IR 05000263/1982001
| ML20058F282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1982 |
| From: | Charles Brown, Madison A, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058F259 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-82-01, 50-263-82-1, NUDOCS 8207300381 | |
| Download: ML20058F282 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Report No. 50-263/82-01(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company j
414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Monticello, MN Inspection Conduc e March 1 through April 30, 1982
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Inspectors:
C. H. Br n M
^Q di(so 7//dd>
A. L. F Approved By:
. Reyes, h 7 6
Reactor P cts Section 2C
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Inspection Summary Inspection on March 1 through April 30, 1982 (Report No. 50-263/82-01(DPRP))
Areas Insoected: Routine resident inspection of the areas of operations; operational safety verification; independent inspection; procurement, storage
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and handling in warehouse; emergency preparedness; plant trips; followup on inspector identified problem; onsite review committee; and followup on LERs.
The inspection involved 140 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors
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including 25 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
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Results: Of the eight areas inspected no items of noncompliance were
identified in six areas. Three items of noncompliance and one deviation were identified in the two other areas (Failure to properly store material; failure to follow procedures in completion of work control documents; and failure to perform audits in the warehouse (noncompliances) - Paragraph 5, failure to maintain the low pressure piping protection during the operation of the RHR system (deviation) - Paragraph 7).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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- W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager
- M. H. Clarity, Plant Superintendent Engineering and Radiation
Protection I
- H.
M.' Kendall, Plant Office Manager
- D. D. Antony, Superintendent, Operations Engineering
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- W. E. Anderson, Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
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- R.
L. Scheinost, Superintendent, Quality Engineering j
- J. R. Pasch, Superintendent, Security and Services
- F.
L. Fey, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
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W. J. Hill, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
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- W. W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance t
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and
auxiliary operators and corporate QA personnel.
- Denotes those licensee representatives attending the management
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interviews.
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2;.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings i
(Closed) Item 263/78-01-01: Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) A0-2-86A has had a history of excessive leakage during testing. The Local Leak
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Rate Test (LLRT) performed in February 1980 showed excessive leakage
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i which was caused by the poppet valve not seating. This was repaired and satisfactorily retested. The LLRT performed on MSIV A0-2-86A in April 1981 showed an acceptable leak rate.
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3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
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logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the
inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected j
emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return
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to service of affected components. Tours of unit's reactor building l
and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment.condi-i tions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive-vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated j
for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was
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being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions
'and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During
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the inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible por-
tions of the standby liquid control' and turbine building fire pro-tection system to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed
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portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
a.
(Closed) LER 80-02: MSIV A0-2-86A Failed Local Leak Rate Test On February 25, 1980, A0-2-86A Icak rate was found to be in excess of the acceptance criteria of 11.5 scfh. The poppet was nct seating. The poppet was machined and the seat was replaced. All seats were lapped and the valves retested satisfactorily. The main seat was to be reworked the next refueling, but the valve tested satisfactorily. The valve rework is now to be performed when the valve does not pass its LLRT.
b.
(Closed) LER 80-03: MSIV A0-2-86D Failed Local Leak Rate Test On February 25, 1980, A0-2-86D leak rate was found to be in excess'
of the acceptance criteria of 11.5 scfh. The seats were machined and lapped. The valve retest was satisfactory.
c.
(Closed) LER 80-14: MSIV A0-2-80A Failed Local Leak Rate Test On March 14, 1980, A0-2-80A leak rate was found to be in excess of the acceptance criteria of 11.5 scfh. The poppet was slightly undersized and a new poppet and stem were installed. The seats were lapped and the retest was satisfactory.
d.
(Closed) LER 81-06: MSIV A0-2-86C Failed Local Leak Rate Test On April 20, 1981, A0-2-86C leak rate was found to be in excess of the acceptance criteria of 11.5 scfh. The main seats were lapped and the retest satisfactory.
