IR 05000295/1979024
| ML19257B699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1979 |
| From: | Kohler J, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257B697 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-79-24, 50-304-79-22, NUDOCS 8001180145 | |
| Download: ML19257B699 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-295/79-24; 50-304/79-22 Docket No. 50-295; 50-304 License No. DPR-39, DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Zion Site, Zion Illinois Inspection Conducted: October 1 thru November 5, 1979 f
ud-erp
/dkf79 Inspector:
J. E. K
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Approved By:
R. L. Spessard, Chief
/2!G f'/9 Reactor Projects Section 1 Inspection Summary Inspection on October 1 thru November 5, 1979 (Report No. 50-295/79-24; 50-304/79-22)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, maintenance, plant operations including followup of nonroutine events, review and followup of LER's, Unit I refueling activities, surveillance and calibration of safety related compenents required by TS, radioactive waste systems, preparation for Unit I refueling, receipt of new fuel for Unit 1, feedwater line cracking on Unit I and Unit 2, fire protection, and diesel generator roller pin inspections. The inspection involved 133 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: One item of noncompliance (infraction-failure to follow pro-cedures which implement the fire protection program paragraph 18) was identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- N. Wandke, Station Superintendent
- C. Schumann, Operating Assistant Superintendent
- L. Soth, Administrative Assistant Superintendent E. hurach, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
- R. Ward, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- E. Fuerst, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
- J. Marianyi, Technical Staff Supervisor J. Gilmore, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor J. Reiss, Technical Staff Engineer J. Joosten, Technical Staff Engineer J. Montgomery, Maintenance Engineer A. Rasmussen, Maintenance Engineer P. LeBlond, Technical Staff Engineer T. Parker, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- P. Kuhner, Quality Assurance L. Pruett, Shift Engineer G. Armstrong, Shift Engineer R. Landrum, Nuclear Station Operator D. Kaley, Nuclear Station Operator R. Turner, Shift Foreman F. Lentine, Shift Foreman
- Denotes those persons present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-20-01): Charging pump shafts. The licensee performed an investigation, per NRR request, in order to determine if material used to fabricate the U1 charging pump shafts was a notch sensitive material, susceptible to failure, as found at several other stations throughout the country. The licensee determined that the shafts do not have heat numbers stamped on the coupling end and was not able to trace the material through a record search.
In lieu of record search, Zion performed a direct measurement of hardness using an Ames R portable tester and Skler-0-Meter con-verted to R and determiEed that both shafts have hardness values in the range of 23-29R. This hardness value is below the hardness value of 28-31R known for shafts manufactured with suspect material.
c Zion Station concluded that the Unit I shafts do no meet the hard-ness specification for suspect material. Further, it was the Zion Station's position that shaft failures at other plants also had histories of high vibration, mechanical, and, seal. bearing. failures.
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Machinery history records at Zion indicate no such history for charging pump 1A and IB.
This information was discussed by station personnel with Mr. Rutherford of IE:HQ, via a conference call.
Mr. Rutherford reviewed the hardness data found at Zion, the maintenance history of the pumps and the run times.
Mr. Rutherford concluded that continued duty for the 1A and IB shafts was permissible based on the Zicn Station investigation, provided that the licensee make the following commitments:
a.
Take weekly vibration measuremects.
b.
Commit to service requirements specified in Westinghouse TB-79-6, dated September 25, 1979, except weekly direct measurement of shaft vibration may be eleminated.
The station has committed to the above requirements on the charging pumps.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-20-02): Potentially underdesigned seismic restraint in each unit involving train A and B of the RHR system.
Immediate licensee action was taken to reinforce Unit 1 and Unit 2 restraints by the temporary installation of sway struts to re-strict lateral movement and supports to restrict downward vertical movement.
The licensee has subsequently received the results of the detailed computer analaysis which was performed by their A-E, Sargent and Lundy, after identification of the potentially underdesigned RHR seismic restraints. The results showed that when considering all forces on the RHR system, neither the temporary restraints nor the orginal restraints were required to meet seismic requirements.
The licensee has removed the sway sheets from each unit and is evaluating removal of th / permanent re.straint.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-18-01): Unit 1 RWST Repair. The licensee discovered boric acid deposits on the 14" containment spray pump suction line from the RWST which was determined to be caused by a degraded plate / plate weld. During the Unit I refueling outage which began in October,1979, inspection and repairs were made while the RWST was drained. A NRC Region III specialist will include the re-sults of this inspection in another inspection report.
3.
Monthly Operating Summary Unit 1 Unit 1 operated in the coastdown mode in preparation for refueling.
The unit was taken off the line commencing.re(ueling activities on October 6, 1979.
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Unit 2 Operated at power levels between 50-70% for the greater part of the month.
Power was limited by feedwater pump and holdup volume availability. The unit experienced the following unscheduled shut-downs.
