IR 05000267/1990003

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Insp Rept 50-267/90-03 on 900101-0206.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previously Identified Insp Findings,Followup on Items of Noncompliance,Monthly Surveillance Observation & Operational Safety Verification
ML20033E563
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain 
Issue date: 02/20/1990
From: Westerman T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20033E560 List:
References
50-267-90-03, 50-267-90-3, NUDOCS 9003130298
Download: ML20033E563 (7)


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APPENDIX-

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f

REGION IV

NRC Inspectio'n Report:

50-267/90-03 Operating License:

DPR-34 h

T Docket:

50-267-Licensee:

Public: Service Company of Colorado (PSC)'

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P.O. Box 840

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Denver, Colorado 80201-0840-Facility;Name:

Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating. Station (FSV)

Inspection At:

FSV, Platteville, Colorado, and PSC office, Denver,

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Colorado

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Inspection Conducted:

January I through February 6, 1990

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q Inspector:

R. E. Farrell, Senior. Resident Inspector

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Approved:

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i T..F. Westerman, Chief, Project Section B Date f

Division of Reactor Projects

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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted January 1 through February 6, 1990

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(Report 50-267/90-03)

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i Areas Inspected:

Routine,. unannounced inspection of licensee action on previously: identified' inspection findings, followup on items.of noncompliance, operationaljsafety verification, monthly surveillance observation,umonthly'

JmaintenanceLobservation,;and defueling activities.

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'Results:.Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were-

1dentified.

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

D. Alps, Supervisor Security

' *M. Block, System' Engineering Manager

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  • F. Borst, Nuclear Training and-Support Manager

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L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Resources

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  • M.- Cappello,' Defueling/ Decommissioning (D/D) Project Manager

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. R. Craun, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager

  • A.- Crawford,. Vice President, Nuclear Operations
  • D.: Evans, Operations / Maintenance Manager
  • M. Ferris, Quality Assurance-(QA) 0perations Manager t

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  • C Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production
  • J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations i
  • M. Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager
  • F. Novachek,. Program Manager, D/D
  • H. O'Hagan, D/D Project Manager

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  • W. Rodgers, Nuclear-Computer Services Manager
  • L. Scott, QA Services' Manager f*N. Snyder, Fuel Deck Manager i
  • P. Tomlinson, Manager,-QA
  • D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

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The NRC inspector also contacted other licensee and contractor-personnel'

during the inspection, t

  • Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted February 6,1990.

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Plant Status The plant is permanently shut down and in the process of defueling. FSV

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does not presently have sufficient onsite spent fuel storage. capacity to

. completely defuel the reactor without shipping spent fuel offsite. The-

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onsite spent fuel storage capacity was filled during.this inspection-

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period with 12 of the 37 core fuel regions removed from the reactor and'

placed in the spent fuel wells.

The licensee'is currently discussing with the Department of Energy (DOE)

'to ship spent fuel to the Idaho National Laboratory per a longstanding contract between DOE and the licensee. During previous normal refueling i

outages, three refueling loads of spent fuel totaling half of a full core were shipped to DOE, Idaho. The licensee is simultaneously preparing a y

. licensing submittal.to construct on site a spent fuel storage facility.

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This facility will be utilized, if necessary, in place of fuel shipment to Idah. _ _ _ _ - - -

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3.

Licensee Action'on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Open Item 267/8708-02:

Inoperable Channel Not.in Tripped

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. Position.

At-FSV, a tripped channel outputs a~ signal.

An inoperable j

channel does, not automatically put out a tripped signal, but.must have a

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trip signal-module placed in the rack in place of. the inoperable module'.

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On occasion, channels not required'to be operable would become inoperable.

If not=placed in a tripped condition at-that time, the operations staff could overlook changing operability requirements when changing reactor modes and inadvertently violate Technical Specifications.(TS).

Improved-licensee attention to instrument channel operability during the last years of FSV operation eliminated this problem. Additionally, the j

reactor is now permanently shut down, so changing operability requirements

with changing reactor mode is no longer a concern.

(Closed) Open Item 267/8812-03:

Excessive Time Required to Fix Identified

Deficiencies.

Prior to cessation of power operation, the licensee was decreasing the number of open deficiency reports.

Items were worked in order of importance to safety.

Currently, identified deficiencies are l

worked immediately. if important to safety.

