IR 05000282/1982017
| ML20028B688 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1982 |
| From: | Feierabend C, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028B675 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-TM 50-282-82-17, 50-306-82-17, NUDOCS 8212030150 | |
| Download: ML20028B688 (8) | |
Text
-
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No: 50-282/82-17; 50-306/82-17(DPRP)
Docket No: 50-282; 50-306 License No: DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN 55066 Inspection Conducted:
September 21 - October 31, 1982 Inspector:
// 7 fz C. D. Feierabend Approved By:
// /I O
. Reyes, ef
'
Reactor Projects Section 2B Inspection Summary Inspection on 09/21-10/31/82 (Report No. 50-282/82-17:50-306/82-17 (DPRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspection of Preparation for Refueling, Drills and Exercises, Operations Safety Verification, Followup on a Fuel Oil Spill, Followup on TMI-2 Lessons Learned Item, Followup on Noncompliance Items, and Followup on Licensee Event Reports. The inspection involved a total of 102 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspector including 14 in-spector hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
8212030150 821117 PDR ADOCK 05000202 G
,
j
-
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted
..
- E. Watzl, Plant Manager D. Hendele, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance G. Miller, Superintendent, Operations Engineer
,
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer i
A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer M. Balk, Superintendent, Operations D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering
- K. Albrecht, Superintendent, Quality Engineering The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, includ-ing shif t supervisv es, reactor operators, technical staff personnel and quality control personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Noncompliance (282/81-01-04;306/81-01-04)
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's corrective actions had been. completed. The inspector reviewed addi-tional audit reports, including an audit of surveillance programs completed in September, 1982, and verified that objective evidence of the audit was included.
b.
(Closed) Noncompliance (282/81-01-05;306/81-01-05)
The inspector confirmed that the licensee's corrective actions had been completed. The licensee is continuing to improve management of QA records.
c.
(Closed) Unresolved item (282/81-01-06 and 07;306/81-01-06 and 07)
The inspector reviewed the fire protection training program procedures and administrators procedures.
Revisions were current. The inspector has periodically observed the licen--
see conduct effective fire drills. No additional items of concern were identified.
d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (282/81-10-01;306/81-11-01)
The licensee has obtained fireproof file cabinets with locks to provide secure fireproof storage for QA records.
-2-
.
O e.
(Closed) Noncompliance (282/81-24-01;306/81-26-01)
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had established a system for assuring that licensed and senior licensed oper-ators complete required reviews of design procedure and fa-cility license changes. Review of the system indicated that all reviews were current.
f.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (282/81-24-05;306/81-26-05)
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had addressed the items related to scheduling independent offsite fire protec-tion inspections, to review purchase requisitions for fire protection items and to document that suppliers and items meet requirements.
g.
(Closed) Noncompliance (282/82-11-02;306/81-11-02)
The inspector confirmed the licensee's actions to assure prompt reporting in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(a)7.
h.
(Closed) Noncompliance (282/82-11-03;306/82-11-03)
- the inspector confirmed that a licensee procedure to pro-vide for normalization of the flux difference channels has been approved.
i.
(Closed) Noncompliance (282/82-16-01;306/82-16-01)
The inspector confirmed the licensee's corrective actions and verified that the "No Smoking" signs are in place.
3.
Operations Safety Verification a.
General Observations Both units operated at power throughout the inspection period. Unit 1 began end of core life coastdown on October 22, with reaaerr power at about 93% on October 31.
Unit 1 refueling outage is scheduled to begin on November 15, 1982.
b.
Control Room Observations The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and ob-served shift turnovers. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components.
-3-
.
o n
.
The inspector observed that Unit 1 coastdown is in accordance with the licensee's Special Order No.204 - Unit EOL - Tave Reduction to Maintain Power Level, dated October 21, 1982. The inspector observ-ed that reactor coolant, steam pressure, and steam flow conditions were maintained within allowable limits.
