IR 05000280/1994012
| ML18153A986 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1994 |
| From: | Belisle G, Branch M, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153A985 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-94-12, 50-281-94-12, NUDOCS 9406290251 | |
| Download: ML18153A986 (11) | |
Text
Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 50-280/94-12 and 50-281/94-12 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and OPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry I and 2 Inspection Conducted:
May 8 through June 4, 1994 Inspectors:
Accompanying Approved by:
Scope:
M. W. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
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S. G. Ting~ent Inspector Personnel:
0. M. Tamai
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Reactor Projects Section 2A Division of Reactor Projects
. SUMMARY
{;-.)...-c,, - "l'"f Date Signed This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant status, operational safety verification, maintenance and surveillance inspections~ on-site engineering review, Licensee Event Report followup, and action on previous inspection item Inspections of backshift, holiday, and weekend activities were-conducted on May II, 12, 17, 19, 20, 27 and June 3 and Results:
Plant Operations functional area
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The operators' and plant systems response to the Unit 1 reattor trip that occurred on May 11 was good (paragraph 3.a).
The May 12 Unit I startup and June 3 Unit 2 shutdown were conducted in a deliberate and controlled manner and command and co~trol was goo Startup 9406290251 940621 PDR ADOCK 05000280 G
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and shutdown procedures were examples of upgraded procedures that were easily followed (paragraphs 3.b and 3.e).
Walkdowns of the low head safety injection and emergency diesel generator air start systems indicated that the systems were operable and in good overall condition (paragraph 3.c).
Maintenance functional area The maintenance and surveillance activities associated with the No. 3 emergency diesel generator start sequencing relays were satisfactorily accomplishe The upgraded maintenance and surveillance procedures were easily followed by maintenance/operations personne Post maintenance testing and Technical Specification requirements were properly implemented (paragraph 4).
Engineering functional area The temporary modification and safety evaluation associated with the installation of No. 2 emergency diesel generator fuei oil piping were adequate (paragraph 5).
- REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- H. Blake, Jr., *superintendent of Nuclear Site Services
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Maintenance
- B. Bryant, Licensing
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager J. Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Preparedriess
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
- D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection A. Friedman, Superintendent of Nuclear Training
- B. Hayes, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- D. Hayes, Superintendent of Administrative Services
- M: Kansler, Station Manager
- A.Keagy, Superintendent of Materials C. Luffman, Superintendent, Security J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- * R. Saunders, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- * K. Sloan. Superintendent of Operations, Acting E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers,-Superintendent of Engineering
- B; Stanley, Supervisor, Station Procedures J. Swi~ntoniewski, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety G. Woodzell, Nuclear Training Other licensee employees contacted included plant managers and supervisors, operators, engineers, technicians, mechanics, security force members, and office personne Management Changes Effective June 1, 1994, Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon replaced Mr. W. L. Stewart as Senior Vice President-Nuclear, and Mr. R. F. Saunders replaced Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon as Vice President, Nuclear Operation Mr. Saunders'
former position as Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations will not be fi 11 e NRC Personnel M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview
- Participated in Exit Interview via telephone conference call Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap *
2 Plant Status Unit 1 began the reporting period at 100% powe On May 11 the unit's reactor trip breakers were manually tripped open by operators due to low SG level Low SG levels occurred during surveillance testing when *an I&C technician inadvertently bumped a relay that caused the B MFW pump to trip and its discharge valve to close. The unit was restarted on May 12 and was at 100% power at the end of the perio The reactor trip and subsequent startup are discussed in paragraphs 3.a and b.
