IR 05000289/2007004
Download: ML073030049
Text
October 24, 2007
Mr. ChristopherPresident and CEO AmerGen Energy Company, LLC 200 AmerGen Way, KSA 3-E Kennett Square, PA 19348
SUBJECT: THREE MILE ISLAND STATION, UNIT 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000289/2007004
Dear Mr. Crane:
On September 30, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed anintegrated inspection at your Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI) facility. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed October 17, 2007, with Mr. Rusty West and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice", a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have anyquestions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,/RA/Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No:50-289License No:DPR-50 C. Crane2
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000289/2007004
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl:Chief Operating Officer, AmerGen Site Vice President - TMI Unit 1, AmerGen Plant Manager - TMI, Unit 1, AmerGen Regulatory Assurance Manager - TMI, Unit 1, AmerGen Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services, AmerGen Vice President - Mid-Atlantic Operations, AmerGen Vice President - Operations Support, AmerGen Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, AmerGen Director Licensing - AmerGen Manager Licensing - TMI, AmerGen Vice President - General Counsel and Secretary, AmerGen T. O'Neill, Associate General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company J. Fewell, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, Exelon Nuclear Correspondence Control Desk - AmerGen Chairman, Board of County Commissioners of Dauphin CountyChairman, Board of Supervisors of Londonderry Township R. Janati, Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection, State of PA J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee E. Epstein, TMI-Alert (TMIA)
D. Allard, PADEP
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000289/2007004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; AmerGen Energy Company, LLC; Three MileIsland, Unit 1; Routine Integrated Report.The report covered a 13-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC'sprogram for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsNo findings of significance were identified
B.Licensee Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant StatusThree Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI) operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power for theentire inspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 3 samples)The inspectors performed three partial system walkdown samples on the followingsystems and components:*On August 8, 2007, the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) and it'sassociated engineered safeguards electrical distribution system while the 'A' EDG was unavailable due to scheduled maintenance. *On August 24, the inspectors reviewed the 'A' train of the accessible portions ofthe building spray system, while the 'B' train of the building spray system was inoperable due to planned surveillance testing.*On August 30-31, the 'A' and 'B' motor driven emergency feedwater (EFW)pumps and injection headers, while the turbine driven EFW pump and portions of the EFW injection header were unavailable due to planned maintenance.The partial system walkdowns were conducted on the redundant and standbyequipment to ensure that trains and equipment relied on to remain operable for accident mitigation were properly aligned. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 sample)On September 14 thru 21, the inspectors performed one complete system walkdownsample on the 'B' decay heat removal, 'B' decay closed cooling water, and 'B' river water system train after completion of scheduled maintenance. The complete system walkdown was conducted to verify proper system train lineup and to verify that system components were correctly positioned and in generally good condition to perform their safety function. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection inspections for several plant fire zones,selected based on the presence of equipment important to safety within their boundaries. The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns, verified the areas were as described in the TMI Fire Hazard Analysis Report, and that fire protection features were being properly controlled per surveillance procedure 1038, Administrative Controls-Fire Protection Program, Rev. 69. The plant walkdowns were conducted throughout the inspection period and included assessment of transient combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment operability, and compensatory measures established for degraded fire protection equipment in accordance with procedure OP-MA-201-007, Fire Protection System Impairment Control, Rev. 5. In addition, the inspectors verified that applicable clearances between fire doors and floors met the criteria of Attachment 1 of Engineering Technical Evaluation CC-AA-309-101, Engineering Technical Evaluations, Rev. 9. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. Fire zones and areas inspected included:*Fire Zone CB-FA-3a, Control Building Elevation 338', 1D Switch Gear Room;*Fire Zone CB-FA-3b, Control Building Elevation 338', 1E Switch Gear Room;
- Fire Zone CB-FA-3c, Control Building Elevation 338'6", ESAS Room;
- Fire Zone DG-FA-2, Diesel Generator Building Elevation 305', Diesel GeneratorB;*Fire Zone IB-FZ-1, Intermediate Building Elevation 295', Valve Gallery &Penetration Room;
- Fire Zone ISPH-FZ-1, Intake Screen Pump House Elevation 308', 1R SWGR &Pump Area and associated Trash Rake and Screen Area;*Fire Zone ISPH-FZ-2, Intake Screen Pump House Elevation 308', 1T SWGR &Pump Rm and associated Trash Rake and Screen Area;*Fire Zone TB-FA-1, Unit 1 Turbine Building Elevation 355', Deluge Systems;
- On July 11, the inspectors reviewed Issue Report (IR) 649263 which evaluated acontinuous fire watch for a fire service water system outage. *On July 19, the inspectors reviewed IR 652842 which evaluated transientcombustible materials staged in the intermediate building at the EFW pump room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
R07 Heat Sink Performance
.1Annual Heat Sink Performance Inspection (71111.07 A - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