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(Closed) LER 81-07: MSIV A0-2-86D Failed Local Leak Rate Test On April 20, 1981, A0-2-86D leak rate was found to be in excess of the acceptance criteria of 11.5 scfh. The valve was repacked and was retested satisfactorily. The maintenarice procedure was revised to include inspection of packing.
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(Closed) LER 80-26: MSIV A0-2-86A Inoperative On August 17, 1980, A0-2-86A closed in nine seconds (maximum allowed is five seconds). Repairs were made and testing frequency was increased. On September 21,1980, LER 80-26 Update, A40-2-86A failed again and A0-2-86D closed in nine seconds. The lubricant used in the Automatic Valve Co.' (AVC) actuators had become sticky due to high temperature. The specific lubricant was used and replaced with a higher temperature lubricant. The failure of A0-2-86A to close was apparently caused by a small particle that prevented the solenoid from operating.
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(Closed) LER 81-04: MSIV A0-2-86B Slow Closure The closure time exceeded required closure time during a routine test on April 19, 1981, during shut down. The AVC actuator was rebuilt and a satisfactory retest was performed.
During the events (LER 80-26 and 81-04), the redundant valves A0-2-80A & B respectively, were operable. A preventative mainten-ance program has been developed to clean and check the AVC actuators and solenoids periodically.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Procurement / Receipt, Storage and Handling of Equipment and Materials Program The purpose of this review was to ascertain whether the licensee is implementing a QA program relating to the procurement, receipt, storage and handling of equipment and materials that is in conformance with regulatory requirements, commitments in the application, and industry guides and standards.
The inspector reviewed various licensee Directives, Work Instructions and licensee Management Memoranda to determine the adequacy and com-pleteness of the problem. The review included the following documents:
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l 1 ACD 5.1 Procurement Control 3 ACD 6.1 Uniform Nuclear Plant Procurement Process I
3 ACD 6.2 Material Control and Storage 3 ACD 6.3 Supplier Inspection 3 ACD 6.4 Nuclear Fuel Supplier Inspection 4 ACD 3.6 Work Request Authorizations 4 ACD 9.1 Procurement Process
4 ACD 9.2 Inventory Control l
4 ACD 9.4 Weld Material Control
4 ACD 9.5 Handling, Storage, Shipping and Preservation of Materials
1 AVI 5.1.1 Purchasing Department Interim-Procedure Development Program l
1 AWI 5.2.1 Diesel Fuel Procurement 3 AWI 6.1.1 Normal and Prompt Procurement Process for Item 3 AWI 6.1.2 Procurement Process Emergency on Confirming
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3 AWI 6.1.3 Off-The-Shelf Procurement 3 AWI 6.1.4 Procurement Process for Services
3 AWI 6.1.5 Receipt Process for Items 3 AWI 6.1.6 Receipt Process for Services
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i 3 AWI 6.3.1 QA Vendor List 3 AWI 6.3.2 Conduct of Vendor Audits 3 AWI 6.3.3 Vender Audit Reports 3 AWI 6.3.4 Vendor Audit Findings 4 AWI 9.1.1 10 CFR 21 Applicability Notification on Purchase Orders
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4 AWI 9.1.2 Procurement on Blanket Purchase Requests 4 AWI 9.1.4 In Storage Maintenance Program It was noted that although an annual update of the Approved Vendors List is required, no guidelines are given.
In addition, there are no provisions to correct or update the Approved Vendors List to acknow-
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ledge receipt of bad material or service from vendors on the list.
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This is considered an Open Item.
(263/82-01-01)
It was also noted that no periodic inspections of the storage area were being performed. This is contrary to the requirements of
ANSI 45.2.2/6.2 and licensee's procedure 4 ACD-9.5.
(263/82-01-02)
i The lack of periodic inspections is a contributing factor to the overall decline in warehouse storage practices as demonstrated by the following items.
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a.
Many end caps on safety related tubing and pipe were missing.
(ANSI 45.2.2/3.5.1)
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In many cases, grey tape was used as an end cap instead of a
bright colored tape.
