IR 05000267/1990015
| ML20029A993 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1991 |
| From: | Collins S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Crawford A PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9103050209 | |
| Download: ML20029A993 (3) | |
Text
January 25, 1991
SUBJECT:
Response to NRC Inspection Report 90-15 REFERENCE:
NRC Letter, Collins to Crawford, dated 12/20/90 (G-90306)
Dear Sirs:
This letter is in response to the weaknesses icer,tified in the inspection conducted by Dr.
J.B.
Nicholas during the cerico Novemoer 6-8, 1990 (Inspection 90-15).
The inspection inclucea the implementation of the emergency plan and procedures during the annual emergency response exercise (FOSAVEX-90).
No violations or deviations were identified.
However, there were three weaknesses identified in the course of the inspection.
The following is PSC's response and schedule of corrective actions planned for ee.ch acmitted weakness.
267/9015-01:
The inspectors noted several occasions when exercise controllers or observers prompted CR operators.
a.
At 0903, the CR communicator inquired of a OA observer the status of the "A" diesel generator and was given the equipment status by the observer. At this time in the exercise scenario, the status of the diesel generators should not have been available from any nonplayer.
b.
At 0922, the Superintencent of Ooerations incuired of an exercise controller the status of the reserve auxiliary transformer and was given -the information requested. According to the exercise scenario, this information should not have been available at that time from a nonplayer.
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P-91035 Page 2 January 25, 1991 c.
At 0929, the CR communicator inquirea of an exercise controller as to whether reactor core maintenance nac been in progress at the time of the ceclaration of the emergency.
The CR exercise controller responded negatively to the cuestion from the CR communicator.
Since initial plant and reactor c0ncitions had been provided to the CR staff at 0814 and :.ue sti un s had been addressed at that time as to plant activitics in crogress, the information requestec by the CR communicator should not have oeen available from a nonplayer.
d.
At 0955, an exercise controller volunteerec the cin.ensiens of tne keyway sump to the CR Emergen:y Caorcinator.
This informaticn was not provided as a contingency message in the exercise scenario and should have not been availaole from a nonplayer.
e.
At 1057, a CR staff memoer inquiroc as to how many pecole were injured in the reactor building.
An exercise controller volunteerec the information of two injurec persons.
This information was conveyed by a controller message in the exercise scenario and should not have oeen volunteerec vercally from a n o n p i r.y e r,
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At 1257, the CR Emergency Coorcinator askea the CR staff wnat was on Level 4 cf tha reactor cuilding anc the exercise controlier volunteered the information rather tnan an exercise player.
This volunte9 ring of exercise information by exercise controllers or observers in response to questions posed by exercise players as a means of providing information not currently available from another exercise player is considered an exercise weakness.
PSC Resoonse:
The weakness is admitted.
The controller training lesson clan, ?T 017.01, will be revised to concentrate more heavily on controller / observer prompting.
The aforementioned examples of volunteering exercise information by exercise controllers or observers will be included in the revision as well.
PSC is contacting other plants in the indus+ry to obtain ideas as to now they train and prepare their exercise controllers.
PT 017.01, " Controller Duties", will ce revised by June 30, 1991.
No further corrective actions a e planned.
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a P-91035 Page 3 January 25, 1991 267/9015-02:
The inspectors observed several problems with the licensee's ability to follow the emergency notification steps contained in the licensee's Raciological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)-CR and RERP-Notification procecures. The following are examples of the proolems observed concerning offsite notifications:
a.
The Emergency Event Notification Form - Sheet 2 from Procecure RERP-CR, Attachment B, was not reviewed and aoproved by tne SS/ emergency coordinator (EC) prior to the NOUE notification calls to the County anc State agencies, The County and State agency notifications were mace between OE49 and 0852.
During that time period only Emergency Event Notification Form - Sheet 1 from RERP-CR, Attachment B, had been revieweo and approved by the SS/EC.
Sheet 2 of the Emergency Event Notification Form was approved later by the SS/EC at 0853.
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b.
The information contained in line 4 of the Emergency Event Notification Form - Sheet 2 from Procecure RERP-CR, Attacnment B, was not communicated to Weld County autnorities during the initial notification call announcing the NOUE at 0349.
Line 4 contains information concerning offsite dangers posed by tne emergency including protective action reecmmendations.
The information conveying no danger to offsite personnel (line 4 Item A) was later communicated to Weld County officials at 0851 in response to a return call to the CR form Weld County requesting the information concerning danger to the oublic, c.
During the initial notification of the NOUE to the State authorities at 08S2, the event resulting in the NOUE classification was not communicated.
This i n f o rma t '.o n was written on the notification form under the heading of plant responses.
d.
The emergency event notification form from Procedure RERP-CR, Attachment B, used for the exercise ALERT notification of offsite agencies, was not reylewed or approsad by the CR Emergency Coordinator prior to the notification of offsite authorities at 0906.
The form had been approved by the 55, but he had oeen relieved of the CR Emergency Coordinator responsibilities by the Operations and Maintenance Manager at 0900, in accorcance with Procedure REPP-CR, Attachment B,
Step 7.
Procedure RERP-CR.
Attachment B, Step 6(a), directs the CR Emergency Cocrdinator to review and approve the completed notification forms.
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P-91035 Page 4 January 25, 1991 e.
The followup notification form (RERP-Notification, Attachment A)
was used to notify offsite authorities o' >he Site Area Emergency at 1045.
Step 3 of this form did not indicate the current emergency classification.
The licensee's failure to obtain requireo reviews and approvals on notification forms prior to their use in performing offsite agency notifications and also not disseminating all of the required information contained on the notification message form is considered an exercise weakness.
PSC Resoonse:
The weakness is admitted.
