IR 05000280/1994030
| ML18153B188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1994 |
| From: | Casto C, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153B187 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-94-30, 50-281-94-30, NUDOCS 9412270028 | |
| Download: ML18153B188 (18) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos.:
50-280/94-30 and 50-281/94-30 Licensee:
Virginia Electric & Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
October 24 - 28 and November 14 - 18, 1994 Inspector: Ji'~- tJ~~
H. Whitener Accompanying Approved by:
Scope:
C.ast,Chlef ~
Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY
/,:?~ I~ -9¥ Date Signed I z/1~/f Y Date Signed This routine announced inspection was conducted in the areas of engineering and technical support activities, design changes and plant modifications, and follow-up on previous inspection finding Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie The inspection resulted in the following assessments:
Plant Modifications:
Interface communications between engineering personnel during the in process interdepartmental review of design changes were good (paragraph 2.b.2).
9412270028 941216 PDR ADOCK 05000280 Enclosure G
- Pre-installation design scope reviews and walkdowns by engineering disciplines were adequate; however, the number of Installation Problem Reports generated indicated that the reviews and walkdowns could be improve Adequate post modification test requirements were specified (paragraph 2.b.2).
Engineering Transmittals were properly used for the transfer of engineering and technical information (paragraph 3.b).
Completed modifications were adequately implemente However, the design change to adjust the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump overspeed trip setpoints to 107% of rated speed resulted in at least one overspeed trip that would not have occurred at the original setpoint (paragraph 3.c.l).
Design change packages sufficiently identified documents required to be revised such as safety review analysis, drawing, and procedure revision Drawing changes reviewed were clear, accurate and timely (paragraph 2.b).
UFSAR and vendor manual were maintained up-to-dat Emergency operating procedure change control was adequate (paragraph 5.d).
Prioritization of Design Basis Document open items were appropriate, in that, no opens items were identified that required immediate resolution (paragraph 5.a)
No safety significant items were contained in cancelled design change packages (paragraph 5.c).
Problem Identification And Resolution:
The various engineering groups were involved in the identification and resolution of problems in the support of reliable plant operatio It was determined that of the 392 plant Deviations Reports (DRs) written since August 1, 1994, approximately 10% were identified by engineering personnel (paragraph 3.a).
A review of active DR status reports for a two month period (since August 1994) showed that engineering had no DRs investigations overdu The quality of engineering responses to DRs was good (paragraph 3.a).
Audits of Engineering Program and Self Assessments:
Quality Assurance audits, engineering self-assessments, and performance monitoring by management of engineering activities were a positive indication of management's efforts to improve engineering performanc These were effective in identifying a number of areas for improvement in the engineering groups (paragraph 4).
Corrective actions in response to the audits and assessments have been developed in order to address the improvement area Benchmark management expectations and goals established for engineering performance were motivating (paragraph 4).
- Followup of Previous NRC Findings:
IFI 50-280, 281/93-18-01, Remains open pending implementation of corrective actions to address the QA audit items, fire protection VPAP procedural updates, and completion of actions regarding approval by NRC of a license amendment to remove the fire protection program from TS The IFI also includes followup on interface communications between engineering personnel during the in process interdepartmental fire protection reviews for design changes (paragraph 6.a).
IFI 50-280, 281,/93-18-02, related to fire brigade drills in safety related Appendix R exemption areas was reviewed and closed (paragraph 6.b).
'v *
- Persons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- D. Benson, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- D. Christian, Station Manager E. Cosby, System Engineer
- B. Garber, Engineer, Licensing R. Green, Supervisor, System Engineering
- E. Harrell, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering Services R. MacManus, Supervisor, System Engineering
- J. McCarthy, Assistant Station Manager
- W. Miles, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- J. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- V. Shifflett, Engineer, Licensing B. Sloan, System Engineer
- T. Sowers, Superintendent Station Engineering
- J. Swientoniewsky, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety E. Turko, Supervisor, Test Engineering and Design Control Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, QA personnel, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit meeting on October 28, 1994
- Attended exit meeting on November 18, 1994
Acronyms and jnitialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap.
