IR 05000280/1994027
| ML18153B130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/24/1994 |
| From: | Belisle G, Branch M, David Kern, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B129 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-94-27, 50-281-94-27, NUDOCS 9411070101 | |
| Download: ML18153B130 (14) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos. : 50-280/94-27 and 50-281/94-27 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
- .*Jns~ection Conducted:
September 3 through October 1, 1994 Inspectors:
A:W: Branch, Senior Resident Inspector S. G. Tingen, Resident Inspector D. M. Kern, Resident Inspector Accompanying Personnel:
D. M. Tamai, NRC Intern Approved by: ~j ;J.~
(§'
G.~. Beljsle~ef Reactor Projects Section 2A Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
/0--;..r~ ry Date Signed
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Date Signed
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Date.Signed I tJ/z_f#.4-Dat'e Signed This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant status, operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance inspections, onsite engineering review, annual emergency exercise, Licensee Event Report followup and action on previous inspection item Inspections of backshift activities were conducted on September 6, 12, 19, 26 and 29, 1994.
1iJ1070101 941024 G
ADOcK osooo2ao
Results:
When cleaning a component cooling water heat exchanger, personnel were very sensitive to foreign material exclusion controls. However, inadequate heat exchanger draining during maintenance activities resulted in rework (paragraph 4.1).
The maintenance associated with 1-SW-PCV-IOOA was satisfactorily accomplished, the mechanics performing the maintenance were well trained and procedures were followed. Scheduling and planning for all maintenance activities associated with the A main control room chiller were good (paragraph 4.2).
An operator entered a quarterly containment spray pump test at a place other than he had been instructed. This weakness was considered as an isolated occurrence (paragraph 4.3).
,*
Operators demonstrated detailed knowledge of emergency diesel generator (EOG)
.. proc*edures and system design during required periodic testing. Procedures
- were generally of high quality. The decision to secure the EOG prior to troubleshooting a bound breaker control switch demonstrated a conservative safety perspective. Operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel effectively coordinated their efforts to minimize the time that the number 2 EOG was unavailable {paragraph 4.4).
Maintenance activities associated with repairing fuel oil transfer pump 1-EE-P-IE were satisfactorily accomplished. Maintenance transmittals and skill of the craft were utilized to perform the majority of this maintenance
{paragraph 4.4).
The safety evaluation associated with injecting leak sealant into the Unit IC steam generator lower handhold cover gasket area addressed the appropriate issue The Station Nuclear Safety And Operating Committee's safety evaluation review was good {paragraph 5).
Operators properly responded to the drill scenario presented by the annual emergency exercise. Drill emergency classifications were properly mad Emergency facilities were properly staffed and communications were goo The recently installed radio system improved drill communication The licensee was very critical when evaluating the conduct of the exercise. Concerns identified during the exercise were listed in the emergency exercise critique results {paragraph 6).
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- H. Blake, Jr., Superintendent of Nuclear Site Services
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Maintenance D. Boone, Quality Assurance
- D. Christian, Station Manager
- J. Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection
- B. Garber, Licensing B. Hayes, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- D. Hayes, Superintendent of Administrative Services
- A. Keagy, Nuclear Materials
- C. Luffman, Superintendent, Security
- J. McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager
- G. Miller, Corporate Licensing A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- S. Sarver, Superintendent of Operations
- R. Saunders, Vice President, Nuclear Operations K. Sloane, Operations
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- D. Sommers, Corporate Licensing
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- B. Stanley, Supervisor, Station Procedures
- J. Swientoniewski, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety G. Thompson, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering E. Turko, Engineering G. Woodzell, Nuclear Training Other licensee employees contacted included plant managers and supervisors, operators, engineers, technicians, mechanics, security force members, and office personne.2 NRC Personnel