October 9, 1979 Main Generator Trip, Reactor Trip October 13, 1979 Loss of condenser vacuum, Reactor trip October 27, 1979 Feedwater piping inspection, Reactor brought to cold shutdown.
4.
Maintenance Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents were reviewed to ascertain that they are conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; maintenance activities were accomplished using approved procedures; maintenance activities were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to an operating status; quality control records were maintained for maintenance activities; and maintenance activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspector observed maintenance in progress concerning the following work requests: Unit 1 ASCO solenoid containment isolation valve up-grading outside containment; and Unit 1 maintenance modification on fuel handling gripper.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log books, shift engineer log book, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tagout logs for the month of October, 1979. The inspector also made visual observations of the routine surveillance and functional tests in progress during the period. This review was conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedures.
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A review of the licensee's deviation repor,ts.fprthe' period was
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conducted to verify that no violations of the licensee's Technical
Specifications were made. The inspector conducted a tour of Unit 1, 2 auxiliary and turbine buildings throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly established, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equipment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal. The inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that plant and component status and problem areas were being turned over to relieving shift personnel.
The following nonroutine events were followed up by the inspector:
a.
Unit 2 Main Generator Trip on October 9, 1979.
A Unit 2 reactor trip occurred at 10:48 am from 91% power.
The initial sequence of events was: main generator trip, reactor trip.
The cause of the main generator trip was not determined even though an extensive investigation was performed.
As a result of the reactor trip, several components failed to operate as designed and required operator action. The following is a description of the equipment malfuctions:
(1) Rod bottom light for shutdown bank C rod e3 did not illumiate Operator Action: Emergency borated to increase RCS boron concentration by 100 ppm to account for rod e3.
Findings: Rod was on bottom, but light failed to illum-inate; module replaced.
Safety Significance: None Closed,.
Status:
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(2)
The 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started automatically and tripped.
Operator Action: Pump was restared manually from control room and operated as required.
Licensee Action: The 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was taken out of service for investigation to determine the cause of the trip, which was thought to be pressure switch drift for the associated oil pump. Failure of the oil pump starting sequence would cause the pump to trip.
Technical Specifications: Technical specifications require two auxiliary feedwater pumps for operation. At the time
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of the trip, the 2A steam driven auxiliary feed pump was out of service for testing at NRR request to determine whether the pump could operate without AC supplied service water.
Two pumps were available prior to the initiating event.
Safety Analysis: Only one of these pumps is required for safety analysis considerations. Two pumps were available after the 2B was restarted manually.
Status: The 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was tested and cleared for service to meet Technical Specification LCO re-quirements.
An LER will be submitted on the 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump trip and will be reviewed in the near future.
This item is considered closed.
(3) Train A Reactor Trip Breaker Failed to Open.
Operator Action: Breaker opened manually.
Technical Specifications: Two trip breakers are required for operation; one required for safety analysis. Two trip breakers were available prior to the trip.
Previous History: May 7, 1979, Train A reactor trip breaker failed to open following a reactor trip.(LER 50-304/79-32).
Type of Breaker:
Westinghouse DB-50.
Licensee Action: One Unit I trip breaker was taken out and placed in Unit 2.
Unit 1 is in refueling.
Status: The licensee found no apparent reason for the breaker not to open. The breaker was cleaned, lubricated and placed back in service.
This item is closed.
b.
Unit 2 Reactor Trip on October 13, 1979. A trip occured due to loss of condenser vacuum. The licensee determined that the cause of the loss of condenser vacuum was a cross tie to the Unit I condenser which had apparantly lost its loop seal.
Pro-cedures were revised to administratively close the cross tie connection.
This item is closed.
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c.
Unit 2 Cold Shutdown.
Unit 2 was brought to a controlled cold shutdown condition on October 27, 1979, to inspect the steam generator feed water piping for possible cracking. This item is discussed further in paragraph 14 of the report.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifi-cations.
Unit 1 Unit 2 LER 79-02 LER 79-39 No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Refueling Activities The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the Technical Specifi-cations and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equip-ment was performed as required by Technical Specifications; observed 2 shifts of the fuel handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical Specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Surveillance of Safety Related Systems / Components Required by Technical Specifications The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveil-lance testing (other than calibrations and checks) on the Unit I type B penetrations in the penetration pressurization system and verified that testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures, that test results were in conforma ce with
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Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were re-viewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Calibration of Safety Related Components Required by Technical Specifications The inspector observed calibration of U1 Containment pressure trans-mitter and U1 Startup Range and Intermediate Range Instrumentation and verified conformance with Technical Specifications.
No item of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Radioactive Waste Syestms Operations The inspector observed the preparation and commencement of a con-tainment purge on October 9, 1979, and verified that the release was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Preparation for Refueling The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures were approved for fuel handling, inspection of fuel to be used, and handling and inspection of core internals. The inspector verified that the new fuel had been inspected in accordance with the licensee's procedures. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for overall outage control.