The inspector observed operator response to information.that a fuel oil leak had been observed.
Immediate contact with the turbine building operator initiated appropriate corrective and followup actions.
(Paragraph 5)
c.
Tours Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings and external areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work re-quests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance, d.
Independent Verification The inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Containment Spray and Caustic Addition Systems. Observations includ-ed confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's procedures, checklists, and plant drawings and verification of correct valve and power supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment and instrumentation were properly aligned.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Drills and Exercises The inspector observed three licensee drills during the inspection period.
a.
Fire drill initiated at 1633 on October 2, 1982.
The drill simulated a fire in the oil storage room of the turbine building. Fire brigade response was monitored by the licensee.
This included response by the offsire fire department.
Brigade and fire department response were timely and appeared to be effective.
b.
Evacuation drill initiated at 1300 on October 5, 1982.
This drill was conducted to test revised procedure for personnel accounting during site evacuation. Test results showed significant improvement in reducing the time to complete accounting for all personnel.
-4-
.
[
.
c.
Emergency preparedness exercise conducted on October 14, 1982.
This exercise was monitored by the Rill Emergency Preparedness Sec-tion and by FEMA. Additionally, the exercise was observed by Messrs.
J. Sniczek, and S. Ramos, ole. The resident inspector observations during the exercise were primarily directed toward the interface and/or affect on plant operation. The exercise was planned and im-plemented with precautions to prevent affect on normal plant opera-tion.
The inspector did note that at oae point, near the end of the drill, that the operating shif t supervisor was not able to initiate processing of water because there was no radiation protection tech-nician available. This was not a safety concern, but did delay the operation until the following shift. The inspector discussed this with plant supervisory personnel, who had also made the observation, indicating that future drill plans will identify specific support personnel for the operating plants during the drills.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Fuel Oil Spill At approximately 1530 on October 29, the -inspector observed licensee response to a fuel oil spill.
An alert construction worker observed oil spraying from the vent / flash arrester of the diesel fire pump fuel oil storage tank.
He notified the control room operator, who alerted the plant operator. The plant operator found that the diesel fuel oil was coming from the No. 22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Day Tank overflow.
The day tank was overflowing because of a malfunction of the level control that all'wed the underground stora?a tank transfer pumn to continue to run, o
although the level switch that should have stopped the pump had actuated.
The day tank overflow, routed to the storage tanks, overflowed the diesel fire pump storage tank. - The operator' stopped the-transfer-pump snd; initiated r 2-
~
actions to begin cleanup ~of the' oil, which wa's in the'esrth'dbdve< the'. bi1
..
storage. tanks.
','
". ~
U
~~
-;,- 7
'
..
.
The plant services supervisor mobilized all available personnel and ob-'
tained dump trucks to remove the oil soaked earth to prevent any of the spill from entering the intake canal.
Cleanup was corpleted by 1815.
Initial estimate of fuel oil loss was approximately 500 gallons.
The licensee is investigating the cause of the spill. An apparent mal-function of the level controls for the No.22 diesel cooling water pump day tank allowed the pump to continue to run, although the local high level alarm was actuated. No alarm was received in the control room.
There was no affect on operability of safeguards systems, as adequate fuel oil was available to all systems and met all Technical Specifica-tion requirements.
Operator and support personnel response was excellent in containing and preventing oil from entering the intake canal.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
-5-
.
...
.
.
.
-
.... _ - -..
.
.
.
!
!
6.
Preparation for' Refueling
!
The aspector reviewed all changes to refueling and fuel receipt pro-ceautes since the last refueling to insure that technically adequate-approved-procedures were available covering the receipt, inspection l
and storage of new-fuel and the handling and storage of spent fuel.
The inspector witnessed portions of the receipt inspection and storage
'
of new fuel. This included verification of the qualifications of fuel receipt inspectors, and verifying compliance with the fuel receipt pro-cedures. Two discrepancy reports were initiated by the licensee receipt inspection. Both were resolved prior to acceptance of the-fuel.
a.