Based on plant specific risk importance, the inspectors selected the 'B' nuclear closedcooling heat exchanger (NS-C-1B) and the 'B' decay heat removal system heat exchanger (DH-C-1B) as samples for inspection. The inspectors evaluated the heat removal capability and verified that any potential heat exchanger deficiencies whichcould mask degraded performance were identified. The inspectors reviewed engineering change request (ECR) TM 03-00794 Attachment B, T1R15 DH-C-1B Performance Evaluation, Rev. 0 and recurring task work order (WO) R2027524, NS-C-1B, PM/Heat Exchanger Inspection & Clean. The inspectors reviewed the operations data and verified that the performance monitoring was conducted using methods outlined in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) NP-7552, Performance Monitoring Guidelines, that pre-established criteria were appropriate, and that the heat exchanger performance met the pre-established criteria including heat exchanger inlet and outlet temperatures and secondary side fluid flow. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2Biennial Baseline Heat Sink Performance Inspection (71111.07B - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed three inspection samples. Based on plant specific riskimportance and resident inspector input, the inspectors selected the 'C' and 'D' nuclear service closed cooling water heat exchangers and 'B' decay heat closed cooling water heat exchanger as samples for inspection.The inspectors reviewed the performance testing and inspection and cleaning methodsto ensure heat removal capabilities were consistent with commitments in response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment and accepted industry practices. The inspectors determined that acceptance criteria were consistent with design basis values. Also, the inspectorsreviewed methods for monitoring and controlling biotic and macro-fouling to verify that they were implemented effectively.The inspectors completed walk downs of the selected components and the associatedservice water intake structure to assess the general material condition of the selected heat exchangers and associated service water components. The inspectors reviewed a sample of IRs related to the selected heat exchangers to ensure that problems related
to these components were appropriately identified, characterized, and corrected. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
On August 7, 2007, the inspectors observed licensed operator requalification training atthe control room simulator for the 'D' operator crew. The inspectors observed the operators' simulator drill performance and compared it to the criteria listed in TMI Operational Simulator Scenario Number TQ-TM-106-LRU-S003, Fire in 'A' Battery Room, Loss of 'A' DC, Concurrent with Escalating OTSG tube leak, and SubsequentLoss of Subcooling Margin, Rev. 1. On September 18, 2007, the inspectors observedlicensed operator requalification training at the control room simulator for the 'C'operator crew. The inspectors compared crew drill performance to the criteria listed in TMI Operational Simulator Scenario Number TQ-LRU-106-S004, Reactor Coolant PumpHigh Vibration and Sheared Shaft and RCS Leak, Rev. 1. The inspectors reviewed the operators' ability to correctly evaluate the simulator trainingscenario and implement the emergency plan. The inspectors observed supervisory oversight, command and control, communication practices, and crew assignments to ensure they were consistent with normal control room activities. The inspectors observed operator response during the simulator drill transients. The inspectors evaluated training instructor effectiveness in recognizing and correcting individual and operating crew errors. The inspectors attended the post-drill critiques in order to evaluate the effectiveness of problem identification. The inspectors verified that emergency plan classification and notification training opportunities were tracked and evaluated for success in accordance with criteria established in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 5.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation for MR scoping,characterization of failed safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs),
MR risk categorization of SSCs, SSC performance criteria or goals, and appropriateness of corrective actions. Additionally, extent of condition follow-up,
operability, and functional failure determinations were reviewed to verify they wereappropriate. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required by 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2, and AmerGen procedure ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Rev. 6. The inspectors verified that appropriate corrective actions were initiated and documented in IRs, and that engineers properly categorized failures as maintenance rule functional failures and maintenance preventable functional failures when applicable. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.*IR 648297 describes the 1E inverter synchronizing board relay RL1 failure.AmerGen did not properly identify the failure as a maintenance rule functional failure (MRFF). The inspectors determined this was a MRFF as the relay failure did result in inoperability of vital buses A and C. However, this would not have resulted in a maintenance preventable functional failure, since preventative maintenance (PM) had been developed and in place to replace the relay boards.
The PM was not overdue and had not yet been completed for the 1E inverter.
As such, the 10 CFR 50.65 a(2) determination remained valid for the system and no violation of the maintenance rule occurred. *IR 651050 described a plant process computer (PPC) failure resulting in theintegrated control system (ICS) unit load demand unexpectedly shifting to manual operation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the scheduling, control, and restoration during the followingmaintenance activities to evaluate the effect on plant risk. This review was against criteria contained in AmerGen Administrative Procedure 1082.1, TMI Risk Management Program, Rev. 6 and WC-AA-101, On-Line Work Control Process, Rev. 13. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.*On July 11, 2007, the FS-P-1 fire service pump was removed from service forscheduled maintenance activities. The condition elevated the online maintenance risk profile to yellow (Risk Document 516, Rev. 8).*On August 16, 2007, the PPC was deenergized to support troubleshooting of asuspected electrical anomaly. This condition required operators to place a portion of the ICS in manual operation, conduct enhanced monitoring of selected plant indications which were no longer available from the PPC, and manually
perform certain periodic calculations of reactor core performance characteristicsas required by technical specifications (Risk Document 1095, Rev. 8). *On August 30 and again on August 31, the turbine driven emergency feedwaterpump (EF-P-1) was isolated to support installation of a high point vent valve on the emergency feedwater (EFW) suction line in accordance with engineering change request 06-00332 EF-V-66 Vent. The condition elevated the online maintenance risk profile to yellow (Risk Document 1248, Rev. 1).*On September 5, the 'A' reactor river water system train was removed fromservice for scheduled maintenance activities. The condition elevated the online maintenance risk profile to yellow (Risk Document 527, Rev. 9).*On September 11, the 'B' decay heat, decay closed, and decay river trains wereisolated to support replacement of the 'B' decay closed pump motor (DC-P-1B),
and other scheduled maintenance activities. The condition elevated the online maintenance risk profile to orange (Risk Document 831, Rev. 19).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that degraded conditions in question were properlycharacterized, operability of the affected systems was properly evaluated in relation to Technical Specification (TS) requirements, applicable extent of condition reviews were performed, and no unrecognized increase in plant risk resulted from the equipment issues. The inspectors referenced NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) Part 9900, Operable/Operability-Ensuring the Functional Capability of a System Component and AmerGen procedure OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determinations, Rev. 3, to determine acceptability of the operability evaluations. The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations for the following degraded equipment issues:*On April 19, 2007, operators observed high maximum fuel rail pressure on thediesel driven fire service pump FS-P-3. Engineers determined that this condition had shown an increasing trend over the past 18 months, but fuel flow to the engine remained sufficient. Therefore, the pump remained operable (IR 648759 and Work Request A2171753). *On July 18, during inspections of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool toinvestigate excessive longitudinal growth, two fuel assemblies demonstrated excessive control rod drag force when a dummy control rod assembly (CRA) was inserted (IR 651242). This observation had the potential to invalidate the existing operability evaluation OPE-07-003, Mark B12 Fuel Assembly Elongation,
Rev. 1. Additional CRA drag testing with actual CRAs was performed withnormal results, indicating that elongation had not caused plastic deformation of the fuel assemblies. The licensee determined the test methodology gave inaccurate results on July 18 and OPE-07-003 remained valid.*On September 3, operators identified air leaking from the air actuator for reactorbuilding emergency cooling outlet valve RR-V-6 (IR 667445). The air leakdegraded to 100 standard cubic feet per hour over the next week. Increased air usage adversely affected the 2-hour backup instrument air system and could potentially affect operability of the EFW injection valves. Operators determined the EFW injection trains remained operable, developed an adverse condition monitoring plan RR-V-6 Positioner Air Leak, Rev. 0, and expedited repairs.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 7 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following post-maintenance test (PMT)activities to ensure: (1) the PMT was appropriate for the scope of the maintenance work completed; (2) the acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operability of the component; and (3) the PMT was performed in accordance with procedures. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.*On August 1, 2007, electricians performed 1301-4.6.2, Station Battery 1BWeekly, Rev. 9 and 1301-5.8.2, Station Battery 1B Quarterly, Rev. 7 following corrective maintenance to address low specific gravity for cell #3.*On August 8, operators performed 1303.4.16, 'A' EDG Monthly InserviceTesting (IST), Rev. 114 following a maintenance outage on the 'A' EDG.*On August 18-19, electricians performed portions of 1104-19, Control BuildingVentilation System, Rev. 71 following troubleshooting and corrective maintenance (work order 2174154) to replace two solenoid valves suspected of causing delayed operation of two control building emergency ventilation dampers.*On August 24, operators performed testing in accordance with 1303.5.2B, 'B'Emergency Loading Sequence And HPI Logic Channel/Component Test, Rev. 3, following replacement of a failed contact in engineering safeguards relay 63Z2/LDB.*On September 6, operators performed testing in accordance with 1300-3KA, ISTof RR Pump 'A' and Valves, Rev. 2, following a scheduled reactor river system
outage for miscellaneous maintenance activities, including replacement of asolenoid valve for RR-V-10A, oil change, and pump relay maintenance.*On September 12, operators performed testing in accordance with OP-TM-543-202, IST of DC-P-1B, Rev. 2, following replacement of the motor for the 'B' decay closed cooling water pump.*On September 27, operators performed testing in accordance with 1303-5.2A, Atrain Emergency Loading Sequence And HPI Logic Channel / Component Test, Rev. 3, following corrective maintenance replacement of Engineered Safeguards and Actuation System (ESAS) relay 63Z-1B/R-C2A.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
(5 Routine Surveillance and 2 In Service Test Samples)The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the following operational surveillance tests toverify adequacy of the test to demonstrate the operability of the required system or component safety function. Inspection activities included review of previous surveillance history to identify previous problems and trends, observation of pre-evolution briefings, and initiation/resolution of related IRs for selected surveillances.*On July 5, 2007, procedure 1303-4.16, Emergency Power System, Rev. 114.
- On July 10, procedure 1303-11.36, HSPS - Reactor Building Pressure ChannelTest, Rev. 21.*On August 17, procedure OP-TM-211-208, IST OF MU-P-1C, Rev. 2.
- On August 21, procedure 1303-5.1A, 'A' RB Emergency Cooling and IsolationSystem Logic Channel/Component Test, Rev. 3.*On August 27, procedure 1303-4.1C, Reactor Protection System Channel 'C' Test,Rev. 14.*On August 29, procedure 1303-3.KC, IST of RR Cooling Valves, Rev. 0.
- On September 23, procedure OP-TM-622-201, Control Rod Movement, Rev. 2.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification (TM) and associatedimplementing documents, interviewed the respective system engineer, and walked down the in-plant system to verify the plant design basis and that system or component operability was maintained. Procedures CC-AA-112, Temporary Configuration Changes, Rev. 12, and CC-TM-112-1001, Temporary Configuration Change Implementation, Rev.