The reouirement for proper completion of the emergency notification forms, found in both RERP-CR and RERP-Notification, will be stressed to Operations personnel as well as personnel responding to the Technical Support Center in the event of an emergency.
During drills and exercises involving both the Control Room and the Technical Support Center, more emphasis will be placed on properly filling out notification forms, cotaining tne necessary approvals, and conducting effective notification calls to offsite agencies.
-Control Room and Tecnnical Support Center eersonnel will receive training on the croper completion of notification forms by April 15, 1991.
No further corrective actions are planned.
267/9015-03:
The inspector noted several problems with the performance of the rescue operations in a very high radiation area.
The following are examples of the problems observed during the rescue operation, a.
The fire brigade / rescue team did not receive a briefing from the CR or TSC before entering Level 5 of the reactor buildin to begin -their search and rescue activities.
For example, t CR had radiation readings from various area radiation monitors in the reactor building in the areas the team was to enter, but this information was not discussed with the fire brigade / rescue team prior to entering the reactor building.
b.
The fire brigade / rescue team had difficulty donning their anti-contamination clothing and respirator-equipment orier to entering the reactor building.
The team could have started the search and rescue attemot in the reactor building much sooner if help had been provided to assemble the necessary protective equipment and instruments and help the team get dressed.
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One fire brigade / rescue team member did not place his self-reading pocket dosimeter on the outside of his anti-contamination coveralls.
Self-reading pocket dosimeters should be readily accessible for immediate dose determination when entering and working in a high radiation area, d.
The fire brigade / rescue team appeared rather disorganized.
No single person was in charge of tne team's activities.
There should be assigned a team leader to oversee and be in charge of the team's activities and act as the communicator between the team and the CR or TSC.
e.
The fire brigade / rescue team entered the reactor building on
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Level 5 without the team's nealth physics technician in the lead position to monitor the radiation fields that they were entering, since this information was unknown.
This practice of health physics personnel surveying an area prior to entry is standard operating procedure.
This matter was later corrected before the team entered the truck bay area, f.
While removing the first injury victim from the reactor ouilding truck bay area, the fire brigade / rescue team members were in radiation areas of 1-11 Rem /hr.
However, no one :hecked his self-reading pocket dosimeter to determine the amount of radiation exposure he had received.
Self-reading pocket
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dosimeter results were not read until the team arrived at the fuel storage building.
g.
The fire brigade / rescue team did not identify the second injury victim on tht truck bed during the initial search.
After the first injury victim had been transported to the fuel storage building, one of the team members mentioned-that he saw another victim on the _ truck bed.
However, this team member did not volunteer-this information to the other team members until after several inquiries had been made by the CR concerning a second
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victim. Once it was determined that there definitely was a second injury victim still in the reactor building truck bay, there appeared to be no urgency on the part of the fire brigade / rescue team to return to the reactor building truck bay to resc'Je the second victim. At 1113 a team member stated he had observed a second injury victim.
However, the team did not depart the fuel storage building until 1132 to retrieve the second injury victim.
During the time following the fuel cask incident which happened at 1030, until 1132, the second injury victim was in an approximately 11 Rem /hr radiation field.
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P-91035 Page 6 January 25, 1991 The failure of fire brigade / rescue team to work swiftly and efficiently and perform their task using proper health physics practices to minimize radiation exposure to themselves as well as to the injury victims and also to minimize the spread of racioactive contamination during the rescue effort is considered an exercise weakness.
PSC Responsel The weakness is admitted.
The fire brigace/ rescue team does inceed have a specified team leacer.
During fire brigade response, the leader is clearly identified by the nat which he wears.
During this particular exercise, however, because they were entering a
potentially contaminated area, it was decided that the team would con anti-contamination clothing as opposed to the typical fire brigace apparel.
Because fire brigade personnel were not accustomed to donning anti-contamination clothing prior to responding to a
situation, this led to the excessive dress out time and apparent lack of leadership among the team ano succeeced in furtner degracing the remair. der of the team's response efforts, a
In orcer to better familiari:e the fire brigade team with the various response modes which may be recuired of them, the drilling frequency of the team will be increased and the scenarios to which they are drilled will be more widely varied.
In the past, fire brigace cr111s were focused towards fire fighting efforts rather than a variety of fire fighting, contamination control, and search and rescue applications.
Fire brigade drills will now include va ryi ng objectives covering the danning of appropriate protective clothing, response to cortaminated/high radiation areas, response.to situations of multiple victims and victims located in more than-one specific area, and first aid treatment for injured individuals, both contaminated and noncentaminated.
Proper contamination control techniques will be stressed during drills, as appropriate. The Control Room staff will participate in these drills as well anc objectives in this area will include proper job briefings for the responding team.
Beginning in January, 1991, the drill frequency of the fire brigace team will be increased to a minimum of one drill rer month with at least five e'
these being unannounced, backshift drills.
On January 23, 1991, a backshift drill of the fire - brigade team was held.
The drill scenaria included response to a contaminated, injured individual and was observed by a member of the Fort St. Vrain Quality Assurance Division.
Initial indications following the drill were quite favorable.
No further corrective actions are planned.
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P-91035 Page 7 January 25, 1991 If you have any questions or comments asse:iated with this inspection response, please call Mr. M. H. Holmes at (303) 450-6960.
Sincerely, eqf. df
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V A.C. Crawford Vice President Nuclear Ocerations ACC/rm cc:
Regional Administrator, Region IV ATTH:
Mr. G. L. Constable, Chief.
Technical Suoport Section Division of Reactor Projects (2 copies)
Mr. J. B. Baird Senior Resident Inspector Fort St. Vrain Rick Hatten, Director Division of Disaster :mergency Services State of Colorado
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