IR 05000275/1989028
| ML16341F488 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1989 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341F487 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-89-28, 50-323-89-28, NUDOCS 9001040027 | |
| Download: ML16341F488 (16) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/89-28, 50-323/89-28 Docket Nos.
50-275; 50-323'icense Nos.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94108 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
November 6-24, 1989 Inspector:
C.
C Approved by:
sp cto IZ I uey, le
Engineering Section Ins ection Summar a
e gne Ins ection durin the eriod November 6-24 1989 (Re ort Nos.
an Areas Ins ected:
A routine unannounced regional inspection of activities re atlng to n)t 1 Inservice Inspection (ISI), and inspector follow-up of open items.
Inspection procedures Nos.
30703, 73051, 73052, 73753, 73755, and 92701 were used as guidance for this inspection.
Results:
General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s
2.
Other than the identified ISI procedure weaknesses, there were no apparent problems identified in the ISI areas reviewed.
The licensee's performance in following up on.one past NRC identified concern appeared to be incomplete and ineffective.
Additional management attention is required in this area to ensure these NRC i.dentified concerns are handled in a timely and effective, manner.
0 en Item Summar
During this inspection, one open item was closed.
9001040027
'91214 PDR ADOCK 0500027
P5C
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- H; J.
- D. A.
- 0. K.
- T
- H. J.
- P. N.
D. A.
J.
E.
N. E.
J. A.
Angus, Assistant Plant Manager, Support Services Tagger, Director Ouality Support Franks, ISI/NDE Supervisor Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor Kelly, Regulatory Compliance Lane, Ouality Control Gonzalez, ISI Specialist Hill, Lead ISI/NDE Specialist Leger, ISI Specialist Keene, ISI Specialist The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contractor-personnel during the course of the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on November 9, 1989.
2.
Inservice Ins ection-Review of Pro ram 73051)
The inspector performed a general review of the basis of the licensee's ISI program and identified the following:
PGEE Letter No. DCL-89-171, dated June 23, 1989, submitted Revision 7 of the Inservice Inspection and Testing Program Plans for Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
Revision 7 of the ISI Program Plan superseded the previous revisions in its entirety, and included several requests for relief.
The Unit 1 ISI program is based on the requirements of the ASNE Code,Section XI, 1977 Edition through and including the summer 1978 addenda.
The initial inspection interval began tray 7, 1985 when Unit 1 was placed in commercial operation.
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed Revision 7 of the Unit 1 ISI program plan, as supplemented by PGSE letters dated September 7 and 19, 1989, and issued a safety evaluation report on October 25, 1989.
The licensee's Ouality Assurance group performed ISI audit 89817T, from August 8 - September 26, 1989, and the results were issued in an October 23, 1989 letter.
The audit report was reviewed by the inspector and found to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas reviewe.
Inservice A sample Ins ection-Review of Procedures (73052)
review of ISI procedures identified the following:
A procedure weakness was identified in the ultrasonic (UT)
examination procedure for pipe welds, procedure No. N-UT-l, Revision No. 4, effective date 10/28/88.
The inspector's review of-completed UT examination data sheets and this UT procedure, identified the following information:
Section 1.2 of this procedure states,
"This procedure complies with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code,Section XI, Appendix III, 1977 Edition through summer 1978 addenda".
The ASME Code, Mandatory Appendices, Section 111-3210(c) of Article 111-3000 "Calibration" states,
"For contact examination, the temperature difference between the examination and basic calibration surfaces shall not exceed 25F(14c)."
(2-)
The UT Procedure under section 5.0 "Procedure,"
Subsection 5.2. 1.d) states,
"The temperature of the basic calibration block surface shall be within 25'F of the examination surfaces".
(3)
(4)
Under Section 5.5 documentation and records, Subsection 5.5. 1 states,
"ultrasonic examination data shall be recorded on Forms N-UT-1A and N-UT-1B".
Form N-UT-1A is the ultrasonic calibration report, and it has blocks for the following data recording:
(a)
one bl,ock to record the temperature of the basic calibration block.
(5)
(6)
(b)
one block to record one temperature of the component to be examined.
(c)
one block to record up to twenty-four welds examined.
Form N-UT-1B is the ultrasonic examination data sheet, and it does not have a space to record the temperature, of the individual components examined, as normally found.on other facility data sheets'n November 3, 1989, the licensee performed UT inspections on three welds on three separate lines/components (Lines No. 236, No.
