IR 05000280/1986004
| ML18149A073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1986 |
| From: | Burke D, Marlone Davis, Ignatonis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18149A069 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-86-04, 50-280-86-4, 50-281-86-04, 50-281-86-4, NUDOCS 8604020415 | |
| Download: ML18149A073 (5) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-280/86-04 and 50-281/86-04 Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 5U-281 License Nos.:
DPR-32 and D~R-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
February 4,
- March 3, 1986 lnspectors:-:=-&it?~~.,,:;g.~~~'f£3.~:::::::::;~-=--:-----:--=-~~~~~~~~~
D. j>r M. J.£X)ais, Resident Inspector Approved by:
U (}. cfu;;;?,~
A J. Ign'.a'tonis',/.5ection Chief Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Date' Signed 31.z-61?&
Date Signed Scope:
This inspection involved 190 inspector-hours in the area of plant operations and operating records, pla11t maintenance and surveillance, plant security, followup of events, and licensee event report Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted R. F. Saunders, Station Manager D. L. Benson, Assistant Station Manager H. L. M11ler, Assistant Station Manager D. A. Christian, Superintendent of Operations E. S. Grecheck, Superintendent of Technical Services J. W. Patrick, Superintendent of Maintenance J. Logan, Supervisor, Safety Engineering Staff S. Sarver, Superintendent of Health Physics R. Johnson, Operations Supervisor R. Driscoll, Site Quality Assurance Manager Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors, chemistry, health physics, plant maintenance, security, engineering, administrative, records, contractor personnel and supervisors.
- Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on a weekly basis with certain individuals identified in paragraph The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio * Licensee Action On Previous Enforcement Matters This item was not inspected during this reporting perio.
Unresolved Items Unresolved Items were not identified during this inspectio.
Operations Units 1 and 2 were inspected and reviewed during the inspection perio The inspectors routinely toured the control room and other plant areas to verify that plant operations, testing and maintenance were being conducted in accordance with the facility Technical Specifications (TS)
and procedures. The inspectors verified that monitoring equipment was recording as required, that equipment was properly tagged, and that plant housekeeping efforts were ade~uat The inspectors also deter-*
mined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, that clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures,
. that excess materi a 1 s or equipment was stored properly, and that
r- --
- combustible material and debris were disposed of expeditiousl During tours, the inspectors monitored the plant for unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, piping hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment and instrument calibration date Certain tours were conducted on backshift Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital battery rooms, fire pump house, emergency switchgear rooms, di ese 1 generator rooms, contra 1 room, auxiliary building, and cable penetration areas to verify certain breaker and equipment conditions and positions for safety-re 1 ated component The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of eme~gency core coo 1 ~ ng systems and engineered safety features systems to verify operability and observe maintenance and testing of certain equipment and components in these system Unit 1 began the reporting period in a cold shutdown condition in the midst of a two week maintenance and snubber inspection outag A reactor startup was conducted on February 7, 198 During power ascension the reactor tripped from approximately 20 percent due to a high water level signal from the 1C1 steam generator while in manual level contro All systems functioned normally and the unit was restarted early in the day of February During the restart when the 1C1 main steam trip valve was opened, the resulting swell caused a high 1 eve 1 condition in the I C I steam generato The I C I steam generator blowdown trip valves went shut and the main feedwater pump tripped, causing an automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater pump Subse-quent investigation of the high level condition revealed that the 1C1 main feed regulator valve bypass valve (HCV-FW-155C) was open with zero demand on the controlle Instrument technicians subsequently inspected and cleaned the air pilot relay for HCV-FW-155C and returned the va 1 ve to s.ervi c The unit was subsequently returned to power operation and operated at power for the remainder of the reporting p*eri o Unit 2 began the reporting period operating at powe On February 16, 1986, Unit 2 commenced ramping down in preparation for an eight day maintenance and snubber inspection outage, During the rampdown, shortly after the main generator was taken off line, the unit experi-enced a turbine trip/reactor trip on I BI steam generator high-high level due to leakage past the main feedwater regulating valv All systems responded normally and the unit continued with the shutdown/
