IR 05000272/1982010
| ML20053D388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1982 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Chung J, Hill W, Lazarus W, Norrholm L, Roxanne Summers, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053D374 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-82-10, 50-311-82-09, 50-311-82-9, NUDOCS 8206040371 | |
| Download: ML20053D388 (20) | |
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(DCSNumbGrs-sGe attachedsheet)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
50-272/S2-10 Report Nos.
50-311/82-09 50-272 Docket Nos.
50-311 DPR-70 License Nos.
DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducte p o April 6 - May 11, 1982 Inspectors:
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/J N L'. 8. Norrholm, Senior Resident Inspector date-1 L-d S/,s-/n R. Summers, Resident Reactor Inspector date
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$k k W. C l aza @, Reactor Inspector date W m. h.J.
s/n/az W. M. Hill, Jr., Sehior Resident Inspector (Region IV)
date h'.7s~ h{w W
$ lI $1 N. J Blumbertf, Re stor Inspefdor date 4lO 0 h/>rlF" x
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. Ch
, Reactor spector
'dat6 Approved By:
r. [.1 AUW 47/#b (.. E. Tripfpf, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2A, da'te Projects Branch No. 2. DPRP 8206040371 820519 PDF ADOCK 05000272 G
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Inspection Sumary:
Inspections on April 6 - May 11,1982 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/82-10 and 50-311/82-09)
Unit 1 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations including tours of the facility; conformance with Technical Specifications and operating parameters; log and record reviews; reviews of licensee events; preparations and implementation of strike plans; and followup on previous inspection items.
The inspection involved 216 inspector hours by the resident and regional NRC inspectors. This included continuous inspection coverage (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day) during and imediately preceding the strike (April 29 - May 11, 1982).
Results: Two violations were identified (Failure to make a 10 CFR 50.72 report - Paragraph 5. failure to adequately monitor a liquid release -
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Paragraph 8).
Unit 2 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations including tours of the facility; conformance with Technical Specifications and operating parameters; log and record reviews, reviews of licensee events; preparations and implementation of strike plans; and followup on previous inspection items.
The inspection involved 198 inspector hours by the resident and regional NRC inspectors. This included continuous inspection coverage (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day) during and imediately preceding the strike (April 29-May11,1982).
Results:
No violations were identified.
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Report Nos. 50-272/82-10 and 50-311/82-09 DCS Nos.:
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050272-820223 050311-820219 050272-820301
. 050311-820221 050272-820306 050311-820226 050272-820316 050311-820227 050272-820326 050311-820228 050272-820327 050311-820301 050272-820403 050311-820304 050272-820413 050311-820307 050272-820501 050311-820313 050272-820502 050311-820320
050311-820326 050311-820402 050311-820428
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050311-820501
050311-820502 050311-820503
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Driscoll, Assistant General Manager - Salem Operations L. Fry, Operations Manager J. Gallagher, Maintenance Manager H. Midura, General Manager - Salem Operations L. Miller, Technical Manager J. O'Connor, Radiation Protection Engineer F. Schnarr, Reactor Engineer R. Silverio, Assistant to the General Manager J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspections including management, clerical, maintenance, opera-tions, performance and quality assurance personnel.
2.
Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Follow Item (272/81-10-01) Periodic review of Perfomance Department - I&C Procedures. The licensee stated that the two-year review of instrument and control procedures has been com-pleted.
The inspector sampled 25 procedures applicable to each unit and found that all had been revised or reviewed within the past eight months.
In addition, all procedures listed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/81-10 had been reviewed during November 1981. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
(Closed) OpenItem(311/80-09-02) Core verification procedure. The inspector reviewed the core verification section of the refueling procedure used to install the Unit 1 Cycle 4 core. Appropriate guidance is provided to verify assemblies and inserts and refer-ence is made to the vendor drawing defining core locations. The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-05-06) Replacement of Containment Fan Cooler materials.
During the Cycle 3 - Cycle 4 refueling outage the licensee completed design changesin Unit ? which replaced motor cooler and fan cooler materials and ny. aced small bore service water piping in containment with stainless steel. These measures are expected to reduce the frequency of containment service water leaks attributed to these components.