Design Changes and Plant Modifications (37550) Procedures Review The inspectors reviewed selected plant procedures and engineering instructions relative to design changes and modifications to determine the adequacy of the controls governing the design change proces The following procedures were reviewed:
VPAP-0301, Design Change Process, Revision 4, August 4, 1994 VPAP-0302, Station Drawing Annotation, Revision, and Distribution Control, Revision 0, December 27, 1993 VPAP-0304, Requests For Engineering Assistance (REA), December 18, 1993
VPAP-0310, Equipment Data System (EDS) Data Base Control, Revision 2, April 18, 1994 VPAP-0602, Vendor Technical Manual Control, Revision 1, July 15, 1993 VPAP-3001, Safety Evaluations, Revision 3, November 15, 1994 The inspectors concluded from reviewing the above documentation that adequate controls were in place to ensure effective implementation of design change Review of Design Change Packages The inspectors reviewed DCPs being implemented or completed since January 1993 listed below to:
(1) determine the adequacy of the safety evaluation screening and the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations; (2) verify that the modifications were reviewed and approved in accordance with TS and applicable administrative controls; (3) verify that supporting calculations were properly performed, documented, and approved; (4) verify the modifications were installed, installation problems were identified by IPRs, and properly resolved; (5) verify that applicable design input information such as seismic requirements, environmental qualification, industry codes, etc., were addressed; (6) verify that applicable design bases were included and affected documents (drawings, EDS, plant procedures, etc.) were revised; (7) verify that the modifications were properly turned over to operations; and (8) verify that both installation testing and post modification test requirements were specified and that adequate testing was performe The following plant modifications were examined:
DCP 88-13 DCP 91-23 DCP 92-060 DCP 92-072 Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Enclosure Modification Replacement of the Equalizing Valve on the Unit 2 Containment Personnel Hatch Airlocks Installation of Two Heat Trace Circuits to Piping to Prevent Moisture Buildup in the Units 1 and 2 Process Vent Radiation Monitors (GW-130 and 131)
Installation of Ball Valves to the Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System for Improved Method of Inservice Testing and Low Poi.nt Drain
Rerouting of Gaseous Waste Header Piping to Reduce Water Intrusion Into the Kaman Process Vent Monitors Addition of Service Water Chemical Treatment at Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Selected plant documentation associated with each DCP was reviewed to verify that the changes were incorporated into the latest revision of the document The inspectors reviewed affected operational procedures, surveillance test procedures, instrument set point drawings, vendor manuals, EDS, fire brigade prefire plans and procedures, fire protection SSA, and UFSAR tables and figures, and determined that the applicable documents had been updated to accurately reflect the design change The inspectors performed field inspections for the service water chemical addition, radiation monitor and emergency diesel
~enerator starting air modifications (DCPs92-060, 93-024, and 93-046) and verified that the modifications were installed in accordance with the requirements specified in the applicable design change packag The inspectors noted the following:
(1)
DCPs92-060 and 93-024 These modifications were initiated to address a recurring problem with water ingress to the radiation monitors causing equipment failure Degrading trends due to the equipment failures identified by numerous deviations reports were noted in both the third quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 199 These design changes implemented in May and August 1994 entailed addition of system drain points, rerouting of piping and installation of heat tracing on the monitor sensing lines to prevent moisture buildup in the system monitor The inspectors noted that there were four Installation Problem Reports associated with the installation of the heat tracing to the radiation monitor sensing line Fire barrier penetration seal FP-PEN-1393 was opened and resealed per procedure O-ECM-0901-02, to route a new conduit and the heat trace wires through the seal. The inspectors verified that a fire watch was established during the time period the penetration was ope Plant QC validated the acceptability of the penetration resealing operation at QC hold point The QC acceptance criteria were technically justified. The inspectors'
review of DRs related to water ingress into the radiation monitors indicated no incidents since July 199 Based on this review the inspectors concluded that the modifications have been effective in achieving the desired result of lowering water ingress which contributed to inducing equipment failures.
