IR 05000295/1979013
| ML19207B734 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1979 |
| From: | Kohler J, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19207B731 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-79-13, 50-304-79-12, NUDOCS 7909050156 | |
| Download: ML19207B734 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL\\ TORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50-295/79-13; 50-304/79-12 Docket No. 50-295; 50-304 License No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Zion Site, Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: April 28 through June 1, 1979
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Inspector:
J. E. Ko 4-7h'3/79 mX
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I Approved By:
R. L. Spe ard, Chief 7//3/79 Reactor Projects Section 1
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Inspection Summary Inspection on April 28 through June 1, 1979, (Report No. 50-295/79-13; 50-304/79-12)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of plant operations, maintenance, non-routine events occurring during the inspection, quality assurance audit results, plant cleanliness, and spent fuel pool modification activities. The inspection involved 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br /> of onsite inspection by one h3C inspector.
Results_: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted N. Wandke, Plant Superintendent
- C. Schumann, Operating Assistant Superintendent
- T.
Parker, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- B. Ward, Unit 2 Operating Engineer E. Fuerst, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
- B. Harl, Quality Assurance
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J. Joosten, Primary Group Leader Tech Staf f K. Schultz, Training Supervisor F. Resick, Station Health Physicist R. Landrum, Nuclear Station Operater T. Flowers, Shift Engineer N. Valos, Shift Foreman F. Pauli, Shift Engineer L. Pruett, Shift Foreman D. Ray, B Operator J. Johnson, B Operator T. White, Instrument Mechanic D. Kaley, Nuclear Station Operator E. Murach, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent L. Soth, Administration and Support Assistant Superintendent G. Armstrong, Shif t Engineer N. Loucas, Shift Foreman D. Walden, Fuel Handling Foreman J. Lafontaine, Fuel Handling Foreman P. Kuhner, Quality Control
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Safety Injection Unit 1 May 23, 1979 (LER 50-295/79-42)
At approximately 1:45 on May 23, 1979 with Unit I at 100% power a safety injection occurred during performance of periodic test proce-dure PT 10a and b, the monthly safeguards logic test.
The safety injection resulted in main steam isolation valve closure and full secondary steam relief. No structural damage or water hammers occurred.
The injection lasted for approximately three minutes during which time the licensee personnel monitored containment pressure and temperature, primary system pressure, pressurizer level and steam generator levels. Shif t personnel determined that the safety injection was inadverent not resulting from a steam line break, and terminated the saf'ty injection.
Confirmation that steam line break indication did not exist on plant instrumentation was obtained by the NRC resident inspector.
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The cause of the safety injection was attributed to personnel error and failure of the B main steam isolation valve to close from safety
injection Train A.
The procedure (PT 10a and b) calls for developing the logic for high steamline flow and requires depressing a push-button labeled RT which is located in the auxiliary electrical area.
The RT puchbutton is depressed while Train A safeguards logic is in test. While depressing the RT pushbutton, two pages of the procedure were inadvertently skipped and pushbuttons which yielded a low steamline pressure were depressed simultaneously with the RT pushbutton.
This action developed a safety injection logic for Train A (high steamline flow concident with low steamline pressure signifying a steamline break).
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Although Safeguards Train A was in test, valve positioning resulting from the signals is not inhibited. For steamline break protection, main steam isolation valves A, B, C and D receive the closure signal from Train A.
The A, C, and D MSIVs closed as designed while the B MSIV failed to close from Train A.
Failure of the B MSIV to close caused a Train B safeguards actuation from the 100 pound differential pressure safety injection.
Several discrepancies were noted during and after the safety injection resulting from Train B.
These discrepancies are described in the following table along with the corrective action and the safety significance.
Equipment Failure Corrective Action Safety Significance B MSIV Failed to Pilot valve replaced, Would have closed (LER close from retested by PT-23 automatically from No. 79-40) Train A successfully.
Train B if real steam-line break existed.
Closed manually from the control room.
Feedwater Failed to Solenoid was cleaned, Closed Automatically Reg. Valve close from repaired and retested from Train B.
IB (DVR Train A by depressing relays No. 1-79-73)
F4, and F5.
Main steam Partially Manually reset Each steamline has five Safety opened and by prying to full steam safety valves capable Valves failed to open position.
of passing 110% of rated reset.
steamflow at 110%
steam generator pressure.
No excessive cooldown occurred.
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Equipment Failure Corrective Action Safety Significance Turbine Started Adjusted governor, The plant has two Driven but cteam performed periodic electric driven and Auxilia ry supply surveillance test one turbine driven Feedwater valve successfully.
auxiliaty feedwater Pump 1A tripped pumps. Only one of (DVR No.
closed.
three is necessary for 1-79-72)
Technical Specifications requirement for two ope _rable pumps was met.
The inspector considers the mechanical failures associated with this event to be corrected.
