IR 05000280/1994025
| ML18153B068 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1994 |
| From: | Casto C, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B067 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-94-25, 50-281-94-25, NUDOCS 9409160301 | |
| Download: ML18153B068 (18) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos.:
50-280/94-25 and 50-281/94-25 Licensee:
Virginia Electric & Power Company 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Inspection Conduct~d:
~ugust 22 ~
1994
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Inspector:---f.:.,o~-'---.*'*:.--£:---+-:;---+*-=~=--=-.::
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Approved by :----'-=~--~~
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C. Casto, Chief 76/ft(
Date 'Signed Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of* Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine announced inspection was conducted in the areas of engineering and technical support activities, design changes and plant modifications, and follow-up on p~evious inspection finding Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie The inspection resulted in the following assessments:
Engineering organization and staffing levels were adequate to perform the assigned duties and responsibilities - Paragraph Engineering personnel with SRO/STA training and work experience in the nuclear industry, especially personnel. in the System Engineering group, were considered positive attributes - Paragraph
.2. Resources and management attention were being focused to control the engineering backlog - Paragraph bAOD030cl 6~~80 PDR PDR G
-**
.
Engineering's response to the resolution of problems for the supported of reliable plant operations was effective - Paragraph Engineering provided adequate and timely support to maintenance and operations for day-to-day activities and emergent issue Communication with interfacing organizations was good - Paragraph A strong program was provided for the review, prioritization and scheduling of plant modifications which emphasizes nuclear and personnel safety - Paragraph The control, review and installation bf Temporary Modifications were effective. Only three active Temporary Modffications were in effect - Paragraph Controls for updating and maintaining critical drawings were adequate - Paragraph 3.c.
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- J. Downs, Superintendent, Outage and Planning
- W. Harrell, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering D. Hayes, Supervisor Administrative Services
- R. Hayes, Supervisor, Quality Assurance T. Huber, Supervisor, ISi, NOE, and Engineering Programs M. Kansler, Station Manager
- R. MacManus, Supervisor~ System Engineering
- J~ McCarthy, Superintendent, Operations W. Mccloskey, Supervisor, Mechanical Design W. Miles, Supervisor, Quality Assurance J. Price, Assistant Station Manager R. Saunders, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- V. Shifflett, Engineer, Licensing
- T. Sowers, Superintendent Engineering E. Turko, Supervisor, Test Engineering and Design Control Other li~ensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, QA petsonnel, craftsmen, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- D. Tamai, Resident Inspector (Intern)
- Attended exit meeting Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Engineering and Technical Support Activities (37550) Organization, Staffing, and Training The inspector reviewed the licen~ee's organization and staffing to determine whether the engineering organization was adequately staffed to provide effective engineering support to the plan Procedure VPAP-0301, Design Change Process (Rev 3, 1/17/94),
established the interfaces among the licensee's organizations and defined the controls necessary to ensure safe implementation of design changes at the Surry Statio Engineering and technical support were provided by both onsite and corporate organization *
The Nuclear Engineering organization was comprised of five departments which reported via managers to the Vice President Nuclear Engineering Services (NES).
- Station Engineering was part of NES and reported through the Manager Nuclear Engineering to the Vice President NE Normal day-to-day onsite support was mainly provided by Station Engineering which included:
three Onsite Design Engineering Sections (Mechanical, Electrical and Civil) with three supervisors, 16 degreed engineers and eight technicians; two*
System Engineering Sections (Primary Systems and Secondary Systems) with two supervisors and 28 degreed engineers; Engineering Testing Section with one.supervisor, one degreed engineer and 13 technicians; ISI-NDE Engineering Section with one supervisor, seven degreed engineers and.six technicians; and a Procurement Engineering Section with one supervisor, seven engineers and two technicians. The total current staffing of the
~ngineering organization met the authorized staffing for 1994;
- however, by 1997, seven engineering positions were proposed to be eliminated through attritio *
The licensee advised the inspector that the Nuclear Engineering organization had performed practically all of the recent plant design changes at Surr The design changes for the core up-rate project which was currently in process was essentially the only design change that had been performed by an A/E contractor. The licensee considered the existing staffing adequate to perform the required plant suppor Practically all future design changes were anticipated to continue to be performed in-house by the licensee'~ engineering staf The inspector also reviewed the training and qualification of the engineering organization. All engineering and technical personnel were required to participate in the site engineering and technical support training program. This program included engineering and operational training in nuclear plant systems, theory, codes and standards, and event assessment and root cause evaluation techniques. All of this training, or equivalent training, was required to be completed within two years of being assigned to an engineering or technical positio Some engineering positions, such as system and reactor engineers, were required to receive additional training. Continuing Training was also required for the technical staff to enhance the staffs knowledge of plant modifications, procedure changes, and to emphasize lessons learned from plant and industry operating experience and event The training department advised the inspector that the training for all of the site technical employees was up-to-date. The inspector reviewed the training records for six engineers and verified that the required training had been completed.
