IR 05000267/1990009
| ML20043E822 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1990 |
| From: | Cummins J, Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043E815 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-90-09, 50-267-90-9, NUDOCS 9006130424 | |
| Download: ML20043E822 (7) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION-IV-1 NRC. Inspection Report:
50-267/90-09-Operating License: DPR-34
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I Docket:
50-267 Licensee:
Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
P.O. Box'840 Denver, Colorado-80201-0840 i.-
' Facility Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)
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Inspection At: ~FSV, Platteville, Colorado Inspection Conducted: May 14-18', 1990'
q AI Inspector:
E.C@ ins,ReactorInspector Datel
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Approved:
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[Ii 11.\\ E. Gag 14rdo, Chief, Operational Programs -
Datei Section, Division of Reactor Safety
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Inspection 'Sumary t
Inspection Conducted May 14-18,1990(Report 50-267/90-09)
Areas Inspected: Nonroutine, announced inspection of licensed operator
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training and review of licensee activities related to items identified during
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. previous NRC inspections.
j Results:.. Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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l 9006130424 900604
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PDR ADOCK 05000267
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DETAILS 1.
PERSONS CONTACTED
- F. J. Borst, Nuclear Training and Support Manager
- L. D. Scott, Quality Assurance Service Manager
- D.Bottorff,NuclearTraining(0peratorTraining)
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- M. E. Deniston, Superintendent of Operations
- D. W. Evans, Operations and Maintenance Mant a r
'*H. O'Hagan, D/D project Manager
- C. H. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production
- P. Anderson, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- J. M. Grambling, Supervisor Nuclear Licensing-Operations
- P. F. Tomlinson, Manager Quality Assurance
- N. Snyder, Fuel Deck Manager
- R. L. Craun, Engineering Manager K.;Einig, Nuclear Operator Training Supervisor-The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.
- Denotes those persons that attended the exit meeting held on May 18, 1990.
The NRC senior resident inspector, R. E. Farrell, also attended the exit.
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2.
PLANT STATUS
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of Colorado (PSC) decided to cease Public Service Company (FSV) Nuclear Generating Station and On August 29,.1990, nuclear operations at the Fort St. Vrain on November 27, 1989, defueling of the reactor commenced. At the time of this inspection, one third of the reactor core had been defueled; however, defueling j
had been temporarily ~ suspended while FSV negotiated with the Department of
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Energy to ship the spent. fuel offsite for storage at the Idaho National
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Laboratory.
FSV did not have sufficient onsite spent fuel storage space to accommodate the entire core.
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3.
FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS (92701 and 92700)
(Closed)' Violation (267/8619-03): This item identified weaknesses related to prompt and effective corrective action in the licensee's programs.
The licensee's performance indicator re' port for March 1990 showed that the licensee had reduced the number of open nonconformance reports (NCRs) from 120 o
in January 1989 to 17 in March 1990. The licensee had established a goal to
_have a level or decreasing backlog of NCRs and to provide engineering dispositions within 20 days. The licensee had also reduced the backlog and disposition time of corrective action requests (CARS). The licensee's performance indicator report for March 1990 showed that seven CARS were open and none of these exceeded the licensee's 120-day goal for disposition.
This violation is considered close. _mm
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-3-(Closed)V'iolation(267/8808-001): This item identified problems related to the distribution and control of controlled design drawings.
Licensee actions to correct these problems included:
training sessions for supervisors and managers (held on April 21,1988); revision of the " Caution Stamping" system in Procedure ENG-1, " Control of Modifications and Documentation Changes, Issue 14, dated July 18, 1988; standardizing dates on drawings; locating set of Special Handling drawings in the site document control office;
- and identifying Procedures ED-100 and SMAP-18 now both identify TCRs as temporary Configuration Reports.
This violation is considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (267/8815-001): This item identified that charts generated by control room recorders were not stored in the record center buildings.
