IR 05000275/1997021
| ML20197B368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197B373 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-97-21, 50-323-97-21, NUDOCS 9712230361 | |
| Download: ML20197B368 (12) | |
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ENCLOSURE
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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Docket Nos.:
50 275: 50 323
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. License Nos.:
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Report No.:
50 275/97 21; 50 323/97-21 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility:.
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
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Location:
71/2 miles NW of Awila Beach Avila Beach, California Dates:
December 1-5,1997 Inspector:
D. W. Schaefer, Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch Approved By:
Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information
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9712230361 971211 PDR ADOCK 05000275 G
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2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Diabic Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-275/97 21: 50-323/97 21 This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected included protected area barriors and detection aids, vital area barriers and detection aids, compensatory measures, security system power supply, security event logs, security training and qualification, and protection of safeguards information.
Plant Sucoort Good protected area barriers and detection systems were maintained. During
performance testing of the detection system, all attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected (Section S2.1).
Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were in place that would provide
delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entry (Section S2.2).
The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. Security
personnel were well trained on the program requirements (Section S2,3).
A very good security backup power supply system was in place. Monthly tests of
this system indicated that it performed extremely well (Section S2.4).
A very good records and reports program was in place. Tne security staff was
correctly reporting security events (Section S3.1).
A very good security training program had been impleinented. Medical examinations
for security officers were thorough and well documented (Section SS.1).
A very good program to protect safeguards information was in place. An excellent
training video provided instructions to individuals regarding the overall protection of safeguards information (Section S8.1).
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~ Resort Details IV. Plant Suncort.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
- S2.1 - Protected Area Barrier and Detection Aids a.
Insoection Scoce (71750 and 81700)
The inspector reviewed the protected area barrier and detection aids to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected.
included the features of the protected area barrier and the design and capabilities of
- the detection tids system.
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Observations and Findinas The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection of the protected area barrier and determined that the protected area barrier was installed and maintained as described in the physical security plan. Additionally, the inspector determined that the protected area barrier provided penetration resistance to both forced and surreptitious entry and was adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary.
The inspector observed the licensee test the perimeter microwave system at tha main protected area and at the intake structure protected area. The detection system at both protected areas was well designed and maintained. All attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected. The licensee'.s tests of the system were performance based to ensure that system failures were discovered and corrected.
Additionally, the inspector verified that an alarm annunciated in the continuously manned security alarm stations, c.
Conclusions Good protected area barriers and detection systems were maintained. During performance testing of the detection system, all attempts to intrude into the protected area were detected.
S2.2 Vital Area Barriers and Detection Aids a.
Inspection Scoca (81700)
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The inspector observed the licensee's vital area barriers and detection aids to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan.
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b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through observation and testing that the vital areas were appropriately locked and alarmed and that the vital area barriers were adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary. The inspector's random observations determined that unescorted access into vital areas was limited to authorized personnel. The alarms annunciated in continuously manned alarm stations. The vital area door locking mechanisms and alarms were properly tested. Er ergency exits from vital areas vv te locked and alarmed.
The inspector observed the licensee test the vital area detection aids. All attempts to intrude into the vital areas were detected. The licensee's tests of the vital area detection system were performa.r.e based to ensure that system f ailures were discovered and corrected, c.
Conclusions Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were in place that would provide delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entry.
S 2.3 Compensatory Measures a.
Insoection Scoce (81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures program to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measures, b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector confirmed through observations that the licensee deployed compensatary measures in o manner consistent with the requirements in the physical security plan. The inspector determined through interviews that the security personnel assigned to compensatory security posts were properly trained for those duties, c.
Conclusions The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirement..
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S2.4 Security System Power Supply.
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Insnection Scoon (71750)
- The security system power supply was inspected to determine compliance with the f
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requirements of the physical security plan.
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lQbservations and Findinas -
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's design and operation of the security backup power supply system that provided emergency power to required security equipment. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the licensee's records for testing
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= the security diesel generator and the uninterruptable power system (UPS). As designed, upon simulating a loss of off site power, the internal battery system immediately took over supplying required components of the security systems with -
power until the security diesel generator automatically started and assumed the
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-load. The test required the system to remain on the security diesel for
- approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This test of the system was conducted every raonth as a
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part of the preventive maintenance and testing program. The inspector determined through a review of records and interviews of security staff that the security backup power supply system performed as required. The inspector also verified through
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interviews with alarm station operators that, upon transfer to the backup power
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system, an automatic indication was received in the al6rm stations.
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Conclusions A very good security backup power supply system was in place. Monthly tests of this system indicated that it performed extremely well.
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S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Security Event Logs a.
insoection Scoon (81700)
The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),
10 CFR 26.73, and the physical secunty plan, b.
Observations and Findinos The inspector reviewed the security event logs from July 1 to November 17,1997.
