IR 05000282/1982006

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IE Insp Repts 50-282/82-06 & 50-306/82-06 on 820401-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operation, Maint,Surveillance,Security,Radiation Protection,Procedures, Design Changes & Event Repts
ML20053E919
Person / Time
Site: Prairie Island  Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/28/1982
From: Burgess B, Feierabend C, Reyes L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20053E915 List:
References
50-282-82-06, 50-282-82-6, 50-306-82-06, 50-306-82-6, NUDOCS 8206100208
Download: ML20053E919 (7)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No:

50-282/82-06; 50-306/82-06(DPRP)

Docket No.

50-282; 50-306 License No: DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN 55066 Inspection Conducted: April 1-30,1982 Inspectors:

g C. D.

eierabend I/Mk2

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B. L. Burgess Approved By

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MNL L. A. Reyes, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2C Inspection Summary Inspection on April 1-30, 1982 (Report No. 50-282/82-06; 50-306/82-06(DPRP)

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operation, maintenance, surveillance, security, radiation protection, procedures, design changes and event reports. The inspection involved a total of 122 inspector hours on-site by 2 NRC inspectors including 15 inspector hours onsite during off-shif ts.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

8206100200 820028

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gDRADOCK 05000282 PDR

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DETAILS 1.

Personnel Contacted

  • F.

Tierney, Plant Manager J. Brokaw, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance E. Watzl, Plant S sperintendent, Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection

  • A.

Huns tad, Staf f Engineer R. Lindsey, Superintendent, Operations J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance D. Mendele, Superintendent, Operations Engineer J. Hof fman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering M. Klee, Superintendent, Nuclear Engineering C. Harmsen, Plant Engineering and Construction, Project Manager E. Sabiatis, Project Engineer G. Lenertz, Engineer G. Miller, Engineer B. Frazer, Engineer R. Hansen, Quality Control Engineer G. Rolfson, Quality Control Engineer B. Held, Shif t Supervisor G. Edon, Shif t Supervisor P. Ryan, Shift Supervisor M. Balk, Shif t Supervisor T. Goetsch, Shif t Supervisor R. Holthe, Shif t Supervisor D. Walker, Shift Supervisor P. Valtakis, Shif t Supervisor

  • Attended exit interview.

2.

Operations Safety Verification a.

General Unit 1 operated routinely throughout the month except for a short period of time on 4/24/82 when power was reduced to 20% to allow access to add oil to the No.12 reactor coolant pump.

Unit 2 operated routinely throughout the month.

b.

Control Room Observations

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i The inspector observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and observ-ed shift turnovers. The inspector verified the operability of sel-ected emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified the proper return to service of affected components.

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c.

Tours Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings, Unit 1 containment and external areas were conducted to observe plant equipment con-ditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that main-tenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3.

Maintenance a.

Review of Work Request (WR') and Work Request Authorization (WRA's)

The inspector selected end reviewed several WR's and WRA's to de-termine the status of safety related systems, to verify that proper priorities were given and to verify that design changes were initi-ated where appropriare.

b.

Observations The inspectors observed portions of safety related maintenance ac-tivities to determine that the activities did not violate limiting conditions for operatica (LCO's), that administrative approvals and equipment control tags were completed prior to initiating the work, that approved procedures were used (or activity was within the " skills of the trade"), that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that proper QA/QC controls were used.

Maintenance activities witnessed included:

1)

D-1 Diesel Generator Turbo Charger Oil Leak.

The work was completed satisfactorily. After repair, the D-1 diesel generator was surveillance tested for operability prior to returning it to service.

2) Repair of No.23 Faa Coil Cooling Water Return Valve MV-32154.

The inspector observed maintenance activities during disassembly and repair of the valve. The valve had been observed to be chat-tering excessively, although was fully operable during stroke tests. Upon disassembly. the valve stem was found separated from the valve plug. Cause for the broken stem was attributed to the vibrational forces experienced by the valve stem when the valve is throttled. This valve has previously experienced similar failures.

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The broken stem was replaced and the valve reassembled, cycled to prove operability and returned to service.

The inspector reviewed the completed work request WRA-F1719-CL-Q and verified documentation of the repairs.

The licensee is investigating a permanent change to eliminate the problem. Possible solutions are to install an orifice in each FCV return line to limit flow without valve throttling or to replace the return valve with a valve designed to perform flow throttling under the installed conditions.

(3) Addition of 011 to No. 12 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP).

The inspector observed a Unit 1 containment entry during power operation to add oil to No. 12 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) in response to a control board annunciation indicating RCP low oil level. The inspector observed that preparations for entry into the high radiation area included planning for minimizing exposure. Surveys were taken by a health physics technician to verify radiation levels prior to job start. Approximately 3 gallons of oil were added to the pump lower motor bearing. Temperatures of the motor stator and casing did not indicate abnormal operation before or after addition of the oil.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4.

Surveillance The inspector witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety related systems and components. The inspection included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specifica-tion requirements, observing that procedures were being followed by qualified operators, that LCO's were not violated, that system and equipment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.

Tests witnessed included:

a.

SP-1100

  1. 12 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Surveillance Test.

Test is performed monthly to verify operability of motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump for Unit 1.

Test was pcrformed satisfactorily.

b.

SP-1158 Cooling Water Valves Test.