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Kern, Resident Inspector D. Tamai, Intern
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2 Plant Status Units 1 and 2 operated at power for the entire inspection perio.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
3.1 Biweekly ESF Inspections 3.1.1 Unit 1 CS System The inspectors walked down the Unit 1 CS system in the safeguards building and the RWST and CAT in the RC Grading work in the RCA required maintenance to dig in the area surrounding the RWST and CA The inspectors observed that maintenance personnel were taking appropriate caution to prevent damage to exposed piping and electrical condui Correct valve alignments, control room indications and breaker positions, and proper housekeeping and labeling were verified.. Overall equipment condition was adequat.1.2 Unit 2 AFW System The inspectors walked down the three AFW pumps located in the safeguards building following maintenance on TDAFW pump 2-FW-P-Proper valve and breaker alignments were verified, and control room indications were observed to be prope The equipment appeared to be in good overall condition and housekeeping was adequat Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance and Surveillance Inspections (62703, 61726)
Maintenance and surveillance activities were observed and reviewed to verified that activities were conducted in accordance with TSs and approved procedures and licensee commitments to regulatory guides, industry codes and standard.1 CC Heat Exchanger Cleaning On September 8 and 9, the inspectors observed personnel performing O-MCM-0812-01, BC and CC Heat Exchanger Cleaning, revision 0, for heat exchanger 1-CC-E-l FME and tag out records were reviewe In accordance with the work order, the tube scrapers (purple Goodway scrapers) were counted before and after the cleaning. All the Goodway scrapers were accounted for. After the cleaning, 37 green Cenco scrapers were also foun The extra scrapers were attributed to being left in the heat exchanger during previous cleanings prior to positive FME controls being establishe DR S-94-1726 was initiated to address the even The inspectors noted that the previous cleaning occurred near the time FME violation 50-280, 281/94-17-02 was issue *
During the cleaning, the inspectors verified the tag out. The SW outlet valve was required closed by the tag out but was partially ope When the inspectors questioned the tagout, they were informed that it was a generic tagout for several jobs and that a partial clearance was always performed to open the valve for drainag However, the outlet valve was not opened enough for sufficient drainage to remove the sludge lancing debris. This debris settled out and plugged the tubes in the bottom portion of the heat exchanger. These tubes were required to be recleane During the CC heat exchanger cleaning, personnel were very sensitive to FME control. However, inadequate draining of the heat exchanger during the maintenance activities resulted in rewor This issue was discussed with the superviso.2 1-SW-PCV-lOOA Diaphragm Inspection On September 13 and 14 the inspectors witnessed PM on the air operator for the AA chiller condenser SW outlet PCV 1-SW-PCV-lOO The PM was performed in accordance with WO 295530-01, procedure O-MCM-0414-03, Copes-Vulcan Model *D-100-40, D-100-60 and D-100-100 Control Valve Overhaul, revision 1, and ICP-l-SW-V-100, Service Water Pressure Control Valves lOOA, 1008, lOOC, 101A, 1018 and I01C, revision The inspectors witnessed removal, inspection and reinstallation of the air operator's diaphragm, valve stroke adjustment, air-operator spring adjustment and packing adjustmen The inspectors reviewed the PMT requirements which required that the valve be stroke time tested in accordance with O-OPT-VS-001, Control Room Air Conditioning System Pump and Valve Inservice Test, revision The inspectors reviewed the results of procedure O-OPT-VS-001, that was performed on September 15, and verified that 1-SW-PCV-IOOA was satisfactorily stroke tested following the maintenanc The inspectors concluded that the maintenance associated with 1-SW-PCV-IOOA was satisfactorily accomplished, mechanics performing the maintenance were well trained, and procedures were followe The inspectors noted that this maintenance required that the A MCR chiller be isolated and that the appropriate TS LCO was entere Numerous other maintenance activities associated with the A chiller were also performed during this perio The SW condenser side of the chiller was rodded out and cleaned, SW check valve l-SW-316 was replaced, a thermostat in the chiller control circuit was replaced and the diaphragm on PCV 1-SW-PCV-IOIA was also replaced. Scheduling and planing for the maintenance activities associated with the A MCR chiller were good, in that, all related maintenance activities associated with this component were accomplished in the same component outage.
