IR 05000282/1982008
| ML20054K577 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1982 |
| From: | Burgess B, Feierabend C, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054K570 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-82-08, 50-282-82-8, 50-306-82-08, 50-306-82-8, IEB-82-01, IEB-82-1, NUDOCS 8207020340 | |
| Download: ML20054K577 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No: 50-282/82-08; 50-306/82-08(DPRP)
Docket No: 50-282; 50-306 License No: DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN 55066 Inspection Conducted: May 1-31, 1982 Inspectors:
A D. Fe wfA4'
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bz B. L. Burgess d
Approved By:
II #2 L. Reye, Chief
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Reactor Projects Section 2C Inspection Summary Inspection on May 1-31, 1982 (Report No. 50-282/82-08; 50-306/82-08)(DPRP)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operation, maintenance, surveillance, security, radiation protection, procurement, preparation for re-fueling, followup on IE Bulletins, followup on operating events, and followup on event reports. The inspection involved a total of 153 inspector hours on-site by 2 NRC inspectors including 21 inspector hours onsite during off-shif ts.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
8207020340 820615 PDR ADOCK 05000282 G
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted F. Tierney, Plant Manager J. Brokaw, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance E. Watzl, Plant Superintendent, Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection R. Warren, Office Manager L. Brunner, Purchasing and Inventory Control Supervisor A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer R. Lindsey, Superintendent, Operations J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering G. Lenertz, Engineer G. Miller, Engineer R. Held, Shif t Supervisor D. cragoe, Shif t Supervisor G. Edon, Shift Supervisor M. Balk, Shif t Supervisor T. Goetsch, Shif t Supervisor R. Holthe, Shif t Supervisor D. Walker, Shif t Supervisor P. Valtakis, Shif t Supervisor 2.
Organization and Administration The inspector was informed of a change in the licensee's corporate man-agement.
Mr. L. O. Mayer, Manager of Nuclea{jSupport Services has re-cently retired. The licensee has designated-Mr. D. M. Musolf to assume the licensing administration responsibilities previously assigned to Mr.
Mayer.
3.
Operations Safety verification l
a.
General Both units operated routinely, with periodic load-following during periods when hydroelectric power was readily available.
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Unit 2 was shut down on May 2 to repair an electrical component in the control rod drive system. The unit was back on line May 3.
b.
Control Room Observations The inspector observed control room operation, reviewed applicable I
logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and ob-(
served shift turnovers. The inspector verified the operability of i
selected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and l
verified the proper return to service of affected components.
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1/ NSP Letter to NRR, Subject: Filings Under Oath or Affirmation by Appli-cant, dated May 19, 1982.
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c.
Tours
- i Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings and external areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance work re-quests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
No items of noncompliance -were identified.
4.
Surveillance
The inspectors witness portions of surveillance testing of. safety re-lated systems and components. This included inspection of Unit 2 con-tainment during power operation and verification of testing the sump
"A",
sump "B", and sump "C" level alarms.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
IE Bulletins a.
IEB No.82-01 Alteration of Radiographs of Welds in Piping Sub-and Rev.1 assemblies.
Not applicable to this facility.
(Closed)
6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup The inspector reviewed the following event reports to determine that.
reportability requirements were fulfilled and 'that corrective actions were accomplished to prevent recurrence.
a.
P-RO-81-09 Unit 1 Operation with One Offsite Source of Power.
The inspector verified that Design Change No.81L657 has been completed to modify cooling tower bus logic.
l (Closed)
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b.
P-RO-81-16 Inoperability of No.22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump.
The inspector discussed the event with licensee l-technical staff.
In addition to the corrective action completed, the licensee has initiated a'de-
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sign change to add an alarm to monitor control pow-
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er for the diesel cooling water pumps.
(Closed)
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P-RO-81-14 No t us ed. -
(Closed)
d.
P-RO-81-21 Not tised.1!
(Closed)
2/ NSP Letter to RIII, Reportable Occurrence No.P-RO-81-14, dated Oct. 6, 1981.
3_/ NSP Letter to RIII, Reportable Occurrence No.P-RO-81-21, dated Oct. 25, 1981.
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e.
P-RO-81-24 Breaker for Heat Trace Rack No.1 Found Tripped.
(Closed)
f.
P-RO-81-25 Containment Purge Supply Valves Failed Local Leak Rate Test.