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Unit 2 began the reporting period at 90% powe The unit was at reduced power due to SG level oscillations and operated until it was shutdown on June 4 for a planned outage to clean SG The shutdown is discussed in paragraph Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the contro.l room to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved procedure The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed operator logs on a daily basis to verify operational safety and compliance with TSs and to maintain overall facility operational awarenes Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed from control room indication to assess operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection programs, radiological work practices, plant security programs and housekeepin Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential safety concerns were properly addressed and _reporte Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Report On May 11, the licensee made a non-emergency four-hour 10 CFR 50.72 report due to manually tripping Unit 1 from approximately 100% powe While I&C technicians were performing 1-IPT-FT-RP-SI-OOlA, Train A Safeguards Actuation Logic Functional Test, revision 1, a relay was inadvertently bumpe The relay contacts closed and tripped open the B MFW pump inboard moto A breaker interlock then caused the outboard pump motor breaker to trip ope The loss of the B MFW pump and subsequent closure of the pump discharge* isolation valve resulted in a significant reduction in SG feedwater flo Operators attempted to reduce power but manually tripped the unit to avoid an automatic trip due to decreasing levels in the SG AFW automatically initiated as designed on low low SG leve Minimum pressurizer level and pressure during.the transient was 14% and 1936 psig respectivel Minimum RCS temperature was 538 degrees Letdown automatically isolated and pressurizer heater breakers opened as designed on low pressurizer leve IRPis and rod bottom lights indicated that rods fully inserted and the steam dumps were utilized to control RCS temperatur No primary or secondary safety valves or PORVs opened during the even **
- The inspectors reported to the station after being notified of the even The inspectors verified that t~e unit was in a stable condition following the trip and attended the post trip revie The inspectors concluded that the operators' and plant systems response to the transient was goo The unit was restarted on May 1 Unit 1 Startup
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The inspectors witnessed sel~cted prirtions of the Unit 1 startup conducted May 12.. Procedure l-OP-RX-006, Withdrawal of the Control Banks to Critical Conditions, revision 0, was utilized to take the unit critical. The inspectors attended the pre-evolution brief conducted by the senior operations manager, monitored nuclear instrumentation during the'approach to criticality, and observed the STA perform the inverse count *rate ratio plots. The
.inspectors concluded that this evolution was conducted in a deliberate and controlled manner and that command and control was goo Procedure l-OP-RX-006 was an upgraded procedure that operators easily followe Biweekly ESF Inspections (1)
No. 1, 2, and 3 EDG Air Start Systems (2)
The inspecto~s walked down the air systems required to be operable for automatic start of the No. 1, 2, and 3 EDG Comprinents inspected were valve positions, air flask pressures, and general condition of system piping, valves, air motors and tanks.- Walkdown of the No. 3 EDG air start system was conducted several times during the inspection period following the completion of scheduled maintenance and testing.. The inspectors concluded that the systems were operable and in good overall condition~
LHSI Systems An inspection of the Unit 1 and 2 LHSI systems was conducte The inspectors walkea down the LHSI pumps and piping in the safeguards valve pit and reviewed the 1993 and 1994 performance copies of procedures OPT-SI-003, Quarterly Testing of SI MOVs and RWST TVs, revision 1 and OPT-SI-005, LHSI Pump Test, revision Components inspected were valve position, snubber condition, and material condition of the equipmen PT-18.lOJ, Verification of Local and Remote Valve Position Indications. of Safety Related Valves in Safeguards Valve Pit Area, revision 1, was used to verify agreement between local valve position indications and control room valve postion indications. The inspectors concluded that the system was operable and in good overall condition.
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- 4 Loss of Uriit 1 CST Level Indication On May 15, both Unit 1 CST control board indications, l-CN-LI-100 and l-CN-Ll-101 failed. One channel failed low and the other hig The failures were attributed to lightning strikes in the
- rea. Operators logged that the failures occurred at 9:08 p.m.*
The Unit 1 CST was filled until it overflowed in order to verify that the tank was ful TS-3.6~0 specifies that system piping, valves,. and control board indication required for operation of components listed in specification 3.6.B.2 be operabl TS 3.6.B.2 states minimum CST tank levels required to be available to the AFW pump The licensee considered that CST.level indication was requireci by TSs and a six hour LCO was entered in accordance with TS 3.0~ TS 3.0.1 requires that if requirements cannot be satisfied becaus~
of circumstances in excess of those addressed in the specification, the unit shall be placed in hot shutdown within six hour *
SNSOC convened and approved a plan to utilize an alternate method to monitor CST level until normal level indication was restore SNSOC also approved that a SE be prepared for the alternate means of CST level indication but did not have to be completed prior to implementation due to time and resource constraints. A heise gage wa~ installed at the base of-the CST and a heise gage pressure versus CST level graph was develope An operator in communication with the control room was stationed to continuously monitor the heise gage and the CST tank was to be filled until it overflowed every two hour In addition, Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW pump suction pressure-gages were compared to ensure that readings were similar. At 2:50 a.m. on May 16, tt,ese measures were implemented and the six hour LCO was exited. At 5:08 a.m. on May 16, 1-CN-Ll-100 was repaired and returned to servic On May 17, 1-CN-Ll-101 was repaired and returned to servic On May 17, SE 94-104 was_approved by SNSO This SE concluded that it was acceptable to utilize the commensurate actions implemented to monitor Unit 1 CST leve *
After additional review, the licensee concluded that TS 3.6.D did not require CST level instrumentation to be operable and therefore, entry into TS 3.0.l due to the loss-of control board CST level indication was a conservative measure and was not
- necessary. This conclusion was based on the review of TS Amendment No. 81 which stated that control board indication was for verification of the AFW valve alignment. At the end of the inspection period, the NRC staff was reviewing the licensee's interpretation of TS 3.6.D and this issue was identified as IFI 50-280/94-12-01, TS 3.6.D Interpretation.