(2)
DCP 93-046 A Field Change No. 4 was written for the DCP that added a quantity of biocide chemical that, under fire conditions, produced a toxic gas that could have an effect on fire brigade preplans and the fire fighting personnel. This discussion was provided in the field change safety evaluatio The revised CDS issued for the field change did not indicate that the Fire Protection Preplan for the area should have been reviewed for impact of a potential fire involving the biocide chemical following implementation of the modificatio The engineer overlooked marking "Yes" for the Fire Protection Program on the CDS which would have keyed a fire protection impact revie Not initiating a fire protection review of the turbine building fire area to reflect the installation of the chemical injection system did not have an appreciable operational or Appendix R fire safe shutdown impact on the statio Following the inspectors' identification that the above field change associated with DCP 93-046 had not been reviewed for fire protection impact, Engineering promptly revised the CD In addition, Engineering initiated a review of all DCPs which had been completed since May 1993 and recent QA audits of the Fire Protection Progra Interviews were conducted with the involved engineer about the discrepancy to determine the circumstances of the error and if any additional missed fire protection reviews had occurred. This review identified that the engineer who developed the field change had discussed the safety evaluation concerns with the Surry Loss Prevention Superviso However,*due to inattention to detail, he had failed to mark the CDS for This oversight had low safety significance since it was associated with a non-safety plant fire zon A recent QA Audit (No. S94-10) had identified other problems with the Fire Protection Program implementation discussed in Section 6.a. of this repor In that the licensee's and inspectors' reviews of completed DCPs did not identify any other missed fire protection reviews within the specified time, the inspectors considered this to be an isolated occurrence and no further inspection in this specific area was required. Also, an Engineering "Lessons Learned" memorandum was to be generated alerting on-site personnel of this issue. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the controls and interface communications between engineering personnel during interdepartmental review of design changes were goo NRC followup on.the fire protection program issues will be addressed as part of NRC IFI 93-18-01 discussed in Section 6.a. of this repor An initial NRC review of DCPs had been accomplished in August, 1994, and documented in inspection report 50-280, 281/94-2 During both that review and this one, no significant safety related deficiencies were note Pre-installation design scope
- reviews, walkdowns by engineering disciplines, and installation instructions were adequate, but based on the number of IPRs generated during implementation of the design packages, pre-installation modification package development could be improve Adequate post modification test requirements were specifie DCPs sufficiently documented the proper closure of design change Violations or deviations were not identified in the areas inspecte.
Engineering Initiatives and Problem Resolutions Engineering and technical support were provided by both Corporate and Station Engineering organization Corporate Engineering normally handled the large, complex engineering projects. Onsite Station Engineering included Mechanical, Electrical, and Civil design engineering; System Engineers for Primary and Secondary systems; and the Test and Design Control Engineering grou Station Engineering normally handled the more routine engineering design work and problem resolution in support of plant operation The inspectors held discussions with engineering personnel and reviewed procedures and documentation of selected plant activities to evaluate engineering initiatives and support of day-to-day plant operations. This support included involvement in plant modifications, monitoring and maintaining system performance, responding to plant problems, performing safety evaluations, et Problem Identification and Resolution The process used by the licensee to identify and track conditions potentially adverse to quality and operability was the DR syste Plant procedures VPAP-1501, Station Deviation Reports (Rev 3, 10/01/92), and VPAP-1601, Corrective Actions (Rev 2, 12/31/92)
described the DR process, including guidance for the issuance of a DR, responsibilities and accountability of the various departments, and closeout activities. The shift supervisor had the responsibility to promptly review all DRs for safety implications, plant operability, technical specification violations and reportability requirement The Station Nuclear Safety group assigned the DR to the appropriate group for resolutio The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed plant records to evaluate the determination of plant operability and reportability and the involvement of engineering in support of day-to-day plant operation The inspectors reviewed 25 DRs associated with plant ventilation system A sample of the typical DR packages reviewed are noted below:
DR N DR S-94-1372 Problem Subject Evaluate PM Lubrication Schedule of Auxiliary Building Ventilation Fans
1-
- DR N DR S-94-0956 DR S-94-0986 DR S-94-1010
