IR 05000275/1989015
| ML16341F170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1989 |
| From: | Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341F169 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-89-15-EC, 50-323-89-15, EA-89-085, EA-89-85, NUDOCS 8905310193 | |
| Download: ML16341F170 (78) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos Docket Nos.:
EA No:
License Nos.
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Meeting at:
50-275/89-15 and 50-323/89-15 50-275 and 50-323 89-85 DPR-80 and DPR-82 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, Calitornia 94106 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Region V Office, Walnut Creek, California Meeting Conducted:
April 25, 1989 Report Prepared by:
Approved By:
P.
PE Narbut, Sr.
Resident Inspector w'~A e M.
M. Mendonca, Chief Reactor ProjectsSection I
~/1 //g Date Signed Meetin on A ri 1
1989 Re ort No.
50-275 and 50-323/89-15 An enforcement conference was held in the NRC Region V Office, Walnut Creek, California to discuss apparent violations for which enforcement action was deferred as described in NRC inspection reports 50-275, and 50-323/89-01, 89-05 and 89-13.
The facts surrounding the violations and the licensees corrective action, taken and planned, were discussed.
8905310l93 8905l2 PDR ADQCK 05000275
PNU
I
Enclosure I DETAILS 1.
Meetin Attendees a ~
Licensee Attendees G.
J.
J.
,W.
S.
L.
R.
B.
D.
W.
B.
M.
T.
R.
G.
E.
A.
A. Maneatis, President, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGSE)
D. Shiffer, Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation D. Townsend, Plant Manager, Diablo Canyon H. Wallace, Vice President Engineering M. Skidmore, guality Assurance Manager F.
Womack, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations C. Anderson, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Construction Services (NECS)
W. Giffin, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Services B. Miklush, Assistant Plant Manager Maintenance Services H. Fujimoto, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support S.
Lew, Director Nuclear Regulatory Affairs R., Tresler, Project Engineer L. Grebel, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance F. Locke, PG8E Law C. Sarkasian, PGSE Corporate Communications M. Greene, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs L. Nicholson, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs b.
NRC Attendees J.
B.
R.
R.
A.
M.
A.
M.
S.
p.
K.
- H.
- G B. Martin, Regional Administrator H. Faulkenberry, Deputy Regional Administrator P.
Zimmerman, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety and projects A. Scarano, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards E. Chaffee, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and projects B. Blume, Regional Attorney D. Johnson, Enforcement Coordinator M. Mendonca, Chief, Reactor ProjectsSection I A. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section P. Narbut, Senior Resident Inspector E. Johnston, Resident Inspector Rood, Project Manager, NRR W. Knighton, Director, Directorate V, NRR
Attendance by televideo conference connection.
2.
Details Mr. Martin opened the meeting discussing briefly the perspective that two central themes appeared to evolve from the apparent violations discussed in the inspection reports.
Those themes involved the problems the
licensee appears to experience in translating technical information into operating philosophies resulting in less than adequate control of critical compon'ents.
He further stated that the lic'ensee had not demonstrated an ability to learn from eirrors in a timely and comprehensive manner.
Mr. Martin stated that the meeting was an enforcement conference designed to ensure that facts as presented in the inspection reports were accurate.
Mr. Martin requested that the licensee address the issues with candor to ensure complete communication.
Mr. 2immerman briefly outlined the violations which resulted in safety related equipment being unavailable to perform their intended function.
He characterized the violations, as appropriate, as a failure to implement design requirements and/or slowness in taking corrective action.
Mr. Mendonca then discussed in greater detail the violations as group'ed by area of concern.
Mr. Mendonca explained that the concern regarding the adequacy of engineering work was exemplified by the violations dealing with the changeout of an Auxiliary Saltwater Pump impeller which had not been followed through by engineering to ensure that affected electrical overcurrent relays.had been properly reset or that affected diesel fuel oil storage calculations had been revised.
Mr. Mendonca pointed out that several opportunities to identify the overcurrent relay setting problem had arisen including engineering notes in the design change and a Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC) discussion of the relay setting subject.
Mr. Mendonca discussed a second area of concern, that being the perceived necessity to improve the communication of requirements from engineering to the plant staff which was exemplified by the failure to implement necessary procedure changes which would require operators to cut in a second component cooling water heat exchanger within twenty minutes following a loss of coolant accident.
Mr. Mendonca pointed out that knowledge of this requirement had been known to engineering as 'early as 1974 in early design basis studies and was, focused again in 1984 in a second study.