The licensee revised Procedure Q-17, " Quality Records," Issue 14, dated March 21, 1990, paragraphs 3.3.5, 4.4.2, and 4.5.2.a to allow the storing of quality
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records which were initially received and processed in the onsite records center, in an approved offsite record-facility which meets the requirements of ANSI N 45.2.9-1979. The licensee evaluated and accepted an offsite facility for interim storage of FSV records (Interoffice Memo NDG-88-0925, dated'
November 4, 1988) and updated Section B.S.17.4 cf the procedure to allow offsite storage of records. The licensee also completed modifications which enlarged the records center storage area (Controlled Work Procedure 89-106).
This violation is considered closed.
-(Closed) Violation (267/8908-001): This item identified that two cross-connect valves (V-46121 and V-46122) between the firemain and the reactor water cooling system had not been included in Surveillance Test Procedure SR 5.3.4c 3-AX and had not been tested.
.The licensee revised Surveillance Procedure SR 5.3.4c3-AX to incluce V-46121 and V-46122. The licensee also reviewed the flow paths for once-through fire water cooling via the prestressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) liner cooling system, and verified that these were the only two valves omitted.
This violation is considered closed.
-(Closed) Violation (267/8908-002): This item identified a failure to test the PCRV. cooling water system scanner high flow alarms.
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The licensee had revised Surveillance Procedure SR 5.4.5-M, 'PCRV Cooling Water Flow Scan Functional Test," to include a set of asterisks printed next to the measured flow value on the flow scanner when the high flow setpoint had been exceeded. The licensee also revised Surveillance Procedure SR 5.4.5-A1, "PCRV Cooling Water Flow Scan Calibration," to include verification that the scanner program contained the correct high flow setpoint values.
This violation is considered closed.
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-4-i (Closed) Violation (267/8917-001): This item identified three instances in which required procedures to perform activities had not been established.
The licensee corrected this as indicated below:
(1) Timely testing of the reactor protection system starting channel and
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linear' power channel trips and alarms following power reductions. Since FSV was permanently shutdown, this concern is no longer significant.
.(2) The licensee issued the necessary instructions to test and calibrate the
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diesel driven fire pump overspeed trip.
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(3) Data Base Change Request No. 89-0268 was issued to provide calibration L
information for the emergency diesel generator temperature gauges.
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This violation is considered closed.
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G Fort St. Vrain had'-ceased nuclear operations and was in a permanent shutdown status with;defueling in progress; therefore, the previously identified-
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inspection findings whit.h are discussed below no-longer impact safety. These findings
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are closed on the basis of having been overcome by events. The licensee had taken what appeart.d to be appropriate corrective action for most of these items;-
-however, NRC verification of these items would require the expenditure of inspection resources, which was not considered'necessary with the plant permanently shutdown and in the process of defueling.
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(Closed) Deviation (267/8815-004):.This item identified a failure to implement consnitments to the NRC for fastener procurement.
(Closed) Deviation (267/8823-002): This item identified that there was no documentation to show that fluorescent penetrant inspection had been performed on Helium Circulator Part Number C 2101-300-95 spring plungers.
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(Closed)InspectorFollowupItem(267/8908-003):- This item identified an apparent discrepancy between the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and the Technical Specification basis related to System '46 isolation on low flow.
t-(Closed)'InspectorFollowupItem(267/8908-004): This item was the result of the fact that a safety evaluation, related to a System 46 cooling water tube to the. lower core' support floor being isolated, had not been performed.
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.(Closed)OpenItem(267/8727-002): This item questioned the use of waivers in
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the training program,
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i (Closed)OpenItem'(267/8808-003): This item was opened pending NRC review of licensee corrective actions related to the records program and records storage facility identified in licensee's Corrective Action Reports CAR-88-002 and CAR-88-00 __
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(Closed)01enItem(267/8808-004): This item identified a concern related to vendors, w1o would not accept 10 CFR Part 21 as a procurement requirement, possibly furnishing connercial grade items.
(Closed)OpenItem(267/8808-007): This item identified material-classification differences between PSC and General Atomic Technologies.
(Closed)OpenItem(267/8815-002): This item was opened pending review of a General Atomic Technologies inspection report on the primary side of a helium circulator.