Items not important to safety

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are worked on a " resources available" basis. The inspector found licensee i

performance in this area satisfactory, i

(Closed) Open Item 267/8813-02:

Analysis of Effect of Dropping Some DC Loads. This item was opened to assure that the licensee had adequate

procedures:for dealing.with-the hydrogen in the main generator when the DC

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hydrogen seal oil pumps are shed from the DC bus following a loss of all i

AC power.

As a result of the plant. shutdown, the main generator has been

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purged:of hydrogen and is filled with carbon dioxide.

(Closed) Open-Item 278/8813-04:

Effect of Revised Environmental

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Qualification Temperature Profile.

The licensee's consultant identified a

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sma11' break scenario -that was more limiting'than the temperature profile used for environmental qualification of equipment.

This problem was reviewed by the staff and resolved by issuance of Operating License

Amendment-68, which added a fixed high temperature trip setpoint for the steam line rupture detection and isolation system.

'(Closed) Unresolved Item 267/88200-005:

Control of Remote Shutdown

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Activities.

This item called for further NRC review of the licensee's

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remote shutdown procedure, training, and drill.

The plant is permanently shut down.

No further NRC review of this item is required.

No violations or-deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

4.

Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702)

(Closed) Violation 267/8807-02:

Valves on Diesel-Driven Firewater Pump Not Included in Valve Lineup.

Three valves (two in parallel with one on l

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the cooling water line to the diesel-driven firewater pump) were omitted L

from the system valve lineup.

The valves are inlet and outlet and bypass

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L flow to the cooling water filter. The valves must.be in the correct l'

positions to assure adequate cooling of the diesel-driven firewater pump.

The licensee numbered the valves and included them in IVL-45-01, Issue 3,

" Integrated System Valve Lineup and Checklist For S0P 45-01" by issuing Procedure Deviation Request (PDR) 89-0545.

~(Closed) Violation 267/8916-01:

Reactor Engineers Working Beyond TS Limits Without Proper Documentation. The licensee has an existing process o

for evaluating and-approving extended work hours beyond normal TS limits.-

This is in accordance with the licensee's TS.

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In accordance with the licensee's response to this violation, the engineers involved in this violation have been reinstructed in the implementation of

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this process. This item is closed.

No violations-or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

5.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

.The inspector made daily tours of the control room during normal working

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hours and at least once per week during backshift hours.

Control room staffing was verified to be at the proper level for the plant conditions at all times. Control room operators were observed to be attentive and aware of plant status and reasons why annunciators were lit. The inspector observed the operators using and adhering to approved procedures

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in the performance of their duties. A sampling of these procedures by the inspector verified current revisions and legible copies.. During -control room tours, the inspector verified that the required number of nuclear-t'

instrumentation and plant protective system channels were operable. The operability of emergency AC and DC electrical power, meteorological, and fire _ protection systems was also verified by the inspector. The reactor operators and shift supervisor logs were reviewed daily along with the TS compliance log, clearance log, operations deviation report (0DR) log, temporary configuration report (TCR) log, and operations order book.

Shift turnovers were observed at least once per week by the inspector.

Information-flow was consistently good, with the shift supervisors soliciting comments or concerns from the reactor operators, equipment

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- operators, auxiliary tenders, and health physics technicians. The licensee's station manager, operations manager, and superintendent of operations were observed to make routine tours of the control room.

The inspector made tours of all accessible areas of the plant to assess the overall conditions and verify the adequacy of plant equipment, radiological controls, and security. During these tours, particular attention was paid to the licensee's fire protection program, including fire extinguishers, firefighting equipment, fire barriers, control of flammable materials, and other fire hazards.

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E A walkdown of the firewater system was performed by the inspector.

Valve b

.and= breaker-positions were verified where possible.

When affected by a clearance, the valves or breakers were verified to be positioned in accordance with the clearance requirements.. Power supplies for components in these systems were verified, but were also subject to clearances in

'some cases.. During this system walkdown, the inspector verified the

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' operability of standby or backup equipment when components or portions of l

systems were inoperable due to clearances.

p-The inspector observed health physics technicians performing surveys and

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checking air samplers and area radiation monitors.

Contamination levels and exposure rates were posted at entrances to radiologically controlled y

areas and'in other appropriate areas and were verified to be up to date by

.the inspecto.

Health physics technicians were present to provide assistance when workers were required to enter radiologically controlled

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areas.