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5 Unit 2 Shutdown On June 3 and 4 the inspectors witnessed the planned Unit 2 shutdow The unit was shutdown to perform SG chemical cleanin The inspectors witnessed ramping power down from 87% power and tripping the unit. Upgraded procedures 2-GOP~2.l, Unit Shutdown, Power Decrease From Maximum Allowable Power To 25%-30% Power, revision 3, 2-GOP~2.2, Unit Shutdown, 25%-30% Reactor Power To 2%
Reactor Power, revision 5, and *2-GOP-2.3, -Unit Shutdown, 2%
Reactor Power To HSD, revision 4 were utilized by operators to shutdown the unit._ The ramp was secured several times in order to adjust IRPi When the reactor trip breakers were opened, all IRPis indicated zero steps with the exception of rod M-1 IRPI for rod M-10 hung up at approximately 30 steps and slowly drifted to zero steps.over the remainder of ~he shif IRPI for rod M-10 is a recurring problem which was being investigated by the licensee. The inspectors concluded that this evolution was conducted in a slow controlled manner and that command and control was goo Shutdown procedures were examples of upgraded procedures that operators easily followe Within the areas inspected, no violations or_ deviations were identifie Maintenance And Surveillance Inspections (62703, 61726)
- During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the-following maintenance/surveillance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure No. 3 EDG Testing/Maintenance On May 19 and 20 the inspectors witnessed the testing and repair of the No. 3 EDG. "The EDG was initially tested in accordance with procedure O-OPT-EG-008, Number 3 EDG Starting Sequence Test, revision The purpose of this test was to verify proper operation of the No. 3 EDG air start motors, motor driven fuel oil pumps, speed sequencing relays and governor boost pump The inspectors reviewed O-OPT-EG-008, attended the pretest brief, and witnessed the test. When testing the redundant start circuits, the right bank air start motors failed to properly sequence on and off as required by the procedur The test was secured and a WO was issued to troubleshoot the relays that sequenced the air start motor DR S-94-1102 was also initiated to document the test failur *
The start sequencing relays were tested in accordance with WO 290213 01 and procedure O-ECM-0704-01, EDG Start and Shutdown Circuit Relay Adjustment And Replacement, revision*3. The inspectors witnessed portions of this testing and the testing identified six relays that required adjustment and three relays that required replacemen The relays were adjusted/replaced as required and reteste On May 20, O-EPT-EG-008 was recommenced and satisfactorily co~pleted. The inspectors discussed corrective actions* with the sys~em engineer who
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indicated that EDG start sequence relay adjustments have been required approximately every other refueling test cycle. At the end of the inspection period, the system engineer was evaluating long term corrective actions that would be addressed in the response to DR S-94-110 During a subsequent inspection -period the inspectors will review corrective actions for DR S-94-110 *
During the performance of this testing and maintena~ce, No. 3 EDG was considered inoperable and the appropriate TS LCOs ~ere entere TS 3.16.B.l.a.2 requires that if an EDG becomes inoperabl~ due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, the operability of the remaining operable EDG must *be demonstrated dail The inspector~ evaluated the need to test Na. 1 and 2 EDGs daily while the No. 3 EDG relay maintenance was being performed.. The inspectors concluded that daily testing of the No. 1 and 2 EDGs was not require The basis for-this conclusion was that the No. 3 EDG was able to automatically start on demand in the condition with degraded start sequence relays. The relay maintenance could have been performed at a later date but the licensee prudently made the necessary repairs when the ~egraded condition was discovered *.
Maintenance procedure O-ECM-0704-01 and surveillance procedure O-OPT-EG-008, were upgraded procedures that were easily performed by maintenance/operations personnel. The inspectors reviewed the assigned PMT requirements for replacement/adjustment of the No. 3 EDG relays *
which required that the EDG be tested in accordance with O-OPT-EG-00 The inspectors concluded that this test satisfactorily tested the relays and this surveillance/maintenance activity was satisfactorily accomplished by the license Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie.