- Unit 2 Containment Spray Quarterly Test On September 19, the inspectors witnessed the quarterly performance testing of the CS pumps and system MOVs in accordance with 2-0PT-CS-002, Containment Spray System Test, revision O and 2-PT-19.1, RWST Chemical Addition Tank and Containment Spray System MOVs, revision The CS spray test was also used to return pump, 2-CS-P-18, to service after maintenanc While performing 2-0PT-CS-002 for the 18 pump, the inspectors noticed that four earlier steps had not been performe Four valves had to be opened or verified ope One valve 2-CS-18, RWST recirculation inlet header, required a change of positio When questioned, the operator checked the procedure and realized that he had entered the procedure at a different place than he had been instructe He returned the lineup to the original condition and performed the steps. If this valve had not been opened, the CS pump recirculation flow path to the RWST would have been through a 1.5-inch line instead of both the 4-inch and 1.5-inch line. The inspectors concluded it was an operator error and informed the shift supervisor. The shift supervisor indicated that the operator would be counsele On September 27, DR S-94-1811 was submitte The inspectors reviewed the DR and determined that appropriate corrective actions were take The inspectors considered this weakness as an isolated occurrence. Emergency Diesel Generator Surveillance Testing The licensee performed surveillance tests 2-0PT-EG-001, Number 2 EOG Monthly Start Exercise Test, revision 5, 2-0PT-EG-005, Number 2 EOG Fuel Oil System Tests, revision 4, and 2-0SP-EG-6.1, Number 2 EOG Lube Oil and Cooling Water Sampling, revision 1, to demonstrate operability of the number 2 EOG and supporting components as required by T The inspectors observed the pre-evolution briefing, equipment lineup verifications, and portions of the surveillance tests to assess the licensee's knowledge and conduct of EOG testing. Test precautions were appropriately highlighted during the pre-evolution brief. The inspectors discussed methods of EOG performance verification and the purpose of selected procedural steps with operators during performance of the surveillance. Operators demonstrated detailed knowledge of the test procedures and EOG system desig The EOG room operator noted that cooling water expansion tank level stabilized slightly below the normal operating band following the EOG start. The operator promptly inspected the EOG room, identified no visible indication of coolant leakage, and notified the control room of this abnormal conditio Lube oil and EOG component temperatures remained norma The Unit 2 SRO contacted the EOG system engineer for assistance. The system engineer verified that recent oil analysis did not indicate the presence of water intrusion and that coolant chemistry was adequate to support a direct addition of water to the expansion
tan The inspectors noted that the licensee did not have a procedure to restore expansion tank level during EDG operatio However, the Unit 2 SRO and system engineer coordinated effectively to assure proper cooling water quality and personnel safety were maintained during restoration of expansion tank leve The inspectors independently confirmed that the post addition coolant water chemistry was within specification as documented in procedure 2-0SP-EG-The inspectors reviewed the above listed surveillance procedures and noted them to be of generally high quality. The inspectors questioned whether operators have sufficient guidance available for prompt restoration of EDG cooling water expansion tank level during occasions when the system engineer is not available for consultation. This item and minor procedure inconsistencies were discussed with the system engineer and operations personne The licensee agreed to review and revise procedures as necessar Operators continued the surveillance following restoration of cooling water expansion tank leve When attempting to place an electrical load on the EDG, the control switch for the EDG output breaker bound in the pull-to-lock position. The system engineer informed the Unit 2 SRO that attempts to further manipulate a degraded control switch with the EDG in operation had the potential to place the EDG out-of-phase onto the emergency bu Operators secured the EDG and initiated a priority one work request to identify and correct the cause of the bound control switc The licensee's decision to secure the EDG immediately rather than attempt cycling the control switch with the EDG in operation demonstrated a conservative safety perspectiv The inspectors reviewed and discussed the maintenance work order with the electrical maintenance superviso The work order provided sufficient flexibility for technicians to identify the cause of the control switch binding and accomplish the repair without necessitating intrusive switch disassembly. Control switch binding was attributed to a degraded switch cover plate. A component failure analysis was in progress at the close of this report period. The cover plate was replaced and operators cycled the switch by hand freely with no indication of further bindin The work order was completed in a timely manner and surveillance 2-0PT-EG-001 was performed successfully as a post maintenance tes During performance of procedure 2-0PT-EG-005, fuel oil transfer pump 1-EE-P-IE, failed to meet acceptance criteria for adequate pump flow rate. The procedure specified a minimum flow rate of 7.6 GP A flow rate of 7.4 GPM was obtained during the tes The pump was declared inoperable and the appropriate TS action statement was entere The inspectors witnessed the overhaul of the fuel oil transfer pump and also witnessed the installation of
the pump following overhaul. This maintenance was accomplished in accordance with WO 298297, procedure MCM-0134-02, Hydrex II Pump Mechanical Seal Replacement, revision 1, and a maintenance transmitta After the pump was disassembled mechanics identified that the internal gear clearances were excessive which resulted in reduced flow output. Components were machined to obtain the correct clearances and the pump was reassemble The inspectors noted that mechanics used skill of the craft and a maintenance transmittal in lieu of a procedure to overhaul the pum The inspectors concluded this maintenance activity was satisfactorily accomplishe The inspectors walked down the EDG fuel oil transfer system when pump 1-EE-P-lE was removed and verified that the system was properly isolated and that FME covers were installed over system opening The inspectors noted that with the fuel oil transfer pump removed the fuel oil piping was not supported and would easily move when agitated by han The suction piping to EDG fuel oil transfer pumps 1-EE-P-lD and F, which were operable, could also be move The inspectors concluded that this piping was required to withstand a seismic event and questioned whether the piping met seismic acceptance criteria with 1-EE-P-lE removed.