3844 and No.
3846) of the safety injection system, and recorded the data on the applicable N-.UT-1A and N-UT-1B forms.
When the inspector reviewed these UT inspection records, there was no way to verify that the temperature difference between the examination and basic calibration surfaces did not exceed 25'F.
The one component temperature recorded on the applicable form N-UT-lA, did not identify which loop component surface temperature was measured and recorded.
Ouring certain outage plant operations, a loop of the SI system in use for residual
heat removal (RHR) could have a surface temperature greater than 25K above the surface temperatures, of the other SI loops.
(7)
On October 16, 1989 the licensee performed UT inspections of four welds on three lines/components (Lines No. 13, 14 and 15)
of the pressurizer spray loops.
Again the licensee only measured and recorded the surface temperature of one line/component.
When this procedure weakness was discussed with licensee management and NDE personnel performing UT examinations, the following information was identified.
(1)
The licensee stated at the November 9, 1989 exit that they would review this procedure, and revise it and the applicable
,forms as required to document that the actual temperature difference between examination and basic calibration surfaces did not exceed 25'F.
(2)
The licensee and UT examiners state that per training and section 5.2. 1 d) of the UT procedure, the temperature difference between each examination and basic calibration surfaces were verified not to exceed 25'F.
While this verification was not required to be documented for each examination, some of the licensee's UT examiners enter the actual examination surface temperatures at the top or bottom of the examination data sheets (Form N-UT-1B) as added information.
(3) It appears that the original intent for the ultrasonic calibration report (Form N-UT-lA) was to have one calibration report for each examination data sheet (Form N-UT-lB), or group of examination data sheets, per component.
This way the actual surface temperatures of the calibration block and component would have been recorded on'the UT calibration report.
The inspector identified to the licensee, that he has normally found the examination surface temperatures recorded on the individual
.UT examination data sheet at other facilities.
(4) It appears that at the time the identified UT examinations were performed on the SI system and Pressurizer piping, existing plant operating conditions would have maintained similar component surface temperatures in each system.
A procedure weakness was identified in the ISI/NDE procedure titled
"Control of Code Calibration Blocks and Standards",
No. ISI. D-851, Revision 3, effective date April 22, 1989.
While this procedure provided instructions for fabrication of new"or replacement calibration blocks, control and repair of.existing calibration blocks, it did not provide instructions for the documentation and verification of modifications performed on these existing calibration blocks.
To ensure acceptable control of the existing configuration of the calibration blocks and standards, all modifications to existing calibration blocks and standards should be
documented and verified by an acceptable procedure.
During this inspection the inspector identified that UT calibration standard No.
4 had been modified per dimensions on an unsigned and undated sketch, and that there was no documentation of a verification of the final configuration of the standard.
The licensee agreed that there should have been better documentation and verification of the modifications performed on UT calibration standard No. 4, and identified that the following actions would be performed:
( I)
The existing UT calibration standard No.
4 modifications will be verified and documented in the applicable records.
(2)
ISI procedure No. ISI D-851 will be reviewed and revised as required, to ensure acceptable documentation and verification of modifications performed on UT calibration blocks and standards.
Drawings of the modified blocks and standards will also be revised, as required to show the latest configuration.
No violations or deviation were identified in the areas reviewed.
4.
Inservice Ins ection-Observation of Work and Work Activities 73753 The licensee was conducting the Unit I third refueling outage.
This cycle 4 outage, was taking place during the second period of the first ten year ISI Interval.
The inspector reviewed the qualifications and certification records for the ISI Examiners and the equipment certifications.
Available Visual (VT), Ultrasonic (UT), Liquid Penetrant (PT)
and magnetic particle (NT)
examinations performed on Steam Generator 1-3, Safety Injection and Main Steam piping systems were observed by the inspector.
I While observing UT examinations, the inspector also observed the licensee replacement of a snubber adjacent to Steam Generator 1-3.
When the new snubber assembly was first installed in the lower pipe clamp/bracket, the lower spherical bearing was not oriented to match the clamp, and the load pin/bolt could not be inserted through the spherical bearing bushing.
One member of the two man installation crew attempted to drive the load pin.through the spherical bearing bushing by striking it three times with a mallet.