DR No.1222 - Bent raixing vanes, dated October 14, 1982.
Fuel assemblies No.J-24 and K-34 had one or more mixing vane angles that were not within acceptance tolerance.. Resolution was a minor ajustment performed by the Exxon representative on site.
b.
DR No.1223 - Cadolinia pin in wrong location, dated October 15, 1982.
The licensee receipt inspector observed that one gadolinia bearing fuel pin in fuel assembly No.J-26 was not in its correct location The fuel inspector-initiated a discrepancy report in accordance with the licensee QA procedure. The fuel vendor provided assistance in reconstituting the fuel assembly, returning the gadolinia pin to its correct location. The inspector reviewed the vendor's procedure XN-NF-SPA-25 Rework Procedure for Exxon Fuel Assemblies at Prairie Is-land, Rev.0, and reviewed records of completed work, including the applicable QA hold points.
Preliminary analyses by the licensee and the fuel vendor indicated that the fuel assembly error would have had minimal affect on the fuel performance. Licensee corporate QA vendor inspectors are com-pleting followup of the vendors evaluation and corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
TMI-2 Lessons Learned Item The inspector reviewed the status of licensee actions in response to NRC requirements as clarified by NUREG-0737. Paragraph identification relates to those paragraphs of NUREG-0737.
II.B.4.
Training for Mitigating Core Damage The inspector confirmed that the appropriate non-operating per-sonnel receive the portions of training to mitigate core damage commensurate with their responsibilities. These include the-6-
a I
,.
s:
plant manager (now has a Senior Operator License) and tech-
,
nicians in health physics, instrumentation and control and-chemistry departments.
(Closed)
8.
Licensee Events Report Followup The inspector reviewed the,following event reports to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled and that corrective actions were accomplished to prevent recurrence,
-
_
i a.
P-RO-82-15 Auto / Manual Switch for Diesel Generator Supply to Bus 16 Left in Manual After Test Thedetailsofthepventweredescribedinapreviousinspection report.1 The compliance with requirement to follow procedures.~ Cor-rective actions to prevent recurrence will be reviewed during followup of the noncompliance.
(Closed)
b.
P-RO-82-16 Iodine Specification in Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Exceeded TS Limits Details of the event were described in a Trevious in-spection repor 2,/ in conjunction with followup of the reactor trip.
(Closed)
9.
Management Meetings and Interviews a.
Meeting October 6, 1982.
The inspector attended a meeting held in the licensee corporate headquarters on October 6, 1982.
Mr. R. Lickus, RIII Emergency Pre-paredness Coordinator, discussed the RIII' Emergency Response Plan and implementing procedures with licensee corporate management.
Representatives from the plant staffs and the Monticello Senior Resident Inspector also attended.
Licensee interest and comments.
were principally directed toward the affect on licensee emergency response facilities and procedures.
b.
Emergency Drill Exit, October 15, 1982.
The inspector attended an exit interview conoucted by J. Patterson, RIII team leader for evaluation of the licensee emergency drill, following the licensee's critique of the drill that was completed on October 14.
1/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-282/82-13;50-306/82-13(DPRP).
2/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-282/82-16;50-306/82-16(DPRP).
-7-
.-
.*
,
.c.
Exit Interviews The inspecto; conducted interim interviews during the inspection period and net with Mr. Watz1 and other members of your staff, as identified.in Paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection.
The tuspector introduced D. L. Williams, newly assigned Resident Inspector, confirming that he was now a permanent member of the resident inspc: tion team.
The inspector discussed the scope and results of the inspection.
The inspector commented that he had observed that operators were alert in identifying and resolving problems.
The inspector stated that from his view the interface with operating plant during the emergency drill was very good, with the exception of lack of availability of a health physics technician.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
,
-8-
-.
_
.-
.
.
.