IR 05000280/1986022
| ML18149A409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1986 |
| From: | Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18149A407 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-86-22, 50-281-86-22, NUDOCS 8611040118 | |
| Download: ML18149A409 (16) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 OCT 2 9 1986 Report Nos.:
50-280/86-22 and 50-281/86-22 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: September 29 - October 1, 1986 Inspector: 0~ /Jc~-
W. M. Sartor Accompanying Personnel: J. M. Will
/lM. 9f Stein Approved by: \\ f /( t./Lt!,#..t<...-
T. R. Decker, Section Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Date Signed Dat'e Signed Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was in the area of the annual Surry Power Station emergency exercise involving observations by three NRC representatives of the key emergency organization functions and locations during the exercis Results:
Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Three exercise weaknesses were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- W. L. Stewart, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- R. J. Hardwick, Manager, Nuclear Programs and Licensing
- W. W. Cameron, Director Health Physics
- R. F. Saunders, Surry Station Manager
- S. R. Burgold, Surry Projects Supervisor
- G. A. Polson, Corporate Emergency Planning Coordinator
- T. B. Costello, Surry Emergency Planning Coordinator
- S. A. Harrison, North Anna Emergency Planning Coordinator
- N. E. Clark, Surry Quality Assurance
- H. L. Miller, Surry Assistant Station Manager Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personne NRC Resident Inspector W. Holland
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 1, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 abov The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection finding No dissenting comments were received from the license The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provi s i ans had been made to test the integrated capabi 1 ity and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and Organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on several occasions. A concern was
identified to the licensee's scenario/controller team regarding the lack of contingency messages to control expected player actions to assure tracking the scenario events and dat The licensee attempted to control the events during the exercise through freeplay which led to unnecessary confusion and inconsistencies affecting both controllers and player These scenario problems were discussed with the licensee's management representatives and identified as an exercise weakness at the critique on October 1, 1986 (50-280/86-22-01).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.A of NUREG 0654, Revision The inspectors verified that the licensee's plan and procedures provided for the assignment of primary responsibilities for emergency respons Adequate staff was available for the principal response organization during this partial participation exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.B of NUREG-0654, Revision 1:
(1) responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined; (2) adequate staffing was provided to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) onsite and offsite support organizational interactions were specifie The inspectors observed much of the activation, staffing, and operation of the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF).
Staffing was prompt at a 11 1 ocati ons and emergency response organizations were activated in a timely manner with one exception in the OS The acting OSC director reported to the TSC that the OSC was operational prior to having any health physics personnel available. This later caused some minor delay in sending a repair team out from the OSC and was identified as an inspector fo 11 owup i tern { 50-280/86-22-02).
The 1 i censee acknowledged the need to report any functional areas not yet manned when providing the initial activation report from the DSC to the TS After activation of the LEOF, the Recovery Manager (in the LEOF) assumed the responsibility for communicating with the State and local governments. It
- was also noted by the inspector that the Recovery Manager was making protective action recommendations to the Virginia Department of Energy Services Manager located in the LEO Although this responsibility is probably best vested in the Recovery Manager of an activated LEOF, as demonstrated by the licensee, it was contrary to Section 5.2.1.1 of the licensee's Emergency Pla The Plan stated that the responsibility for recommending protective actions may not be delegated by the Station Emergency Manager, but that it can be assumed by the Recovery Manage Since this responsibility had not been assumed by the Recovery Manager, it was identified as an exercise weakness (50-286/86-22-03).
The licensee acknowledged the need to clarify the Emergency Plan regarding which responsibilities are expected to be assumed by the Recovery Manager and which are expected to remain with the Station Emergency Manage The licensee's Local Public News Center and Corporate Emergency Response Center were activated and operational during a major portion of the exercise to support the onsite organization in their respective role However, these areas were not observed by the NRC inspection tea No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector noted that arrangements for requesting assistance resources are provided for in the Emergency Pla The licensee has made arrangements in the LEOF to provide for federal and State official No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the implementing procedure The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie *
- Notification Methods and Procedure (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b){5), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizatio No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that prov1s10ns existed for prompt communications among the pri nci pal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b){6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization appeared to be adequate throughout the exercis The licensee effectively used alternate means of communications for the TSC insta-phone and the LEOF to Local Public News Center ring-down telephones which were not fully functional during the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie.
Public Education and Information (82301)
1 This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency has been made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47{b){7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercis The licensee established its Local Public News Cente No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I *
The emergency response facilities were activated and promptly staffed during the exercis The facilities appeared to be adequately equipped to support the emergency respons No violations or deviations were identifie. Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a raoiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the acciden An integral portion of the accident assessment program is the availability of current plant status and core assessment dat It was noted by an inspector in the LEOF that no hard copy transmittal of plant status and core assessment data was provided to the LEOF or CECC from 2148 to.2254 hours0.0261 days <br />0.626 hours <br />0.00373 weeks <br />8.57647e-4 months <br />. This failure to provide approved updated status data to the LEOF and CECC was identified as an exercise weakness (50-286/86-22-04).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l)~ and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I '
An inspector verified that the 1 i censee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the ten-mile EP The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteri Additionally, prior to termination of the exercise, the licensee conducted a planning phase to simulate transition into the recovery mod No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise*and weaknesses noted in the 1 icensee' s emergency response organizations were formally presented to 1 i censee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted a post-exercise critique following the exercise on October 1, 1986, and the results were presented to licensee management later that mornin The licensee's critique identified some 22 items requiring additional investigation or corrective actions (50-286/86-22-05).