The test is performed quarterly as required by Technical Specifications. During the per-formance of the test, two valves (MV-32154 and MV-32136) were identified as requiring additional-4-

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investigation in order to determine if maintenance was required. A work request was written for MV-32136 to repair a suspected leaking valve seat. MV-32154 was annotated on the surveillance procedure to indi-cate that the valve remote shut indication would 11-luminate before full valve plug travel was completed in the shut direction. The test was completed and reviewed by the Shift Supervisor. The test was de-termined to be satisfactory, c.

S P-11066a

  1. 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Test.

Test was performed prior to removal of D-2 Diesel Generator from service for maintenance as required by Technical Specifications. Test was performed satisfactorily.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

5.

Procedures The inspector reviewed selected procedures in the areas of startup and operation of safety related systems, abnormal condition procedures, emergency procedures, maintenance procedures and administrative proce-dures to verify that review and approval was in accordance with Techni-cal Specification requirements and that technical content was adequate.

The licensee has completed alarm response procedures for all annunciators.

The procedures are available in the control room for operator use. The procedures are organized by annunciator designations. Discussions with operations personnel indicate that the procedures are being reviewed to recommend ways of quickly identifying and relating the appropriate pro-cedure in response to a specific alarm.

The inspector reviewed the status of all temporary procedures and Spec-ial Orders issued during the past y2 ar and confirmed compliance with Technical Specification (TS) review and approval requirements. The in-spector reviewed TS Amendments to assure that appropriate procedure changes had been made.

In response to a RIII request the inspector aanfirmed that the licensee's procedures adequately verified oil level in the diesel generator gc,vernors.

This was in response to a possible generic problem identified at another facility.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

6.

Design Change Review The inspector reviewed selected design changes to assure that design changes had been reviewed and approved and implemented in accordance with Regulatory Requirements, Technical Specifications, and established-5-(

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QA/QC controls. During the review the inspector identified an apparent weakness in tg7 control of design chaq; es other than weaknesses previous-ly described.-

The weakness identified involved the preparation and dissemination of training material as part of the design change package.

Administrative Control Directive 5 ACD 6.1 which implements Power Pro-duction Directive 3 ACD 4.1, Design Changa Control, requires in Section 5.9 that the Responsible Engineer shall prepare training material and assure that af fected plant staff personnel are appropriately trained rel-ative to assigned Design Changes prior to placing the affected system, components and structures in an operable status.

Implementation of this requirement is contained in Design Change Control Form No. 3-3016-1, Re-vision 3, which is reviewed by the Responsible Engineer prior to design change approval.

If training is deemed necessary by the Responsible Engineer, or as part of the design change approval process, Design Change Control Form No. 3-3017-10, Revision 2, is completed to indicate the training required.

Of the various design change packages reviewed by the inspector, Design Change Nos. 80L585, 80L589, 81L663, and 80Y149 Part 3 required training.

The inspector reviewed the training files to determine that training mat-erial related to these design changes had been submitted to the training department. The inspector found that the form of training material was either a handwritten note briefly describing the design change and the purpose for the design change or a copy of the design change package sum-mary description and safety evaluation.

In one instance, DC81L663, Re-moval of CV-31591 (Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank Pump Bypass Valve),

training was listed in the design change package, but no training material had reached the training department at the time of the inspection. The design change had been completed, with the exception of drawing changes.

Actual significance of removal of the valve on systems operation was min-imal as the valve was not used for operation but had been listed on a checklisq always remaining open.

In some cases it was not apparent when a design change had been luplemented and made operational.

Discussion held with cognizant operations and training personnel con-firmed that currently there is no mechanism to assure that appropriate training relative to design changes is accomplished prior to placing an affected system, component or structure in an operable status. Without such a mechanism the possibility exists that design changes could be completed and made ope rable prior to the necessary training performed to operate a system safely.

The inspector discussed this with licensee plant and corporate QA per-sonnel and during the exit interview. The licensee acknowledged the in-spection comments and will consider various means for improvements in a planned revision to the design change procedure.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

1/ IE Inspection Report No. 50-282/82-04; 50-306/82-04(DPRP)

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a,. rnte 1 The licensee routinely compare measured boron concentration with the predicted value in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.

During February the comparison indicated that the boron concentrations were higher than predicted, and during March it became apparent that there was sufficient divergence that the difference might continue to the equivalent of one percent reactivity, requiring an evaluation and reporting. The licensee has communicated with the fuel vendor and pre-11minary information indicates that the probable cause is a faster de-pletion rate of gadolinium for the last new fuel (40 assemblies inserted for Cycle 7) than was predicted.

Comparison of the measured boron level with predicted level on 4/23/82 did indicate a difference of approximately one percent in reactivity.

The licensee submitted a prompt report (P-RO-82-06) in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.

Licensee nuclear engineering staff has discussed the anomaly with NRR project and fuel cycle personnel. The inspector will follow resolution during followup of the Event Report.

No items of noncompliance were ident ified.

8.

Exit Interview The inspector conducted interim interviews during the inspection period and met with Mr. Tierney and members of his staf f, as identified in Par-agraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection.

The inspector discussed the scope and results of the inspection. The inspector stated that this inspection completed the annual review of design changes and that an additional weakness was identified concerning the training associated with implementing a design change. Also it was not always apparent from the record when a design change or af fected component was turned over to plant operations. The inspector stated that these items would be reviewed during followup of previously identi-fied weaknesses.

The licensee stated that a revision to the design change directive is in progress, and that these items will also be considered during future revisions and in implementing procedures.

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