Similar modifications are planned for Unit 2 during the first refueling outage.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-05-05) Reactor cavity sump level indi-cator subject to common mode failure.
During the Unit 1 Cycle 3 - Cycle 4 refueling outage, the licensee completed a design change to provide independent level devices for the cavity sump pump and alarm. A similar modification to Unit 2 (DCR 2SC526)
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(Closed) Violation (272/81-22-01) Failure to post a Radiation Area. The
inspector reviewed licensee procedure RP 1.010, Posting of Radi-ation Signs and Barriers, Revision 4, dated December 17, 1981 and additional steps taken by the licensee to prevent. recurrence.
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No recent failures to properly post areas have been identified.
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The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Violation (272/81-25-04) Failure to post Airborne Radioactivity
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Area.'
In addition to the document cited above, the inspector
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reviewed specific notifications made to responsible personnel with regard to posting for areas with elevated noble gas concen-i trations. The inspector had no.further questions on this item.
(Closed) Follow Item (272/82-06-02) Procedures to maintain nitrogen in -
i ventory. The licensee has published guidance to shift supervisors-
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i to ensure adequate supplies of high pressure nitrogen are on site in order to maintain continuity of boric acid tank level indica-
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tion. The inventory.is recorded daily by field operators and 50% is used as the ordering level. The. inspector had no further l
questions.
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(Closed)-Violation (272/80-24-01) Failure to control essential personal
items. The inspector confirmed that licensee procedures for con-i trol of articles near the refueling cavity had been modified as stated in the response letter. Observations during the recently
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j completed outage confimed that personnel were aware of loose i
article control requirements and that tool control measures were
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in effect. The inspector'had no further questions on this item.
l (Closed) Violation (272/80-23-01) Failure'to lock a high radiation area.
The inspector confirmed corrective ~and preventive measures out-l lined by the licensee.
New locked cage doors have been installed in the ' elevation 55' area to better. define the actual bounds of the high radiation areas. Frequent inspection of these areas has
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identified no cases of recurrence.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-05-04) Reactor' cavity sump monitoring.
The licensee completed an evaluation of potential sources of
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water into the reactor cavity sump during operation when inspec-tion is not possible. The evaluation concluded that alternate
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mechanisms exist to detect system leakage to the sump. Therefore, failure of the sump pump level sensor to start the sump pump should not present a problem.
In addition, the leak monitoring procedure
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has been modified to carry fomard the-time and date of the most
recent previous pump run.
Since the alarm and pump controls now
.have separate devices in Unit 1, the postulated problem and this
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resolution apply only to Unit 2 until the next refueling outage.
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(Closed) Violation (272/81-01-02,311/81-01-01) Failure to acknowledge entry into Technical Specification Action Statements. The in-spector confimed through discussions with licensed operators and training instructors that this item is included in the current requalification training program.
In addition, Unit I now has redundant level instrumentation for the Auxiliary Feed-water Storage Tank, complete with an alann that will indicate low level prior to exceeding the Technical Specification limit.
The makeup valve to the tank has also been provided with a remote operator. These modifications are scheduled for Unit 2 at the next outage. The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-10-02) Reactor Engineering Manual Part 7, "Incore - Excore Detector Flux Difference", revision. The inspector reviewed the revised procedure, dated February 19, 1982, in which the following changes were incorporated:
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The responsibility of observing the test initial conditions were clearly defined.
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Precautions were defined.
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Details of inducing Xenon oscillation were specified.
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Recovery from the induced Xenon oscillation was identified.
This item is closed.
3.
Review of Plant Operations A.
Daily Inspection The inspector toured the control room area to verify proper manning, access control, adherence to approved procedures, and compliance with LCOs.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed. Status of control room annunciators was reviewed. Nuclear instrument panels and other reactor protective systems were examined. Control rod in-sertion limits were verified. Containment temperature and pressure indications were checked against Technical Specifications. Effluent monitors were reviewed for indications of releases.