(Closed)OpenItem(167/6818-002): This item determined that explicit references to senior reactor operator and special senior reactor operator's responsibilities had not been added to the fuel handling procedure manual as the licensee committed to do in a memorandum to the NRC dated April 14, 1988.
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(Closed)OpenItem(267/8818-03): This item identified a concern about the licensees use of seminars to disseminate important information to employees.
(Closed)OpenItem(267/8818-004): This item identified a concern related to the deletion of scheduled courses without any explanation.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(267/8808-005): This item identified a problem due to a lack of clear guidance with respect to establishment of applicable vendor technical. and quality documentation requirements for specific procurements.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(267/8808-006): This item identified a problem-related to the providing a clear record documenting the engineering evaluation of component critical parameters and bases for dedication.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem(267/8808-008): This item identified a concern related to the lack of timeliness in responding to 10 CFR Part 21 reports.
(Closed) Violation (267/8808-002): This item identified a failure to specify quality assurance requirements in a procurement document, Purchase Order N8446.
(Closed) Violation (267/8815-003): This item identified that a helium circulator was installed with a quality assurance receipt inspection hold tag attached to it.
(Closed) Violation (267/8815-006): This item identified problems related to welding and nondestructive testing.
(Closed) Violation (267/8823-001): This item identified problems related to repair welding performed on Helium Circulator C-2101.
The above items are considered close. _ -.. _. _.
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4. -LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING (41701)
The_ termination of operations, going into permanent shutdown, and starting defueling of the reactor core had significantly changed the training needs of.
the FSV licensed operators.
As a result, the licensed operator's duties had been significantly reduced in scope.
In the shutdown and defueling plant status a licensed operator was only required to monitor a limited number of plant parameters related to decay heat removal, perform administrative duties in relation to defueling, and fill out several data sheets on various control room indicators. The number of emergency or abnormal events that the operator had to be prepared to respond to.
was also reduced.
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The FSV Nuclear Training and Support Department had adjusted the licensed operator training program to meet the needs of a facility in a shutdown and defueling mode. To determine the training needs of the licensed operators more accurately, training department personnel conducted a licensed operator task analysis in accordance with Training Administrative Procedure TAP-4C, " Analysis," Issue 2,
& dated May 10, 1989. Based on the findings of this task analysis, many of the previous operator tasks for an operating plant had been.
dropped from the licensed operator training program. Examples were tasks associated with the turbine generator, startup, power operations, and emergency operating procedures that were no longer applicable. Examples of tasks that continued to be significant and were receiving attention were tasks associated with fuel handling, monitoring condensate and helium flows, electrical systems, and the radiological emergency response plan.
The inspector determined from review of the licensee's licensed operator requalification training schedule (July 31, 1989, through June 29,1990)that the. scheduled training was appropriate to the current plant status.
The inspector reviewed the training records, including the latest requalification-examinations taken in May 1989, of three licensed reactor on rators and three senior reactor operators. The inspector verified that the training records-accurately documented attendance and the satisf actory completion of the training courses identified on the operator requalification training schedule. The records were readily retrievable and in order.
The licensee's pass rate for licensed operator requalification examinations over the past three years had been:
Tested Passed Failed 1989
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1988
24
1987
24 2(retestedandpassed)
The inspector attended a licensed operator requalification training session on communications and verified that the technical content of information presented was adequate..In addition, the instructor followed a well developed lesson
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' plan,t.R 098.01, in presenting the training material. A copy of the lesson plan, which clearly stated the objectives of the training, was provided to each student. Thesessionincludedmeaningfulpracticaldemonstrations(utilizing
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walkie-talkies), and the instructor encouraged and got good class participation.
Retention of qualified personnel at FSV did not appear to be a problem, in-
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- part because of a retention plan implemented by the licensee in January 1989.
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Therefore, the licensee's training program was geared more toward continuing training rather than initial training.
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The licensee's licensed. operator training program had been accredited by the InstituteofNuclearPowerOperations(INP0). An INP0 reaccreditation inspection was scheduled for June 1990.
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EXIT INTERVIEW (30703)
An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 on May 18, 1990. During this interview, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector,