IR 05000285/1981029
| ML20032E906 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1981 |
| From: | Hunnicutt D, Kelley D, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032E901 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-81-29, NUDOCS 8111230485 | |
| Download: ML20032E906 (8) | |
Text
-
.
APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report 50-285/81-29 Docket 50-285 License DPR-40 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station - Unit 1 Inspection at:
Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska Inspection conducted: October 1-31, 1981 QMdlN
il S/8l Inspector:
D. L. Kelley, Senior R ident Reactor Inspector
/ [ Tate k. ~
d il/M8/
Inspector:
I i. A. Yandell, Reactor inspector
' Da'te Reactor Project Section 2 k
vnIe<yf
///8/cf/
Approved by: D. M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Reactor Project Section 2
/ Da'te Inspection Summary Inspection conducted during period of October 1-31, 1981 (Report 50-285/81-29)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection including (1) Operational Safety Verification (refueling mode); (2) Surveillance (refueling mode); (3) Maintenance (refueling mode); (4) Refueling Activities. The inspection involved 171 inspector hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
Within the four areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
8111230485 811104 PDR ADOCK 05000285 G
.-
.
.
.
.-.
-
-
-.
i
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- S. C. Stevens, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station W. G. Gates, Supervisor, Operations G. R. Peterson, Supervisor, Maintenance L. T. Kusek, Supervisor, Technical B. Hickle, Chemistry & Radiation Protection Supervisor
- R. L. Andrews, Section Manager, Operations J. J. Fluehr, Reactor Engineer T. Chapman, Plant Health Physicist J. J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Administrative Services D. Dale, QC Inspector
- Denotes those attending exit interview.
The inspectors aiso talked with and interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection. These employees included licensed and unlicensed operators, craftsmen, engineers, and office personnel.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (Refueling Mode)
The inspectors performed certain activities to ascertain that the facility is being operated safely and in confonnance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee's management control system is effectively dis-charging its responsibilities for continued safe operation. The inspec-tors activities and findings in this regard are described in the following paragraphs:
a.
Inspection Activities Performed Several Times Per Week (1) Control room observations were mada which included the following items.
(a) Licensee adherence to selective Limiting Conditions for Operations (LC0's).
(b)
Verification of operator adherence to approved procedures.
(c)
Verification of control room and shift manning (Refueling).
(2) Review of selected logs and records to obtain information on plant operations, trends, compliance with regulatory require-ments, and assess the effectiveness of communication provided by these logs and records.
_. _ _
_
_
_
_ _ _ _ _,
_
__
_
_ -_
_.
_
.. _ _ _
_
_.
_
'
.
F
i b.
Inspection Activities Performed on a Weekly Basis (1) The iicensee's equipment control was reviewed for proper imple-mentation by performing the following inspection activities:
(a) Review of maintenance order log and tag-out log to deter-
!
mine the licensee's compliance with LC0's and Technical Specification' action statements.
(b) Verification of " return to operable status of selected
>
safety-related components and systems."
(2) The inspectors toured the plant at various times during the inspection to determine and/or verify equipment conditions, plant conditions, security, safety, and housekeeping. Obser-vations included the following:
,
(a) General plant and equipment condition.
.
(b) Fire hazards.
J (c) Control of combustible material.
(d) Fire watch postings and presence of fire watches when
required.
(e) Physical security.
The inspectors verified that the security is being implemented by observing that:
.
The security organization is properly manned and security personnel
.
are capable of performing their assigned tasks.
Protected Area barriers are not degraded.
.
Isolation Zones are clear.
.
Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or
.
controlled within the protected area.
'
Persons within the protected area display photo identification
.
badges and persons requiring escort are properly escorted.
Vital area physical barriers are not degraded.
.
Persons and packages ara checked prior to entry into the l
.
protected area.
i
i
.,.-.-. -..-..-,, -,., -. -, _. -,. -..-._.-,.~ _
- -.
- - _,
... -. _. - _ - _ _. -.
-
-
,
..
-
-
.
The inspectors observed several shift turnovers and reviewed several shift turnover sheets.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Maintenance Observations (Refueling Mode)
a.
The inspectors observed portions of the following maintenance activ-ities :
(1)_ M09395, Tensioning of Reactor Vessel Studs. The inspectors attended the pre-meeting held to brief the personnel involved with the work. The inspectors observed the first pass as called for in MP-RC-6-11 and the taking of the first set of micrometer readings. The inspectors verified the qualifications of two QC inspectors participating in the activity.
(2)
FC-79-181B, Automatic Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater. The inspectcrs observed electricians from Industrial Electrical Works, Inc. doing field connection work in panels AI-196 and AI-198 under contract #1288. The inspectors verified that proper drawings were being used and discussed with the contractor QC manager how field work was verified and drawings controlled.
(3)
FC-79-1810, Automatic Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater, (SRDC0 81-220; Wide Range Steam Generator Level Indication). The in-spectors observed craftsmen from ESSCO making connections to existing tubing of LT-901A and LT-901B in accordance with OPPD drawing D-4065. The inspectors reviewed the original, signed off SRDC0 retained by Generation Station Engineering, and reviewed the results of the 1500 pound hydrostatic test performed on the tubing.
In addition, the inspectors observed the opening of the "B" Steam Generator as the licensee made preparations for eddy current testing.
The inspectors verified that proper radiological controls were utilized, and observed that Health Physics were present during the evolution.
b.
On October 22, 1981, the containment HP discovered four contract workers, in an area of containment requiring-respirators, not wear-ing respirators. They were immediately escorted from the area and given whole body counts. There were no abnormal indications recorded on the results of the whole body counts. The licensee investigated the occurance and determined that between the time that inquiries were made of the requirements (several days) for entry and the actual entry, the respirator requirements changed. The workers apparently failed to note the change. The licensee has reviewed the method of posting to ensure that pcsting visibility is adequate and re-instructed the personnel involved on the need to heed the postings and follow re-quirements. This is a licensee identified item.
No further investi-gation by the NRC is deemed necessar.
c.
The inspectors determined through personal observation and review of records, where appropriate that:
(1) These activities were not violating Limiting Conditions for-Operations.
(2) Redundant components were operable.
(3) Required administrative approvals and tag-outs were obtained prior to initiating the work.
(4) Approved procedures were being used, if appropriate.
~
(5) The procedures used were adequate to control the activity.
(6) Activities were being accomplished by qualified personnel.
(7) Replacement parts and material being used were properly certi-fied.
(8) Radiological controls were proper and are being properly-implemented.
(9)
Ignition source controls were properly implemented.
(10) QC hold points, if any, were observed.
(11) Equipment was properly returned to service.
d. The inspectors reviewed outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee is giving priority to safety-related maintenance and.that a backlog is not developing on a given. system which could affect its operability. The inspectors also determined that the proper approvals were obtained for job orders which appear to constitute design changes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
-.
-
.
4.
Surveillance Observations (Refueling Mode)
a.
The inspectors observed portions of _ the following surveillance tests:
(1) CP-105, " Pressurizer Pressure ' Channel 105," as part of ST-SDC-1, F.1, which verified the shutdown cooling interlock on HCV-347 and HCV-348.
(2) ST-ESF-14, F.3, Offsite Power Low Signal, but test was halted by an apparent failure in one of the steps. M0#12456 was issued to trouble shoot the problem.
(3) ST-ESF-6-F3, F4, Automatic Diesel Generator' Operation, which verified the actuation of the ESF Systems with loss of off-site power.
b.
The inspectors determined through personal observations and records, as appropriate, that:
(1) Approved procedures were used.
(2) Test instrumentation was calibrated.
(3) Limiting Conditions for Operation were met when the system being tested was removed from service.
(4) The test data was recorded accurately and completely. Selected test results were independently verified by the inspector.
(5) The surveillance test documentation was properly reviewed and test discrepancies were rectified.
(6) Test results met Technical Specification requirements.
'
(7) The test was done by qualified personnel.
c.
The records review was conducted to verify that:
(1) Schedules and procedures were followed.
(2) Calibration history included; calibration interval, date of last calibration, and conformance or non-conforma.nce to required tolerance prior to and following adjustments.
(3) Each. item had a unique identification number.
(4) Reference standards were correct and verifiable.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
5.
Refueling Activities a.
The inspectors reviewed procedure OP-11, Reactor Core Refueling Procedure, and observed various refueling activities to verify com-pliance with Technical Specifications.
In reviewing the initial conditions of OP-11, the inspectors verified that:
(1) various equipment checkouts and surveillance procedures were performed, (2) the reactor cavity water level was being maintained 23 feet above the upper end fitting of the fuel, (3) personnel participating in core loading had been briefed on the procedure, (4) at least two source range channels were providing continuous visual indication in the control room, (5) containment integrity had been established, (6) required radiation monitoring equipment was tested and op-erational, (7) shutdown cooling was established, (8) auxiliary building ventilation was lined up for the refueling mode, (9) boron concentration was being maintained greater than 1700 ppm and determined once a shift, and (10) proper communications were established between the Control Room, spent fuel area, and the refueling machine in containment.
The inspectors reviewed appendix A to OP-11, Fuel Movement Sequence, and verified that it was approved by the PRC and distributed to the various operating stations. The Master Copy was being maintained in the Control Room.
The inspectors observed refueling operations in the Control Room, the spent fuel pool area, and the containment.
During these evolutions, the inspectors observed movements of the following fuel bundles:
IA11 G003 G017 HA03 E017 HA17 HA06 IA36 IA05 G41 FIO5 E019 F006 F102 G014 l
>
-s
-
8-The inspectors verified that the licensee's staffing during refueling was in accordance with Technical Specifications and observed that.the licensee maintained good housekeeping in the refueling area.
b.
During fuel transfer operations on October 15, 1981, the TV camera mounted on Ethe lower end of the refueling machine mast collided with the reactor vessel, at the time the machine was transiting empty from one core position to another. The collision sheared the cap screws holding the camera, so that the camera was only secured by two electric cables and the tilt air piston.
With the camera in this condition, the mast could not be fully retract-ed. The manufacturer (PAR) was contacted and the method of retracting-and removal of-the TV camera discussed.
A tarpaulin was lowered under the mast and the camera maneuvered into alignment using the cables and air piston. The mast was successfully retracted and the fuel handling machine moved away from the vessel.
It was then decided that the best method of removal was to send a diver-into the cavity. This was done on October 16, 1981.
The camera was removed and four items (two pairs of safety wired cap heads and two shims) were successfully removed 'from the core shroud and fuel bundle tops.
Fueling operations were resumed after verifying no more items were in the vessel.
Refueling operations were successfully completed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Interview i
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
on October 30, 1981, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection.
!
.