The inspector noted that several of the supervisors and managers (site and corporate) had received operations SRO/STA or Reactor Operator training. Also, a large number of the engineering staff had many years of nuclear plant experience, most of which had been at Surr The inspector considered the long years of nuclearwork experience by most of the engineering staff and the engineering personnel having SRO/STA training to be a positive attribut The inspectors interviewed several of the system engineers to assess their knowledge of their assigned system It was noted that most of the system engineers had considerable ~ractical experience in the nuclear industry and on their assigned system Also, many of.the system engineers had worked at Surry for several years and were very knowledgeable of the operational features of the plant. A walkdo~n insp~ction was made with the system engineers for the service water system, chemical and volume control system, and main switchyard. These system engineers demonstrated a strong knowledge of their assigned system The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel and reviewed documentation of selected plant activities to evaluate the engineering involvement and support of day-to-day plant operations. This support included developing DCPs for minor plant modifications; preparing and reviewing temporary modifications; preparing and performing post modification testing; responding to and resolving design questions from station departments; EWR backlog reduction; reviewing results of surveillance tests; preparing and coordinating the performance of special tests with operations; and providing responses or resolutions to Deviation Reports, Engineering Transmittals, etc. Based on these discussions and on the inspector's observations during the inspection, it appears that the various engineering groups were providing adequate and timely support to maintenance and operations for day-to-day activities and emergent issues and that the communication with interfacing organizations was goo Based on a review of the engineering work activities and low engineering backlog, the inspector concluded that the current staffing levels within the various engineering departments was adequate to provide the necessary plant engineering and technical suppor Engineering Backlog The inspector reviewed the status of engineering backlogs to determine if sufficient engineering resources and management attention were being focused to prevent the buildup of a large engineering work backlo The following items were reviewed:
(1)
Request for Engineering Assistance (REAs)
The inspector noted that as of August 25, 1994, approximately 252 REAs had been generated since January 1, 199 Including the REAs carried over from 1993, action had been completed on 247 REA A total of 28 REAs, with an average age of approximately 50 days, remained ope Only four of the open REAs had been open for more than 100 day These include an item open for 170 days and an item open for 114 day These two items were open pending receipt of additional information. from Westinghous One item had been open for 129 days pending receipt of additional i'nformation from the corporate office, and one item.had been open for 106 days pending completion of an additional evaluation on the main steam dump syste Of the total number of REA processed in 1994, approximately 16 percent (42) involved changes to existing DCPs by means of field change request, 12 percent (30) were resolved by use of the Item Equivalence Evaluation Report process or other similar process, nine percent (23) by engineering work request, eight percent (21)
were sent to corporate office for additional engineering review, and six percent (16) were resolved by means of an engineering transmittal. Refer to paragraph 3.a for additional information on the REA progra The inspector concluded that the number of open REAs was not excessiv (2)
Design Change Packages (DCPs)
As of August 22, 1994, there were 69 DCPs in various phases of completion assigned to Engineerin The management goal was to maintain the number of DCPs being worked to less than 10 For the past 12 months, the active DCP requests had averaged 63 per mont This was well below the management goa (3)
Drawing Changes As of August 1, 1994, there were a total of 390 drawings to be updated; This was below the station goal of 500 drawing For the past 12.months the number of drawings required to be updated has averaged approximately 530 drawings. This slightly exceeded the station goa One reason the average exceeded the goal was due to the high number of drawings required to be* revised following DCP completions during the spring 1994 refueling outag The inspector concluded that the current number of drawings requiring revision was not excessive..