4, specified requirements for development and installation of TMs.*Engineering change request 07-00461, NR-SR Cross-Connection Code Repair,Rev. 1 was performed on July 11, 2007, to address a degrading through-wall leak caused by microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC). The leakage had been previously identified and trended as documented in IRs 608589, 613770, 611631, and 610963.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION SAFETYCornerstone:Occupational Radiation Safety20S1Access Controls (71121.01 - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected activities and associated documentation in the belowlisted areas. The evaluation of AmerGen's performance in these areas was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable TSs, and applicable AmerGen procedures. Plant Walkdowns, Radiation Work Permit Reviews, and Jobs in Progress ReviewsThe inspectors toured the facility and reviewed radiological controlled area accesscontrols, posting, barricading, and High Radiation Area access controls. The inspectors verified selected locked High Radiation Areas were closed and verified locked status. The inspectors made independent radiation survey measurements during the tours to evaluate applicable controls including radiological postings. The inspectors selectively evaluated personnel monitoring practices and evaluatedexternal and internal dose assessments. The inspectors selectively evaluated personnel radiation exposure results since the previous inspection. The inspectors selectively reviewed radiological controls for on-going diving operations.
Problem Identification and ResolutionThe inspectors selectively reviewed self-assessments and IRs to determine if identifiedproblems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. The review included potential radiation worker or radiation protection personnel errors to determine if there was an observable pattern traceable to a similar cause. (Section 4OA2)High Risk Significant, High Dose Rate High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) ControlsThe inspectors discussed changes for HRA access controls since the last inspection withthe Radiation Protection Manager and selected supervisors to determine if there were changes and if the changes resulted in a reduction in the effectiveness and level of worker protection. Radiation Worker/Radiation Protection Technician Performance and Radiation ProtectionTechnician ProficiencyThe inspectors reviewed issue reports since the last inspection to identify problems withworker or radiation protection technician performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted the following activities to determine if AmerGen was properlyimplementing operational, engineering, and administrative controls to maintain personnel occupational radiation exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and applicable AmerGen procedures. The inspectors selectively reviewed Station ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes and presentations since the previous inspection. Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure TrackingThe inspectors reviewed 2006 station aggregate dose estimates relative to applicablegoals. The inspectors selectively compared the results achieved (person-rem sustained)with the intended dose goals. The inspectors evaluated differences between initial radiation dose estimates and actual doses sustained for work activities to identify causes for differences in results achieved. The inspectors reviewed 2007 dose goals and planned major work activities. The inspectors reviewed long-term dose reduction
initiatives. The inspectors selectively reviewed AmerGen's proposed TMI 5 year exposurereduction plan.Source-Term Reduction and ControlThe inspectors selectively reviewed and discussed AmerGen's source term reductionstrategy designed to minimize the source term external to the core and results achieved.
The inspectors discussed source term reduction initiatives outlined in the proposed 5 year exposure reduction plan. Problem Identification and ResolutionThe inspectors reviewed issue reports in this area since the last inspection to determine ifAmerGen was including ALARA deficiencies and issues in its corrective action program.
(See Section
==4OA2 )
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment==
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected activities and associated documentation in the belowlisted areas. The evaluation of AmerGen's performance in these areas was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable TSs, and applicable station procedures.Self-Contained Breathing ApparatusThe inspectors reviewed the functional testing and inspection of self-contained breathingapparatus (SCBA) to ensure the equipment was being properly maintained and inspected in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations and applicable regulatory requirements. The inspectors reviewed periodic testing of the SCBA units' components (i.e., hydro testing of tank, maintenance and testing of regulators, low pressure alarms).
The inspectors reviewed 5 year maintenance records for three SCBAs. The inspectors reviewed training records for personnel authorized to use SCBAs, including shift personnel, and also reviewed training and qualification of personnel authorized to service SCBA vital components. The inspectors reviewed and compared procedures for maintenance and use of SCBAs relative to manufacturer's recommendations. Verification of Instrument Calibration, Operability, and Alarm Setpoint VerificationThe inspectors selectively reviewed calibration and operability check records of selected instrumentation used for work activities (diving) and surveys of radioactive waste shipments (Ludlum 12159, 102763; E-140-1123; Telepole - 6696-045; SAC-4:394; E-530N - 674; AMP 100- 76557, 78646). The inspectors reviewed calibration of the High
Range Containment Monitoring System (RMG-22,20) and reviewed calibration of thereactor coolant sample line area radiation monitor (RMG-18). The inspectors selectively reviewed calibration and checking of the whole body counter (stand-up) and reviewed calibration of both pocket ion chambers and electronic dosimetry worn by divers. Problem Identification and ResolutionThe inspectors reviewed issue reports in this area since the last inspection to determine ifAmerGen was including instrument deficiencies and issues in its corrective action program (Section 4OA2). The review included self-assessments, audits, and corrective action reports.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety2PS2Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's radioactive waste processing, storage, andtransportation programs, in the below listed areas, relative to applicable criteria specified therein. Additional documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
.Inspection Planning/In-Office InspectionThe inspectors reviewed the solid waste system description in the Updated Final SafetyAnalysis Report (UFSAR) and recent radiological effluent release reports for information on the types and amounts of radioactive waste. The inspectors reviewed AmerGen's audit program in this area. (See Section 4OA2)System WalkdownThe inspectors walked down accessible portions of the station's radioactive liquid andsolid waste collection, processing, and storage systems and locations to determine if systems and facilities were consistent with descriptions provided in the UFSAR, to evaluate their general material conditions, and to identify changes made to systems.