Panel indications for onsite/offsite emergency power sources were examined for automatic operability. During entry to and egress from the protected area, the inspector observed access control, security boundary integrity, search activities, escorting, badging, and availability of radiation monitoring equipmen.
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The inspector reviewed shift supervisor, control room, and field operator logs covering the entire inspection period. Sampling re-views were made of tagging requests, night orders, the jumper / bypass log, incident reports, and QA nonconfomance reports. The inspector also observed several shift turnovers during the period.
The above daily inspections, which included back shifts, were made on April 6-9, 11-16, 19-21, 26-30, May 1-11.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
B.
Plant Tours The inspector toured accessible areas of the plant at least once per week. The tours included the control rooms, relay rooms, switchgear rooms, penetration areas, auxiliary building (elevations 122', 100',
84',64'_,55'), fuel handling building, turbine building, service water intake structure, plant perimeter and containment.
During these tours, observations were made relative to equipment condition, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological con-trols and conditions, housekeeping, security, tagging of equipment, ongoing maintenance and surveillance, and availability of redundant equipment.
Operability of the following Unit 1 and 2 ESF subsystems was verified by confirming flowpath valve positions, breaker alignment, instrumen-tation and equipment condition:
Containment Spray (both trains -
Auxiliary Building), Auxiliary Feedwater (3 trains - Auxiliary Building and Penetrations), Safety) injection (both trains - Yard, Auxiliary Building and Penetrations, Service Water (both trains - Yard, Auxiliary Building). Current tagouts were selected for review and were verified in effect as specified. Records of current surveillance for tank boron concentrations, vital heat trace and pump testing were reviewed. The inspector conducted a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 Containment Spray System, to examine confomance with as-built drawings, lineups, supports, instrumentation, electrical and controls cabinets and to confirm avail-ability of the system.
The following Limiting Conditions for Operation, not directly verifi-able in the control room, were confirmed by field inspection or record review: service water availability to Auxiliary Feedwater (3.7.1.3),
Fire barriers (3.7.11), Diesel fuel inventory (3.8.1.1), and CARD 0X
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system availability (3.7.10.3).
During these plant tours, minor problems associated with unsecured compressed gas bottles, apparent fire hazards, and poor housekeeping were. identified and were discussed with facility management.
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During a plant tour on April 13, 1982, the inspector noted that the AMS-2 air monitor located in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration area on elevation 78' carried a calibration sticker which indicated cali-bration was due on April 9, 1982.
Subsequent investigation found
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that.the AMS-2 was listed on the equipment calibration list generated
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i through the Inspection Order system and was scheduled to be calibrated.
i The combination of a long weekend and a lost Inspection Order card resulted in a delay in recalling the device for calibration. These.
instruments are recalled for calibration every three. months although licensee representatives stated that intervals as long as six months
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could be justified. A number of additional monitors. inspected all had calibrations conducted within the previous several weeks, indi-cating that the recall system was functional. The device in question was imediately removed from service and calibrated. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
On May 1, 1982, the inspector found that mechanical snubber 23 FWSN 15A, located in the Unit 2 South Penetration Area, appeared to be locked up. The licensee subsequently inspected the snubber and con-l firmed the inspector's finding.. The snubber was replaced and all I
remaining feedwater system snubbers inspected. One additional snubber was replaced. An LER will be submitted.
The inspector had no further questions relative to observations during plant tours.
4.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pur-
suant to Technical Specifications 6;9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the
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inspector. The reports were reviewed to determire that the report included
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the required infomation; that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; that planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified problems; and, whether any infomation in the report.should be classified as an abnomal occurrence.
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The following periodic and special reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - March 1982 i
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Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - March 1982
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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5.
Operating Events a.
UNIT 1 The inspectors witnessed the initial startup of the Cycle 4 core
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on April 12, 1982. Criticality was achieved at 6:00 a.m. with actual rod position and boron concentration close to predicted values.
-- In order to train emergency response personnel, the licensee con-ducted a practice emergency exercise between 8:00 a.m. and 2:00
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p.m. on April 14, with participation by the states of New Jersey and Delaware. The inspector observed the exercise and attended the critique to ensure that all pertinent comments were noted and corrective actions initiated.