Nr. Shiffer stated that the NRC inspection reports had been reviewed carefully and PGE E had no disagreement with any facts and agreed with the safety significance of the problem areas as presented in the report.
Mr. Naneatis stated that he had read the inspection reports and found they were thorough, professional and constructive.
Nr. Shiffer stated there was one area where an additional consideration had arisen.
This consideration concerned the inoperability of the auxiliary feedwater pump due to an open vent valve allowing steam to engulf the pump room.
Mr.
Shiffer indicated that recently developed thinking indicated that the damaging environment of the room may have been reduced in severity when the temperature had risen sufficiently -to activate the rooms fire sprinklers.
Mr. Shiffer indicated that this effect had not been fully evaluated.
Mr. Narbut suggested the licensee also consider possible negative effects of the sprinklers actuation.
Mr. Nendonca then discussed the isolation of an auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply with out the recognition that the isolation resulted in pump inoperability.
Nr. Mendonca indicated that this event also had multiple
opportunities for discovery including the reviews and considerations of clearance coordinators and the shift supervisor and foreman reviews.
The second example provided by Nr. Mendonca was the absence of vendor recommended maintenance and training on the overspeed trip valve for the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine steam supply.
Nr. Martin added that the story of the throttle valve was illustrative, in that although the vendor manual wasn't followed which could be acceptable provided licensee personnel knew what they were doing and made reasonable documented decisions for departures from vendor requirements; the same device, he understood, had failed once before in 1988 and licensee actions missed the opportunity to discover the omissions then.
Likewise, when the problem recurred in February 1989 through the chance training of an auxiliary operator the licensee again missed the opportunity to discover the omission.
Nr. Mendonca continued with a description of the other major area of concern, that being valve lineup problems and the perceived lack of aggressive timely action to resolve such problems in light of many precursor events such as a July 1988 reactor trip caused by a mispositioned valve.
Mr. Mendonca noted that the current example of an open vent valve on the steam supply for the auxiliary feed water pump was noteworthy and that equipment lineup problems have continued as exemplified by the recent April 16, l989 reactor trip which could have been avoided if a potential transformer had not been mistakenly left out of service.
Nr. Martin noted that the event involving the auxiliary feedwater pump room filling with steam was compounded by the fact that the cause of the open valve was never fully resolved.
He noted that this raises a
particular concern regarding the possibilities that personnel may not present the facts in a completely self-critical, open manner.
He further noted that this possibility is more disturbing than the event that happened.
Nr. Townsend stated that he didn't believe either possibility was the case and added that the plant management was dealing with the issues of operator attentiveness and attitude.
He added that he believed operators do share information to the best of their ability to recall the situation factually.
Mr. Shiffer added that personnel accountability is emphasized and that PGICE has instituted a positive discipline program and incentive programs to aid in personnel and organizational accountability and performance trending.
Mr. Shiffer stated that PGSE had gotten the message about equipment lineup problems when the plant burned up a safety injection pump due to a switch lineup problem.
Mr. Mendonca continued with a discussion of the view that the licensees corrective actions to known problems had not been timely as exemplified by the tardiness in discovering missing check valves in the floor drains for the diesel fuel oil transfer vaults, followed by tardiness in taking corrective actions when the condition became known in December 1988.
Mr. Naneatis stated that he appreciated the opportunity to discuss the events in the reports and added that PGSE saw the positive value of the
issues.
He added that PGKE will aggressively resolve the problem areas and that PG8.E devotes major resources to the safe efficient running of the Diablo power plant.
He explained that in addition to Mr. Shiffer's group devoted solely to Diablo, PG&E has about 5000 personnel in the Engineering/Construction group available to support Diablo.
As a result of the NRC findings, he said, he is redirecting the support of engineering to make it more proactive in support of the plant.
He added that PGIIE is responding fully to new regulatory issues but he is distressed that PGSE is not showing better performance in the engineering support area.-
He ended by stating that PG8E is committed to operating Diablo safely.
Mr. Shiffer stated that the NRC inspection report had been reviewed and his view was that the report accurately represented the safety significance of the pertinent issues.
Note:
The licensee staff then presented their corrective actions as represented on copies of their slides which are included in this report as an attachment.
The information captured on the slides will not be repeated in this report's narrative.
Nr. Anderson presented that information described on slides regarding the quality of engineering, a summary of the problem areas as seen by PGIIE in the engineering area, and corrective action including actions to improve engineering responsiveness.