Problem Subject MCR Chiller Out of Service Due to Clogged Suction Strainer MCR Chiller "A" Service Water Temperature Higher Than Normal Inactive Fire Alarm for Turbine Lube Oil Purifier The DR documentation for the above reports provided an adequate description of the problem or conditio The inspectors concluded that the DR packages provided sufficient information to support the licensee's determination of operability and reportabilit Engineering responses for these DRs were adequate, with descriptive evaluations and recommended dispositions which resolved the problem This demonstrated good engineering involvement in support of plant operations and maintenanc The various engineering groups were involved in the identification and timely resolution of problems in the support of reliable plant operation. Approximately 10% of the 392 plant DRs written since August 1, 1994, were identified by engineering personnel. A review of active DR status reports for a two month period (since August 1994) showed that engineering had no assigned DRs overdu The quality of engineering responses to DRs was goo Engineering Transmittals The ET process was implemented in early 1994 to provide engineering and technical information in support of plant operations at a minimal level of revie The procedure, Engineering Transmittals, STD-GN-0041, Revision 2, indicates that an ET may be used to transmit technical information to support equivalency, provide interpretations or justify exceptions to specifications, evaluate plant or test data to establish acceptance criteria for station documents, et An ET may not be used to effect a physical change to the plant, perform a safety evaluation or implement a setpoint chang The inspectors were concerned that the general guidelines for ET use could allow application of this process when a more prescriptive process was warrante At the exit interview the licensee indicated that the definitions for use of the ET were general in nature to provide flexibility in use of the document; however, the procedure would be reviewed with the inspector's concern in mind to see if more specific definitions are appropriat The inspectors reviewed 12 of the ETs and did not observe any examples of misuse of the process. Also, the station Quality
- Assurance group had reviewed 28 randomly selected ETs and observed no misuse of the proces Examples typical of the ETs reviewed by the inspectors are:
S-94-0105, RCS Equipment Elevations Engineering was asked to provide certain equipment elevation Engineering responded providing the elevations and the source of the informatio S-94-0096, Inadequate Core Cooling' Monitor Engineering was asked to evaluate removal of an erratic thermocouple from the monito Engineering reviewed the Technical Specification for the monitor and the operable equipment and concluded that the Core Cooling Monitor met the Technical Specification with removal of the thermocoupl S-94-0147, Use Of Cleaning Solvent Engineering was asked to identify an acceptable cleaning solvent for a RC Engineering consulted Westinghouse on the required qualities, obtained a Material Safety Data Sheet and a vendor supplied information sheet on the cleaning solven From the data Engineering decided that Penetone 724 was acceptabl The inspectors concluded that the ET process was a useful tool in support of engineering involvement in plant act~vitie Engineering Initiatives Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump The TDAFW Pump overspeed trip setpoint was originally set at 5250 rpm, 125% of the normal operating speed of 4200 rp This provided a 25% overspeed margin before causing a turbine tri In a study performed for the licensee by Stone & Webster, it was later determined that at the overspeed trip setpoint the discharge pressure from the TDAFW pumps exceeds the pressure rating of the discharge pipin Stone & Webster calculation, 14937.41-M-18, showed that to limit the discharge pressure of the TDAFW pump to the design rating of the discharge piping the overspeed trip setpoint should be reduced to 4494 rpm, 107% of the normal operating spee DCP 88-16-3 was implemented in early 1991 to reduce the overspeed trip setpoint to 4494 rpm which corresponds to a pump discharge pressure of 1432 psi While this modification was effective in reducing the pump discharge pressure to within ASME Code requirements it also contributed to an equipment trip. Since the modification five overspeed TDAFW pump trips have occurre In
RCE 93-25-01 the licensee determined that at least one TDAFW pump overspeed trip (Unit 2 on August 22, 1994) would not have occurred if the overspeed trip setpoint had been at 125% rather than at 107% of rated spee After extensive investigation including metallurgical analysis and effects of thermal expansion and steam pressure, the RCE Team concluded that the most probable cause of the overspeed trips was a build up of mineral and corrosion products on the governor valve stem in the packing gland area causing the 410 stainless steel stem to bind with the carbon packing rings. The licensee has implemented weekly and monthly periodic checks on the freedom of movement of the governor valve until a final resolution is reache In addition, the licensee has initiated a study at corporate engineering to evaluate the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine overspeed trip setpoint design basis for normal and overspeed trip setpoints for the original and current desig The inspectors concluded the action taken by the licensee demonstrated good engineering support of plant operations.
However, the appropriateness of the decision to reduce the overspeed trip setpoint is pending a design study implemented by the licensee. Other options available included upgrading the system piping and components to withstand the pump discharge pressure or install relief valves in the discharge pipin An Inspection Followup Item was opened to track the results of the design review as follows:
IFI 50-280, 281/94-30-01:
Review the results of the design study of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed Trip Setpoin.
