IR 05000282/1982020

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IE Insp Repts 50-282/82-20 & 50-306/82-20 on 821101-30. Noncompliance Noted:Several Operable Instrument Channels for Containment Spray Actuated Low
ML20028C765
Person / Time
Site: Prairie Island  Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/13/1982
From: Feierabend C, Reyes L, David Williams
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20028C758 List:
References
50-282-82-20, IEB-79-27, IEB-82-02, IEB-82-03, IEB-82-2, IEB-82-3, NUDOCS 8301140080
Download: ML20028C765 (8)


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s U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No: 50-282/82-20; 50-306/82-20(DPRP)

Docket No: 50-282; 50-306-License No: DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company _

414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN 55066 Inspection Conducted: November 1-30, 1982 Inspectors:

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e erabend

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D. L. Williams

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Approved By:

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Reactor P jects Section 2B

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Inspection Summary Inspection on November 1-30, 1982 (Report No. 50-282/82-20; 50-306/82-20(DPRP)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of operations safety verifica-tion, cold weather preparations, maintenance, surveillance, review and audit, followup of previous inspection findings, followup of IE bulletins, and follow-up of operating events. The inspection involved a total of 102 inspector hours onsite by 2 NRC inspectors including 21 inspector hours onsite during off-shif ts.

Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in seven areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (number of operable instrument channels for containment spray actua-tion less than allowable by Technical Specifications - Paragraph 6).

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' DETAILS 1. Personnel Contacted E. Watzl, Plant ManagerL D. Hendele,' Plant Superintendent', Engineering and Radiation Protection

'R. Lindsey, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance-

'G. Miller, Superintendent, Operations _ Engineer A. Hunstad, Staff. Engineer A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer M. Balk, Superintendent,~0perations D. Schuelke, Superintendent,' Radiation Protection J.. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance J..Hoffman,1 Superintendent,~ Technical Engineering M. Klee, Superintendent,_ Nuclear Engineering

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K. Albrecht,-Superintendent, Quality Engineering G. Lenertz, Lead Production Engineer B. Stephens, Lead Production Engineer R. Frazier,-Engineer L. Anderson, Engineer J. Curtis,-Engineer K. Beadell, Engineer 2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection-Findings a.

(Closed)

Noncompliance (282/82-13-01)

The inspector confirmed that the licensee's corrective actions had been completed. This included review and revision of the diesel generator test proccdures prior to December 1, 1982 as committed.-

b.

(Closed)

Open Item (306/81-05-01)

The inspector verified that the licensee had implement-ed actions to prevent recurrence of damage to safety injection pumps. This was observed during performance of the Unit 1 integrated response to safeguards signal test.

3. Operations Safety Verification a.

General Observations Unit 2 operated at-power throughout the inspection period. Unit 1 continued coastdown to approximately 77% of rated power when it was shut down for refueling on November 15, 1982.

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Control Room Observations

. The 2 inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable

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logs,. conducted discussions with control room' operators,Jand ob-served.shif t' turnovers.' The -inspector verified.the ' operability' of

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' selected emergency systems,oreviewed equipment control records, and.

verified the proper-return.to' service of affected components.' LThe inspector observed operator and test personnel performance during initiation.of the test of. Unit 1 responseLto safeguards signal ~ test.

c.

Tours.

Tours of Unit 'l containment, auxiliary' and turbine ~ buildings and

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external areas were conducted to observe plant, equipment conditions,1

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including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work requests had been-initiated.for equipment in need of maintenance.

d.

Independent Verification The-inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Safety: Injection and. Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Observations'in-

! cluded confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's procedures, checklists, and plant drawings and verification of correct valve and power supply breaker positions to insure that plant. equipment and instrumentation were properly aligned.

The inspector performed independent verification of selected portions -

of the licensee's refueling integrity checklist to confirm that in-tegrity had been established prior to start of fuel handling.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4. Cold Weather Preparations The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for cold weather operation and confirmed that it had been implemented. Two surveillance procedures assure that. safety related and fire protection systems will not be affect-ed by freezing:

a.

SP-1637 Winter Plant Operation b.

