IR 05000289/2005007
| ML052510788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/2005 |
| From: | Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Crane C AmerGen Energy Co |
| References | |
| IR-05-007 | |
| Download: ML052510788 (18) | |
Text
ber 8, 2005
SUBJECT:
THREE MILE ISLAND STATION, UNIT 1 - NRC SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY INSPECTION REPORT 05000289/2005007
Dear Mr. Crane:
On July 29, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a safety system design and performance capability team inspection at your Three Mile Island Unit 1 facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 29, 2005, with Mr. Rusty West and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspection team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of the inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-289 License No. DPR-50 Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report 05000289/2005007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Mr. Christopher
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000289/2005007; July 11-29, 2005; Three Mile Island Unit 1; Engineering Team
Inspection.
This inspection was conducted by five inspectors from the NRCs Region I Office and a NRC contractor. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
ii
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
1R21 Safety System Design and Performance Capability (SSD&PC) (IP 71111.21)
1. Inspection Basis
The NRC team performed an inspection to verify that the selected safety systems would achieve their design and performance capability. Additionally, the team assessed the ability of AmerGen to monitor the systems for age-related degradation that could result in the systems failing to fulfill their design requirement. The inspection effort reviewed AmerGen's programs and methods for monitoring the capability of selected safety systems to perform the current design basis functions. The scope of the teams inspection also included nonsafety-related structures, systems and components that provided functions required to support the selected systems safety functions.
The systems reviewed during this inspection were selected by the inspection team using information from AmerGens and the NRCs probabilistic risk analysis models. The models were used to identify the most risk significant systems, structures, and components, in the mitigating system and barrier integrity cornerstones, by determining which systems were the highest risk contributors to dominant accident sequences. The inspectors also used deterministic criteria in the selection process by considering previous SSD&PC sample selection, recent inspection history, site problem history, and operational experience. The two systems selected for review were:
- High Pressure Injection (HPI)
The inspection included review and examination of support systems, such as electrical power, instrumentation, and related structures and components. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of calculations, analyses, engineering processes, and engineering and operating practices that were used by the licensee to support the performance of the safety systems selected for review and the necessary support systems during normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Acceptance criteria utilized by the NRC inspection team included NRC regulations, the technical specifications, applicable sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), applicable industry codes and standards as well as industry initiatives implemented by the licensees programs. A complete list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment to this report.
2. System Needs
a. Inspection Scope
The team inspected the following attributes of the two systems and associated support systems: Process Medium, Energy Sources, Control Systems, Operations and Heat Removal. The inspectors verified the above attributes met the requirements and design basis specifications identified in the UFSAR, technical specifications, licensee commitments, design basis documents, vendor technical manuals and plant drawings.
A complete list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment. The attributes verified to meet system requirements are described below:
Process Medium. The team verified that the EFW and HPI systems would supply the required flow rate and pressure to the steam generators and the reactor coolant system, respectively, following normal transients and design basis events and that sufficient water was available to meet design requirements. The team also verified that adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) existed for the EFW and HPI pumps and that air entrainment and vortexing would not be experienced as the pumps draw down the inventory of their associated water supplies.
Energy Sources. The team verified that electric, steam, control power and air supplies for the EFW and HPI systems would be available during a design basis event (DBE) and were adequately designed to energize/actuate the associated equipment during the DBE.
Control Systems. The team reviewed the automatic and manual controls for the EFW and HPI systems to assure that the automatic and manual control functions would be available for initiation, control and shutdown actions. Additionally, a review of alarms and indicators was performed to ensure that operator actions could be accomplished in accordance with the design assumptions.
Operations. The team reviewed normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures to verify that operator actions for the EFW and HPI systems assumed in the design bases could be completed. Those operator actions that were identified by the licensee as risk significant were reviewed. Additionally, the team verified that operators were able to manually initiate the system, monitor components and system indications, automatically or manually control system functions and shutdown the system.
Heat Removal. The team verified that the pumps and area cooling systems provided sufficient heat removal capability for the EFW and HPI systems to maintain pump operability. Additionally, the team verified that the temperature rise on system components was limited such that component temperature qualification was not exceeded.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
3. System Condition and Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors inspected the following attributes of the EFW and HPI systems and associated support systems: Installed Configuration, Operation, Design, and Testing.
The inspectors verified the above attributes met the requirements and design basis specifications identified in the UFSAR, technical specifications, licensees commitments, design basis documents, vender technical manuals, calculations and plant drawings.
The attributes were verified to meet system requirements as described below:
Installed Configuration. The team confirmed that the installed configuration of the EFW and HPI systems were in agreement with design basis assumptions by performing detailed system walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems. The walkdowns focused on the installation and configuration of piping and instruments; component material condition; licensee identified deficiencies; the placement of protective barriers; the susceptibility to flooding, fire, or other environmental concerns; physical separation of redundant trains; and provisions for seismic and other pressure transient concerns.
The team compared their observations of the current installation configuration of the systems with the design and licensing bases to assure that the system would be capable of functioning during plant transients or accident conditions. Additionally, the team confirmed whether AmerGen had identified system deficiencies and entered them into the corrective action program.
Operation. The team performed a procedure walk-through of selected, risk significant manual operator actions to confirm that the operators had the ability, access and tools necessary to accomplish actions credited in the design basis. The team verified that system alignments and the performance of operations procedures were consistent with the design and licensing basis, which included ensuring operator actions could be performed within the assumed timeframe. The team also verified that the necessary instrumentation and alarms were available to the operators to support system operations.
Design. The team reviewed the mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation design of the EFW and HPI systems to verify that the systems and subsystems would function as required under design conditions. This included a review of the design basis, design changes, design assumptions, calculations, boundary conditions, and models as well as a review of selected modification packages. Instrumentation was reviewed to verify appropriateness of applications and setpoints based on the required equipment function.
Additionally, the inspectors performed limited independent calculations and analyses in several areas to verify the appropriateness of the design values.
Testing. The team reviewed records of selected periodic testing including inservice testing, post maintenance tests and calibration procedures. The team verified that the results obtained by system and component testing adequately demonstrated that the systems met operability requirements. The test results were compared against system calculations, drawings, and procedures. Test results were also reviewed to ensure automatic initiations occurred within required times and that testing was consistent with design basis information.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. System Components
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected several risk significant components in the EFW and HPI systems to ensure equipment at the component level met design requirements. The components selected for detailed review included:
- Makeup Discharge Isolation Valves, MU-V-16 A & C
- Borated Water Storage Tank Suction Valves, MU-V-14B & MU-V-36
- Decay Heat to Makeup System Flow Isolation Valve, DH-V-7B
- EFW Flow Control Valve, EFW-V-30 A-D
- HPI pumps A, B & C
- Borated Water Storage Tank The inspectors inspected the following attributes of these EFW and HPI components:
Component Degradation, Environmental Qualifications, Protection, Input/Output and Operating Experience. The inspectors verified the above attributes met the requirements and design basis specifications identified in the UFSAR, technical specifications, licensees commitments, design basis documents, vender technical manuals, calculations and plant drawings. A complete list of documents reviewed is included in the attachment. The attributes were verified to meet system requirements as described below:
Component Degradation. The team reviewed the licensees maintenance and operations procedures to determine how potential age-related degradation of the selected components were monitored and corrected. The team verified that component and/or component materials replacement are scheduled prior to exceeding its expected qualified life or allowed number of cycles. Additionally, the team verified that deficiencies that could potentially reduce the life expectancy of the components such as boric acid corrosion were evaluated and corrected.
Environmental Qualification. The team verified that the equipment was qualified to operate in the environment in which it may be subjected to under normal and accident conditions. The team reviewed design information, specifications, and documentation to ensure that the EFW and HPI components were qualified to operate within its normal and accident environments. These included a review of the temperatures, pressures, humidity and radiation fields the components are exposed to while installed in the system.
Protection. The team verified that the EFW and HPI system components were adequately protected from natural phenomenon and other hazards, such as high energy line breaks, fire and floods. The inspectors reviewed design information, specifications, and documentation to ensure that system components were adequately protected from those hazards identified in the UFSAR which could impact their ability to perform their safety function.
Input/Output. The team verified that selected EFW and HPI system component inputs and outputs (e.g., coolant flow, electrical voltage and control air) were adequate to the receiving component during normal, event and accident conditions.
Operating Experience. The team verified that insights from TMI and industry operating experience have been incorporated into procedures affecting the selected components.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of EFW and HPI system problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to design or qualification issues. In addition, condition reports written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The lead inspector presented the inspection results on July 29, 2005, to Mr. Rusty West and other members of the licensees staff. The inspection team verified that this inspection report does not contain proprietary information.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
- M. Bensel, System Engineer - Electrical
- G. Chick, Plant Manager
- R. Dantulari, Electrical Design Engineer
- C. Demars, Corrective Action Coordinator
- E. Eilola, Director - Site Engineering
- K. Heisey, System Engineer
- E. Johnson, System Engineer
- P. Kopicki, Electrical Design Engineer
- R. Masaero, HPI System Engineer
- A. Miller, Licensing Engineer
- D. Palofaro, System Engineer
- J. Piazza, Manager - Mechanical & Structural Engineering
- T. Rausch, Director - Corporate Engineering
- B. Shumaker, System Engineering Supervisor
- C. Smith, Licensing Manager
- W. McSorley, Operations Engineer
- J. Valent, System Engineering Supervisor
- R. West, Site Vice President
- T. Wickel, Senior Manager - Design Engineering
- V. Zeppos, Mechanical Design Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
None.