The plant was shut down from Mode 2 (zero power) to Mode 3 at
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1:59 p.m. on April 13, 1982 due to dilution of the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) below Technical Specification limits.
Subsequent In-vestigation detennined that the BIT inlet valves were leaking through. Since repair of these valves can only be accomplished in cold shutdown, cooldown was initiated at 3:00 a.m. on April 14.
The inspector noted that Title 10 CFR 50.72 requires that notifi-cation of NRC be made within one hour for "..Any event requiring initiation of shutdown of the nuclear power plant in accordance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation."
Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.4.1 requires that, with BIT boron concentration below limits, the plant be placed in Hot Stand-by within seven hours. While the plant was shutdown as required, no report was made to NRC. This failure to make a report constitutes aviolationof10CFR50.72(272/82-10-01).
Following repairs to the BIT inlet valves, the unit was heated to
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Mode 3 at 10:39 p.m. on April 18, 1982. The plant was critical at 12:53 p.m. and synchronized to the grid at 10:30 p.m. on April 19.
The generator was taken off line at 11:00 p.m. due to high tempera-i tures on a turbine bearing. The reactor remained in Mode 2.
Following a series of reactor startups for training and completion
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of bearing inspections, the unit was synchronized and power ascension l
initiated. At 10:00 a.m. on April 22, 1982, the generator was l
taken off line for testing of the overspeed trip. When the breakers l
were opened, the turbine tripped while power was still slightly in excess of 10%. As a result, the reactor tripped automatically.
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The reactor was again critical at 11:08 a.m. and the power ascension j
test program resumed. At the end of the report period, reactor l
power was 100%.
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At 10:55 a.m. on May 1, an operator, noting that~ the control room
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wide range level recorder for Steam Generator 13 Wide Range level had been failed for some time, initiated an investigation. At about 3:35 p.m. the instrument and control engineer perfoming troubleshooting, found that two terminals in the hot shutdown panel were shorted, failing the signal high, making the instrument in-operable both on the control room recorder and the hot shutdown panel meter. The short was created by a formed piece of wire, iden-tified by the licensee as a type of device used during wire wrapping to form the bundle prior to applying tie-wraps. The wire form was wedged in a cable bundle and the two free ends were shorting the teminal screws. The ends were not affixed. Review of the recorder trace identified the time of failure as approximately 1:30 p.m. on April 28. The instrument is required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 as post-accident instrumentation.
Inoper-ability for up to seven days is permitted by the Action Statement.
Monthly surveillance to channel check the instrument was due on May 5.
The instrument was returned to service and the Action Statement terminated at 3:45 p.m. on May 1,1982. A Licensee Event Report will be submitted.
Further details of licensee and NRC review of this matter are discussed in NRC Investigation Reports 50-272/82-13 and 50-311/82-12.
b.
UNIT 2 The unit tripped from 1007 power at 12:47 a.m. on April 17 due to
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low-low level in Steam Generator 24 resulting from loss of Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 21. The punp tripped hydraulically shortly after the emergency DC oil pump had been placed in service for a weekly test. Troubleshooting identified no specific cause for the hydraulic trip and the trip could not be repeated. A transient slug of air in the hydraulic system was postulated as the cause. All systems functioned nonnally on the trip. The unit was critical at 1:49 p.m. and synchronized to the grid at 10:10 p.m on April 17. The trip was reported to NRC as required.
The unit tripped from 100% power at 12:17 a.m. on April 21 due to
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low-low level in Steam Generator 22 caused by loss of Steam Gen-erator Feedwater Pump 21. The feedwater pump tripped on indicated overspeed. Troubleshooting was inconclusive, however additional recording instrumentation was installed to evaluate any subsequent trip. The plant was again critical at 1:57 a.m. and synchronized to the grid at 3:45 a.m.
NRC was notified of the trip as required.
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At 3:44 p.m. on April 28, Steam Generator Feedwater Pump 21
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tripped while the plant was operating at 100% power. Operator action to rapidly reduce power to 60% prevented a reactor trip.