No items of noncompliance identified.
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12.
Receipt of New Fuel The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel and verified receipt inspection was performed in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
No items of noncpmpliance were identified.
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Unit 1 Feedwater Line Cracking The licensee inspected Unit I feedwater lines weld areas by radio-graphy and destructive examination.
Based on these examinations cracks were found to exist in all four Unit I feedwater to steam
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generator nozzle areas.
It was decided that a major repair would be undertaken to eliminate cracking. The repair involves removal of elbow sections of pipe in each of four steam generator feedwater
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lines and repair of cracking in each of four steam generator nozzles and nozzle to pipe weld areas.
This Item is unresolved pending completion of repairs, and it is being followed by a Region III specialist inspector.(295/79-24-01)
14.
Unit 2 Feedwater Line Cracking Company representitives met with the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland on October 26, 1979, to review the inspection results of Unit 1 feed-water piping. The decision was made to shut down Unit 2 for feed-water piping inspections. The licensee brought Unit 2 to cold shut-down on October 27-28, 1979 and performed radiography on Unit 2 feedwater/ steam generater nozzle area.
Cracking was found on Unit 2 and the NRC was notified promptly.
Repairs on Unit 2, which are taking place concurrently with Unit 1, require removal of elbow sections of pipe in each of four feedwater lines and repair of cracking in feedwater line to steam generator nozzle weld and removal of pitting in the steam generator nozzle.
This item is unresolved pending completion of repairs, and it is being followed by a Region III specialist inspector.(304/79-22-01)
15.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Emergency Procedure A steam generator tube rupture accident occured at the Prairie Island Unit 1 facility in October, 1979.
Information received from the licensee described the sequence of events that the licensee used to depressurize the primary side es well as the effect of tripping the reactor coolent pumps upon initiation of safety injection on low primary system pressure.-
A prelimenary review of the Zion Station Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) was performed by the inspector and the licensee. Because Zion has primary loop isolation valves, the two facilities (Zion and Prairie Island) are not identical.
The Westinghouse owners group has reviewed the Prairie Island event as well as present E0P's on steam generator tube rupture accidents.
The Zion station is presently revising the steam generator tube rupture E0P in order to incorporate the latest information available. This revision is expected to be completed by December, 1979, and will be reviewed by the inspector.
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This item is unresolved pending license revision to steam generator tube rupture E0P.(295/79-24-02; 304/79-22-02)
16.
Sandia Labs Request for Information Sandia Labs called the resident inspector on October 17, 1979 and requested data describing peaking factors at Zion Units 1 and 2 at various times in core life. This information was provided with the aid of the Zion Station Nuclear Engineer via telephone and copies of various stations flux maps were sent to Sandia Labs.
This item is closed.
17.
Surveillance Test Witness The inspector witnessed the performance of a major surveillance test of the integrated actuation of the ECCS involving initiating signals, diesel loading, diesel loading, timing, safeguards positioning of valves and component starting sequence.
The test was performed while Unit I was in hot shutdown at the be-ginning of the refueling outage and took into account measures to mininize the amount of time ECCS capability was blocked.
The inspector reviewed approved procedures, witnessed portions of the test and reviewed test results. The results of the major surve-illance activity showed that ECCS performed as designed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
18.
Fire Protection While making a tour of the turbine building on October 31, 1979, to inspect the implementation of station administrative controls re-garding fire protection,A.he inspector observed a welding job in the Unit 1 turbine area. The welding authorization card specified a fire extinguisher; however, the nearest extinguisher to the job site was a hose 20-30 feet away.
The inspector discussed this item with management.
It is the Zion Station management position that fire extinguisher requirements mean an extinguisher at the job site in the vicinity of the gas bottle.
Failure to have a portable fire extinguisher at the job site for welding taking place in the Turbine Building on October 31, 1979, is considered an item of noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.2.A.11.(295/79-24-03; 304/79-22-03)
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19.
Diesel Generator Roller Pin Inspection Zion Station was notified in August, 1979 of a potential deficiency in the diesel generater system involving possible abnormal wear of the roller pin assembly. The vendor, Cooper Bessemer Company, re-commends that a field inspection be performed.
The inspector discussed the schedule for performing this inspection during the monthly management exit. No inspections have been per-formed to date; however, the inspections should be performed during the Unit 1 outage scheduled to run until December, 1979.
This item is unresolved pending comp 1.cion of the inspections.
(295/79-24-04)
20.
Meetings Attended The inspector attended the following meetings offsite during the Month of October, 1979:
October 15, 1979--Michigan State Congressional Committee on Nuclear Power, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
October 22-24, 1979--NRC Resident Inspector Meeting, Bettendorf, Iowa.
21.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is re-quired in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unrerolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 19.
22.
Exit Interview
'I The inspector met with li'censee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on November 5, 1979 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.
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