IR 05000263/1982004
| ML20054D251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1982 |
| From: | Axelson W, Grant W, Januska A, Nicholson N, Paperiello C, Pperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054D247 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-82-04, 50-263-82-4, NUDOCS 8204220479 | |
| Download: ML20054D251 (15) | |
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-263/82-04 Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Monticello, EN Inspection Conducted: March 1-3, 1982 4- 0-[f I Inspectors: W x so
'i 0 Y
%.
ant 0.A L L A.G.bnuska
- /, - 6 2,
)(d hc/A w
'/!//[A N. A. Nicholson
/
~ 0 'N Approved By:
W.
n hief Emergency Preparedness Section 6kl
>
C.
. Pa eriel o, Chief Emergency Preparedness and
'
Program Support Branch
_.,
Inspection Summary:
,
Inspection on March 1-3, 1982 (Report No. 50-263/82-04(DEPOS))_
-
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Monticello Nuclear
-
Generating Plant full scale emergency exercise, involving'obse p ations by nine NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the
'
exercise. The inspection involved 117 inspector-hours on site by six NRC
-
inspectors (two resident inspectors) and three consultants.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
J i
l I
~, I
' *
,
a m
.
-
.
""
-
_ _ _
.
DETAILS
-
1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed C. Brown, Senior Resident Inspector, NRC, Region III; Control Room A. Madison, Resident Inspector, NRC, Region III; Control Room W. Axelson, NRC, Region III; Technical Support Center (TSC)
G. Laughlin, NRC Consultant; Operations Support Center (OSC) In Plant Health Physics T. Earle, NRC Consultant; Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
A. Januska, NRC, Region III; (EOF)
N. Nicholson, NRC, Region III; (OSC) Post Accident Sampling Teams L. Garcia, NRC Consultant; (OSC) Offsite Monitoring Team W. Grant, NRC, Region III; (TSC)
Northern States Power Company and Arcas Observed E. Ward, Manager, Nuclear Environmental Services, HQEC System Dispatcher Controller J. Gonyeau, Manager, Production Training, Chief Controller D. Gilberts, Senior Vice President, Power Supply D. Antony, Superintendent, Operations Engineering L. Nolan, Lead Chemical Engineer L. Eliason, General Manager, Nuclear Plants J. Windschill, Assistant Plant Health Physicist T. Bushee, Media Services B. Day, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services P. Yurczyk, Radiation Protection Coordinator W. Anderson, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
S. Pearson, Superintendent Operations M. Davis, Radiation Protection Specialist, OSC Controller M. Offendahl, OSC Controller B. Frederick, Senior Consultant, Regulatory Liason E. Reilly, OSC Controller G. Hudson, Assistant Administrator, Emergency Prepardness, EOF Controller
'
D. Allred, TSC Controller R. Ridge, Roving Controller B. Schmitt, Radiation Protection Instructor E. Earney, Plant Training Superintendent R. Jacobson, Senior Chemist F. Fey, Superintendent, Radiation Protection K. Jepson, Plant Chemist G. Mathiasla, Emergency Planning Coorinator, TSC Controller l
l
_
_ M. Hammer, Lead Instruments and Controls Engineer
-
G. Goering, General Superintendent, Nuc1 car Technical Services W. Shamla, Plant Manager W. Albold, Superintendent of Maintenance
,
M. Clarity, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection
'
All of the above persons were present at the exit interview.
2.
General An exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan was conducted at the I
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant on March 2, 1982, testing the response of the licensee, State and local agencies to a simulated emergency. The exercise tested the licensee's and the State and t
local agencies' capability to respond to a hypothetical accident scenario involving a major release of noble gases and iodine caused
-
by a large break LOCA and various other mechanical failures.
Attachment I describes the scenario.
,
3.
General Observations a.
This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix E requirements using the Manticello Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the event had been real, the licensee's actions would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions for protection of the public, c.
Observers
!
Licensee representatives and nine NRC observers observed and critiqued this exercise.
d.
Critique The licensee held j s,<*:
on March 2, 1982, immediately after
the exercise. The +4C ana rhe licensee identified improvement items are discussed in Paragraph 4.
'
4.
Summary of Areas for Improvement Problems identified by NRC observers and discussed during the exit interview include areas in which additional attention should be given.
They are listed below:
,
I
.
e
-
____ ________-_____-_____-_____
.
.
a.
When possible, assign two persons to each post-accident sampling /
-
survey team to minimize survey time and reduce search and rescue efforts in case of injury.
b.
The OSC coordinator should be provided with an assistant or b'a relieved after a few hours to minimize fatigue from the stress-ful working conditions.
c.
The current location of the continuous air sampler in the OSC should be examined to determine if it is sampling air represent-ative of the OSC.
d.
