card and connecting cables but the problem was not corrected. On September 26, while the technical staff was called in for a Unit 1 protection system failure, a walk down of Unit 2 cabinets was made. A wire ribbon connector'in Rack 12 was identified as being installed in the reverse direction. The cable was~ reconnected' in-the proper orientation and the sporadic alarms stopped. The cable had been installed backwards for 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> and 20 sporadic alarms had occurred before the problem was resolved. The sensitivity to sporadic alarms appears to have been lessened due to the long history of similar alarms.
The wire ribbon connectors for the loop calculator processor and the TSP do not have guides to prevent connecting them in a I
improper orientation. There are identifying marks on the
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connectors; however, the markings are difficult to see. The station was unaware of these facts. The work package traveler to install the EPROMs did not identify a proper orientation.
In addition, there was no indication of a problem following-the EPROM
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. installation as the ' system continued to operate for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without any abnormal indication. The Protection Set 3 problem was identified by the difference between the multi-color wire ribbon
orientation between Rack 12 and the other racks for the unit.
i The protection set would have provided the proper protective response had the need arose; however, it has not been determined whether the annunciators associated with the set were fully functional. The licensee was reviewing what effect the reversed
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wire ribbon connectors had on the annunciators. The result of this review is considered an inspection followup item (295-93019-
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Ol(DRP)).
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On September 25, the power distribution panel for Unit 1, Protection Set 4 failed and required replacement. The first new panel from stores failed due to faulty switches and the second
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i spare was successfully installed and the set returned to service.
The vendor identified a power distribution panel failure at another site and planned to investigate the root cause of the failures.
On October 8, Unit 2, Protection Set 3, Rack 12 would not accept new setpoints in preparation for the unit cooldown.
It was determined that the wire ribbon cable for parameter updating had l
been installed in the reverse direction.
The wire ribbon connector was correctly orientated and the new set points were entered.
This had occurred during the EPROM installation on l
September 24. The problem was not self. disclosing until an j
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first identified reversed connector on September 26, several i
opportunities were missed to check for similar errors and correct'
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the problem.
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b.
Assessment of Engineering and Technical Support
Progress has been made in resolving Eagle 21 issues in that better communications have been established between the licensee and the vendor, and that problems identified at Zion have been
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substantiated by the vendor.
However, there appears to be a lack
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of management oversight concerning licensee activities, which l
could have avoided the parts inventory problem and identified the i
I second reversed cable in a more timely manner.
i No violations or deviations were id0ntified.
L 7.
Licensee Event Report followup (92700)
l Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
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review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent i
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recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical I
Specifications.
The LERs listed below are considered closed.
- LER NO.
DESCRIPTION 295-90013-01 Incorrect Containment Flood Level Specified in UFSAR.
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295-92008-01 Service Water Butterfly Valves Do Not Meet Design Requirements No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification (40500)
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The effectiveness of managerrent controls, verification and oversite activities in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection were evaluated. Management and supervisory meetings involving plant status were attended to observe the coordination between departments.
The results of licensee corrective action programs were routinely monitored
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by attendance at meetings, discussion with the plant staff, review of L
deviation reports, and root cause evaluation reports.
a.
SAQV Related Events Followup on Spent Fuel Pool Rerack Pro.iect: During the last l
I inspection period, the licensee completed reracking the spent fuel pool.
During this inspection period, the licensee critiqued the first use of a matrix organization on the rerack project The inspectors found the critique to be thorough and comprehensive, addressing problems and benefits of the matrix organization concept.
On the positive side, the composite crews (fuel handlers, radiation technicians, decontamination workers, and mechanical maintenance riggers) worked well. together and overcame many problems through-teamwork and job ownership.
Problems encountered included management personnel changes (such as three different operating engineers and a complete changeover in fuel handling supervisors) and inexperienced personnel.(resulting in a extensive learning curve). A further problem identified was the team leader's lack of authority over the personnel on the job.
The critique concluded that projects of this magnitude should be handled by experienced personnel, with a dedicated team leader having control over the team members.
b.