SP-1660 Winterization of Hydrant and Roof Hose Stations The licensee is reviewing these procedures to revise and eliminate some duplication before the next winter season.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

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5EMaintenanc'e"

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ThA inspecEor'reviewe'd: maintenance' procedures, observed ~ maintenance'.ini progress,Lobserved~ quality assurance and radiation protection activities

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and reviewed ~ maintenance records ~for several inspection,1 repair and de-j sign change activities.-

a...In~ Service Inspection

.The inspector observed. preparations for_ radiation controls and main-.

-tenance activities.related to' support of eddy. current (EC) examination of' steam' generator: tubes, inspection'of reactor' coolant pump: seals, and removal'of the reactor vessel head. ThisEincluded observation of-cleaning reactor vessel! studs and~ flange bolts for aanwa'y covers-in--

preparation for-NDT examination. EC results were reviewed by a.RIII--

inspector. l_/

'b.

D-3' Reactor' Vessel Head Removal The inspector-reviewed the' status of procedure D-3 to assure that re--

quired prerequisites-had been completed and that preparations would include radiation protection and procedural control of heavy. loads.

The inspector observed maintenance. personnel' lift the= head, inspect-the vessel flange, move the vessel head via the prescribed safe load-path and place the head on the_ storage pad. All activities were closely monitored by health. physics personnel.

The licensee had provided maintenance and radiation' protection sup-ervisors with new headsets to improve consnunication during inspec--

tions and: lifting operations. This_ appeared to provide significantly better control than in previous outages.

c.

Containment Purge System Modifications (DC-81-L-679)

The inspector observed portions of licensee activities relate'd to-removal of the 36 inch containment purge valves-inside containment

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and welding of new flanges. The purge valves are being replaced by blank flanges, which will be installed for any operation above cold shutdown. Similar Unit 2 modifications were completed during the last refueling outage. The inspector observed that appropriate QC hold points had been established and that the required NDT had been completed.

1/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-282/82-19; 50-306/82-19(DPRP)

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d.

Hydrogen Recombiners (DC-82-Y-055)

The inspector observed activities related to moving the recom5iners into containment, and installation in permanent location. The WRA prescribed a safe load path the handling in accordance with the licensee program for controlling heavy loads.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

6. Followup of Cap on Containment Pressure Sensing Line While performing local leak rate testing in Unit 1 containment on Novem-ber 20, 1982, an engineer observed a "Swagelok" cap on the sensing.line for containment pressure transmitter No. PT-948.

PT-948 provides input for closure of main steam isolation valves. Unit 1 was in cold shutdown in preparation for refueling.

An immediate inspection of the sensing lines for the redundant transmit-ters verified that no other sensing lines were obstructed. The licensee made a containment entry on November 21 to inspect all containment pres-sure sensing lines and verified that none were obstructed. Additionally, the licensee cut all tubing fittings from the sensing lines and installed identification tags by each line to prevent any error in capping a wrong line.

The licensee attempted to determine when the cap could have been placed on the tubing. The location of the end of tubing for PT-948 is within reach from the floor at that elevation. None of the others could be reached without climbing. The cap could have been placed during tnis refueling outage but this could not be firmly established, therefore the licensee assumes that it had been in place during power operation.

Review of plant records confirmed that PT-348 was used to record contain-ment pressure during the last integrated leak rate test, in 1980, con-firming that the channel was operable at that time.

The licensee has identified the event as LER No. P-RO-82-23, and will submit a report in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.

Unit 1 was in cold shutdown when the cap was discovered, so containment pressure instruments were not required to be operable, however, as the licensee cannot assure that PT-948 was operable during previous operation, this is considered to have been noncompliance with TS 3.5.C, which speci-i fies minimum operability and redundancy requirements.

(NC282/82-20-01)

l 7. Licensee Event Reports Followup The inspector reviewed the following event reports to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled and that corrective actions were accomplished to prevent recurrence.

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P-RO-81-20'.

Se' veral : Westinghouse; Type NBFD ' Relays Failed :

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-This event; report was discussed in~ detail.In'a previous.

inspection' report.2_/ The licensee has continued to non--

itor/the; status'of NBFD relays. 'During;this refueling

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outage-the: licensee'is-replacing coils, furnished by'the

= manufacturer,.to' complete upgrading of suspect 1 relays.

(Closed)

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P-RO-82-20 t -121 ABSV Filter-Failed DOP1 Test-

' The. report. accurately describes /thi event. -An? event report would not be required if a successful test had been performed. prior to replacing the filter. elements.

(Closed)

No items of' noncompliance were. identified.