Areas visually inspected included storage areas and plant facilities. Visual inspectionrecords and previous surveys were also reviewed. The inspectors also discussed operation of the systems with cognizant licensee personnel. The inspectors reviewed the following matters:
- the status of any non-operational or abandoned radioactive waste processequipment and the adequacy of administrative and physical controls for those systems;*changes made to radioactive waste processing systems and potential radiologicalimpact including conduct of safety evaluations of the changes, as necessary;*current processes for transferring radioactive waste resin and sludge to shippingcontainers and mixing and sampling of the waste, as appropriate;*radioactive waste and material storage and handling practices;
- sources of radioactive waste at the station (waste streams), processing (asappropriate) and handling of the waste; and *the general condition of facilities and equipment. The review was against criteria contained in the station's UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 20,10 CFR 61, the Process Control Program (PCP), and applicable station procedures.Waste Characterization and ClassificationThe inspectors reviewed the following matters:
- radiochemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams;*the development of scaling factors for difficult to detect and measureradionuclides;*methods and practices to detect changes in waste streams;
- classification and characterization of waste relative to 10 CFR 61.55 and 10 CFR61.56;*implementation of applicable NRC Branch Technical Positions (BTPs) on wasteclassification, concentration averaging, waste stream determination, and sampling frequency;*current waste streams and their processing relative to descriptions contained inthe UFSAR and the station's approved PCP; *current processes for transferring radioactive waste resin and sludge dischargesinto shipping/disposal containers to determine adequacy of sampling; and *revisions of the PCP and the UFSAR to reflect changes (as appropriate).The review was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 71, the UFSAR, the PCP, applicable NRC BTPs, and licensee procedures.Shipment PreparationThe inspectors selectively reviewed the training and qualification program for personnel shipping radioactive materials. The inspectors confirmed proper training. The review was against criteria contained in NRC Bulletin 79-19 and 49 CFR 172 Subpart H.Shipment Records and Documentation The inspectors selected and reviewed the records associated with five non-exceptedshipments of radioactive material made since the previous inspection in this area
(Shipment Nos. RS-07-101, RS-07-055, RS-07-102, RS-07-103, RS-07-057). Thefollowing aspects of the radioactive waste, radioactive material packaging, and radioactive material shipping activities were reviewed:*implementation of applicable shipping requirements including completion of wastemanifests;*implementation of the specifications in applicable Certificates of Compliance, asappropriate, for the approved shipping casks including limits on package contents;*classification and characterization of waste relative to 10 CFR 61.55 and 61.56, asappropriate*implementation of recent NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT) shippingrequirements rule changes;*implementation of 10 CFR 20 Appendix G;
- implementation of specific radioactive material shipping requirements;
- packaging of shipments;
- labeling of shipping containers;
- placarding of transport vehicles;
- conduct of vehicle checks;
- provision of driver emergency instructions;
- completion of shipping paper/disposal manifest;
- evaluation of package against package performance standards, as appropriate;
- conformance with procedures for cask loading, closure and use requirementsincluding consistency with cask vendor approved procedures;*use of latest revision documents.The review was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20; 10 CFR 61; 10 CFR 71;applicable DOT requirements, as contained in 49 CFR 170-189 for the above areas; station procedures; applicable disposal facility licenses; and applicable Certificates ofCompliance or vendor procedures for various shipping casks.The inspectors also selectively reviewed the year 2006 Annual Radioactive EffluentRelease Report, relative to types and quantities of radioactive waste shipped offsite and relative to changes to the PCP.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151- 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
On August 6, 2007, the inspectors reviewed all reactor trips during the previous 24months to verify if they should be counted against the new PI-Unplanned Scrams with Complications, which went into effect the third quarter 2007.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152).1Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program and Cross-References to Problem Identification And Resolution (PI&R) Issues Reviewed Elsewhere
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing a list of daily IRs, by performing detailed reviews of selected IRs, attending daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensee's computerized database.The inspectors also reviewed a sample of IRs associated with 10 CFR 50.59 issues andplant modification issues to ensure that AmerGen was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas and that the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified..2 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
a. Inspection Scope
(71121)The inspectors reviewed problem reports to determine if identified problems were enteredinto the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors selectively reviewed the reports to evaluate AmerGen's threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems (AR Nos. 665247, 665252, 664284, 664189, 663523, 664275, 665133, 664323, 659357, 6555960, 655539, 651844, 651593, 476838, 476842, 323733, 454625, 478472, 470902, 476842 ) The following audits and assessments were reviewed:
-NOSA-TMI-06-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental MonitoringProgram, dated April 19, 2006-Liquid Radwaste Program, Focused Assessment (AR454625)
-Occupational Safety, Access Control, ALARA, Focused Assessment (AR526380)
This review was against criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, Technical Specifications, and thestation procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Annual Sample:
Review of The Operator Workaround and Adverse Condition MonitoringPrograms
a. Inspection Scope
(71152- 1 sample)The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator work-arounds(OWAs), the list of operator challenges, existing operator aids and disabled alarms, and the list of open main control room deficiencies to identify any effect on emergency operating procedure operator actions, and impact on possible initiating events and mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated whether station personnel were identifying, assessing, and reviewing OWAs as specified in AmerGen administrative procedure OP-AA-102-103, Operator Work-Around Program, Rev. 1.The inspectors also reviewed AmerGen's implementation of OP-AA-108-111, AdverseCondition Monitoring and Contingency Plans, Rev. 4 for degraded structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The listed adverse condition monitoring plans (ACMs) were assessed to understand the nature of the degradation, the additional monitoring in place to ensure the requisite level of functionality, and Amergen's plans to address the issues for the long term. The inspectors interviewed selected station personnel to assess their understanding of the open ACMs. *Nuclear Services River Water (NR) and Secondary River (SR) MicrobiologicallyInduced Corrosion (MIC) Leak dated 4/6/07*SR Underground Pipe Leak dated 2/10/2006
- 2B Feedwater Heater Level Control dated 1/24/07
- Unexpected 'B' Core Flood Tank Leakage dated 8/3/06
- Fuel Leakage Monitoring Plan dated 9/29/06
- CO-T-1A De-Ice Line Flange Leak dated 4/20/07
- HD-V-29 Steam Leak Monitoring dated 5/8/07
- Erratic Flow in 'B' decay heat system dated 5/24/07
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
AmerGen adequately implemented various aspects of OP-AA-102-103 and OP-AA-108-111. The inspectors noted that the ACMs had appropriate monitoring plans which included periodic inspections. Degradations that could be addressed by online repairs/replacements have been planned, while those needing specialized plant conditions have been planned for the October 2007 refueling outage. The inspectors noted that
station management was well aware of these ACMs and had plans in place to resolve theunderlying issues at the first opportunity. 4OA3Event Followup (71153 -1 sample).1Sulfuric Acid Leak
a. Inspection Scope
On July 14, 2007, operators discovered a 0.25 gallon per minute unisolable leak from theAbove Ground Circulating Water Acid Tank (IR 650096). This tank contained 6,300 gallons of sulfuric acid. The tank is contained in a moat and inside a building. All leakage was contained in the moat and no release to the environment occurred. TMI entered abnormal operating procedure 1203-44,"Hazardous Release," Rev. 40 and took appropriate actions to contain and stop the leakage. Approximately 100 gallons of sulfuric acid leaked from the tank. Because this amount exceeded Federal reportable quantity limits and station personnel did not expect to be able to repair and clean up the leak within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the licensee made a report to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP) as required by procedure. The inspectors reviewed the operators' actions during the event, reviewed the event for reportability under 10 CFR 50.72, and reviewed compliance with environmental and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn October 17, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results toMr. Rusty West and other members of the TMI staff, who acknowledged the findings. The regional specialist inspection results were previously presented to members of AmerGen management. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary and none was identified.ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- D. AtherholtManager, BOY Systems
- C. BakerManager, Chemistry
- J. BashistaEngineer, River Water Systems
- P. BennettManager, Design Engineering
- B. CarskyDirector, Operations
T. DoughertyPlant Manager
- E. EilolaDirector, Site Engineering
R. GreeneGL 89-13 Programs Engineer
- J. HeischmanDirector, Maintenance
A. MillerRegulatory Assurance
- T. NahayDirector, Work Management
L. RajkowskiManager Engineering Programs
- C. SmithManager, Regulatory Assurance
- L. WeirManager, Nuclear Oversight Services
- C. WendManager, Radiation Protection
- R. WestVice President, TMI Unit 1
- T. WickelSenior Manager, Design Engineering
- V. ZepposEngineerOthers:M. MurphyPADEP, Bureau of Radiation Protection
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None
A-2Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentDrawings:302-011, Main Steam Flow Diagram, Rev. 68
- 2-082, Emergency Feedwater Flow Diagram, Rev. 23
- 2-101, Condensate Flow Diagram, Rev. 62
- 2-202, River Water System, Rev. 71
- 2-640, Decay Heat Removal Flow Diagram, Rev. 80
- 2-645, Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Rev. 38
- 2-712, Reactor Building Spray Flow Diagram, Rev. 48Procedures:OP-TM-214-000, Building Spray System, Rev. 7
- OP-TM-424-000, Emergency Feedwater System, Rev. 6
- 1301-1, Shift And Daily Checks, Rev. 156Other Documents:ECR 06-00332,
- EF-V-66 Vent
- WO C2012709
- IR 663707
- TMI On-Line Station Risk Evaluation Document, On-Line Risk # 535, Tag# 1303-5.2A&B, Rev. 10 Clearance TMI On-Line Station Risk Evaluation Document, On-Line Risk # 831, B Decay Heat Train, Rev. 17Clearance Tag#