(4)
Maintenance Work Reque~ts A total of 3291 maintenance work requests were open at Surry, with 153 awaiting engineering response or input, as of August 25, 199 Of the items on engineering hold, 74 were corrective maintenance related and 79 were DCP relate Three work request had a high "Priority 2" rating. These items involved work that could impact safe and reliable plant operatio One of these items had been open for less than nine days and the other two for less than 30 day The remaining items had a low "Priority 3 or 4" rating and involved work items that did not directly affect the safe and reliable operation of the plan The number of work orders on engineering hold was not considered excessive by the inspector. *
(5)
Deviation Reports (DRs)
The licensee advised the inspector that since January 1, 1994, 426 DRs had been assigned to the engineering organization for resolutio Of this number 86 were considered safety related. During the month of July 1994, the engineering organization was assigned 38 Deviation Reports, responded to -46 reports, and had no reports which were overdu The inspector concluded that adequate engineering resources and management attention were being focused to control the engineering backlo Problem Identification and Resolution The inspector interview~d engineering personnel and reviewed plant records to evaluate the involvement. of engineering in support of plant operation Engineering's resolution of problems identified by Deviation Reports (DRs) to resolve plant discrepancies and engineering initiatives in the upgrades to the Service Water System, Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability Program, Procurement Engineering Program and the enhancement of the Equipment Data System were examples of programs in which the engineering organization provided outstanding support to resolve plant problem (1)
Deviation Reports (DRs)
Site DRs were issued to identify conditions potentially adverse to quality and operability. The process for the review of identified deviations was included in procedures VPAP-1501, Station Deviation Reports (Rev 3 10/01/92), and VPAP-1601, Corrective Action (Rev 2-PN & SI 12/31/92).
The person who identified a deviation was responsible for the
.
I
- prompt notification to site supervision and for the preparation of a DR to be delivered to the shift superviso The shift supervisot assigned a number to the DR and sent copy of the DR to the Station Nuclear Safety group for processing. The shift supervisor reviewed the DR for safety implementation, operability, technical spec i fi cation
. violations and reportability requirement The Station Nuclear Safety group assigned the DR to the appropriate group for processing, evaluation and resolution. Only the DRs assigned to the engineering organization were reviewed during this inspectio The inspector reviewed the following DRs which had recently been completed by engineering:
DR N DR S-94-1220 DR S-94-1324 DR S-94-1449 Title/Description Venting of Unit 1 Safety Injection System Low Head Safety Injection Check Valves Failed to Seat Unsuccessful Attempts to Load Main
- Control Room Chillers
. The DR documentation for the above reports supported the licensee's evaluation of operability and reportability and provided an adequate description of the problem or conditio For each new DR, DRs and work requests previously issued on the system or component were reviewed for repetitive problems. A cause determination evaluation was made and corrective action was provide Engineering responses for theses DRs were adequate, with descriptive evaluations and recommended dispositions which.appeared to resolve the problem (2)
Service Water System The Surry Circulating and Service Water Systems have a history of biological fouling to the plant condensers and safety related and non-safety related heat exchangers which have affected plant performanc These systems provide the cooling medium for the plant condensers and heat exchanger The inspector reviewed the following enhancements to the Service Water System which the licensee had initiated to resolve these problems and improve performance:
Spot chemical injection:
DCP 93-046 installed a temporary brominator chemical injection system on one Component Cooling Water (CCW) System heat exchange *
This installation was successful in reducing the bio-fouling; therefore, the DCP had been revised to install a permanent chemical injection system for each of the four CCW heat exchanger The construction of this modification is in proces Improved screen design for Service Water supply from canal:
The traveling screens for the Service Water System supply from the canal were redesigned by maintenance which had improved the screen function and maintainability by minimizing corrosion damage and reducing carry over of debri CCW heat exchangers:
The CCW heat exchangers were modified by replacing the heat exchanger tubes with stainless steel and coating the carbon steel shells with an epoxy coatin Charging pump seal cooling:
DCP 94-006 had been issued which will replace the existing closed loop CCW/Service Water cooling system for the Charging Pumps seal cooling system with a once through process fluid cooling syste The revised cooling system fluid supply will be from the charging pump first stage discharge casting, back to the suction side of the pump which will maintain the pumps' seals at a satisfactory temperatur This design eliminates the pumps reliance on support systems and will eliminate the previous problems associated with fouling and leakage. This modification is in process and is scheduled to be completed during the next two refueling outage Submersible motor operated valves:
The motor operators for the circulating water inlet valves were being modified to meet submersible operability requirements from floodin Six of the eight valves have been modified and work was in process on the remaining two valve Valve replacement: Approximately 40 small aluminum-bronze isolation valves had been replaced with stainless steel valves to correct problems with microbiological foulin De-alloying of the valves had caused weeps through the body of the valve. These valves were replaced under the licensee' Procurement Engineering Item Equivalent Evaluation Report (IEER)
program.