' The records were available for review and maintained for the time required by
. regulations. The inspector. determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory
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requirements regarding the reporting of security events. The logs and supporting
- security incident reports were accurate, neat, and contained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine root cause, reportability, and corrective action taken.
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The licensee's records included trending and analysis of the major entegories of-events.
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- Conclusions A very good records and reports program was in place. The security staff _was-correctly reporting security events.
S5
- Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification
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SS.1 Security Training and Qualification a.
Innoection Scone (81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the security, training, and qualification plan and the contingency plan, b.
Observations and Findinas The security orgsnization conducted all required training in accordance with its approved security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector confirmed, by a review of the composite security training records that the required training was conducted every 12 months.
The inspector interviewed two members that recently graduated from the Nuclear Security Officer (NSO) Academy. The inspector determined through interviews that the licensee's initial training had been very thorough and met all requirements of the approved security plans. The individuals' knowledge of station security procedures and requirements was excellent, Additionally, the inspector observed security officers during the performance of their
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duties. All security officers displayed excellent conduct and knowledge of the
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The inspector reviewed training and qualification records for six security officers.
The training records were complete and maintained in a very orderly f ashion. The results of the medical examinations were properly documented in the training records. The inspector interviewed security officers and confirmed that the medical examinations were thorough.
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Conclusions A very good security training program had Deen implemented. Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented.
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- -7 S8
. Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues (MC 81810,92700,92904)
S8.1 Protection of Safeguards Information a.-
1nsoection Snone (81810)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for protection of safeguards q
information to determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of -
Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed 32 of the 78 locations used to store safeguards information.
The inspector determined through interviews and observations that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the protection of safeguards information. The licensee restricted access to safeguards to authorized persons with a need to know and disclosed this information only to authorized persons.
When unattended, safeguards information was stored in a locked security storage container, and combinations to these containers were known only by authorized individuals. Additionally, while in use or otherwise outside of a locked security storage container, safeguards information was under the control of an authorized individual.
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The inspector also verified that each page of documents containing safeguards information was conspicuously marked. Additionally, the front and back pages of each document were conspicuously marked, and these documents were reproduced only to the minimum extent necessary. The licensee properly destroyed documents containing safeguards information via shredding. Additionally, when transmitted outside an authorized place of use or storage, these documents were packaged to conceal the presence of safeguards information.
The inspector viewed a tmining video that the licensee had recently updated. The video provided excellent instructions regarding the control, handling, marking, processing, storage, and destruction of documents containing safeguardn information.
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Conclusions A very good program to protect safeguards information was in place. An excellent training video provided instructions to individuals regarding the overall protection of
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safeguards information.
S3.2 (Closed) 1.icensee Event Report 50-275, J23/97-S03 00: Partial Failure of the Intrusion Detection System.
In accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(d) and 10 CFR 73, Appendix G(1)(c), the licensee telephonically reported to the NRC on September 4,1997 (Event 32869), that a
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-8-degraded alarm system had been discovered. At approximately-11:30 a.m.,
September 4,1997, the licensee discovered that portions of its protected area intrusion detection system were not reporting alarms and that one of its computer reinote multiplaxer units (RMU) had partially f ailed. The central alarm station operator implemented corrective actions to compensate for the loss by dispatching security. officers to the affected areas. Subsequently, all affected alarm zones were
. satisf actorily tested and compensatory measures were released.
The licensee's investigation of this event determined that the partial failure of the RMU resulted in loss of alarm annunciation on isolated alarm zones. This event was reviewed by a lict.nsee security review group comprised of security and technical maintenance personnel. A review of post-event tests, subsequent operation and routine testing of the affected alarm zones, f ailed to identify the root cause of the partial RMU failure.
The licensee's investigation also determined there was no malevolent intent involved in the f ailure of the isolated alarm zones or the f ailure to implement required compensatory measures. Additionally, no conditions adverse to plant security resulted from the delay in establishing full compensatory measures. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's investigation of this event and confirmed that -
a separate perimeter alarm detection system (the perimeter video capture system)
continued to operate during this event. Additionally, the inspector confirmed that the licensee appropriately reported this event to the NRC. The inspector determined that there were no violation of regulatory requirements associated with this event.
S8.3 (Closed) Inspection Followup item 275/9615-02; 323/9615 02: Unsecured Vital Area Doors During a previous security inspection, the inspector identified that since 1994, the number of events involving unsecured vital area doors had significantly increased and that these events had been caused partially by individuals not closing the doors.
The increased number of unlocked vital area doors had been previously identified as a weakness in the security program.
Subsequently, the 1996 SALP Report stated that the Security Program warrants additional management attention due to the declining performance trend due in part to vital area doors.
