IR 05000267/1990005
| ML20042F307 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1990 |
| From: | Baird J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042F304 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-90-05, 50-267-90-5, NUDOCS 9005080144 | |
| Download: ML20042F307 (7) | |
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APPENDIX B i
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
i NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/90-05 Operating License: DPR-34-
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Docket: 50-267 Licensee:
Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
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P.O. Box 840.
Denver, Colorado 80201-0840 Facility Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)
Inspection At:
FSV, Platteville, Colorado and PSC offices, Denver, Colorado; I
Inspection Conducted:. February 7 through March 29, 1990 i
Inspectors:
R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector R. P. Mullikin, Project Engineer
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Approved:
h /b /h 4-/ / 7/ 9D d.*3. Baird. Technical Assistant, 01 vision Ddte
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of Reactor Projects
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Inspection Summary i
Inspection Conducted February 7 through March 29, 1990 (Report 50-267/90-05)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite followup of licensee event reports, followup on items of noncompliance, operational safety
verification, monthly surveillance observation, and monthly maintenance
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observation.
Results: Within the areas inspected, two violations of NRC regulations were identified. The first violation was a failure to follow procedures (paragraph 6). The second violation was-use of a procedure, which had not sbeen reviewed by the plant operations review committee, to handle a spent fuel shipping cask full of spent fuel (paragraph 7).
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DETAILS-
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1.
Persons Contacted
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D. Alps, Supervisor, Security
- M. Block, System Engineering Manager
- F. Borst, Nuclear Training and Support Manager L. Brey', Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Resources.
R. Craun, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager A. Crawford, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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- M. Deniston, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Evans, Operations / Maintenance Manager -
- M. Ferris, Quality Assurance (QA) Operations Manager
- C Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production
- J. Gramling Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations M. Holmes. Nuclear Licensing Manager M. Niehoff, Nuclear Design Manager F. Novachek, Program Manager, Defueling/ Decommissioning (D/D)-
- H. O'Hagan, D/D Project Manager
- W. Rodgers, Nuclear. Computer Services Manager
- T. Schleiger, Superintendent, Chemistry & Radiation Protection
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- L. Scott, QA Services Manager
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- N. Snyder, Fuel Deck Managers
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- P. Tomlinson, Manager, QA
- D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted March 29, 1990.
2.
Plant Status The plant is pemanently~ shut.down anti in the process of defueling.
FSV coes not presently have sufficient onsite spent fuel storage capacity to completely defuel the reactor without shipping spent fuel offsite. The-
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onsite spent fuel storage capacity was filled previously with 12 of the 37 core fuel regions removed firm the reactor and placed in the spent fuel wells.
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The licensee is currently negotiating with the Department of Energy (DOE)
to ship spent fuel to the Idaho National Laboratory per a longstanding.
contract between 00E and-the licensee.
During previous normal refueling outages, three refueling loads of spent fuel totaling half of a full core
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were shipped to DOE, Idaho. The licensee is simultaneously preparing a licensing submittal to construct a spent fuel storage facility onsite.
This facility will be utilized, if necessary, in place of fuel shipment
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Onsite Followup of' Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
(92700)
The inspectors ' reviewed selected LERs to determine whether corrective actions, as stated in the LERs, are appropriate to correct the cause of j
the event and to verify that these corrective actions have been implemented.
i (Closed)LER88-002:
Loop I Shutdown and Manual Scram. The corrective I
actions of this LER were reviewed and found satisfactory as the
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corrective actions associated with Violation 267/8803-01. This review
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l-was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/89-20.
(Closed) LER 88-005: Neutron Flux Rate-of-Change High Scram. The reactor was shut down with all rods in when a neutron flux; rate-of-change
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high scram was received. - The reactor is now permanently shut down.
No-further action is required.
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(Closed) LER 88-017: _ Reacter Building Crane Restraints Inadequate for Tornado Loads.. New crane restraints were designed and -installed to assure that the crane would stay on its runway rails during a maximum tornado event. No further action.is required.