Following the management critique, the NRC inspector provided preliminary findings observed during the exercis Discussion also addressed the need for additiona 1 time between exercise termination and forma 1 critiqu This should be particularly valuable to the licensee to better determine 11why
events were wrong while the controller/observer teams are still togethe Once the team consisting of North Anna Station, Surry Station, and Corporate personnel returns to their respective sites, the opportunity for good discussion of problem areas noted and corrective actions needed is essentially los No violations or deviations were identifie.
Inspector Followup (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Foll owup Item 50-280/85-33-03:
Protective action recommendations (PAR) for keyhole area around plan An inspector observed that the PAR made were consistent with the licensee's procedur Attachment:
Surry Emergency Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Summary
e SCOPE OF EXERCISE On October 1, 1986, Virginia Electric and Power Company intends to demonstrate its capability to effectively implement the Surry Power Station (SPS)
Emergency Plan in a small scale exercis The purpose of this exercise is to activate and evaluate major portions of the Emergency Plan, associated implementing procedures, and selected portions of the Virginia Electric and Power Company Corporate Emergency Response Pl an in accordance with Nuc 1 ear Regulatory Corrmission Regulation 10CFR50.47(b)(I4).
A scenario shall be prepared to accomplish a successive escalation of the emergency from the "Notification of Unusual Event" to a 11Site Area Emergency" classification as outlined in NUREG-065 Free play is encouraged and controllers will only interfere with the play if the exercise lags behind schedule, if the emergency response personnel take incorrect actions to carry them to the next exercise event, or if action is taken that would correct the expected simulated response earlier than scheduled by the scenari At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the routine safe operation of the statio Station management may, at their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of... ti_me* necessary to ensure this goa Exercise "players" will not have prior knowledge of the simulated incident or any parts thereo The Technical Support Center, the Operations Support Center, and the Local Emergency Operations Facility will be activated in response to appropriate scenario action *
Virginia Electric and. Power Company also intends to activate the Corporate Emergency Response Plan and associated implementing procedures at its General Office Building in Richmond, Virginia, to demonstrate the Corporate Emergency Response Center capability to interact with the Local. Emergency Operations Facility and the Local Public News Center.
I OBJECTIVES OF EXERCISE The objectives of this exercise are to demonstrate by actual performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions as they relate to the Surry Power Station (SPS) Emergency Pla The simulated accident will involve response and.subsequent recovery actions to include:
classification, notification of company personnel and emergency off-site organizations, simulated actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with th~ even In addition, the exercise will simu~ate an emergency that results in off-site radiological releas Simulations of some aspects of emergency preparedness, without actual demonstrations by
- the Station or Corporate entities, may occur where it is deemed impractical to call for personnel involvemen The following objectives have been developed in order to establish the scope of the 1986 SPS eme*rgency exercis The objectives ensure that required events are included in the exercise scenario, and establish criteria to be evaluated by controllers and observers during the actual conduct of the exercis GAP/jmj/SP4/122
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A. OVERALL STATION OBJECTIVES 1. Demonstrate the emergency organization I s ability to make proper decisions related to emergency radiation exposure guidelines, and the capability to implement these decision.
Demonstrate at emergency facilities the ability to establish and maintain emergency management command and control authority., and maintain continuity of authority throughout the exercis.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and make recommendations to protect station personnel public based on plant parameters and/or informatio protective action
~nd the general field monitoring Demonstrate the ability to classify actual or potential emergencies in accordance with SPS Emergency Pl an Imp 1 ement i ng Procedure.
Demonstrate the ability equipment alterations in systems or components and to develop alternative systems or response to accident affected plant to formulate respective procedures to accompany these required modifications, if necessar.
Demonstrate the capability to ascertain and to requisition the necessary parts to perform corrective maintenance on damaged equipment, if necessar.
Demonstrate the ability to evacuate designated non-essential personnel from the sit GAP/jmj/SP4/122
A. OVERALL STATION OBJECTIVES (continued) Si mu 1 ate transition into the recovery mod Requests ' for simulated technical support will _be made, as well as transmitting information to the facilities needed for recovery suppor.
Demonstrate the ability to augment the on-shift emergency organization to support emergency operations in a timely and effective manne. Conduct an effective critique, in order to disclose significant exercise findings which require corrective actio B. OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES Demonstrate the ability of the Operations Staff to recognize operational symptoms indicative of degrading plant condition.. Demonstrate proficiency in evaluating parameters, * properly categorizing the situation utilizing the station's emergency action * level scheme, and making the requisite emergency classificatio.
Demonstrate the ability to properly escalate the emergency classificatio.
D~monstr:ate efficient and effective use of notification/alerting procedures and method.