Subsequent investigation by the licensee detennined that the l
stop valve to the pump high backpressure switch had been shut and the vent valve opened. As a result, feedwater pump turbine l
control circuitry saw a loss of condenser vacuum and initiated
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an automatic pump trip. Under most circumstances, recovery at this power level would not have been possible. No authorized _
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manipulation of the' valves was identified. Valve alignment was
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restored to nonnal and the pump returned to service. Licensee and NRC measures taken in response to this apparently deliberate
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tampering are discussed in NRC Combined Inspection Reports 50-
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272/82-09 and 50-311/82-11 and in Combined Investigation Reports
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50-272/82-13 and 50-311/82-12.
At 10:30 p.m. on May 3, during containment inspection to deter-
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mine the cause of increased leakage to the sump, operators discovered a 0.2 gpm service water leak in a coil of Containment
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Fan Coil Unit 23. The leak was isolated and repaired.
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accordance with IE Bulletin 80-24, the leak was promptly reported
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to NRC. Operation for up to seven days is permitted with one CFCU inoperable. The unit was restored to service within the allowable time frame.
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SITE i
-- At midnight on April 30 all bargaining unit employees represented
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by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 1576 initiated a strike. The IBEW represents all personnel on
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site with the exception of security and office workers. Operators
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up to the level of reactor operator were included. Management personnel relieved operators of licensed duties at 10:00 p.m. on April 30. The licensee retained approximately 390 people on site and continued to operate and maintMn the two operating units in two 12-hour shifts. Adequate numba of operators were available.
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Operators assigned in the control room had recent or current operating experience.
Following departure of bargaining unit personnel, the licensee l
I completed an extensive program of valve lineup verifications,
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equipment checkouts and electrical panel inspections. Except as
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noted above with respect to the Unit 1 Steam Generator 13 Level I
Instrument, no anomalous conditions were identified.
At the conclusion of the inspection period, the IBEW was still on strike and both units were operating at 100% power.
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During the period 12:00 to 6:00 p.m. on May 3, several brush fires
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were observed in marsh land 4 to 5 miles east of the site. At 2:34 p.m. one of three 500 KV transmission lines leaving the station tripped. Observation by helicopter confirmed that a fire had burned througn the area under the tower line. Following reset of protec-tive relaying, the line was restored to service at 2:47 p.m.
The licensee stated that periodic protective relay trips, particularly in the presence of ionized smoke, are not uncommon. No damage to the lines, except for minor soot deposition, was observed. Although the fires were within a mile of the current picket lines, local police contend that the fires were set by local muskrat trappers.
The inspector had no further questions with respect to operating events observed and reported during this period.
6.
Surveillance Testing a.
The inspector observed the performance of surveillance tests to confirm the 411owing:
testing was perfomed in accordance with adeouate pro-cedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operations were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were properly. accomplished; test results confomed with Technical Speci-fication and procedural requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual perfoming the test; deficiencies noted were reviewed and appropriately resolved; personnel performing L.e surveillance activities were knowledgeable of the systems and the test procedures and were qualified to perform the tests.
These observations included:
1 PD - 5.2.001 Rod Drop Time Measurement - Hot Full Flow, Revision
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2. dated January 6, 19R2.
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1 PD - 2.5.001 Channel Sensor Calibration, Reactor Coolant RTD
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Cross Calibration Check, Revision 3, dated September 23, 1981 i
i 1 PD - 16.2.012 Channel Functional Test, Source Range N32, Revision
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I 0, dated April 29, 1980
-- SP(0) 4.0.5 - P (SJ) In Service Testing Safety Injection Pumps 21 and 22 2 PD - 18.1.009 Solid State Protection System Functional Test
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j Train B, Revision 0, dated January 11, 1982 l
1 PD - 8.1.002 Rod Position Indication Signal Conditioning Module
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Calibration, Revision 3, dated May 31, 1979 l
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1 PD - 8.1.003 Rod Position Indication System Calibration, Revision
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3, dated November 26, 1980 SP(0) 4.6.2.3.(a) Operability Test of Containment Fan Coolers
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(CFCU 23)
Operational Test of IC Diesel Generator on May 7,1982
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4.0.5 (P) In-Service Testing - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 13
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SP(0) 4.2.4,(a) Quadrant Power Tilt
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SP(0) 4.2.11 Axial Flux Difference
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Steam Generator 21 and 24 Pressure Protection Channel Functional
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Test b.