Relay Project As a result of a reactor trip due to the failure of a single relay the licensee initiated an engineering study to identify those relays where a single failure could cause a reactor tri The trip reduction team determined that this type of problem was confined to the CLS system which involves principally the containment spray and pressure logic relay The identified relays have been replaced in both Units and a PM established to replace these relays every other outag Engineering evaluation has determined the root cause of frequent relay failures to be the heat load in the relay rack Initiatives to improve this condition include
additional relay room cooling and replacement components which generate less hea The System Engineer is actively involved in the daily maintenance of the relay logi The plant does not have as built drawings showing wiring termination At each relay failure the System Engineer must trace the relay wiring and provide a temporary modification with instructions on where to install jumpers to prevent interrupting the logic chai The inspectors concluded that system engineering is actively involved in supporting plant daily operations and maintenanc Violations or deviations were not identified in the areas inspecte.
Quality Assurance Assessment and Oversight The inspectors reviewed Surry Station Engineering management performance assessments, and audits of the Station Engineering safety related activities conducted by the Surry QA organizatio The assessments and audits were part of the overall Virginia Power quality assurance program at Surry Nuclear Power Statio The inspectors reviewed the following QA organization's activities that were either completed or in progress:
S94-10, October 1994, Fire Protection and Loss Prevention Program Assessment
S94-19, February 1994, Technical Specification Surveillance Review Assessment S94-052, May 1994, System Engineering Assessment S94-054, June 1994, Design Change Implementation Process, Operational Readiness Review Assessment The inspectors found that the QA organization audits of engineering activities were goo The audits were effective in identifying a number of areas for improvement in the engineering and fire protection program Corrective actions were developed to address these improvement finding Station Engineering groups were performing self assessments on a monthly and quarterly basis. These assessments were developed for the SSES self assessment plan for 1994 in accordance with SSES Implementing Procedure SSES-1.09, Revision 5, "Controlling Procedure For The Engineering Self Assessment Program."
Twelve specific engineering Performance Indicators related to modifications, drawing updates, DR response timeliness, LERs, Periodic Test/Surveillance Test Program, and ALARA were evaluated and an
"Engineering Program Performance Annunciator Panel Report" was issued for each monitored engineering functional activit *
The inspectors reviewed several SSES self-assessments including: Surry Performance Annunciator Panel Status for the Second and Third Quarters 1994 and Monthly Engineering Assessments for the months of August and October 199 These assessments indicated that Engineering continued good performance in 3 areas evaluated: (1) limited total number of field changes to 5 during the quarter; (2) no LERs attributed to Engineering; and, (3) reduced drawing backlog to less than 500 inventory in the quarte The two areas identified as needing improvement were performance and oversight of ORRs and Surveillance The performance decline in these areas was attributed to personnel performance errors and inattention-to-detail. Discussions with licensee personnel indicated that an initiative was in development to track and validate the status of corrective actions in response to the engineering self-assessment Based on these reviews, the inspectors concluded that the QA audits and engineering self-assessments by management of engineering activities were a positive indication of management's efforts to improve engineering performanc These audits and assessments of the engineering groups were effective in identifying a number of areas related to personnel performance errors and inattention-to-detail which needed improvemen Proposed corrective actions in response to the audits and assessments had been developed to address the improvement area The inspectors considered the bench-mark management expectations and goals established for engineering performance motivatin Violations or deviations were not identified in the areas inspecte.
Corporate Engineering Activity Reviews DBD Open Item Review The inspectors reviewed the open items listed in Chapter 24 of SDBD-SPS-CH, Chemical and Volume Control System, and SDBD-SPS-EB, EB System, to determine if any item required immediate resolutio Particular attention was focussed on discovering any item and/or items that indicated that a safety-related or important to safety function might not. be accomplished as require The inspectors determined that none of the reviewed open items warranted immediate licensee actio PPR Review NDCM 6.1, Problem Reporting System, rev1s1on 6, establishes PPRs as a means to analyze and review concerns arising from design and engineering activities that may be significan The Problem Reporting System is not considered as a corrective action or commitment tracking syste However during the processing of PPRs, if deficiencies are found, corrective action documents such as station DRs are issued.