Demonstrate effective communications/informational flow from the control room (simulated control room) to supporting location C. SECURITY OBJECTIVES Demonstrate the adequacy of access control and security for emergency response facilitie GAP/jmj/SP4/122
- C. SECURITY OBJECTIVES (continued) Demonstrate station employee accountabilit.
Demonstrate the ability to implement site evacuation and access procedure.
Demonstrate call-out of station personne D. HEALTH PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OBJECTIVES Demonstrate the necessary radiological controls to remove a contaminated injured individual from an accident scene and to assist the medical team in minimizing the consequences of a contaminated individua.
Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessments, and to formulate offsite radiological dose projection.
Demonstrate the use of the Post Accident Sampling System to obtain samples in support of accident assessment activitie.
Demonstrate collection and analysis of water, vegetation, soil, and air samples both on-site and off-site, as appropriat.
Demonstrate use of communications by the monitoring teams, to include sending, receiving, and understanding message conten.
Demonstrate response to and analysis of simulated elevated airborne and/or liquid activity levels (as appropriate), and of simulated elevated area radiation levels *
GAP/jmj/SP4/122
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D. HEALTH PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OBJECTIVES (continued) Demonstrate initiation and use of appropriate procedures for the collection, analysis, and documentation of Post-Accident and Environmental Monitoring samples, and for Radiological Monitoring evaluatio.
Demonstrate the ability to assess data obtained as a result of sampling activities, and the ability to factor results into the overall assessment proces E. HEALTH & SAFETY OBJECTIVES 1. Simulate the injury and contamination of one employee and demonstrate appropriate response:.
a)
Transportation to an offsite medical facility; and b)
Participation by the offsite medical facilit.
Demonstrate that surrounding Volunteer Rescue Squads can send supporting units to the station and simulate successful life support missions in coordination with station personnel assigned to the task F. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY OBJECTIVES Demonstrate the staffing of the following Emergency Response Facilities:
GAP/jmj/SP4/122 Control Room (CR) or Simulated Control Room Technical Support Center (TSC)
Operational Support Center (OSC)
Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
F. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY OBJECTIVES (continued) Demonstrate the communications capabilities of the Control Room (Simulated Control Room),
TSC, OSC, LEOF, and CERC, and the ability to maintain these communications with Federal, State, and local government This shall include sending, receiving, and understanding the content of messages involve.
Demonstrate the proper utilization of the Emergency Response Facilities and that adequate emergency response equipment exist G. CORPORATE OBJECTIVES 1. Demonstrate that the LEOF can be adequately staffed and communications properly establishe.
Demonstrate that the CERC can be adequately staffed and made functional (e.g., maintain communications, provide engineering assistance, provide logistic support, and establish a Rumor Contro 1 group). Demonstrate the activation of the Local Media Cente.
Demonstrate coordination of news announcements with off-site emergency response agencie.
Demonstrate the timely release and distribution of news announcement.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct timely and informative media briefing.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to outside news inquiries, if receive GAP/jmj/SP4/122
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.SCENARIO NARRATIVE The scenario begins with a hurricane watch being declared for Southeastern Virginia, including Surry Count The Surry Power Station Emergency Plan (SEP)
is activated with a declaration of NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVEN A loose part in the RCS causes a portion of RCP 11C 11 impeller to break of Intense vibration causes the pump to annunciate its alarm, resulting in a reactor trip. Post-trip conditions proceed normally until circuit 25Al fail This results in the loss of RCP "A".
Storm damage to the primary overhead 1 i ne causes the loss of RSS "B".
This results in the loss of RCP "B" and places the RCS on natural circulation using the Main Steam PORV Loose parts and debris in the RCS causes coolant flow blockage to some fuel assemblie Since natural circulation is inadequate to cool the affected assemblies, fuel cladding failure occur An ALERT is declared when RCS activity exceeds 300 µCi/gm I-131 dose equivalen Early in the scenario a primary to secondary leak develops in S/G "B".
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared based on the High-Range Radiation Monitor on Main Steam line "B" or projected offsite dose when MS Line "B" cannot be isolated due to failure of the PORV and the manual isolation valv A member of the maintenance team sent to repair the "B" Steam Generator PORV isolation valve becomes dizzy after working 30 minutes on the upper level of Unit #2 safeguard During his return to clean change the victim faints and fa 11 s in the a 11 ey way hitting his head on the propane tank rack near the service building entranc The victim receives a 3 inch laceration above his 1 eft eye, is bleeding, unconscious and suffering from heat exhaustio He also has suffered a concussion from the fal The HP survey team in the alley way reports the accident and determines the individual has been contaminated as a result of the radioactive steam being released from Unit 2 safeguard Injuries are severe enough to warrant transportation to the hospita Field Monitoring Teams are dispatched to assess release to the environment. A site evacuation is ordered because of a projected release time of li hours due to time it will take to fix the POR The isolation of the PORV one hour later terminates the releas Upon restoration of circuit 25Al, RCP 11A" becomes available for forced circulation that provides adequate cooling to the cor GAP/ jmj/SPll/318