Assessment of SAQV The critique of the spent fuel rerack project was thorough and comprehensive, and addressed 'the problems and benefits of the matrix organization concept, beyond the specifics of the rerack project itself.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Manaaement Meetinas (30703)
On September 27 through 29, Mr. Martin Farber, Chief - Section 1A, visited Zion and. met with the Station Manager and Site Vice' President.
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10.
'Temocrary Instruction 2500/028 " Employee Concerns Proaram" The inspectors verified the licensee had implemented an employee concerns program to provide an alternate path from normal line management to raise safety concerns. The specific characteristics of
this program and an evaluation of its effectiveness is described on the l
attached form. This Temporary Instruction is considered closed.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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11.
Inspection Followuo items (IFI)
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inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed with the
licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which.
involve some action on the part of the NRC, licensee or both.
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inspection followup item disclosed during this inspection is discussed
in section 6.
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12.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives,. denoted in section 1,-
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throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection l
on October 14, 1993, to summarize the scope and findings. of the
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inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'
comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes
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reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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Attachment-j i
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAMS q
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l PLANT NAME:
Braidwood Licensee:
CECO DOCKET #:
50-456:457 -
Byron CECO 50-454:455
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Dresden Ceco 50-237:249
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LaSalle Ceco 50-373:374 J
Ouad Cities Ceco 50-254:265 Zj.o.n CECO 50-295:304-
.l NOTE:
Please underline yes or no, if applicable, and add comments'in the i
space provided.
A.
PROGRAM:
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1.
Does the licensee have an employee concerns program?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
Comments: The licensee conducts a quality first (QF) program to identify and address employee concerns.
Other programs such as the vision through' quality (VQ) search for opportunity (SFO)
exist. The VQ SF0 program is more oriented toward identifying and-
developing improvement initiatives versus a formal program for -
raising specific safety issues.
Therefore, the completion.of-this form will deal only with the QF program.
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2.
Has NRC inspected the program?
The NRC had not recently inspected this program.
B.
SCOPE:
(Circle all that apply)
1.
Is it for:
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Technical? (Yes or No/ Comments)
i b.
Administrative? (Xes or No/ Comments)
c.
Personnel issues? (Yes or No/ Comments)
Comments: The concerns are categorized as security, quality, and i
management but may, in fact, involve any of the above.
'
)
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2.
Does it cover. safety as well as 'non-safety issues?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
j 3.
Is it designed for:
a.
Nuclear safety?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
b.
Personal safety?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
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c.
Personnel issues - including. union grievances? (Yes or t
!Lo/ Comments)-
'
Comments: Although it can involve personnel issues, it does not zi deal with union grievances.
j 4.
Does the program apply to all licensee employees? (Yes or l
No/ Comments)
>
i.
L 5.
Contractors?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
i i
Comments: This program is not necessarily stressed to contract employees which the licensee believes are not in a position to-identify-Quality First issues, for example parking lot paver.s.
6.
Does the licensee require its contractors and their subs to'have a similar program?
(Yes or !Lo/ Comments)
Comments:
CECO administers the entire program.
7.
Does the licensee conduct an exit interview upon terminating.
.l
.
employees asking if they have any. safety concerns?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
,
Comments:
Upon termination, employees are given concern
disclosure statements to complete.
Exit interviews are given.
l The percentage of terminating employees receiving exit interviews i
has been drastically reduced due to a reduction in program.
manpower since the beginning of the. year..
i
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C.
INDEPENDENCE:
]
1.
What is the title of the person in charge?
Quality First Administrator (QFA)
.!
2.
Who do they report to?
Director of Station Quality Verification 3.
Are they independent of line management?
Yes - Reports through offsite quality verification organization 4.
Does the ECP use third party consultants?
No - However, quality verification personnel have~ been utilized to do interviews. The QFA determines the appropriate group to do the investigation.
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5.
How is a concern about a manager or vice president followed up?
'
This would.be decided on a case by case basis.
,
D.
RESOURCES:
i 1.
'What is the size of staff devoted to-this program?.