Nr. Skidmore added that a gA examination for the auxiliary feedwater system would be done after the DCN was issued.
Mr. Martin submitted that the gA review was a good approach to determine if the plant, in fact, matches the DCM.
Likewise, Mr. Martin comnended the licensee on the concept of performing joint design/systems engineering walkdowns of the systems on a quarterly basis.
Mr. Anderson stated that engineering was performing a review of the design changes performed for the last Unit 2 refueling outage to determine if other analysis errors or oversights existed.
Mr. Wallace explained the effort was an attempt to perform a "lessons learned" approach to identify past problems.
Nr. Martin stated that the licensee's efforts in responding to engineering problems 'was impressive.
He commented further that the licensee had an advantage in that it was starting with a design staff in place.
He further added that it was his, experience that aggressive scrutiny breeds better performance.
Nr. Martin then asked whether guality Assurance was involved in scrutinizing the engineering work.
Nr. Skidmore responded that guality Assurance was i'nvolved and was performing safety system outage modification inspections (SSOMI's) with the aid of outside contractors with design experience to monitor engineering performance.
Nr. Naneatis stated that PGSE is addressing the subject and has initiated action by moving Nr. Anderson into his current positio Mr. Giffin then presented the slides describing actions to improve design basis understanding.
Mr. Shiffer added that in addition to programmatic improvements scheduled for completion over a period of years, he has instructed the plant and design system engineers to perform a review of every system procedure to identify any.obvious problems similar to those identified in the NRC reports.
He stated this quick review should be c'ompleted by the end of June 1989.
Nr. Niklush added that certain maintenance procedures had been revised to require engineering approval of procedure changes.
The examples he provided included procedures for pipe snubbers and bolting.
Mr. Womack then presented the slides dealing with equipment status control.
Nr. Zimmerman asked whether he considered equipment lineup problems to have gotten better or worse with time.
Nr. Womack responded that certain improvements have been made but the plant had not made the progress that was intended.
Mr. Miklush added that the equipment lineup problems have shown a
number. of cases where interface problems between ISC and operations were a
common theme.-
Nr. Martin asked how operators were responding to new equipment lineup initiatives.
Nr. Womack replied that the response seemed to be going rather well.
As an example he stated that subsequent to the April 16, 1989 reactor trip the operator who left the potential transformer out of service voluntarily came to him to explain what had occurred and to express his chagrin.
Mr. Womack stated operations was instituting 100K lineup verification effective today.
Nr. Niklush then 'presented the slides dealing with improvements in the preventative maintenance program which was shown deficient by the lack of vendor recommended maintenance and testing of the overspeed trip device.
Mr. Martin pointed out the importance of vendor recommendations and provided the example of the shutdown of Palo Verde plants due to maintenance practices that did not incorporate vendor recommendations.
Nr. Martin further explained that in addition to paying attention to written vendor recommendations it is sometimes necessary to have an outreach to vendors to identify historical problems that are not necessarily published such as was the case with reactor trip breakers.
Mr. Niklush agreed and added that the plant has found that vendor representatives have knowledge but don't necessarily write such information down.
Nr. Giffin then presented the information on the slides dealing with the plant testing program.
He stated the review of vendor testing recommendations would be completed by June 30, 1989.
Mr. Martin emphasized the importance of vendor testing recommendations and stated that the vendor for the Palo Verde steam dump valves had recommended monthly tests, which had not been done.
Nr. Knighton stated that the presentation by the licensee had been excellent and was impressed by the short term procedure improvement program and the DCM program.
He stated the licensee's approach seemed proactiv Mr. Townsend addressed the slides dealing with problem resolution timeliness.
Mr. Martin asked Mr. Skidmore whether guality Assurance was actively involved in problem resolution timeliness.
Nr. Skidmore stated they were but the, results of trending of quality evaluations (gEs)
and nonconformance reports '(NCR's)
had not shown improving trends.
Mr. Townsend stated that the licensee program to do formal justification for continued operation (JCO) studies for identified problems had been performed effectively and so far in 1989, ten such studies had been performed which had been the total for 1988.
Mr. Shiffer then presented the slides dealing with engineering and operations interface.
Mr. Martin presented closing remarks and stated that the discussion had been heartening.
He stated that the aggressive identification and resolution of problems is a revealing 'litmus test of an organization.
He also stated that the licensee's presentation indicated that they were trying to create a situation which would foster the proper attitudes and provide multiple opportunities to identify and resolve problems.