New valve seats had been installed during the March 1981 refueling outage. Leak testing after instal-lation was satisfactory. The licensee has elected to test these valves after usage, prior to' restart of the plant. The valves remain locked closed during power operation.
(Closed)
g.
P-RO-81-31 Spent Fuel Assembly D-34 Top Nozzle Event.
The licensee forwarded a report to update initial information on May 12, 1982. The fuel vendor has identified the apparent cause as intergranular stress corrosion. The licensee has taken precautions to min-imize possibility of recurrence during fuel handling operations.
(Closed)
h.
P-RO-82-07 Not used.
(See Paragraph 8a.)
(Closed)
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No items of noncompliance were identified, t
7.
Procurement The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures governing the procure-
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ment of safety related material and spare parts. Various procurement documents were reviewed to verify technical requirements were met, that
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Quality Assurance program requirements were addressed and that safety related procurements were properly documented in:accordance with appli-
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l cable requirements.
The inspector observed receipt inspections performed by qualified ware-housemen.
In addition, the inspector held discussiona with warehousemen and Quality Control personnel to insure that nonconforming items were identified for resolution prior to release for issue, that items having 10mited shelf life were periodically checked for expiration status and that preventive maintenance was accomplished when required.
During the inspection, the inspector noted that mgph of the nonsafety related stock identified in an earlier inspection-had been removed to an offsite storage area. Ilowever, in Warehouse C the bulk of items stored exceeded available storage space and precluded achieving good warehouse storage practices.
l 4/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-282/81-01; 50-306/81-01.
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The inspector held discussions with cognizant licensee personnel to de-termine what actions were in progress to rectify the warehouse storage problems. The licensee stated that efforts are in progress to expand present onsite warehouse storage area. Construction of an additional warehouse has been included in facility planning. The licensee had identified this as requiring expedited action and expects construction to begin this fall.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Operating Events a.
Control Rod Drive Power Supply Failure On Saturday, May 1, 1982, at approximately 1702, the inspector was notified by the Unit 2 duty Shift Supervisor (SS), of a rod control system problem. Power Control Cabinet 1BD had received an urgent failure alarm, indicating inability to drive several control rods.
The SS had reviewed Technical Specifications (TS) and had notified the Operations Committee. The Operations Committee poll determin-ed that all rods were operable.
On Sunday, May 2, 1982, the inspector was notified at 1220 by the Shif t Emergency Communicator that Unit 2 was being shutdown.
No-tification of Unusual Event (NUE) had been initiated because of an interpretation that control rods were inoperable. State and local emergency notification were notified as required by the Prairie Is-land Emergency Plan. The inspector responded to the site to observe plant shutdown and to monitor licensee response. The plant was shut-down without rod motion by addition of boric acid. When reactor pow-er was below 157. the plant was manually tripped and all rods respond-ed.
The NUE was terminated at 1443 with the plant shutdown.
The inspector held discussions with shift personnel and reviewed plant logs. The inspector was informed that the on-shif t SS on May 2, 1982 had evaluated the Technical Specification requirements and had re-polled the Operations Committee. The Operations Committee reevaluated the circumstances against the Technical Specification requirements and interpreted that the TS Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCO) had been exceeded.
(Time allowable for an inoper-able control rod is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.) The licensee's emergency plan re-quires initiation of an NUE whenever the SS determines that plant shutdown is required by a TS LCO.
The problem was identified to be in the electrical portion of the system. The rod control system was repaired and the plant systems were realigned for restart. The required surveillances were com-pleted and the plant was restarted and synchronized to the grid on May 3, 1982.
The licensee identified the event as requiring a (LER) and submitted a prompt notification to RIIIgj event report on May 3, 1982.
5/ NSP Letter to RIII, Reportable Occurrence No.P-RO-82-07, dated May 3,1982.
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Subsequent review of'the TS indicated that the second SS had con--
servatively evaluated the control rod drives to be inoperable when they did not respond t.o a movement signal whereas, the intent of
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the TS is that it "cannot be moved by its drive mechanism". relates to being movable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or untrippab as is better described in Standard Technical Specifications.gy, The licensee completed evaluation of
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the event and determined that, because the LCO had not been exceed-ed, the Technical Specifications did not require The licensee documented this in a letter to RIII.97 event report.
(Closed)
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b.