cooldown for the maintenance outag The unit was restarted and returned to power operation on February 24, 1986, and operated at power for the remainder of the reporting perio The resid.ent inspector observed the startup and verified that critical rod position was within the window predicted by the estimated critical positio *
,
3 Resolution And Followup Actions For The NRC Vendor Program Branch Inspection (Report 50-280 and 281/85-35, dated January 14, 1986)
The NRC Division of Quality Assurance Vendor Program Branch (VPB) inspectors conducted inspections at the Surry Power Station; the inspection results are documented in the report referenced abov The resident inspectors coordi-nated with the VPB inspectors during the VPB inspection at Surr The following items were resolved by the resident inspectors: Item 6.a concerned Westinghouse Technical Bulletin 85-08 -
Emergency Hydrogen Recombine The bulletin informed all facilities using a Westinghouse supplied hydrogen recombiner of a general worksmanship problem that could lead to heater power supply cable insulation damag The TB recommended an inspection of the power supply cable for damage and a check for evidence of burrs or sharp edges on metal parts that might cause cable damag The resident inspector reviewed electrical preventive maintenance procedure HG-CP-E/Rl II PMP for Hydrogen Recom-bi ner and Associated Control Panels 11 performed on February 20, 1986, which specifically inspected the power supply panel No problems were foun The resident inspector also reviewed Period Test 2-PT-3 Electric Hydrogen Recombi ners 11 which was performed October 30, 198 The PT performed an operational test of the hydrogen recombiner Each recombiner rr;et the acceptance criteria by reaching the operating temperature band of 1200 +/- 50°F in four hours. This item is considered close * Item 6.b discussed Westinghouse Technical Bulletin 83-03, DB/OS Circuit Breaker Shunt and Undervoltage Coils Trip Test. The information in the Bulletin was evaluated and the plant maintenance and testing procedures were revised in 1984 to independently test the shunt and UV coil trip function, which is why changes to the station procedures were not require This item was previously close.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below to ascertain whether NRC reporting requirements were being met and to determine the appropriateness of corrective actions taken and planne Certain LERs were reviewed in greater detail to verify corrective action and determine compliance with the TS and other regulatory requirement The review included examination of the logbooks, internal correspondence and review of Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee meeting minutes and discussion with various staff member (Closed) LERs 280/86-02, 86-04, and 86-06 concerned activity spikes of dose equivalent Iodine-131 following unit trip The activity levels exceeded the TS limit of 1.0 microcuries/c The maximum activity was 2.26 micro-curies/c The activity spikes were caused by known, but not specifically
located fuel element defect Post-shutdown conditions enhanced the release of fission products, causing an increase in reactor coolant specific activit The level of activity was monitored at least once every four hours until it returned to less than 1.0 microcuries/c (Closed) LER 280/86-08 concerned the automatic start of auxiliary feedwater pump 1-FW-P-38 during protection system logic testin A failed relay caused the automatic start; the relay was replaced and the components satisfactorily tested and returned to servic (Closed) LER 281/85-14 concerned a rod control urgent failure alarm caused by a failed A-101 pulser card in the logic cabine The failed card was replaced, the urgent failure alarm was reset, and correct rod motion was verifie (Closed) LER 281/85-12 concerned an inadvertent dilution during reactor coolant system fill operation The dilution was caused by problems in the boric acid/Primary Grade Water blend syste Calibration drift on the flow transmitter inputting to the boric acid integrator caused inaccurate operation of the boric acid flow controlle The boric acid concentration of the blended flow was increased and a shutdown margin calculation was performed; adequate shutdown margin was verifie Instrument technicians r~calibrated the blend system transmitter and system operation was verified to be satisfactor.
Plant Physical Protection Gates and doors in protected and vital area barriers were closed and locked when not attende Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructe Personnel were properly identified, searched, authorized, badged and escorted as necessary for plant access contro Isolation zones described in the physical security plans were not compromised or obstructed.