,
Since the beginning of the year, staff has been cut'to one
individual for all six Ceco plants.
u 2.
What are ECP staff qualifications (technical training,:
-
interviewing training, investigator training, other)?
,
L No specific qualifications exist for_ the QFA, who has been involved in the program a number of years.
Guidelines fori
.
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interviewers are available but there are no specific qualifications, q
f E.
REFERRALS:
1.
Who has followup on concerns (ECP staff, line management, other)?
l The QFA may do the fol'owup himself or assign it to another group-
including line management.
F.
CONFIDENTIALITY:
i
1.
Are the reports confidential? -(Yes or No/ Comments)
!
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2.
Who is the identity of the_ alleger made known to (senior
~
. management, ECP staff, line management, other)? '
J Information on the alleger identity remains with QFA.
j 3.
Can employees:
a.
Be anonymous?. (Yes or Ho/ Comments)
b.
Report by phone?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
A toll free number is available.
G.
FEEDBACK:
1.
Is feedback given to the alleger upon completion of the followup?
j (Yes or No - If so, how?)
'
' '
l Feedback is given by mail or telephone.
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Does program reward good ideas?
.
l-L No
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y 3.
Who, or at what level, makes the final decision of resolution?-
.This is determined by QFA in conjunction with line' management.
..
L 4.
Are the resolutions of anonymous concerns disseminated?
i
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l'
No i
5.
Are resolutions of valid concerns publicized (newsletter, bulletin board, all hands meeting, other)?
,
No i
!
H.
EFFECTIVENESS:
,
.
1.
How does the licensee measure the effectiveness of the program?'
- f i
Not measured l
2.
Are concerns:
j l
a.
Trended? (Yes or !Lo/ Comments)
l i
There are too few official " Records of Concern" (ROC) to
'
warrant trending.
The QFA does informally look for. common j
concerns on items which do not warrant official ROCS.
,
>
L b.
Used? (les or No/ Comments)
a Corrective actions are addressed in the program.
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3.
In the last three years how many concerns were raised?
,
Closed? -What percentage were substantiated?
The QAF screens comments and identifies those to be handled as j
official " Records of Concern" (ROC).
The following data is for. ROCS from 1990 through August 1993. No
formal ROCS have been initiated thus far in 1993.
.j
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- Closed Percent Substantiated
)
LaSalle
100 i
Byron
22 i
i Braidwood
33 Quad Cities
33 Dresden
25 Zion
0
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.i Comments received' during or after a refuel. outage that the QAF l
determines do not warrant an official ROC are compiled and transmitted to' plant management for information.
This occurs several months after the outage.
l 4.
~How'are followup techniques used to measure effectiveness (random'
j survey, interviews, other)?
,
No followup techniques utilized except perhaps for contractors l
they see multiple times at different Ceco sites.
j
5.
How frequently are internal audits of the ECP conducted-and.by j
whom?
r There are no audits of this area. The onsite quality verification
'!
superintendent is responsible'for reviewing information copies of l
quality ROCS to determine if additional QA reviews are warranted.
!
I.
ADMINISTRATIVE / TRAINING:
a 1.
Is ECP prescribed by a procedure?
(Yes or No/ Comments)
,
,
Nuclear Operations Directive (N0D)-0A.12 " Quality First Program
'l
'l Directive"
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2.
How are employees, as well as contractors, made aware of this
!
program (training, newsletter, bulletin board, other)?
,
.I The program is briefly described in Nuclear General' Employee o
Training (NGET).
It may also' be mentioned in occasional safety
!
meetings or departmental tailgates.
j ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:
(Including characteristics which make the program especially effective or ineffective.)
In viewing the number of official " Records of Concerns (ROC)," that are
,
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formally tracked, investigated, and resolved, the effectiveness of the program is questionable. No ROCS have been generated thus far for 1993.
!
This may be partially related to the staff reduction and availability of
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personnel to conduct exit interviews. Due to the lack of resources, l
some concerns which would have been handled as official ROCS in previous
'
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years are now being handled more informally.
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4