(ANSI 45.2.2/3.5.1(1))
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c.
In several incidents the number of dessicant bags in a container were not noted on the container.
(ANSI 45.2.2/A3.6.3(7))
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d.
Many untagged items were in the aisles.
It was determined that most of these were placed in the warehouse to await disposal.
(ANSI 45.2.2/6.3.4)
e.
Several instances were found of safety-related austenetic stain-less steel in contact with carbon steel and painted surfaces.
(ANSI 45.2.2/3.6)
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Several items requiring hold tags were not tagged. These items were not in a segregated hold area.
(ANSI 45.2.2/5.3)
These items are considered a breakdown in the storage program and are contrary to licensee's procedures AWI 9.1.4 and 4 ACD-9.5.
(263/82-01-03)
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i The inspector also noted that hold items had spread beyond the hold
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area and were, in fact, scattered throughout all three warehouses.
This is considered an Open Item.
(263/82-01-04)
a The inspector also reviewed procurement documents for completeness and traceability of parts. The licensee's record system utilizes the Work Request Authorization (WRA) number to track parts used on a specific job back to their purchase documents. Of the five l
WRAs reviewed, the inspector was unable to trace parts with three.
Apparently, in an attempt to improve the WRA program, QA and manage-ment have required the rewriting of WRAs when found to be too broad in nature. However, the new WRA number was not crossreferenced for the parts used, which is in violation of the licensee's procedure 4 ACD 3.6 Section 6.2.19.
Consequently, the parts used for WRA 80-1323 and WRA 80-1168 cannot be traced to their orgin at this time.
(ANSI 45.2/9).
At this time there is no evidence that improper parts
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were used. All other records reviewed were acceptable. This is con-sidered an item of noncompliance.
(263/82-01-05)
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Other Inspections and Drills i
During the inspection period, two team inspections were performed and the annual Emergency Plan response drill was conducted.
a.
INPO Second Evaluation of Site
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l The INP0 audit team was onsite from March 24 through April 2,
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1982, for their second evaluation of Monticello. The evaluation was directed at performance rather than an evaluation of the
program. The report is expected to be issued in approximately
one month.
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Emergency Response Evaluation
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r A regional based inspection team was onsite from March 15 through
March 24, 1982, to evaluate the site's Emergency Response Plan and personnel training in handling an event. The report (50-263/
82-05) will be issued soon.
c.
Emergency Response Drill I
l The evaluation drill for emergency responses was held on March 2.
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The regional observers and NSP evaluators were in attendance (resident inspectors observed responses in the control room).
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A combined resident and regional inspection report has been issued (50-263/82-04) which indicates no major problems were identified.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Independent Inspection a.
Quality Assurance Meeting The inspector attended a meeting at NSP Headquarters on March 25, 1982, to review a draft revision to the QA procedure related to-design changes. The Prairie Island SRI and Mr. Jokela (Director, Power Supply QA) were at the meeting. The licensee is evaluating
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the suggestions and comments made by the inspectors.
b.
Reactor Containment Ventilation Valves During the preparations for startup of the reactor after the scram, containment ventilation valves A0-2386 and A0-2387 could not be shut by the switches in the control room. The valves were physically observed to be open, and the air operators had air pressure supplied in the closed direction. The control solenoid was tapped and the control valve reset to the air vent position and the ventilation valve opened. The closing of the other valve was similarly performed. The solenoid valves were replaced with environmentally qualified units. An attempt to reproduce the failure was made on a mockup, but with no success. The replace-ment unit's directions for installation stated that the solenoids must be mounted vertically for the solenoid valves to operate.
The origiuril solenoid was not installed properly in that the valve vendor recommended that the solenoid should be mounted vertically.
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The vertical orientation is required because the solenoid slug weight, when de-energized, is used to reset the interval valving
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to vent the air pressure off the valve operator which shuts the valve.