The inspector identified to the installation crew that it appeared the spheri'cal bearing assembly was not oriented to match the clamp, when it was passed up to the man standing on the pipe (above the clamp)
and then installed in the clamp.
The second member of the installation crew then used a flashlight and tool to align the spherical bearing assembly bushing with the clamp and the load pin/bolt was installed.
The inspector identified the improper snubber installation to licensee management who agreed at the November 9, 1989 exit to take the following actions:
(1)
Remove the identified snubber assembly and inspect the lower spherical bearing assembly for damage.
(2)
Repair or replace the identified snubber assembly as required (3)
Review the applicable procedures for handing/testing/repair/
maintenance of snubbers, to see if additional instructions are required in the procedures for alignment of spherical bearings assemblies prior to load pin/bolt installation.
(4)
Review qualification training provided for personnel performing snubber work, and revise the training, if required.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas reviewed.
5.
Inservice Ins ection - Data Review and Evaluation 73755)
The inspector reviewed all available NDE ISI calibration sheets, data sheets and NCR's generated this outage, prior to and during this inspection.
Except for the component surface temperature concern identified in paragraph 3 of this report, all reviewed documentation was found to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas reviewed.
6.
Fo1 1 ow U
(92701)
(Closed) Follow-u Item No. 50-275/88-04-02:
Investi ate Function of During the initial inspection it was identified that as part of the licensee basis for requesting relief from the IST program requirements to calibrate rotameter/flowmeter FI-929, that the licensee had stated
"these flowmeters shall be observed to function properly during each pump test."
The licensee never issued written or verbal instructions to licensee personnel on when or how to perform this verification.
The licensee also stated that the accuracy/verification of flowmeter FI-929 would be verified to be functioning properly during a February 10, 1988 pump test in accordance with A/R No.
A009974.
Follow up Inspection Report No. 50-275/88-25 identified that in September of 1988 the following was identified:
The licensee was investigating replacement of gauges FI-929 and FI-9?3 with flow orifices and local indicators per Design Change Package (DCP) Nos. J-39535 for Unit 1 and J-40535 for Unit 2. If the Final DCP's were approved, the new gages would be installed during future outages, based on material availability.
A licensee representative identified that if this gauge indicates a
flow, the engineering group considers the gauge was functioning properly based on its desig The licensee indi.cated that the subject gauge manufacturer would be contacted to see if they could identify what local parameters could be observed on the gauges to verify proper operation of the gauges without removal for calibration.
During this inspection the inspector reviewed the latest licensee actions on this item as documented in acti,on request (A/R) numbers A00099074 and A0124373 (print dated November 9, 19S9),
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Work Order Numbers C0052594 (Unit 1) and C0039829 (Unit 2),
and identified the following:
(1)
The licensee contacted the original FI-929 gauge manufacturer, who indicated that unless the gauge guide rod was bent or had an imperfection, the reading from the gauge should be indicating actual flow conditions.
Without,calibration, the gauge manufacturer could not identify any method to observe that the subject gauge functioned properly during each pump test.
There was no documentation included in the licensee closure material provided to the NRC during this inspection, that showed the gauge in question had been disassembled and inspected by the licensee for possible damage or imperfections.
(2)
The licensee engineering evaluation of the original basis for the relief request statement,
"These flowmeters shall be observed to function properly during each pump test",
was inadequate.
This is evident by the fact that the licensee did not have a documented method developed to verify and document that the original flowmeters were observed (by plant personnel)
to function properly during each pump test.
(3)
The licensee engineering review of this identified NRC concern was weak, with little documentation of any engineering analysis.
(4)
A replacement Barton DP pressure gauge, Model No.
200 was installed in Unit 1 this refueling outage, to replace the original rotameter/flowmeter FI-929.
A similar replacement gauge is scheduled to be installed in Unit 2 during the next refueling outage in early 1990.
These new gauges can be calibrated by the licensee on site.
In discussion with the licensee, the inspector stated that additional management attention is required in the future to ensure effective and timely resolution of NRC identified concerns.
Since the gauges are being replaced with gauges that can be calibrated by the licensee, this item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas reviewe.
Exit Meetin (30703)
The inspector.met with the licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1,
on November 9, 1989.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's finding up'to the time of the meeting were discussed.
At this meeting the inspector identified that he had obtained some information that. would be reviewed later in the region, with the findings documented in this report.
The available information was reviewed and the findings included in paragraphs 4 and 6 of this report.