By Order dated April 20,1981, Unit 1 Operating License DPR-70 was amended to include a requirement for leak testing check valves which
serve as primary coolant pressure isolation valves. NRC review of initial test results is documented in.NRC Inspection Reports 50-272/80-32 and 50-272/81-14.
During the current refueling outage, the valves were retested as required by the order. The inspector reviewed comple-ted surveillance procedure SP(0) 4.4.6.3, Emergency Core Cooling - ECCS Subsystems, Unit 1, Revision 3, dated March 2, 1982. The testing was completed on April 6,1982. The test included all valves specified in the order. All results were acceptable with the maximum leak rate re-corded as 0.78 gallons per minute (gpm). Acceptance criteria range from 1.0 to 5.0 gpm based on previous test results.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.
Maintenance Activities The inspector observed portions of maintenance activities to determine that the work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, Technical Specifications, and industry codes or standards. The following items were considered during this review:
limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing was performed prior to declaring that particular compo-nent as operable; and activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
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Activities observed included:
RCCA Lifting Coils - Rods Failed to Lift
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RPIS - RPIS vs. Rod Demanded Position Exceeded + 12 Steps
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.
Licensee Events a.
In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed:
UNIT 1 82-12/03L No.1B Diesel Generator - Inoperable
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82-13/03L IPR 1 & IPR 2 - Loss of Reactor Coolant System Vent
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Path 82-14/03L Wind Speed Indication - Inoperable
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82-15/03L Loss of No.1A Vital Bus - Wire to Undervoltage
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Relay Shorted
82-16/03L Containment / Plant Vent Monitors - Improper Alignment
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82-17/03L No. 1C Safeguards Equipment Control System - In-
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operable 82-18/01T Valve 14SW65 - Containment Service Water Leak
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UNIT 2 82-14/03L No. 21 Steam Generator Level Channel 2 - Inoperable
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-- 82-15/03L Missed Surveillance - Reactor Coolant Leak Rate 82-16/03L Axial Power Distribution - Out of Target Band
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82-17/03L Containment Fan Coil Unit - Inoperable - Low
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Service Water Flow
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-- 82-19/03L No. 2A Safeguards Equipment Control Cabinet -
Inoperable 82-20/03L No. 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - Inoperable -
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Failed Governor 82-21/03L Containment Air Lock - Inoperable-4 82-22/03L No. 21 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan - Inoperable
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82-25/03L No. 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump - Overcurrent
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b.
Onsite Licensee Event Followup b
For those LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted by asterisks in detail paragraph 8a), the inspector verified the reporting requirements of Technichi Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective' action had been taken, that the event was f-
reviewed'by the licensee as required p/ AP-4 and 6, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical
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Specification limits. The following findings relate to the LERs re-viewed on site:
UNIT 1
-- 82-12/03L This report details inoperability of Diesel Generator 1B caused by. corrosion failure of a jacket water
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heater. Both heaters were replaced with a more
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corrosion-resistant type under open design change ISC-0086. Since the replacement requires draining of chromated water from the jacket water cooling system, the licensee has elected to perform the
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design modification on an as-needed basis.
82-13/03L During maintenance on Pressurizer Power Operated
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Relief Valves in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5), control
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room operators failed to maintain one valve open to '
provide a vent path for overpressure protection as required by Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.b.
The oversight was detected within the eight hour period -
provided in the Action Statement and the vent path was restored.
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82-15/03L With the plant in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5), the 1A
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Vital 4 KV Bus was de-energized for a period of less than one hour, resulting in temporary loss of component cooling, RHR, boron flowpath, and service water to diesel generators. All applicable Action Statements of the Technical Specifications were met. The bus was de-energized due to shorting of a relay wire to the enclosure cabinet. Subsequent investigation revealed that during outage modifica-tions made to add additional undervoltage protection
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for the bus, the additional wires had not been dressed properly to preclude enclosure interference when opening and closing the door. The wires were properly routed and a complete inspection made of
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similar work to ensure that no other grounds could
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be generated during routine operation of 4 KV enclosures.