An October 1996 Quality Assurance assessment report stated that Quality Assurance had followed up this issue and found that the security and maintenance organizations were actively pursuing equipment corrective measures to remedy door
- hardware. However, as stated in the Quality Assurance report, all plant departments that utilize vital area doors impact this problem since human f actors (not checking that doors are secured af ter use) appeared to be the predominant cause of unsecured vital area doors.
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During this inspection, the inspector confirmed that the licensee's corrective measures had significantly reduced the number of unlocked vital area doors.
Additionally, the licensee anticipated that the scheduled replacement of additional:
" problem" vital area doors would possibly further reduce this type of event.
SS.4 - (Closed) inspection Followup item 275/9715-02; 323/9715 02: Description of Vehicle Barrier System
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On February 28,1995, the licensee submitted its description of the vehicle barrier system to the NRC. Subsequently, on November 19,1997, the _ licensee inc'uded its description of the vehicle barrier system in its security plan. During a previous
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security inspection, the inspector identified the following:
_The licensee's description of the vehicle barrier system did not indicate that:
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(1)
Portions of the security building and the warehouse building serve as components of the overall vehicle barrier system.
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(2)
The north end of the site utilizes 4-inch bollards and a retaining wall as part of the overall vehicle barrier system.
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The north end of the warehouse search area utilizes two removable bollards as part of the overall vehicle barrier system.
Appendix 1 of the security plan incorrectly s'ated, in part, that "The Diablo
Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Vehicle Barrier System protects plant components necessary to obtain and maintain a safe shutdown condition of either Unit 1 or (emphasis added) Unit 2 against a Design Basis Vehicle...."
During this inspection, the inspector verified that a licensee's recent chenge to the physical security plan had corrected these items.
S8.5 (Closed) Inspection Followup item 275/9715 03; 323/9715-03: Security Procedure SP-419 During a previous security inspection, the inspector reviewed Security Procedure SP-419, " Vehicle Barrier System," and identified the following:
Ooenino of Gate. Section 7.5 incorrectly stated, in part, that "When a gate
is opened to allow personnel or rnaterial access / egress, the gate should (emphasis added) only be opened to the exter.t necessary (e.g., a gate should not be fully opened to allow a person to exit with a hand truck)." This procedure is permissive and does not meet the intend of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7),
discus:;cd above in paragraph S1.1(b)(4).
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Inspection of Vehicle Barrier Svstem. Section 7.8.1 incorrectly stated, in part, that " Daily inspections of the VBS shall be made by officers conducting
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-10-routine perimeter fence checks. Daily inspections of the VBS do not require documentation." This procedure does not meet the requirements of ~
Appendix i to the security plan that requires, in part, that any observed degradation of the vehicle barrier system is documenwd..
Comnensatorv Measures. Section'7.9.1 discusses the implementation of
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compensatory measures fcr f ailed components of the vehicle barrier systam.
This procedure ooos not include guidance contained in R9rdatory Guide 5.68 (Protection Against maleyolent use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants), to.
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tho effect that the NRC will be contacted whenever compensatory measures remain in effect over 30 oays.
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During this inspection, the inspector vefified through review, that the above changes had been incorporated into Revision 2 of Security Procedure SP-419.
V. Manaamment Meetinas X1.
Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management '
at the conclusion of the inspection on December 5,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented, i
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ATTAQiMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATlON -
B PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED LiCDD5tt
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f R. Powe<s, Vice President and Plant Manager C. Belmont, Director, Nuclear C.uality Services H. Cowan, Security Shift Supervisor, Training
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W. Crockett, Manager, Nuclear Quality Services
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S. Dienhart, Security Shift Supervisor, Security Services W. Drake, Watch Commander, Security Services
- L. Fisher, Supervisor, Compliance and Administration, Security Services B. Hansen Harris, Security Shift Supervisor Special Projects J. Hays, Manager, Site Servicer-J. Hubble, Supervisor, Security Support Services
L. Lunsford, Supervisor, Operations and Training, Security Services S. Ketelsen, Supervisor, Regulatory Services J. Molden, Manager, Operations Services M. Mosher, Senior Supervisor, Nuclear Quality Services W. Ryan, Supervisor, Access Authorization / Fitness for Duty, Security Services R. Taylor, OA Engineer, Nuclear Quality Services R. Todaro, Director, Security Services HRC D. Allen, Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 92700 Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports
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LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED ltems Onened -
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50 275; 323/97 SO3-00 LER Partial Failure of Intrusion Detection System 50-275; 323/9615-03-IFl Unsecured Vital Area Doors
- 50-275;-323/9715-02 IFl Description of Vehicle Barrier System
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- 50 275;-323/9715-03-IFl Security Procedure SP-419 LIST OF DOCUMENTATION REVIEWED Safeguards Event Log from July 1 through November 17,1997-Safeguards Event Log Trending Report, Third Quarter,1997 Employee Class Attendance Reports November 11,1996 through November 11,1997 Security Procedure SP-419, " Vehicle Barrier System," Revision 2
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