- 07501238, for Decay Closed Cooling Pump 1B Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionOther Documents:Fire Hazards Analysis Report - Vol. 1, Update 18, Rev. 22
- Fire Pre-Plan Strategies, TMI Unit 1, dated January 31, 2007
- NRC Information Notice 2007-26, Combustibility of Epoxy Floor Coatings at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.IR 663869
Section 1R07:
- Heat Sink PerformanceIssue Reports128727139264
- 140209
- 141469
- 197692
- 206396264708286168
- 287025
- 366945
- 371356
- 396876427645452314
- 487813
- 537666
- 550932
- 23823651412651651
- 651653
- 651654
- 665579
- 666045669983670003
- 670025
- 2271
- 673592
- A-3AttachmentProceduresCY-AA-110-000, Conduct of Chemistry, Rev. 5CY-AA-120-400, Closed Cooling Water Chemistry, Rev. 9
- CY-TM-120-8000, Chemistry Specifications, Rev. 0
- 1301-6.7, Monitoring of Silt Buildup in River Water Screen House, Rev. 14, performed 12/24/05
- 1301-6.7, Monitoring of Silt Buildup in River Water Screen House, Rev. 14, performed 8/26/07
- 1301-9.7, Intake Pump House Floor, Silt Accumulation and Inspections, Rev. 22, performed
- 4/26/07
- 1301-9.7, Intake Pump House Floor, Silt Accumulation and Inspections, Rev. 22, performed
- 5/13/05
- GL 89-13 Program Implementation Instructional Guide, Rev. 6
- ER-AA-340-1002, Service Water Heat Exchanger and Component Inspection Guide, Rev. 3
- ER-TM-340-1002, Guidance for Heat Exchanger Inspections and Cleaning at TMI, Rev. 0
- ER-TM-TSC-0007, Severe Flood Guidelines, Rev. 0
- OP-TM-533-272, Data Collection for Heat Balance Testing of
- DH-C-1B and
- DC-C-2B, Rev. 3
- OP-TM-AOP-005, River Water Systems Failures, Rev. 5
- OP-TM-PPC-A0089, River Water Inlet Temperature, Rev. 1
- OP-TM-511-487, CW De-Ice Supply to Screen House Intake, Rev. 4
- M-144, Heat Exchanger Inspections and Cleaning, Rev. 25, performed 1/9/06
- 6510-SUR-4515.03, TMINS Asiatic Clam Surveillance, Rev. 3
- 202-32, Flood, Rev. 65Drawings302-202, River Water System Flow Diagram, Rev. 71
- CalculationsC-1101-212-E410-084,
- TMI-1:
- DH-C-1A/B Design Analysis, Rev. 0C-1101-531-5310-009, Evaluation of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Heat Exchangers, Rev. 1
- C-1101-533-E410-010, DH Service Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging Limits, Rev. 1
- C-1101-543-E210-012,
- DC-C-2A/B Channel & Tube Required Thickness, Rev. 0
- C-1101-543-E540-014,
- TMI-1: DHCCW Heat Exchanger 12R Test Evaluation, Rev. 0
- C-1101-823-5450-001,
- Code, Rev. 9Work OrdersR1837750,
- DH-C-1B/DC-C-1B Heat Load Test, performed 10/18/03R2010727, Perform Cleaning & Inspection of Heat Exchanger, performed 11/5/05
- R2010727, Activity 03, TMI, Unit 1, 2B Decay Heat Closed Cooler,
- DC-C-2B (eddy current), performed 11/14/05R2027524, NDE Data Report 2006-007-002,
- NS-C-1B, performed 1/13/06
- R2049095, NDE Data Report 2006-007-004,
- NS-C-1D, performed 2/9/06
- R2049095,
- NS-C-1D: PM/ Clean & Inspect (Eddy Current), performed 2/16/06
- R2049356,
- NS-C-1A: PM/ Clean & Inspect (Eddy Current), performed 1/3/06
- R2055396, NDE Data Report 2006-007-001,
- NS-C-1A, performed 1/10/06
- R2064824,
- NS-C-1C: PM/ Clean & Inspect (Eddy Current), performed 2/14/06
- R2064826, NDE Data Report 2006-007-003,
- NS-C-1C, performed 2/6/06
- R2075573, IST of DR Train B Pump and Valves, performed 1/13/06
- A-4AttachmentR2085805, RWPH Silt Accumulation, performed 4/26/05R2102391, IST of DR Train B Pump and Valves, performed 7/11/07
- R2103195, ISPH Desilting by Divers, performed 4/27/07
- R2107259, Silt Buildup- Screen House, performed 8/26/07OtherCommitment Change Tracking Number 06-001Commitment Change Tracking Number 06-002
- Commitment Change Tracking Number 06-003
- Commitment Change Tracking Number 07-025
- ECR 03-00794,
- TMI-1:Evaluation of
- DH-C-1B and
- DC-C-2A Cooler Performance During T1R16,
- Rev. 0
- ECR 05-00684,
- TMI-1: Evaluation of
- DH-C-1A and
- DC-C-2B Cooler Performance During T1R15, Rev. 0
- GPU Letter 6710-96-2097, Generic Letter 89-13 Revised Response, dated 6/6/96
- Program Health Report (ER-AA-340/TDR 117/TDR 119), Microbiologically Induced Corrosion
(MIC) And Heat Sink, Second Quarter 2007
- System Health Overview Report, Nuclear Services River Water System, June 2007
- System Health Overview Report, Decay Heat River Water System, June 2007
- System Health Overview Report, Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water System, June 2007
- System Health Overview Report, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water System, June 2007
- TMI Operations Plant Manual, Section M-06, Island Flood Control, Rev. 8
- TMI-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5, Decay Heat Removal System
- TMI-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.6, Cooling Water Systems
- TMI-1,
- Topical Report 119, Generic Letter 89-13 Program Description, Rev. 5
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramProcedures:EP-AA-1009,
- TMI-1 Emergency Action Level Matrix, Rev. 9OP-TM-AOP-001, Fire, Rev. 0
- OP-TM-AOP-031, Loss of Nuclear Services Component Cooling, Rev. 1
- OP-TM-AOP-050, Reactor Coolant Leakage, Rev. 0
- OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, Rev. 7
- OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage, Rev. 4
- OP-TM-EOP-010, Emergency Procedure Rules, Guides and Graphs, Rev. 7
Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessProcedures:OP-AA-108-115,
- Operability Determinations, Rev. 1Other Documents:IR-388972
- IR-621252
- IR-626831
- IR-631269
- A-5AttachmentIR-639476IR-642365
- IR-648297
- IR-649053
- IR-650800
- IR-651050
- CAP-T1999-0722
- WO-R2063789
- Power Labs failure analysis report
- TMI-49607, IE Inverter Synch Board Relay RL1
- TMI-01 System Health Overview 2nd Quarter 2007 for System 602, Plant ComputerSection 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProcedures:1105-10, Plant Computer Operations, Rev. 35
- 1107-3, Diesel Generator, Rev. 119
- 203-7, Hand Calculations for Quadrant Power Tilt and Core Power Imbalance, Rev. 43.