(3)
Additional engineering evaluations are in progress, sych as the use of a copper based non-toxic foul release coatings for the service water piping, which when implemented should further enhance the reliability of the Service Water Syste Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability The licensee has formed a joint Surry, North Anna and corporate Emergency Diesel Generator Committee to ensure high reliability: and availability of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) at Surry and North Ann The committee was composed of personnel from corporate Nuclear Operations office, and System and Maintenance Engineers and EDG Planners from Surry and North Anna.* An outside engineering firm was included as an advisor to the committe The committee meets quarterly and has developed several modifications for the EDG An example of a minor modification which had improved performance of the EDGs was the installation of the duplex spin-on type fuel filter Also, the implementation of an oscilloscope trace trending and analysis test device had been developed and was being used to monitor and evaluate the diesel engines' air start system, engine starting and acceleration, and governor response system for the EDGs.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's data on EDG reliability and unavailability for 1993 and 1994 and noted that the only listed EDG failure since May 1991 occurred on March 17, 1994, when EDG No. 3 failed due to degraded MVAR outpu The reliability for March through June 1994 was 0.990 which met the licensee's goal of 0.990 and was better than the established station blackout reliability'target value of 0.97 In 1993, the EDGs were unavailable for a total of 102.2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> For 1994, the EDGs were unavailable for 98.87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> in March to repair~ voltage ~egulator and in May for 127 hours0.00147 days <br />0.0353 hours <br />2.099868e-4 weeks <br />4.83235e-5 months <br /> for upgrades to the fuel oil filters for 57 hours6.597222e-4 days <br />0.0158 hours <br />9.424603e-5 weeks <br />2.16885e-5 months <br /> to repair some of the fuel lines. The licensee's goals for unavailability were 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> in 1993 and 550 hours0.00637 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.093915e-4 weeks <br />2.09275e-4 months <br /> for 199 The industry unavailability goal is less than 2.5 percent of the total tim For Surry this is 657 hour0.0076 days <br />0.183 hours <br />0.00109 weeks <br />2.499885e-4 months <br /> The Surry unavailability goal of less than 550 hours0.00637 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.093915e-4 weeks <br />2.09275e-4 months <br /> was 107 hours0.00124 days <br />0.0297 hours <br />1.76918e-4 weeks <br />4.07135e-5 months <br /> less that the industry goal and was considered conservativ The performance of the EDGs at Surry were better than the industry goals for both reliability and unavailabilit The inspector performed a walkdown inspection of the EDGs and noted that the material condition of the EDGs and the general housekeeping of the EDG rooms were very good.
(4)
Procurement Engineering Program (5)
Through coordination among the various engineering groups, the Procurement Engineering organization was providing the correct technical and quality requirements for the
procurement of materials for the Surry Power Station. This group was instrumental in the successful accomplishment of several recent initiatives. One example was the above described replacement of approximately 40 aluminum-bronze service water system valves with stainless steel valves to correct the microbiological fouling proble These valves were replaced under the Procurement Engineering IEER program when it was determined that the installation schedule would not support buying these valves as safety related valve Another example was the replacement of containment isolation Valve l-RC-160 by DCP 92-054. This valve had a hard seat and had a history of excessive leakag Procurement Engineering worked with Design Engineering and the valve manufacturer to find a soft seated valve which would provide a better sealing capabilit Due to excessive lead time and necessity to support the outage, Procurement Engineering generated a test package to commercially dedicate the valv The valve was installed and successfully passed the required containment isolation tes A Failure Trend Analysis for components and parts was also developed by Procurement Engineerin Data was collected from several sources such as a Failure Tracking Database, Component Failure Analysis Report, and Casual Determination Evaluation to identify products that performed satisfactory
- or unsatisfactory during testing or while in servic Fro this information actions were developed which improved component or part reliability and reduced operating cost Equipment Data System The inspector reviewed the licensee's electronic Equipment Data System. This system was a user friendly mainframe based relational data base system with four major subsystems or elements. These include:
Equipment Data System, a master data base list of all of the plant components by mark number, safety classification and location; Bill of Material System, a master list of actual components installed in mark numbered locations with alternate components approved for installation in the same location; Document Management Information System, a data base index of all related documents and revision date; and Plant Work Control System, controlled the generation of plant work orders for performing maintenance on the plant systems and components.