On-Site Engineering Review (37551)
No. 2 EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Discharge Piping Temporary Modification During the inspection period, a fuel oil leak was identified in the discharge piping of the No. 2 EDG fuel oil transfer pump 1-EE-P-l TM S2-94-05 was implemented to bypass the leaking pipe by installing mechanical jumpers to a spare EDG fuel oil transfer pip One jumper was utilized to connect the dischar~e of pump 1-EE-P-lE to the spare EDG fuel oil transfer piping and the other jumper connected the spare piping to the No. 2 EDG day tank inlet. The inspectors reviewed TM S2-94-05 and supporting SE 94-100 and walked down the TM during and after installation. The inspectors verified that applicable Appendix Rand TS requirements were met and that the TM was installed per installation drawing The* inspectors concluded that the TM.and SE were adequat The licensee was planning to prepare a DCP to convert the TM into a permanent design chang Within the areas inspected, no violations or de~iations were identifie *
7 Licensee Event Report Followup (92700) The inspectors reviewed the LER listed below and evaluated the adequacy of the corrective acti.o The inspectors' review also included followup of the licensee's corrective action implementatio (Closed) LER 50-280/92-07; Unit 1 Reacto~ Trip/Turbine Trip Due to Contract Personnel Performing Unauthorized Turbine 'Maintenance.* This issue involved an automatic Unit 1 reactor trip due_ to an error made by contract maintenance personnel. The cause of the trip and the corrective actions to restart the unit were discussed jn NRC Inspection Report NOs. 50-280, 281/92-1 As actions to prevent recurrence, RCE 92-002 was performed to verify the root cause of the event and identify corrective action The inspectors reviewed RCE 92-002 which concluded that Westinghouse personnel should be required to comply with station procedures when systems/components are isolated and turned over to Westinghouse for maintenanc In a letter dated September 21, 1992, Westinghouse on-site personnel were directed to adhere to specific station administrative maintenance procedure Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie Action on Previous Inspection Items (92701)
. (Closed) URI 50-280, 281/92-22-03, l&C Maintenance Practices. The first -
part of this URI involved an apparent discrepancy between the actual practice of not danger tagging instrument valves and the VPAP-1402, Control of Equipment, Tag-Outs, and Tags, requirement to utilize danger tags for establishing safe work boundarie The inspectors reviewed revision 2 to VPAP-1402 which was implemented to provide additional guidance to the l&C technicians when i~olating and re~oving components for calibration and/or repair. Step 5.3.1.b required that an l&C technician remain at the work site when an instrument is removed unless the system opening is capped, plugged, or tagged ou The inspectors concluded that this resolved the apparent di screpan*c The second part of this URI involved past practices for performing in-place calibrations following the installation of new transmitter The licensee reiiewed five work orders involving transmitter replacement and calibration. Based on this review it was concluded that it was common practice to perform bench calibrations prior to installation and in place calibrations after installation. The inspectors reviewed the approved PMT program requirements for transmitter replacemen The PMT program required that transmitters be tested in accordance with calibration procedures follo~ing replacemen The inspectors reviewed 1-PT-2.3A, Pressurizer Level Protection (L-1-459), revision 4 and l-PT-2.5A, Steam Generator Level (L-1-494), revision 3, and verified that these calibration procedures required transmitters to be calibrated in place following replacement.**
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations wer~ identifie **.
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8 Exit Interview 9.
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 7, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. * The inspectors described the area inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results addressed in the Summary section and those listed belo Item Type/Number IFI 50-280/94-12-01 LER 50-280/92~07 URI 50-280, 281/92-22-03 status Open Closed*
Closed Description/(Paraqraph No.)*
TS 3.6.D Interpretation (paragraph 3.d).
Unit 1 Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip Due to Contract Personnel Performing Unauthorized Turbine Maintenance (paragraph 6).
I&C Maintenance Practices (paragraph 7).
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the license Index of Acronyms and lnitialisms AFW CFR
HSD l&C IFI IRPI LER LCO LHSI MFW MOV N NRC PMT PORV PSIG RC RCS RWST AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE DEVIATION REPORT EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
- FAHRENHEIT HOT SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP ITEM INDIVIDUAL ROD POSITION INDICATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION*
LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION MAIN FEEDWATER MOTOR OPERATED VALVE NUMBE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POST MAINTENANCE TEST POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH - GAGE ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK y
SE SAFETY EVALUATION SG STEAM GENERATOR SI SAFETY INJECTION SNSOC STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE STA SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR TS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TM TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TV TRIP VALVE URI UNRESOLVED ITEM VPAP VIRGINIA POWER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WO WORK ORDER