- IT-TM-1001, Plant Process Computer Database Update Process, Rev. 0
- OP-TM-602,-411, Halting FIDMS, Rev. 2Other Documents:WO C2014528
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance TestingDrawings:302-842 sheet 2, Control Building and Machine Shop Ventilation Flow Diagram, Rev. 7Other Documents:1303.4-16, 'A'
- IR 657177
- IR 661913
- IR 675938
- WO R2077448
- WO R2106750
- IEEE Std 450-1995, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of
- Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Nuclear Power Plant ApplicationsStation Risk Report # 522 ,EG-Y1A Outage Station Risk Report for WW0732, Rev. 0
Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingProcedures:1303-5.1A,
'A' RB Emergency Cooling and Isolation System Logic Channel/Component Test,
- Rev. 3Other Documents:Risk Document 536, HPI/Makeup & Purification System, Rev. 7
- A-6AttachmentWO R2099749WO R2104149
- IR 593595
- IR 659138
Section 2PS2: Radioactive Material Processing and TransportationProcedures:OU-AA-101, Rev. 11, Refuel Outage Management
- RP-AA-22, Radioactive Material/Waste Transportation/Disposal Program Description
- RP-AA-403, Rev. 1, Administration of the Radiation Work Permit Program
- RP-AA-551-1002, Rev. 0, Evaluation and Estimation of Cobalt Introduction Into Systems by
- ValvesRP-AA-600, Rev. 0, Radioactive Material Waste Shipments
- RP-AA-602, Rev. 11, Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments
- RP-AA-605, Rev. 1, 10
- CFR 61 Program
- RP-AA-4002, Rev. 2, Radiation Protection Refuel Outage Readiness
- RP-TM-401-1002, Rev. 0, Three Mile Island Outage ALARA Planning and Controls
- RP-TM-605-1001, Rev. 1, TMI Waste Characterization
- RP-TM-850, Rev. 0 Radiation Protection Emergency Equipment Readiness
- RW-AA-100, Rev. 4, Process Control Program for Radioactive Waste
- TQ-AA-126, Rev. 3, Radioactive Material Shipper
- TQ-AA-133, Rev. 12, Environmental Training
- 6610-OPS-4510.03, Rev. 2, Inspection and Maintenance of Respiratory Protection EquipmentOther Documents:10 CFR Part 61 Sampling and Analysis Results, Radioactive Material Shipping Documentation,Radioactive System Operating procedures (Primary Resin and Pre-coat Processing, Concentrated Waste Storage Tank Operations), Radioactive Shipping ContainerCertificationsSection 4OA1: Performance Indicator (PI) VerificationIssue Reports544634544751
- 578700
- 584916
- 618773
- 2990
- 633130
- 633208
- 673584Procedures:1302-5.31C, 4160V 1D Bus Loss of Voltage/Degraded Grid Timing Relay Calibration and Logic
- Check, Rev. 15ER-AA-1047, Mitigating Systems Performance Index Basis Document, Rev. 1
- A-7AttachmentER-AA-2020, Equipment Performance and Information Exchange and MSPI Failure
- Determination Evaluation, Rev. 3TMI-2006-004, MSPI Basis Document, Rev. 1 Other Documents:Event Number 43498
- LER 2006-002-00
- LER 2006-003-00
- LER 2892006002-Automatic Reactor Trip due to an Invalid Turbine Trip Actuation
- LER 2892006003-Automatic Reactor Trip due to a Design Application Deficiency Within the
- Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors Initiated by an Off Site Grid Disturbance.
- NEI 99-02 Revision 5 , Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. July 2007
Section 4OA3: Event Followup1203-44, Hazardous Release, Rev. 40IR-650041
- IR-650096
- IR-650313
- IR-651244
- Hazardous Substance/Waste and Petroleum Product Spill Reporting Form for "Circulating Water Acid Tank" on 7/14/07
- Exelon Reportability Manual
- NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines for 10
- CFR 50.72 and 50.73, Rev 2.
- A-8Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACMAdverse Condition MonitoringADAMSAgencywide Documents and Management System
- ALAR [[]]
AAs Low As is Reasonably Achievable
AmerGenAmerGen Energy Company,
- LLC [[]]
- BT [[]]
- CF [[]]
- CR [[]]
- DO [[]]
- DR [[]]
- EC [[]]
- ED [[]]
- EF [[]]
- HR [[]]
- INP [[]]
OInstitute of Nuclear Power Operations
- IS [[]]
- LOC [[]]
- MI [[]]
CMicrobiologically Induced Corrosion
- NC [[]]
- NE [[]]
- NR [[]]
- OW [[]]
- PADE [[]]
- PAR [[]]
- PC [[]]
PProcess Control Program
- PI& [[]]
RProblem Identification and Resolution
- PM [[]]
- PP [[]]
- SCB [[]]
- SS [[]]
CStructures, Systems, and Components
- TM [[]]
IThree Mile Island, Unit 1
- UFSA [[]]
- VHR [[]]
AVery High Radiation Area