82-16/03L This report details a release of Gas Decay Tank ~11
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on March 26, 1982 during which radiation monitors 1R11A, 1R12A and 1R12B were not realigned from monitoring containment to monitoring the plant vent.
As a result, the release was made with no continuous monitoring for iodine and particulates as required by the Environmental Technical Specifications. The
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inspector reviewed documentation for release 1-GDT-13-82. Measured tank activity prior to release was
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3.61E-5 uCi/ml for a total of 3.36E-3 Ci.
During
the release, plant vent monitor 1R16 and waste gas monitor 1R14 were in service. These are gross activity monitors which will isolate a release when the setpoint is reached. The IR16 setpoint is cal-culated to isolate prior to exceeding allowable release rates. Although the procedure is specific in requiring that the iodine and particulate monitors be realigned, the check lists attached to the release fom are insufficient and confusing as to the re-quired lineup prior to initiating the release. The licensee's stated corrective action, which included only counseling of the individual involved, appears inadequate to prevent recurrence. The release of waste gas without appropriate monitoring constitutes a violation of the Appendix B Technical Specifications (272/82-10-02). Adequacy of licensee corrective action will be detemined after receiving their re-sponse to the Notice of Violation.
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82-17/03L While conducting a safeguards loading sequence
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surveillance test, the licensee discovered that the IC4D feeder breaker to IC Vital 4 KV bus could be tripped from the control room prior to reset of the sequence. While proper loading of all egefp-ment had been verified during previous surveillance tests, the removal of tripping capability while under sequencer control had not been addressed in the procedure prior to this test.
Investigation revealed an uncontrolled jumper, probably dating to the construction interval when the 4 KV busses were energized but the Safeguards Equipment Cabinets were not yet installed. The remaining control cir-cuits were inspected and no similar jumpers found.
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All other equipment was similarly tested for in-ability to trip when under safeguards' control and no other deficiencies were noted.
82-18/01T This report details a containment service water
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leak of 0.5 gpm from a flange on valve 14SW65 in the service water cooling system for Containment Fan Coil Unit 14. The leak was isolated and the flange bolts tightened, stopping the leak.
UNIT 2 82-16/03L This report details several events involving loss of
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circulating water pumps requiring rapid power reduc-tions due to increasing condenser back pressure.
In each case, axial flux difference was driven out of the target band for short intervals. The Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.2.1.a was complied with in each case. The inspector further noted that license amendment 6, issued on March 29,
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1982, increases the target band to +6 and -9% from the target value.
82-19/03L Spurious operations of the Safeguards Equipment
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Cabinets have been a continuing problem (reference NRC Inspection Report 50-311/81-19). During these operations, post accident loads associated with the particular SEC start but no injection occurs.
In many cases, these spurious operations have been associated with operation of unrelated plant equip-
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l ment. The licensee has initiated a program to in-stall filter circuits and shielding in the cabinets l
to prevent triggering electromagnetic interferences.
i These modifications have been made in Unit 1 and are scheduled for Unit 2 during an outage of suffi-cient duration under Design Change 2EC1387. Effec-tiveness of this modification will be evaluated during review of unresolved item 81-19-04.
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82-20/03L During routine surveillance testing, the steam-
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driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump would not achieve the required speed. The problem was isolated to a leaky overspeed ball check valve.
The governor linkage was also found out of adjustment.
Inspection of the linkage is part of the established surveillance procedures. The governor was repaired and the pump retested within the time frame allowed by Technical Specifications.
82-25/03L Details of this event are discussed in NRC Inspec-
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tion Report 50-311/82-08. To ensure continued operability of Residual Heat Removal Pump 22, the licensee conducted operational checks at an in-
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creased frequency for a period of four weeks. The inspector confimed that the tests were performed and that no recurrence of the initial failure to start was noted.