Safety Injection (SI) Pump Operation Without Minimum Flow 1) Pump Operation On May 5,1982, while completing SP-2088 Monthly Safety = Injec-tion Pump Test of the No.22 SI Pump, an alert operator observed a fluctuation in suction pressure and shut down the pump. Imme-diate investigation of the cause by the auxiliary building op-erator and Shif t Supervisor (SS) found that the pump casing 1was hot. Further investigation found that manual valve No.2SI-15-4 was closed, isolating minimum flow.
Af ter opening valve No.2SI-15-4 and _ verifying that the No.22 SI pump shaft turned freely by hand, the ' surveillance test was sat-isfactorily completed, verifying that the pump had remained op-erable. The inspector discussed the 2 vent with operating shif t personnel shortly after the event.
He also reviewed plant re-cords and discussed the event with plant Technical Staff and management to determine the cause.
2) Background Review of Plant records determined that the No.22 SI pump had been taken out of service on April 5, 1982 to repack the dis-charge valve. Valve No.2SI-15-4 had been tagged closed to pro-vide isolation for performing the maintenance, in accordance with the Work Request Authorization (VRA) No.E7401-SI-Q. The WRA required prior testing of the No.21 SI pump, which was per-formed. The No.22 SI Pump was demonstrated to be' operable af-ter completion of the maintenance and the isolation had been
" returned to normal status" by the operator on duty.
Review of the test record for SP-2088 that had been performed on April 5, 1982 to demonstrate operability showed that the pump had performed satisfactorily, ' satisfying the criteria of maintaining discharge pressure within acceptance criteria during the prescribed 15 minute operation. However, it was not clear from the portion of the WRA that prescribes the isolation re-quirements, whether valve No.2SI-15-4 had been reopened. The 6/ NUREG-452 Revision 4.
Standard Technical Specifications for Westing-house Pressurized Water Reactors.
7/ NSP Letter to RIII, Reportable Occurrence - No.P-RO-8207, dated May 14, 1982.
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person that had specified the isolation status had not made an entry in the " normal status" column for valve No.2SI-15-4, al-though for all other valves and switches he had identified the
" normal status" as well as the " isolation status".
Discussions with operations personnel could not confirm the "as lef t" sta-tus following the test performed on April 5.
Performance of SP-2088 on May 5 indicated normal operation un-til just before termination of the test (the pump had already been running the required 15 minutes) when the operator stopped the pump. The pump was operated for 19 minutes during the test performed on May 5.
3)
Probable Causes It appears that valve No.2SI-15-4 had remained closed following the maintenance performed on the system on April 5.
The system design does not provide indication of flow through the minimum flow test line nor position indication in the control room for the manual valves. SP-2088 does not currently include verifica-tion of all minimum flow valve positions prior to pump operation.
4) Safety Significance Although lack of a minimum flow path for a SI pump would not affect pump operation during a large break LOCA, it appears that it could cause pump failure if undetected during a small break LOCA, when system pressure may exceed pump discharge pressure. This could cause damage to one of the two redundant pumps.
5)
Licensee Actions to Prevent Recurrence The licensee is considering one or more of several alternatives for assuring that the event will not recur. These include re-vising SP-1088/2088 to require verification of all minimum flow valves prior to pump operation, addition of the valves to the monthly valve position verification checklist and a design change to add flow indication to the minimum flow line.
6) Reportability The licensee initially identified the event as a Significant Operating Event (SOE) requiring investigation by plant manage-ment and reporting the results to the Operations Committee (OC)
and Safety Audit Committee (SAC). On May 25 the OC concluded that the event should be classified as reportable. The licensee plans to report the event to RIII in accordance with TS 6.7.B.2.c.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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9.
Preparation for Refueling The inspectors reviewed all changes to refueling and fuel receipt pro-cedures since the last refueling to insure that technically adequate-approved procedures were available covering the receipt, inspection-and storage of new fuel and the handling and storage of spent fuel.
1The inspectors witnessed portions of the receipt, inspection-and stor-age of new fuel. This included verification of the qualification of fuel receipt inspectors, and verifying compliance with the fuel receipt procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Management Interviews The inspector attended eut exit interview conducted by RIII inspector L. Hueter on May 7, 1982.
The inspector conducted interim interviews during the inspection period and met with Mr. Tierney at the conclusion of the inspection. The in-spector discussed the scope and results of the inspection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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