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(Closed) LER 89-004: Wide Range Nuclear Channel Upscaled from Noise Source and Actuated Scram. This event involved-13 scram actuations due to
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electronic noise. All events occurred while the reactor was shut down.=
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The reactor has since been permanently shut down. No further.' action is required.
(Closed)LER89-007:
Loop I Shutdown and Turbine Trip Ca' used by Loss of l
Instrument Bus.. An instrument bus was deenergized when it was transferred to its alternate power supply to facilitate-maintenance on the associated battery charger which-is the normal power supply. The bus was deenergized for approximately 20 seconds.
The licensee was unable to identify any equipment failure or inadequacy. The equipment operator
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involved was walked through the switching operation several times. No further action is required.
L (Closed)LER89-010:
Loop I Shutdown Caused by. Fuse Failure in Loop I Circulator Speed Control System. The fuse failed as designed when a l
faulty electronic module drew too much current. The fuse and module were l.
replaced.
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(Closed)LER89-013:
12 Cable Trays Found Overfilled. The overfill l-condition resulted from an error in the licensee's cable fill computer i
program. The program was corrected. The overfilled trays were reviewed
and the licensee determined that while the fill criteria was exceeded,
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heat generation and dead weight criteria were not exceeded. Thus, the trays meet the licensee's fire hazards analysis and seismic analysis.
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(Closea)LER89-014: Degraded Fire Barrier Seals. The licensee identified four degraded fire penetration seals during e routine inspection of these seals. The seals were degraded due to an inadequate installation procedure which had already been corrected. The degraded seals were replaced.
(Closed) LEl4 89-.017: Reactor Scram Sipal Generated by Wide Range Nuclear Channels III and V While ResetJr Shut Down. The scram signal vos generated by electronic ocise with th2 reactor shut dovn and all rods inserted. The reactor is pernenently shut down. No action is required.
(Closed)LER89-019: Moisture Ingress to Instrumant Air System. Due to
a procedural violation, a valve left open, and multiple valve failures, the licensee introduced steam to the "A" train instrument air via leak through Rom the station air system.
Equipment has been repaired, equipmeni operators have been retrained, and employee general training.
now emphasizes procedure compliance. These actions are sufficient without hardware modifications as the plant is pennanently shut down.
4.
Followup on items of Noncomplianen (92702)
B (Closed) Violation 267/8920-01:
Failure to follow Procedures. A failure to close a valve in accordance with a valve lineup allowed steam from the auxiliary boiler to enter thJ station air and one train of instrument air.
This led to the event described in LER 89-010. The corrective' actions, described in paragraph 3 of this report regarding LER 89-019 are sufficient to close this item.
5.
Operational Safety veritigtion (71707)
The inspectors made tours of the control rum during norme.1 working hours und during backshift hours. Control room staffing was verified to be at t5e proper level for the plant condition. During control room tours, the inspectors verified that the required number of nuclear instrumentation and plant protective system channels were operable. The operability of emergency AC and DC electrical power, meteorological, and fire protection.
systems was also verified by the inspectors. The reactor operators and shift supervisor logs were reviewed along with the Technical Specification (TS) compliance log, clearance log,(operations deviation report (ODR) log, temporary configuration report TCR) log,andoperations order book. Shift turnovers were observed, The inspectors made tours of all accessible areas of the plant to assess the overall conditions and verify the adequacy of plant equipment, radiological controls, and security. During these tours, particular attention was paid to the licensee's fire protection program, including fire extinguishers, firefighting equipment, fire barriers, control of flanmable materials, and other fire hazards, w
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The inspectors observed hecith physics technicians performing surveys and checking air samplers and area radiation monitors.
Contamination levels and exposure rates were posted at entrances to radiologically controlled areas and in other appropriate areas and were verified to be up to date by the inspector =. Health' physics technicians were present to provide assistance when workers were required to enter radiologically controlled areas. The inspectors observed workers following the int.tructions on radiation work permits concerning protective clothing and dosimetry and L
using proper procedures ft,r contamination control, including proper removal of protective clothing and whole-body frisking upon exiting a.
radiologically controlled area.