The licensee evaluated this condition via a seismic analysis computer program and concluded that the fuel oil transfer piping was capable of withstanding a seismic event with the pump remove Following pump reinstallation, the fuel oil transfer piping could not be move The pump was tested in accordance with 2-0PT-EG-005 and an acceptable flow rate of 8.3 GPM was obtaine Operators successfully demonstrated the number 3 EDG operable as required by TS 3.16.B.1 during the period in which the number 2 EDG was inoperable for repair of the fuel oil transfer pum The number 2 EDG was returned to service at 11:36 pm on September 2 The inspectors concluded that operations, engineering, and maintenance personnel effectively coordinated their efforts to minimize the time that the number 2 EDG was unavailabl Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Onsite Engineering Review {37551)
Review of SE for Temporary Leak Sealant Repair On September 6 a steam leak was repaired on the Unit 1 C SG lower handhold cove Every other bolt securing the *handhold cover to the SG was removed one at a time and replaced with a stud and special capnu The outer portion of the flange was wrapped with wire and a leak sealant compound was injected into the flange area via each stud/capnut assembly. Safety Evaluation 94-166, Leak Seal 1-RC-E-lC Handhold, dated September 1, 1994, concluded that this repair method did not create an*
- unreviewed safety question. The inspectors reviewed SE 94-166 and attended the SNSOC meeting that approved this S The inspectors concluded that the SE addressed the appropriate issues in that stress analysis for the bolting material and wire wrap were performed, amount of compound injected was limited, and the effect of radiation on the leak sealant was analyze The SE was approved by SNSOC with no change The SNSOC review of the SE was considered good, in that, the method of temporary leak repair was thoroughly evaluate Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Annual Emergency Exercise (82301)
The inspectors observed the annual emergency exercise conducted on September 21, and also attended post exercise critiques. Activities in the CRS, TSC, LEOF, OSC and HP area were observe The inspectors monitored the beginning of the exercise scenario from the CR Operators properly responded to the scenario. The SS/SEM and STA properly classified the scenario as an Alert when conditions warrante The turnover between SS/SEM and Assistant Station Manger to assume the SEM position was thorough. * Al though the exercise scenario simulated an event occurring in Unit 1, an individual operator was assigned as the Unit 2 CR During the scenario, the third RO assisted the Unit 1 CRO at the control board and the Unit 2 CRO assumed the primary responsibility of the third R The inspectors noted that during an actual event, the Unit 2 CRO would not be available to assume the responsibilities of the third RO and an extra licensed operator would be required to fill the position of the third R This issue was discussed with the licensee who stated that extra licensed personnel are assigned to each shift in order to provide additional support when require This issue was listed as a comment on the emergency exercise critique result The TSC was promptly staffed and the Site Area and General Emergency event classifications were properly mad Damage control team tasks were prioritized as the TSC staff properly responded to the exercis The inspectors noted that at one point in the scenario 10 CFR 50.54(x)
was invoked when the initial conditions of a procedure could not be met and were wave The licensee's basis for implementing 10 CFR 50.54(x)
was that TSs require that procedures be followed and that deviating from procedural requirements resulted in deviating from TS requirements and therefore, required that 10 CFR 50.54(x) be invoke The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.54(x} and concluded that the licensee interpretation regarding procedure compliance was extremely conservative. However, when 10 CFR 50.54(x) is implemented, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(i)(B) requires that a one-hour report to the NRC be mad No report was simulated during the exercise. This concern was listed as a comment on the emergency exercise critique result Communications between the Recovery Manager and state and local officials in the LEOF were noted to be goo During the scenario, the
wind direction was predicted to chang Personnel in the LEOF were prepared for the change in wind direction and promptly expanded the area that required evacuation/shelter when a change in wind direction occurre Operations in OSC were good and well organized. Status updates were held frequently and were communicated to all maintenance personne Adequate pre-job and post-job briefs were held for damage control task Proper emphasis was placed on communications with the damage control team The operations information link assisted in expediting planning of damage control task The inspectors attended the post drill critique conducted in the LEOF and OS The inspectors also attended the post drill critique conducted by the exercise observer The inspectors noted that personnel were encouraged to express any problems encountered. Several comments were received. The licensee's exercise observers thoroughly reviewed these comments and identified additional issues and comments pertaining to the drill. The