This data system permitted easy and rapid access to equipment data, accurate transfer of information among departments, provided useful component history file, and permitted cqntrol/restocking of components and spare part The inspector concluded that the active involvement of the engineering groups in the above areas were effective and-aided in the resolution of problems and supported reliable plant operation.
Design Changes and Plant Modifications (37550) Planning, Development, and Implementation of Plant Modifications The inspector reviewed Procedures VPAP-0301, Design Change Process (Rev 3, 1/17 /94) and VPAP-0304, Request for Engineering Assistance (Rev o~PNOl, 9/21/93), which provided the instructions to be followed in* the originating, prioritizing and processing of requests for engineering assistance and implementing design changes to the plant. The implementation of these procedures at Surry was.discussed with the Superintendent of Station Engineerin The licensee encouraged personnel who identified technical plant
- problems to submit a Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) to Nuclear Engineering Services (NES).
Procedu~e VPAP-0304 provided the instructions to be followed in the originating and processing of a RE Prior to submitting a request, the originator was required to reviewed the REA with the originator's superintendent to ensure that the requested action was appropriat The REA was then forwarded to the Superintendent Station Engineering for an initial screening to determine what NES action was appropriat Requests which did not require design change modification packages could be resolved by normal engineering means, such as work o~ders, Engineering Transmittals, IEER, et REAs which involved inoperative or degraded components, and requests for correction of Technical Specification (TS) related discrepancies were assigned a high priority for resolution. Normally, DCPs were not initiated for these item REA requests for plant improvements and other similar requests were assigned by the Superintendent Station Engineering to the appropriate engineering section to identify the necessary engineering involvement and to develop preliminary cost information on the reques Upon compl~tion of the initial
~ngineering evaluation, the ofiginator*or the originator's superintendent and an engineering representative presented the REA to the Surry plant Modification Management Review Team (MMRT) for review and approval or rejectio MMRT meetings were conducted on an as-needed basis but normally were held about two times each mont The MMRT was composed of the following members:
Assistant Station Manager Operations and Maintenance Superintendent Operations Superintendent Station Engineering Superintendent Nuclear Site Services Superintendent Outage and Planning Superintendent Maintenance The Superintendent Radiological Protection participated in the MMRT reviews if requested by the Assistant Manager Operations and Maintenanc REAs approved by the MMRT were sent to an engineering planner for scheduling and pr1oritization. * Nuclear safety and personnel safety items were required by Procedure VPAP-0304 to be assigned the highest priority rating factor. Regulatory issues and operational improvements were assigned a lower priority rating factor. Approved REAs were then sent*to the appropriate engineering section for development of a DC Disapproved REAs were returned to the originator with an explanation as to why the REA was disapproved.*
The total number of REAs processed in 1994 was discussed in paragraph 2.b.(1).