The inspectors randomly verified that the number of armed security officers required by the security plan were present. A lead security officer was on duty to direct security activities on each shift.
The inspectors verified that search equipment, including an x-ray enachine,
. explosive detector, and metal detector, were operational or a 100 percent hands-on search was conducted.
The protected area barrier was surveyed by-the inspectors to ensure that it was not compronised by erosion or other objects.
The inspectors observed that vital area barriers were well maintained and not compromised. The inspectors also observed that persons granted access to the site were badged and visitors were properly escorted.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed performance of portions of Procedure SR 5.2.21-SA, Issue 23, " Semi Annual Surve111arce on ACM Diesel." perfonned February 7, 1990. The inspector observed an equipment operator opening and closing 480 VAC breakers in the 480 VAC switchgear room in response to directions received via a hand-held radio from the test director. While the inspector ohcerved, the test director directed the equipment operator to perform Step 5.4.27, Substep C, which required opening a breaker. While the j
equipment operator looked fcr the correct breaker, it became clear from radio transmissions received that the test director and other test participants had proceeded beyond Step 5.4.27 Substep C, without waiting for confirmation that the breaker had been opened in accordance with the l
procedure.
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The equi > ment operator repeatedly tried to advise the test director that the brea(er had not yet been opened. When the test director did respond, the equipment operator was advised to proceed with the rest of the test and skip Step 5.4.27, Substep C, as the test had proceeded beyond that point.
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This'is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (267/9005-01),
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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspector observed licer,see personnel on March 1,1990, taking naasurepents of fittings attaching spent fuel casks to the dedicated truck beds which carry these casks.
In preparation for fuel shipment, the licensee discovered that the cask-to-truck fittings were not uniform between the three cask-truck sets. The licensee was taking measurements to determine if new hardware could be fabricated to make the three casks and truck beds interchangeable.
To facilitate this measurenent taking, the licensee utilized the mobile yard crane to lift each spent fuel cask from its truck trailer and suspend the cask several inches above the trailer, allowing technicians to measure the truck-to-cask hardware.
While the inspector watched, the licensee's workers lifted the spent fuel cask loaded with spent fuel and suspended it several inches off its trailer to take the required measurenents.
The irspector questioned the appropriateness of this activity as it took place outside, while a truck bay in the reactor building with nuclear safety related ventilation and a nuclear safety-related crane were available.
The inspector was informed by licensee personnel that +.here was a truck in the reactor building truck bay and they elected to do this work outside rather than move the truck into the truck bay.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedure for doing the work,
" Station Service Request (SSR) 90500781," to determine if an adequate review of this activity had been accomplir.hed prior to initiating the work. The inspector found that this procedure had not been reviewed by the plant operations review comittee as required by the licensee's TS AC 7.1.2.5.a.
This ic an apparent violation of NRC regulations (267/9005-2).
Fort St. Vrain Oversight Comittee Meeting (30702)
The licensee has appointed an oversight comittee comprised of industry and PSC personnel to oversee the defueling and decomissioning activities.
This oversight comittee reports-to the PSC Chief Executive Officer.
The inspector observed the oversight committee meeting held at the FSV Visitor's Center on March 14, 1990s and at the PSC Diamond Hill office on March 15, 1990. The meeting agenda inclu6ed the following topics:
Defueling and decomissioning status
Plan for enhancing NRC relations
Sumary of licensing scope
' Comparison and contrast of FSV to Rancho Seco and Shoreham
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- Public interest in defueling/deconnissioning and plans to address
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Low level radioactive waste disposal contingency plans
Issues driving early decommissioning
Report on review of PSC's independent spent fuel storage facility
Flooding the PCRV as an approach to dismantling vessel internals
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g Plans to enhance engineering independence
Report on defueling alternetives
Report on FSV design control and review process, including 10 CFR 50.59 review The inspector found the neeting to tie a frank and open discussion of defueling and decommissioning issues.
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Exit Meeting (30703)
An exit interview was conducted with I tcensee representatives identified in paragra)h 1 on March 29, 1990. During this interview, the inspector reviewed tie scope and findings of the report. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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