- No PPRs were considered as OPEN for Surr However, 15 and 10 PPRs were issued that involved Surry or Surry and North Anna during 1993 and 1994, respectivel Of these, 14 were closed after the concern was determined to be valid and/or significant and required corrective actions per the DR proces Six of the remaining eleven PPRs were reviewed by the inspectors to determine if the concerns involved operability of safety-related systems, structures, or components and were appropriately addresse The following PPRs were reviewed:
PPR Number 93-004 93-005 93-007 93-019 94-001 94-008 EQ Boundary Doors, Hatches and Plugs Posi-Seal Butterfly Valves Bearing Design Defect Refueling Shutdown Margin Met. Tower, Power, NUREG-0654 Boron Recovery, UFSAR Discrepancy RH, Appendix R, Shutdown Analysis The inspectors determined that these PPRs were adequately resolve Observations and conclusions concerning two PPRs and their associated documentation follo Technical Report No. EQ-0066, Documentation of PPR 93-004 - Review of EQ Boundary Doors, North Anna and Surry, revision 0, that supported closeout of PPR 93-004 did not provide the licensing basis for excluding a 30-inch steam line break as the maximum break inside the MSV Subsequent discussions with NRR verified that for EQ purposes a main steam line rupture inside the MSVH need not be considered when establishing MSVH EQ boundarie PPR 93-005 was closed before the cause was determined for the Posi-Seal butterfly valve failures at Arizona Public Service's PVNG Based. upon the applications for similar valves at Surry, vendor correspondence and test results for a 10-inch Duke Power Company valve, the inspectors concluded that the closeout was reasonabl DCP Backlog Review The inspectors reviewed the trend in the number of ready-for-work DCPs for the period from October 1993 to September 199 This number had decreased from 153 to 8 During the period, 99 DCPs were issued and 153 were close To understand what constituted DCP closures, a review of DCP completions during 1994 was conducte For this calendar year through October 26, 19 were closed due to installation and completion and 34 were closed due to cancellatio The number of cancellations was mainly
attributed to a backlog reduction effort. Twelve cancelled DCPs (Nos.91-048, 92-016,92-021, 92-024,92-025, 92-090,92-096, 92-097,93-030, 93-082,94-005 and 94-027) were randomly selected to ascertain if important to safety items had been delete For 10 DCPs the issues were either incorporated into other DCPs or field revisions or were no longer necessary due to other completed modification activitie Two DCPs were cancelled because of cost/benefit consideration DCP 92-024, MI Cables, Wi*ring, &
Tags/2, addressed cable, wiring and tag to drawing discrepancies identified during 1989 engineering walkdown Due to the length of time since the walkdowns, another engineering walkdown would be required before the corrections could be implemente The licensee concluded that "For the projected benefits, it would not be cost effective to spend Station/Engineering man-hours to correct these discrepancies."
DCP 93-082, NI Amplifiers And Processors - Gammametrics, was to install new power supplies in the Gammametrics Nis due to the power supply's failure rat The new power supplies were supplied at no charge by the vendor but were sold to investment recovery before this DCP could be writte Due to a decrease in the power supplies' failure rate, the licensee determined that the design change was not cost effective with the additional cost of purchasing new power supplies. Since neither the specific drawing discrepancies nor Gammametrics power supply failure history was reviewed by the inspectors, the validity of the licensee's cost/benefit statements were not assesse The inspectors concluded that, in general, the DCPs cancellations were appropriat Excluding the cancelled DCPs there was a small downward trend in the number of DCP A status review was also conducted of the number of DCP requests during October 1993 to September 199 During this timeframe, 92 requests were received while 99 requests were issue The number of outstanding request at the start and the end of the period was 56 while the number varied between 55 and 74 during the perio Thus, the DCP request backlog remained constant during the perio EOP Documentation Control VPAP-0506, EOP Development, Revision and Maintenance, provided requirements and guidelines for establishing and maintaining the EOPs and their supporting documentatio The Setpoint, Step Difference, Generic Applicability and Design Difference documents were maintained in accordance with NAF-233, EOP Deviation Basis Document Maintenanc The inspectors reviewed NAF-233 revision 2 issued September 30, 199 The procedure provided adequate controls to ensure that EOP changes were properly reflected into the above listed document Self-assessments and audits The inspectors reviewed assessments and audits reports written by various corporate engineering group The reports covered