8. Surveillance Observation The. inspector witnessed portio'ns of su'rveillance testing of safety re--

lated systems,and components. The inspection' included verifying that

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the tests were scheduled and ' performed within Technical: Specification-i

' requirements, observing that procedures were.being followed by'qualif-

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ied operators, that LCO's were notLviolated, that system and equipment U

restoration was completed, and that test results werc _ acceptable to

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. test and Technical Specification requirements.

a.

SP-1047 Control Rod Exercise The inspector observed a portion of-this test conducted

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on Unit 1 on November-2.

The inspector reviewed the-test records and verified that the test results had.

been reviewed and approved by appropriate supervisory and technical staff personnel.

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.The inspector noted that the' test. procedure did not re-quire movement of control bank "D".

Followup and' dis-cussions with operating and technical staff personnel indicated that this was because bank "D" is routinely used for power changes, and normally moves sufficiently-often to assure operability. The licensee agreed that

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procedure SP-1047 would be revised to document movement I

of all control banks. This item will be reviewed during a' subsequent inspection.

(0 pen 282/82-20-01)

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l 2/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-282/82-09; 50-306/82-09(DPRP)

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.SP-1083 Unit'l Response.to Safeguards Signal Test The' inspector observed initiation of the_ test and verifi -

cation of plant responses by assigned operators and tech--

nical staff personnel. All systems operated as designed.

Three valves were identified-for repair. In all cases'

the redundant valve performed satisfactorily.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

9. IE Bulletins a.

IEB 82-02 Degradation ofl Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants The inspector reviewed status of licensee actions in re-sponse to the Bulletin.

1) Action Item 1 The licensee reviewed existing procedures and had prepared and implemented additional procedures where necessary to assure that the items identified in the bulletin have been included.

(Closed)

2) Action Item 2-The licensee identified NDT examinations to be sched-uled and completed following opening for the current Unit 1 refueling outage.

The licensee is assessing methods for assuring that appropriate inspection will be performed whenever a component is disassembled.

(0 pen)

3) Action Item 3 The licensee has submitted a report 3/ providing the information requested.

(Closed)

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4) Action Item 4 The licensee will submit a report providing the re-quested information after completion of the next re-fueling outage for each unit.

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5) Action Item 5 The licensee has submitted the requested report.4/

3/ NSP Letter to RIII, Subject:

IE Bulletin 82-02, dated August 2, 1982.

4/ Ibid.

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b..IEB 82-03 Stress-Corrosion
Cracking in Thick-Wall, Large-Diameter,

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Revisions iStainleas' Steel, Recirculation: System Piping.at BWR Plants.

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Not Applicable.~. (Closed)

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IEB'79-27'

Loss of-Non-Class I-E Instrumentation and Control! ower P

1 System Bus During Operation

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In response-to.a regional request the inspector.again reviewed the licensee's response 5[ to the. bulletin-to

< confirm licensee ~ actions and schedule.- Although~licen =

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.s'ee evaluation.had determined.that system design _was-acceptable without changes, the. licensee did schedule-replacement of the' instrument inverters with units-cap-able of automatic ' transfer to --alternate AC power...This.

t has been completed on Unit 1 and'is scheduled to.be com 1 pleted for Unit 2 during.the. Unit 2 refueling outage.-

. (Open) '(306/79-27-BB)

No items'of noncompliance were. identified.

10. Review'and Audit The inspector observed portions of two, Operations Committee (OC) polls and observed an OC meeting conducted on November 19, 1982. Subjects dis-cussed included preliminary review of-design changes DC 82Y310- Loose Parts-Monitoring System, DC 80Y140 - Hot Shutdown Panel, and 81 L722 -

Unit 1 Cycle 8 Reload.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

11. Management Meeting A meeting between NRC and licensee management representatives was held in the licensee's corporate offices on November 10, 1982. The meeting was held to discuss the results of the NRC performance appraisal of licensed activities. The results of the appraisal will be discussed in a separate report.

12. Exit Interviews The inspector attended an exit interview conducted by RIII inspector K. Ward on November 26, 1982.

The inspectors conducted interim interviews during the inspection period and met with Mr. Watz1 at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspec-tors discussed the scope and results of the inspection and stated that one item'of noncompliance had been identified related to discovery of the capfon one containment pressure sensing line by a licensee engineer.

(Paragraph 6)

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