The review of other ventilation valves showed the solenoids were also mounted incorrectly on seven other valves. The solenoid valves were replaced with the environmentally qualified solenoid
valves. The change was made under Design Change No. 82M026.
The licensee's evaluation indicated that the problem could have (
been an increase in friction on the solenoid slug for some unde-termined reason. The solenoids had operated with no problems i
since the construction phase of the plant. The disassembly of the solenoid valve body showed that the valve body was clean and not the reason for the sticking. All valves were tested for the design change, and the results were satisfactory. The
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licensee submitted LER 82-004 to describe the improperly mounted i
solenoids.
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A review of the logs showed that the two valves had been opened a maximum of four hours before the reactor vessel water was cooled to below 212*F.
All previous tests and operations had shown the valves to be operable. Therefore, this occurrence was l
within Technical Specification requirements.
i No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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c.
Inoperable RHR Inboard Isolation Valve Subsequent to the plant trip of April 8, 1982, the licensee proceeded to take the unit to cold shutdown.
In order to place the RHR system in service, the licensee restored the power leads to the inboard suction isolation valve. The leads had been re-moved during power operation in accordance with a operating memorandum to prevent " hammering" of the valve by the limitoraque valve operator.
" Hammering" is caused by the valve operator running the valve disc into the seat until the Limitorque shuts off at the preset torque. The gear train then relaxes below the limits of the torque switch which causes the motor to restart.
The gear train again drives the disc into the seat until the preset torque limit is reached. This process repeats and results in damage to the valve and/or operator.
While the permanent fix is under review, a temporary operating memo was issued to replace the leads when the valve was required to be opened, i.e., cooldown of the reactor. The operators mis-i interpreted the memo and lifted the leads after opening the valve.
This action prevented the valve from closing upon the initiation of a group 2 isolation signal. A Night Order Book entry was made clarifying the temporary operating memo. The inoperable (RHR in-board isolation valve was discovered by the STA during an inadver-tent actuation of the low pressure piping isolation when the valve failed to close. The outboard RHR cooling valve was demonstrated to be operable during the time the inboard valve was inoperable.
The RHR inboard isolation provides protection for the RHR low pressure piping during shutdown as delineated in section 2.4.3 of the FSAR.
l Failure to provide low pressure piping protection during operation of the RHR system is considered a deviation from the FSAR (263/82-01-05)
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Onsite Review Committee The inspectors attended four meetings of the onsite review committee and observed its activities conducted during the month of March and verified conformance with technical specifications and other regula:
tory requirements. The charter and/or administrative procedure
gcverning review group activities; membership and qualifications; meeting frequency; and quorum were followed.
Items reviewed included
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proposed technical specification changes, noncompliance items and corrective actions, proposed facility and procedure changes and proposed tests and experiments conducted per 10 CFR 50.59, and others required by technical specifications and procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Plant Trip On April 8, 1982, maintenance personnel were tracing a ground in the generator field power supply. The generator voltage controller had been placed in manual to preclude voltage variations in the field. Tko leads were lifted to isolate a component which resulted in the loss of a 120 V signal to the voltage controller. This caused a load transient on the generator which resulted in a fast trip of the turbine stop valves.
The turbine trip resulted in a reactor trip. The resultant pressure spike caused several safety-relief valves to open prematurely.
All systems responded as expected with the exception of safety-relief valve "H" which opened and failed to shut for about four minutes.
The operators maintained control of the reactor vessel level. Vessel pressure decreased approximately 400 psig with a temperature decrease in the range of 80-90 F before the valve reclosed. After the valve shut, the temperature recovered to 500*F and was maintained there for a soak period before normal cooldown was commenced. The " top works" for the relief valve were replaced with a rebuilt " top works" after.
the main piston and disc were visually inspected. Due to slight leakage the following week in the first stage with tailpipe tempera-ture at 175*F, the " top works" were replaced again.
The plant was returned to operation on April 11, 1982.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 6,1982, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the items of noncompliance.
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