engineering activities associated with areas such as welding procedures, fire protection program implementation, electric distribution load list maintenance and snubber program implementatio The reports identified both technical and process issue Significant issues were promptly addresse Less significant issues or isolated examples were resolved or scheduled for resolution in accordance with their relative significant and resource availabilit The inspectors determined that the internal engineering assessment/audit program was effectively utilized by the licensee to discover and resolve problem Violations or deviations were not identified in the areas inspecte.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92702) (Open) IFI 50-280, 281/93-18-01, Followup of Licensee Actions Associated with Surry Station Engineering Tracking Item No. 5135 The licensee actions taken on this item consisted of preparation of a corporate level engineering study concerning BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A Fire Protection Program compliance, and development of a cross-reference listing of Surry station programs and procedures that satisfy the Appendix A fire protection commitment The study noted that some of the listing's sections concerning Surry commitments required further review by the onsite organizations and included.a list of those item During an August-September 1994 QA Audit of the Surry Fire Protection Program (Audit No. S94-10), it was identified that the plant procedures listed in the fire protection program study as meeting the licensee's fire protection commitments did not reference the applicable parent commitment document The audit stated that this condition could result in a fire protection program change that would violate a Fire Protection Program commitmen Additionally, the audit identified.several discrepancies within the Fire Protection Program governing procedure, VPAP-240 Procedural inconsistencies exist in the fire protection program procedure, VPAP-2401, for implementing NRC Branch Technical Position BTP 9.5-1 (included in Chapter 12 of the Appendix R Report and the UFSAR) fire protection commitments related to personnel functional responsibilities and overall ownership of the Program onsite. Other discrepancies concerned inadequate fire brigade preplans (DR S94-1753), and inconsistent implementation of Surry Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report technical commitment The inspectors concluded that these QA Audit issues reflected the original type of discrepancies identified by the NRC inspectors in this IFI, indicating that corrective actions to address the Fire Protection Program issues had not yet been fully implemente Also, as a result of these identified issues, the licensee had
- placed on "HOLD" their proposed TS Change No. 260 regarding removal of fire protection requirements from TSs in response to GLs 86-10 and 88-1 This IFI remains open pending implementation of corrective actions to address the QA audit items, fire protection VPAP procedural updates, and completion of actions regarding approval by NRC of a license amendment to remove the fire protection program from TS (Closed) !FI 50-280, 281/93-18-02, Conduct of Fire Drill Exercises in Fire Areas Where Deviations from NRC Fire Protection Requirements Were Approve In response to this item, the licensee had developed a fire brigade drill scenario in accordance with procedure O-LSP-FP-004 for a charging pump cubicle (Fire Area No. 17).
Fire Drill Report 93-17 critique documentation was reviewed to verify that the drills had been successfully performe The actions taken were found to be satisfactory, therefore this item is close Violations or deviations were not identified in the areas inspecte.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 28 and November 18, 1994, and with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding Proprietary information is not contained in this repor No dissenting comments were received from the license Type/Item Number IFI 50-280, 281/94-30-01 IFI 50-280, 281/93-18-01 IFI 50-280, 281/93-18-02 Acronyms and Initialisms Architect/Engineer Status OPEN OPEN CLOSED Description/Paragraph N Review the results of the design study of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed Trip Setpoint (paragraph 3.c.l).
Followup of Licensee Actions Associated with Surry Station Engineering Tracking Item N (paragraph 6.a).
Conduct of Fire Drill Exercises in Fire Areas Where Deviations from NRC Fire Protection Requirements Were Approved (paragraph 6.b).
A/E ALARA ASME As Low As Reasonably Achievable American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BTP CDS CFR CLS eves DBD DCP DR EB EOG EDS EOP EQ ET EWR GL GW IEER IFI IPR LER MCR MMRT MSVH MVAR NAF NDCM NES NI NRC NRR ORR PM PPR PVNGS QA QC RCE RCP RCS REA Rev RH SRO SSA SSES STA TDAFW TM TS UFSAR VPAP
Branch Technical Position Controlled Document Summary Code of Federal Regulations Consequential Limiting Safeguards Chemical Volume and Control System Design Basis Document Design Change Package Deviation Report Black Battery Emergency Diesel Generator Equipment Data System Emergency Operating Procedure Environmental Qualification Engineering Transmittals Engineering Work Request Generic Letter Gaseous Waste Item Equivalency Evaluation Report Inspection Follqwup Item Installation Problem Report Licensee Event Report Main Control Room Modification Management Review Team Main steam Valve House Mega Volts Amps Reactive Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Nuclear Design Control Manual Nuclear Engineering Services Nuclear Instrumentation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operational Readiness Review Preventive Maintenance Potential Problem Report Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Quality Assurance Quality Control Root Cause Evaluation Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System Request for Engineering Assistance Revision Residual Heat Senior Reactor Operator Safe Shutdown Analysis Surry Station Engineering Services Shift Technical Advisor Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Temporary Modification Technical Specification Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Virginia Power Administrative Procedure