The inspector observed workers following the instructions on radiation work permits concerning protective clothing and dosimetry and observed workers using proper procedures for contamination control, including proper removal of protective clothing and whole body frisking upon exiting a radiologically controlled area.

The inspector randomly-verified that the number of armed security officers required by the security plan were present.

A lead security officer was on duty to direct security activities on each shift.

The inspectors y

verified that search equipment, including an x-ray machine, explosive detector, and metal detector were operational or a 100 percent hands-on search was conducted.

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The protected area barrier was surveyed by the inspectors to ensure it was

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.not compromised by erosion or other_ objects, The inspector-observed that vit'l area barriers were well maintained and not compromised.

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a inspectors also observed that persons granted access to the site were

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' badged-and visitors were properly escorted.

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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

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.The inspector. routinely checked surveillance logs to confirm that surveillances. required with the plant shutdown were maintained current.

  • Special attention was paid to _surveillances involving defueling.

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inspector observed performance and/or reviewed documentation of the y-following surveillances:

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SR 5.7.1, Fuel Handling Machine

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SR 5.7.3 Fuel Handling and Maintenance in the Reactor

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SR 5.7.4, Spent Fuel Shipping Cask

i SR 5.7.5, Instrumentation SR 5.7.6, Communications During Core Alterations No violations' or deviations were identified during the review of this program area.

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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The licensee added two neutron sources to the core during this inspection period.. The neutron sources were added to help maintain count rate on the source range neutron monitors as required by TS Limiting Condition for Operation 4.4.1.

The licensee utilized new fuel blocks for the neutron source installation.

These were actual fuel blocks manufactured previously to hold fuel, not

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dummy blocks. The fuel pin holes were plugged with graphite dowels and no fuel was installed..

e At the bottom of the handling tool hole in the top of each block, an additional cavity was machined to hold the neutron source.

Such a block, when placed in-the core in lieu of a fuel block, would look like a fuel block, contain no fuel, contain no poison, but contain a neutron source.

The inspector observed the quality control inspection of the empty fuel

. blocks that were to hold the neutron sources. The inspector observed the

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installation of the neutron source into empty Fuel Block 11-5130, which

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was destined for Region 10 of the reactor core. The neutron source was californium 252 and was giving off approximately 3.85 E+8 counts per second.

l The inspector also observed the installation of Fuel Block 11-5130 in the reactor. Health physics coverage was conservative.

Film badges were changed to hold-neutron exposure film.

Health physics technicians

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provided-full-time monitoring of dose rates.

The inspector noted the full-time presence of quality assurance, reactor engineering, and fuel deck management during placement of the source in

- the' fuel block and placement of the fuel block in the reactor core.

I No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.

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Defueling Activities (60710)

The inspector monitored defueling activities during the inspection period.

The licensee completed defueling of the 12 core regions for-which there is onsite spent fuel storage capacity. Active fuel is still contained in 25

of the 37 core regions.

The inspector noted the presence of-health physics and QC during fuel movements. The licensee maintained a systems engineer on shift to be responsible for fuel accountability. The inspector verified that the fuel handler at the controls of the fuel handling machine held a current NRC license to handle fuel. The licensee has these licenses on display in the fuel handling machine control room.

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i-1The inspector noted that excellent skills and attention to detail were

. displayed by the' fuel handlers and system engineers. -The licensee's fuel

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deck organization appeared to function very well.

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The' licensee identified what appeared to be a hairline crack running the

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full length of one face of a fuel block.

The block in question was Serial

o No. 1-2448, taken from Region 20 of the core.

The. licensee' believes this cracking is identical to that found during the_1982 refueling.. At that

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time,'the licensee did detailed studies which~were reviewed by the NRC.

The conclusion was that this cracking does not affect fuel integrity,-

structural integrity, or heat removal.

The licensee is not visually examining all fuel blocks as~they are removed

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from the core.

The licensee is verifying the serial number on one' side of each hexagonal block.

Cracking on another face of the block would be

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noticed only by-chance.

The crack identified above was identified in'this manner but once known, was brought to the attention of the. inspector.

No violations or deviations were identified during the review of this program area.

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Exit Meeting (30703)

l An exit interview was-conducted with. licensee representatives identified i-in paragraph 1 on February 6,1990.

During this interview, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report.

The licensee did not s

identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the

inspectors.

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