Nr. Maneatis closed stating that PGIIE was becoming more aware of problem areas, was becoming more self critical and was conscious of -industry's rising standards of excellence.
Mr.- Shiffer proposed that a future meeting be set up to provide Nr.
Fujimoto the opportunity to explain the functions of Nuclear Operations Support (NOS) for example PGIIEs efforts to stay up with the state of the art of industry.
Mr. Martin stated that PGIIE had presented a proactive self-critical attitude with actions identified to improve performance.
He added that he hoped to see PGSE's actions payoff in improved performance.
Mr. Johnson briefly discussed the revised enforcement policy, prior to the meeting being adjourned at 4:50 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 April25, 1989 Pacific Gas and Electric Company
April 1989 Enforceient Conference Agenda Presentation Item
Opening Remarks Item 2 Summary of Enforcement Concerns
3. Hartin G.A. Haneatis A. Chafee H. Hedonca S. Richards Item 3 PG&E Response and Discussion I.
Initial Comments J.D. Shiffer II.
Assurance of Safety Systems Functionality A.
Quality of Engineering B.
Design Basis Understanding/
Procedural Implementation C.
Equipment Status Control D.
Maintenance E.
Testing Program III. Corrective Action Timeliness IV.
Engineering/Plant Interface
15
10
15
R. Anderson B. Giffin L. Womack D. Miklush B. Giffin J.
Townsend J. Shiffer/
W. Wallace Item 4 Closing Remarks
G. Haneatis J. Shiffer W. Wallace J. Hartin PG&E Attendees G. Maneatis J. Shiffer W. Wallace R. Anderson D. Townsend B. Giffin L. Womack D. Hiklush H. Tresler B.
Lew T. Grebel S.
Skidmore W. Fu)imoto G. Sarkesian 3882M
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE AGENDA April 25, 1989 Item 1 Opening Rem'arks Item 2 Summary of Enforcement Concerns Item 3 PG8E Response and Discussion I.
Initial Comments II.
Assurance of Safety Systems Functionality A. Quality of Engineering B. Design Basis Understanding/
Procedural Implementation C.
Equipment Status Control D. Maintenance E.
Testing Program III. Corrective Action Timeliness IV. Engineering/Plant Interface Item 4 Closing Remarks
'
ua i o
n ineerin 04/2S/SQ 17:00 IIA
QUALITYOF ENGINEERlNG
"PG&E recognizes many areas from the NRC Inspections as well as our own inspection efforts where improvements in the quality of engineering products and support of the Plant are necessary."
PG8E EVALUATIONOF THE PROBLEM
~ Fundamental Engineering is Good Sound Judgements Correct Technical Decisions Rapid Response to Major Operational Problems Approximately 2300 Gales Created or Revised in Past Year
~ Out of Many Reviews and Inspections Involving More Than 30 Outside Reviewers, Inspectors and Engineers:
"No Problems Were Found With Significant Safety Consequences."
'
PG8E EVALUATIONOF THE PROBLEM (CONTINUED)
HOWEVER:
~ Certain Errors, Discrepencies, and Inconsistencies have have been identified during the 4 System Audits, 2 SSOMls,
SSFAR, and
NRC Combination SSF I/SSOMI
~ Quality of Engineering Work has been Questioned by:
NRC Onsite Inspectors Region V
NRR SSFI/SSOMI Team
~
PGtkE recognizes need for positive and aggressive corrective action 04/24/89 17:00 IIA
SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS Most Identified Problems Fall Into Three Major Categories
~ Attention to Detail
~ Rigorous Adherance to Procedures
~ Engineering Responsiveness to Plant Needs
CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
~ Certain Inattention to Detail and Documentation of Engineering Judgement
~ Certain Failure to Follow Procedures Completely and Thoroughly
~ Earlier Schedule for Design Releases for Future Outage Work
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
~ Greater Sensitivity in Indepth Inspections, Reviews and Audits
~ Changing Direction in the Industry Toward a
Greater Level of Detail and Consistency in Documentation-
CORRECTIVE ACTION
~ Emphasize the Importance of Paying Attention to Details and Operating in Strict Accordance with Approved Procedures and Commitments
~ System Engineer Program
- Improve Relationship Between Plant and Engineering Personnel Improve Knowledge of Systems and Their Operation
~ Enhanced Design Criteria Memorandums
{DCMs)
More Detailed Design Basis Documentation Surveillance Testing Requirements/Design Basis Substantial Design Review Coordinated with All Disciplines 04/24/SQ 18:00 IIA-7
'
CORRECTIVE ACTION (CONTINUED)
~ Improvements in DCP/DCN Preparation Job Estimate (Major Work Package)
Reviews
- Onsite Walkdown and Discussion During JE Approval (Constructability, Operability, Maintenance Consideration)
- Participation of Engineering/Construction/
System Engineer/Operations Review of Past DCNs (From 2R2)
Additions and Changes to Programs and Procedures
- Improvements to the Technical Review Check List
- Retraining on Use of Procedures
- Strengthened Review for Impact on Related Calculations
- Improved Setpoint Documentation