Many of these REAs were high priority items such as corrective maintenance for components which had to be returned to service within a relatively short period of tim These REAs did not require a MMRT review and were generally promptly corrected or resolve Of the REA items sent to the MMRT, approximately 29 percent (75) were rejected due to the lack of plant need or inadequate economic justification. The remaining approximately 20 percent (52) were developed into DCP Based on *discussions with licensee engineering personnel, and review of the above documentation, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had a strong program for the review, prioritization and scheduling of plant modifications which emphasized nucl~ar and personnel safety in lieu of operational improvements or regulatory issue The effective implementation of this program was considered a strengt Temporary Modifications The inspectors reviewed and assessed the licensee's Temporary Modification {TM) process to determine its adequacy for controlling and tracking temporary changes to the plant's configuration. Procedure VPAP-1403, Temporary Modifications (Rev 2, 3/21/94), provided controls for preparation, review, installation, extension, and removal of TM At the time of*this inspection, there were no active TMs oh Unit 1 and only the following three active Unit 2 TMs in place:
TM S2-94-08 TM S2-94-ll TM S2-94-12 Trial Chemical Injection of Ethanolamine into Unit 2 Secondary System for Control of System pH and Corrosion (Requested 7/19/94)
Operation of Non-safety Related Unit 2 Containment Chilled Water Refrigeration Unit 2-CD-REF-l by Jumpering a Defective High Bearing Temperature Detector (Requested 7/10/93, Reissued 6/29/94)
Installation of Jumper fo~ Removal of Switchyard Circuit Breaker 53102 Pending Completion of Unit 2 Switchyard Modification by DCP 94-10 (Requested 7/25/94)
The TMs were reviewed and the inspector verified that each TM had an appropriate safety evaluation and had been reviewed and approved in accordance with VPAP-140 A walkdown inspection was made of the switchyard jumper installed by TM S2-94-12 and the inspector verified that the jumper had been installed as indicated by the T The inspector noted that the station "As Built Drawings" had not been revised to indicate the installation of this jumpe The licensee informed the inspector that each TM was required by VPAP-1403, Section 6.12, to be reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety Operating Committee (SNSOC) to determine the necessity for revising Station drawings which were affected by a T For TM S2-94-12, the SNSOC determined that there was no need to revise the station drawings to ind~cate the changes of this T However, for TM S2-94-08 the SNSOC determined that the changes affected by this TM should be.indicated on the station drawing As noted in paragraph 3.c, the inspector reviewed the drawings affected by this TM to verify that these drawings had been revised. *
The inspector concluded that the licensee's process for control, review, installation, and removal of TMs was adequate and in accordance with established procedures. Also, based on the low number of active TMs, management control of TMs was effectiv Drawing Control The inspector reviewed the licensee's program and procedures that were developed and implemerited to maintain drawing control~
Methods for making plant design changes, including drawing control, were controlled in accordance with Procedure VPAP-0302, Station Drawing Annotation and Revision (Rev O, 12/27/93).
VPAP-0302 i dent i fi ed two drawing c 1 ass i fi cations for Surry:
"Priority Drawings," required to be revised prior to completion of the Operational Readiness Review, i.e. prior to completion of the DCP
and returning the system to operations; and "Non-Priority Drawings," required to be completed 90 days following engineering's receipt of notification to revise the drawing which is normally approximately 90 days following completion of the DC The program and procedures were examined to ensure that design control was maintained and drawings were updated in a timely manner to reflect the as-built plant. The inspector reviewed the following sample drawings associated with selected DCPs to verify and ensure they were updated and controlled in accordance with Procedure VPAP-0302:
Drawing N FM-89A, Sheet 1 11448-FMC-89A, Sheet 1 11448-FM-84B, Sheet 2 11448-FMC-84, Sheet 1 11448-FM-86B, Sheet 2 11448-FM-064A, Sheets 1-6 11448-FP-247E 11448-FP-247H 11448-MKS-1014Al 11448-MKS-1014A2 11548-FE-3CJ 11548-FE-2B 11548-ESK-lOAL 11548-SE-104B ll 548-FE-44E 11548-SE-107BX1 13058-FM-157L 13058-FE-l FE-9F 11548-SE-120AG (1)
DCP 92-54 DCP/TM N DCP 91-027 DCP 92-054 DCP 93-036 DCP 93-070 DCP 86-03 TM S2-94-08 Drawing 11448-FM-86B, Sheet 2 indicated that the drawing had been revised by DCP 93-18 in lieu of the correct DCP, DCP 92-5 This minor error was corrected by the Drawing Update group on August 26, 199 (2)
DCP 93-036 Drawing Nos. 11448-FM-064A, 11448-FP-247E, 247H, and 11448-MKS-1014Al, 1014A2 had not been revise The drawing change
- request for these drawings, dated March 22, 1994, had been misplaced and was not located until three months late These drawing were in the revision process on the date of*