exercise objectives and issues and comments were thoroughly discussed, recorded and presented to managemen The inspectors concluded that the licensee was very critical when evaluating the co~duct of the emergency exercis During the drill, the inspectors observed the licensee utilize the new trunked radio system that was recently installed. Each organizational group (operations, HP, chemistry and maintenance) had communication within its own group and to the main system hu Each group could not communicate directly with each other on independent channels (i.e. the OSC could not communicate by radio to HP or security). This reduced the amount of unwanted information to all groups and allowed each group to remain focused on their team member The inspectors observed the use of the new radio system in the OS With the exception of the damage control teams assigned to the emergency switchgear rooms, communications with the damage control teams were very good overall. Radio checks were conducted after leaving the OSC and frequent status check-ins were utilize At one point in the drill, there were three damage control teams assigned independent tasks in the ESG Because of the electrical equi,pment in the ESGR, radios were not a 11 owed to be use The inspectors noted that the three damage control teams were communicating with the OSC via one station telephon The teams were congregating around the telephone to receive further instructions from the OS This observation was provided to the licensee and was added as a comment to the emergency exercise critique result Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9 Licensee Event Report Followup (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below and evaluated the adequacy of the corrective action. The inspectors' review also included followup of the licensee's corrective action implementatio.1 (Closed) LER 50-280, 281/93-007-00, Portions of the Turbine Trip Inputs to the Reactor Protection System Were Performed Outside the TS Required Time Frames During Previous Outage TS table 4.1-1, item 28 requires that turbine trip inputs to reactor protection be functionally tested prior to each startup. During a review of TS surveillance implementation, the licensee identified that this testing was being accomplished after a unit was on line in lieu of prior to each startup. As corrective action, procedure 1/2 IPT-RP-TM-001, Turbine Trip Signal Input to Reactor Protection System Functional Test, was developed to provide instructions for testing these components prior to startup. The inspectors reviewed performance copies of l/2-IPT-RP-TM-001 dated March 22, May 12 and June 2.2, 1994, and verified that the turbine trip inputs to reactor protection were functionally tested prior to
- each Unit 1 and 2 startup performed in 199.2 (Closed) LER 50-280, 281/93-007-01, Missed Surveillance Due to Failure to Test One Contact of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Low-Low Steam Generator Auto Start Logi TS table 4.1-1, item 3 requires that the SG water low-low level instrumentation channels for AFW pump auto-start be calibrated during each RF During a review of TS surveillance implementation, the licensee identified that Unit 2 procedures did not test the A/C SG level combinatio As a result, a contact.i.n the,.;start matrix was not being teste Unit 1 procedures fully tested the channe As immediate corrective action a 24-hour LCO was entered and exited after the circuit was properly tested. The inspectors reviewed 2-0PT-FW-012, SG Low-Low Level Test, revision 0, and verified that the procedure was updated to provide instructions for testing the SG low-low A/C combination that opens the steam admission valves to the TDAFW pum The inspectors also discussed this issue with the supervisor of station procedures who now is required to review all procedure changes on a daily basis to ensure that procedure changes for one unit are evaluated and implemented for the other unit when require.3 (Closed) LER 50-280, 281/93-007-02, Missed Surveillance Due to Not Performing Auxiliary Feed Water Channel Check Prior to Certain Startup TS table 4.1-2, item 1, requires that the AFW flow rate channels be checked prior to each startup if not done within the previous wee During a review of TS surveillance implementation, the licensee identified that AFW flow channel checks were not performed prior to startup when the unit was not initially in a cold shutdown conditio When this condition was identified, Unit 1 was in cold shutdown and Unit 2 was in hot shutdown so no immediate corrective action was require The inspectors reviewed
- 1/2-GOP-l.4, Unit Startup from Hot Shutdown to 2% Power, revision 10, for Unit 1 and revision 9 for Unit 2, and verified that the procedures were revised to require AFW flow instrument channel checks be performed prior to startu The three LERs discussed above were identified by the licensee during their corrective action review of TS surveillance testing. This project was discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-280/94-24 and 50-281/94-2 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Action on Previous Inspection Items (92702)
(Closed) URI 50-280, 281/92-15-01, Lack of Formal UFSAR Update Process for Non-Plant Type Modifications or Changes That Occur On or Around The Facility. This item resulted from the NRC's review of the licensee's evaluation of environmental changes around the site (Tl 2515/112).