~ Schedule Earlier Release of Engineering Design Packages
- April 28, 1989 for 1R3
- June 30, 1989 for 2R3 04/25/Stt aft:SD IIA S
CORRECTIVE ACTION (CONTINUED)
~ Technical Training System Engineer Training on Design Basis
- Engineering Participation in Plant Operations Courses
~ Rotational Assignments
~ Additional Staffing (Adding Approximately 45 Engineers)
ENGINEERING RESPONSIVENESS
~ Programs Identified in Previous Slides Will Improve Responsiveness
~ Role of OPEG
- Experienced Staff (Supervisors and Key People have an Average 16 Years Nuclear and Related Experience)
24 Hour Availability
- Participation in-Plant, Safety/Project Reviews
- Close Relationship Between System Engineers/
Plant Operators/Maintenance/OPEG
- Complete Design Authority
~ Enhanced Staffing and Support in GO and-OPEG
- More than 300 Engineering Personnel (60 in OPEG)
- Averaging 150 trips per month
'
"Taken together, this is a
powerful program of actions and enhancements that will improve Engineering's performance and support of the plant and will assure continued improvement to plant operation."
04/28/80 1b:00 IIA 11
DESIGN BASIS UNDERSTANDING COMPLETED ACTIONS
~ System Engineer Procedure Issued
~ System/Design Engineer Matrix Issued
~
15 System Engs Completed Tech Staff Training
~ Quarterly SE/DSE Walkdowns and Reports Completed
~ DBSRG Issued
~ First Design Basis Training Session Completed
DESIGN BASIS UNDERSTANDING PRIORITY NEAR TERM ACTIONS
~ Correspondence Review (Complete)
~
~ System Engineers Attend Technical Training Class on Assigned System
DESIGN BASIS UNDERSTANDING FUTURE ACTIONS
~ Development of DCMs
~ STPs and Selected Maintenance Procedures Review
~ Design Basis Training Program Established Systems Engineers Maintenance Engineers Operations Engineers
~ Sample Review of Operating Procedures
'
EQUIPMENT STATUS CONTROL ACTlON PLAN
~ Increased Operator Awareness
~ Control of Equipment Operation
~ Corrective Actions Implemented
~ Planned Corrective Actions 04/22/89 2:00 PM IIC
'
EQUIPMENT STATUS CONTROL INCREASING OPERATOR AWARENESS
~ Meetings Held With Operations Personnel Clearly Identify Problem Ownership Identify Personal Responsibility
~ Meeting With Operations Supervisors Reiterate Problem Ownership and Responsibilities Identify Corrective Actions Emphasize Leadership and Supervisory Roles to Ensure That Procedures and Policies Implemented
~
100%
Independent Verification of Clearance and Valve Alignment Activities 04/22/89 0:00 PM IIC 2
EQUIPMENT STATUS CONTROL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED
~ Revised Operating Order on Manual Operation of Valves
~ Revised Operations Policy More Comprehensive Use of Formal Instructions Physical Position Verification Documentation of All Equipment Manipulated for Clearances or Administrative Tag-Outs Augmented Preservice Alignment Verification
~ Documentation and Verification of Pipe Cap Installation on Equipment Clearances
EQUIPMENT STATUS CONTROL PLANNED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
~ Revise Clearance Administrative Procedure Pipe Caps Additional Verification Documentation of All Components Manipulated
~ Combine Operating Orders and Procedures on Manual Valve Alignment to Expand on Existing Policies, Training, and Procedures
~ Interim System Alignment Checklist Upgrade
~ OVIDiProcedure Upgrade Action Plan
'
VENDOR RECOMMENDATION SAMPLE REVIEW PROGRAM
~
Component Types Investigated Approximately 650 components
~ 27 Component Types had vendor recommendations fully incorporated into DCPP program
~ 24 Component Types had vendor recommendations not fully incorporated into DCPP program
~ Review of unincorporated vendor recommendations indicates most are unnecessary
~ Documentation of the basis of current PM tasks is minimal
VENDOR RECOMMENDATIONS SAMPLE REVIEW RESULTS
~ Vendor maintenance recommendations are not based on:
Rigorous performance criteria (i.e.,
EQ equipment)
- Specific applications or environments
~ Plant programs are based on real failures and root cause evaluations:
- Examples:
Nuclear Instrument lnverters 4KV Circuit Breakers Control Rod Drive MG Sets Buffalo Forge Fans Grinell Diaphram Valves 04/24/SQ 17:00 IID 2
PM PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS
~ Develop a systematic method to docoment the reason'or performing PM on components
~ Short Term Schedule complete in 1989 Compare vendor recommendations against DCPP PM program for remaining safety-related components Justify and document reasons for doing/not doing vendor recommended maintenance
~ Long Term Schedule Continue root cause investigation program Apply RCM logic on a system and component basis Complete 4 or 6 systems a year for RCM
OCPP TESTING PROGRAM ACTIONS BEING TAKEN
~ SHORT TERM
- Vendor Testing Recommendations Sample Review
- Engineering to Specify Critical Design Bases Functions to be Tested and Acceptance Criteria in DCNs
-
.