this inspection. After the inspector found that thes drawings had not been revised, the licensee promptly revised these drawing on August 25, 199 The revisions to these drawing were identified as non-priority and were primarily to change the pipe classification. The licensee considered the failure to made these changes within the specified 90 days for Non-Priority Drawings had no safety or operational impact on the station. The drawings were revised August 26, 199 (3)
DCP 93-070 Drawing No. 11548-SE-1048 had not been revised. This was a Non-Priority Drawing and required a revision to delete a cable from the cable schedul The licensee considered that the failure to make these changes within the specified 90 days for Non-Priority Drawings had no safety or operational impact on the station. The drawing was revised on August 26, 199 (4)
DCP 86-003 Drawing No. 11548-SE-1078Sl had not been revised. This drawing was a Non-Priority Drawing and required a cable addition to the cable schedul The licensee considered the failure to make these changes within the specified 90 days for non-priority drawings had no safety or operational impact on the statio (5)
TM S2-94-08 Drawing Nos. 13058-FM-157L and 11548-SE-120AG had not been revtse Two drawing change requests were issued by the respective engineer for this TM but the requests were not received by the Drawing Update Grou At the time the TM was approved by the SNSOC, a time limit had not been established to update the drawing FM classification drawings are listed as Priority Drawing and SE type drawings were listed as Non-Priority Drawing Not revising these drawings to reflect the installation of the chemical injection system for trial application did not appear to have an appreciable safety or operational impact on the statio Following the inspector's identification of the above drawings associated with DCPs93-036 and 93-070 and TM S2-94-08 not being revised to indicate as-built plant conditions, the licensee *issued Deviation Report No. S-94-1685 on these discrepancie Engineering promptly initiated a review of all 49 DCPs which had
been completed since May 1993, to determine if any additional drawings had not been updated. -out of this review, only a minor discrepancy with DCP 86-003 was identified. This.DCP required a revision to drawing No. 11548-SE-107BX Upon further review, the Drawing Upd~te Group found that the electrical instrumentation revisions to this drawing should have been added to drawing N SE-117AQ and the electrical power revisions should have been added to drawing No. 11548-SE-107BV These revisions were completed on August 26, 199f. Also, an Engineering "Lessons Learned" memorandum was to be generated to alert on-site personnel of this issu Based on the low safety consequence associated with not up-dating a very sma 11 number of Non-Priority drawings-out of several
_hundred which were properly revised, the inspector considered this to be isolated occurrences and no further inspection was require The licensee's and inspector's reviews of completed DCPs did not identify any critical drawings that had not been updated within the specified tim Therefore, the inspector concluded that the licensee's-controls for updating and maintaining critical drawings were adequate and effectively implemente * Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702) (Closed) Violation 280, 281/93-12-01, Priority Drawings Not Update The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated July 3, 199 The drawings identified by the NRC inspectors which were not *properly updated were properly updated on May 6, 199 The licensee also reviewed a total of 267 additional drawing to determine if these-drawings had been properly update Twelve additional drawings were identified which had not been updated within the administrative time limits. These drawing were also properly updated.* To prevent recurrence the licensee revised the governing procedures to eliminate the 15 date priority classifications. After this change, only two drawing classifications exist at Surry:
"Priority Drawings" which are require to be updating prior to the completion of the operational readiness review, and "Non-Priority Drawings" which are required to be updated within 90 days of the initiation of controlled document review process. Also, the drawing classification series designated as "Priority Drawings" were reviewed and reduced in number where possibl *
The inspector reviewed the governing procedure, VPAP-0302, Station Drawing Annotation and Revision (Rev O, 12/27/93), and verified that the above revisions had been mad (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 280, 281/93-12-02, Labeling of Test Valves in EDG Air Start Syste During the walkdown inspection of the EDGs, the inspector verified that the test valves had been properly labele ~
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized-on August 26, 1994, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding Proprietary information is not contained in this repor No dissenting comments were received from the license.
Acronyms and Initialisms A/E ccw CFR DCP DR EDG ET EWR IEER
- MMRT MVAR NES NRC REA Rev SRO STA TM TS VPAP Architect/Engineer Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Design Change Package Deviation Report
.Engineering Transmittals Engineering Work Request Item Equivalency Evaluation Report Modification Management Review Team Mega Volts Amps Reactive Nuclear Engineering Services Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Engineering Assistance Revision Senior Reactor Operator Shift Technical Advisor Temporary Modification Technical Specification Virginia Power Administrative Procedure