Licensee investigation into this event concentrated on reviewing the procedure (PT 10 a and b) as well as expected operator actions.
Although two additional licensed operators familiar with PT 10 a and b were brought in specifically to perform the test, it was determined that the degree of communication between the two individuals by sound powered telephone could have been improved.
(One individual was in the control room and one individual was in the auxiliary electrical area). Furthe rmo re, it was concluded that human engineering deficiencies in the auxiliary electrical area which require simul-taneous depression of three separate pushbuttons to develop the safeguards signals contributed to the error.
During the management exit held on June 1, 1979, periodic test pro-cedure PT 10a and b was discussed as well as possible changes that were going to be made. These changes dealt with modifications to the RP pushbutton as well as some procedural modification. At the time of the management exit, these changes were not finalized.
Consequently, this item will be carried as unresolved pending further resolution by the licensee and will be followed in subsequent inspections.
(295/79-13-01; 304/79-12-01)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
QA Audit Performed by Commonwealth Edison The inspector was made aware of the results of an inhouse quality assurance audit performed by the corporate off-site audit group.
One significant finding was made regarding implementation of Zion Administrative Procedure 13-52-8.
According to the audit finding all of the requirements of ZAP 13-52-8, which controls the shipment of dry active wastes, were not being implemented.
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The inspector discussed this item with the plant's Quality Assurance Department as well as at the monthly exit. The ZAP in question will be controlling the anticipated future shipment of old spent fuel racks. The licensee stated that these problems were being resolved and a formal response to' the in-house audit would be available shortly.
At the time of the management exit, these changes had not been finalized. Consequently, this item will be considered unresolved pending resolution by the licensee.
(295/79-13-02; 304/79-12-02)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Unit 2 Reduction in Plant Load May 11, 1979 Unit 2 entered a limiting condition for operation regarding Technical Specification 4.8.3.c at about 9:00 a.m. on May 11, 1979, when it was found that the J diesel generator would not except load during the time the 2A residual heat removal (RHR) pump was out of service for maintenance. A 2.5% per minute load reduction was begun with the anticipated off line time at 1:00 p.m.
The load reduction was cancelled at approximately 12:30 p.m. when the 2A RHR pump maintenance was completed and the pump was tested and declared operable. The inspector has no further questions regarding this item.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Special Engineered Safeguards Inspection As a result of the Three Mile Island incident, the inspector conducted a special inspection of all engineered safety feature systems at the Zion Generating Station.
The results of this inspection are contained in a special inspection report which was forwarded to the licensee in June of 1979. The inspector has no further questions regarding this item.
6.
Plant Cleanliness The inspector commented during the management exit on 6/1/79 that the auxiliary building looked clean and that licensee personnel should continue housekeeping efforts, particularly in any areas where boric acid might deposit and crystallize.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Technical Specification Comments
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D' iring the month, an item pertaining to the Zion Technical Specifi-cations was discussed with operating personnel. This item and the inspector's comment are as follows:
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Operability of a diesel generator:
Is a diesel generator which is running, loaded, and parallelled to its safety bus considered operable at the Zion Generating Station while maintenance is being performed on its air starting system?
Answer: Regarding the Zion diesel generators, the diesels are considered operable as long as all safety functions can be performed while running during the maintenance on the air starting system.
If the diesel generator trips during mainten-ance, a limiting condition for operation would exist and the diesel generatar would not be declared operable until all maintenance items were completed and a successful periodic test pe rfo rmed.
8.
Testimony Preparation for Spent Fuel Pool Expansion During the month, written testimony was prepared by the inspector for the public hearing regarding plans to increase the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool.
In preparation for this hearing the Quality Assurance, Quality Control and Fuel Handling Departments were contacted.
In addition, a noncompliance history regarding Quality Assurance at the Zion Generating Station was reviewed and discussed with other members of Region III office.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Review of Plant Operations During the month, the inspector made tours of the turbine building, auxiliary building, control room and the perimeter and security areas. With regard to the plant, the tours involved valve lineup audits, review of LC0 conditions, discussions with plant operating personnel, review of station logs, and review of overall plant cleanliness. The security tours involved witnessing badging vehicle searching, package surveillance and compliance with station visitor policy.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Plant Maintenance The inspector either witnessed or reviewed the results of the fol-lowing maintenance activities during the month to determine if work control procedures and required supervision were in effect. The following is a list of the maintenance activities involved in the review:
IM maintenance on MA station 2C FW pump to repair the speed a.
controller.
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b.
2A RIIR pump seal replacement.
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c.
Starting air leaks in "0" D/G.
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B MSIV failure to close from Train A.
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FW Reg valve failure to close from Train A.
11.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more informatioris required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and 3.
12.
Management Interview A management meeting was held on June 1, 1979, by the resident inspector with Mr. Wandke and others of his staff in which the results of the inspection were summarized.
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