- Review of STPs by Design and System Engineers
- Review of Vendor Testing Recommendations
- All System and Component Functions to be Surveilled Will Be Identified and Acceptance Criteria Established in the Enhanced DCMs
PROBLEM RESOLUTION TIMELINESS PREVIOUS IMPROVEMENTS
~ Designation of APM Responsibility for NCRs
~ use of Significant Problems List
~ Quarterly Trend Review 04/2d/89 Od:4d III 1
l
PROBLEM RESOLUTION TIMELINESS RECENT IMPROVEMENTS
~ Personnel Accountability for NCRs on PIMS
~ Monthly PSRC Review of NCR Status
~ Quarterly PSRC/GONPRAC Review of NCR Trends
~ Monthly Operating Experience Report
~ Weekly QE Review at Plant Manager Meeting-
~ Engineering Work Request by ARs
~ l3CN Tracking on PIMS
~ Assignment of Trip Reduction Responsibility
S
PROBLEM RESOLUTION TIMELINESS ADDITIONALENHANCEMENTS
~ Accountability for Timely Problem Resolution
~ Development of Timeliness Criteria to be Used for Plant Equipment Problem Evaluation
~ Weekly Meetings With NRC Resident to Ensure Significant Issues Are Understood And Resolved in a Timely Manner
ENGINEERING/OPERATIONS INTERFACE HISTORICAL STATUS (1985 1987)
~ Design Engineering Maintained NPG (NECS) Provides Project Management Engineering Responsible for Design
- Engineering Organization Matrixed to NECS
~ Several Interface Mechanisms Manager, NECS (NPG)/DCPP Project Engineer (ENCON)
OPEG Responsible for Daily Interface and Prompt Response to Plant Problems OPEG is Voting DCPP TRG Member and NOS is Voting NPG TRG Member
-
NECS Manager and Chief Mechanical and NUclear Engineer are GONPRAC Members
-
OPEG Attends DCPP Daily Coordination Meetings and NECS Manager Attends Weekly VP Staff Meetings at DCPP
-
NECS Manager Part of DCPP Management Walkdown Program
'
'
ENGINEERING/OPERATIONS INTERFACE RECENT/FUTURE ENHANCEMENTS
~ Plant System Engineer/Engineering System Design Engineer
~ Personnel Rotation
~ Matrixed Employees Included in NPG Goals and Objectives Program
~ Development of a Common Set of Administrative Policies/Techniques
- PIMS to be used by all Nuclear Organizations
- Common Priority System
- Rewrite of NPG Administrative Policies/Procedures
~ Miscellaneous
-
OPEG Now Non-Voting Member of PSRC
- Project Engineer will be added to DCPP Management Walkdowns
C
SYSTEM DESIGN/
PERFORMANCE REVIEW PROGRAM
~
Begun in 1988
~ Engineering to review four systems
'from operations/maintenance perspective to identify potential cost effective modifications
{both physical/procedural)
and to increase system reliability'
Systems selected:
Condensate, Gaseous Radwaste, Instrument Air, Intake and Saltwater (excluding ASW)
~ Project to complete in summer 1989, but improvement actions are already ongoing
'a e
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