The fo 11 owing i terns were re.viewed:
The adequacy of the licensee's program in evaluating health and safety issues resulting from changes in population distribution, industrial facilities, military activity, or transportation hazards that arise on or near the sit Documentation of changes in population distribution, industrial faci 1 it i es, military activity, or transportation hazards that occur on or near the site in updates to the UFSA The results of that inspection determined that the licensee had no formal program to routinely review changing population distribution or new hazards created by demographic changes around the facility. The licensee also did not routinely update site information contained in chapter 2 of the UFSA The inspection als~ identified two hazards that were not adequately addressed in the UFSA Since identification of the above items by the NRC, Virginia Power has developed a formal program to perform periodic reviews of UFSAR sections that are not routinely changed by plant modifications. Procedure VPAP-2803, Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Management, revision 0, was developed and contains instructions in section 6.2.6 to perform the section review The inspectors reviewed this procedure and held discussions with project management as to details of these periodic review The inspectors were provided a Level II schedule for the UFSAR Improvement Project. This project has completed the review and update of UFSAR chapter 2 which was reissued in revision 22, dated April 199 The inspectors reviewed this revised chapter and determined it adequately resolved the two hazards identified in the URI associated with air traffic and the onsite combustion turbine Remaining reviews and overall project completion is currently being scheduled and
- personnel are being assigned. The licensee elected to have the corporate licensing group maintain the UFSAR with engineering assistance being requested as neede Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 5, 1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results addressed in the Summary section and those listed belo Item Number LER 50-280, 281/93-007-00 LER 50-280, 281/93-007-01 LER 50-280, 281/93-007-02 URI 50-280, 281/92-15-01 Status Closed Closed Closed Closed Description/(Paraqraph No.}
Portions of the Turbine Trip Inputs to the Reactor Protection System Were Performed Outside the TS Required Time Frames During Previous Outages
{paragraph 7.1).
Missed Surveillance Due to Failure to Test One Contact of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Low-Low Steam Generator Auto Start Logic {paragraph 7.2).
Missed Surveillance Due to Not Performing Auxiliary Feed Water Channel Check Prior to Certain Startups
{paragraph 7.3).
Lack of Formal UFSAR Update Process for Non-Plant Type Modifications or Changes That Occur On or Around The Facility {paragraph 8).
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms AFW AUXILIARY FEEDWATER BC BEARING COOLING CAT CHEMICAL ADDITION TANK CC COMPONENT COOLING CFR CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS CRO CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR
.
.. __..
.....
- .
- ,.
CRS CONTROL ROOM SIMULATOR CS CONTAINMENT SPRAY DR DEVIATION REPORT EOG EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ESGR EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM ESF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE FME FOREIGN MATERIAL EXCLUSION GPM GALLONS PER MINUTE HP HEALTH PHYSICS LCO LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION LEOF LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY LER LICENSEE EVENT REPORT MCR MAIN CONTROL ROOM MOV MOTOR OPERATED VALVE NRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OSC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER PCV PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PM PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PMT POST MAINTENANCE TEST RFO REFUELING OUTAGE RCA RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL AREA RO REACTOR OPERATOR RWST REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK SE SAFETY EVALUATION SEM STATION EMERGENCY MANAGER SG STEAM GENERATOR SNSOC STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE SRO SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR SS SHIFT SUPERVISOR STA SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR 1; SW SERVICE WATER TDAFW TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TI TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION TS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TSC TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UFSAR UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT URI UNRESOLVED ITEM WO WORK ORDER