The inspector had no further questions with respect to LERs reviewed during this period.
9.
Post-Refueling Startup and Testing The licensee conducted initial heat up of Unit 1 on April 3,1982 and achieved initial criticality of the Cycle 4 core on April 12, 1982. A series of observations and reviews were conducted by the inspectors to confirm that the plant systems were ready for power operation and that the startup testing program, outlined by the licensee in correspondence to NRC dated January 7,1982, was completed.
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The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and checklists to confim equipment availability and prior confimation of operability consistent with Technical Specification requirements. System walkdowns were conducted to confirm readiness for operation. The systems included safety injection, containment spray, electrical distribution and component cooling.
During the outage, the licensee had replaced Component Cooling Heat Ex-changer 12 with a plate type heat exchanger. Tha inspectors reviewed test documentation to confim that an adequate preoperational test of this sub-system had been perfomed prior to service. Procedures were reviewed to confim coverage of the system as modified.
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Portions of the following startup activities and tests were observed by the inspectors; initial criticality, boron endpoint determination, flux mapping for power distribution, power coefficient measurements, isothermal temperature coefficient measurement, target axial flux diTference deter-mination, and core thermal power evaluation (calorimetric).
In addition, the inspectors confimed that the following had been performed; checkout of rod position indication, rod drop time measurement, incore/excore calibration quadrant power tilt, and shutdown margin determination.
Initial review of test data identified no deficiencies. The test data will be reviewed in detail during a subsequent inspection (272/82-10-03).
-No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10. Employee Strike At midnight April 30, 1982, all bargaining unit employees represented by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1576 went on strike.
These employees included all operators to the level of Nuclear Control Operator (licensed Reactor Operators), and all maintenance and technician personnel at non-supervisory levels.
Prior to the strike, the inspectors confirmed that the licensee had adequately prepared a contingency plan for continued operation. At the start of the strike and as it continued, the inspectors evaluated the turnover to management personnel and verified that regulatory and-safety criteria were adequately addressed by assigned personnel.
The licensee's plan called for retaining approximately 400 persons on site to man all required watches and job functions. Licensed duties. in the control room were assigned to currently experienced Senior Reactor Operators who nomally perfom the shift supervisory functions. Similarly, maintenance and technical functions were assigned to supervisory personnel with current or recent experience in the respective jobs to be perfomed.
Contingency planning included adequate consideration for consumable supplies, access to the station when required, comunications, local police support, offsite assistance, and the well-being of the confined staff. Twelve hour shift rotations were established with all licensed positions being adequately
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l covered oy recently experienced operators. Non-licensed positions were filled by a core of licensed operators augmented by engineers and staff
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l personnel receiving on-the-job training.
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In addition to positions defined in Technical Specifications, the inspector confirmed that adequate numbers of qualified personnel were available to fill the functions of Table B-1 in NUREG-0654 to meet emergency planning.
requirements.
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Due to an apparent act of tampering (see Detail paragraph 5), 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> NRC inspection on site was initiated on April 29, 1982 and continued in place at the end of the report period.
The inspectors observed an orderly turnover of operations to management staff which was completed at 10:00 p.m. on April 30, 1982. All required functions were manned as outlined in the contingency plan at that time.
In addition to equipment checkout and valve lineups, the staff confirmed availability of communications equipment (normal and emergency) at the start of the strike.
In a manner similar to plant staff, the security force maintained sufficient numbers of qualified people on site to man at least two augmented shifts.
The strike continued through the e,d of this report period. The inspectors evaluated continuity of manning as required by t1e license, qualifications of personnel in assigned tasks, and the impact on plant staff of protracted working hours and confinement. The inspection also addressed continuity of surveillance and maintenance activities as required by comply with Technical Specifications. One week into the strike, the licensee instituted a rotation plan whereby approximately 25% of the staff would leave for two days. Adequate two-shift staffing was maintained on site to meet all re-quirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
11. Unresolved Items Areas for which more infomation is required to detemine acceptability are considered unresolved.
Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 2 and 9.
12.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and
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findings.
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