The dose assessment computer program should be re-examined to determine the apparent errors in the iodine to noble gas ratio made in the prediction of offsite radioiodine doses.
e.
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for core melt sequences or events leading to loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of containment need to clarified in the EPIPs.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room The resident inspectors observed control room operation throughout the course of the exercise. Observations included verification that the Shift Supervisor and the Control Room Operators under-stood their responsibilities and appropriate procedures were followed in a timely manner. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
was present and understood his responsibilities, and the Emergency Plan was addressed when appropriate. EALs were implemented as required; communicationc were accurate and were passed to the appropriate personnel in & timely manner. Accurate logs were maintained to provide a record of events as they occurred.
The inspectors observed that the STA performed his functior,s of advising and assisting the Shift Supervisor very well.
f.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Inspectors observed licensee's activities in the Technical Support Center (TSC) during the entire exercise. The TSC was fully activated within four minutes of the initiating event. The TSC fully performed the functions provided as guidance in NUREG-0696.
The TSC was well managed and had good internal and external communications. The well coordinated activities of an adequate staff demonstrated a good level of training of TSC personnel.
The TSC followed and trended plant parameters. Display boards were used for plant parameters, maintensnce work in progress,
_
.
,
meteorological data, offsite dose projection, and emergency
-
classification and modifications. The TSC had adequate but crowded space for all personnel. Continuous direct radiation
<
and airborne radioactivity monitors were in operation.
At 0935 a Site Area Emergency was declared due to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). A site evacuation was ordered and site accountability begun.
It took 12 minutes to account for all
,
'
site personnel, well within the 30 minute design criteria. There seemed to be some hesitation in declaring a General Emergency after a LOCA occurred; drywell radiation levels were increasing and one drywell vent valve had failed to close. There was a good indication that 2 out of 3 fission product barriers were lost with potential loss of the third. There appeared to be a problem with the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)
and the Emergency Action Levels interface.
The dose assessment computer program used to predict offsite doses prior to actual sampling seemed to be overly conservative in its estimation of radioiodine dose. The dose predicted by the computer used a conservative default value of 20% of the measured noble gas concentration.
It would be more prudent to make recommendations based only on available and reliable data.
Overall operation of the TSC was excellent throughout the exercise.
However, there were some problem areas noted:
The dose assessment computer program should be re-examined to
.
determine the apparent error in the lodine to noble gas ratio made in the prediction of offsite radioiodine doses prior to sampling.
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for core melt sequences or events
.
leading to a loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of containment need to be clarified in the EPIPs. Valuable time was lost prior to the declaration of a
,
General Emergency and recommendation of protective measures while the situation was obviously deteriorating.
These areas were also identified by the licensee's observers and were discussed with the licensee during the exit intervie:<.
g.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
j The E0F was activated quickly by personnel who completed assigned tasks (e.g. communications checks, cssignment of personnel moni-toring devices, etc.) prior to the assumption of responsibility
,
from the plant.
Plant status was continuously recorded and the Emergency Manager (EM) conducted an update every half hour when he and other groups (plant engineering, health physics) presented current status.
Communications appeared to be very effective al-
,
,
.
_
.
_.
-
. _. _ _
_ __
_-
__
i l
.
though only one side of conversations was monitored. Multiple l
-
conversations did not present a disturbing influence to one another.
i The physical layout of the EOF appeared to be extremely functional.
The EM was at the hub of the activity and could both monitor and communicate conveniently with support groups. -The entire operation appeared to be run very efficiently.
h.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
The OSC was activated in a timely manner.and was well managed. All
'
!
personnel were accounted for by use of the card reader system within
!
twelve minutes of the assembly alarm. The OSC appeared to be well staffed with maintenance, health physics, and chemistry personnel.
,
!
However, an assistant for the OSC coordinator is recommended due to a high stress position function. Participants were familiar with the responsibilities and conducted their assignments ade-
quately. The OSC Coordinator maintained good control over main-tenance and monitoring activities based from this area. The OSC
'
Coordinator directives were clear and concise.
Communications
between the OSC, TSC, and survey / maintenance teams were good, p
with the exception of some inplant dead spots as discussed with licensee controllers during the exercise. The OSC Coordinator repeated incoming radio transmissions from dispatched teams to
,
verify messages and radiation levels. The OSC Coordinator performed-very well but it is doubtful if he could have maintained such a
'
j stressful pace under real accident conditions without assistance.
Direct reading measurements and surveys for smearable contamination were taken approximately every 20-30 minutes to determine OSC habitability. A continuous air sampler, turned on approximately.
45 minutes after the OSC was activated, was positioned in the decontamination room adjacent to the continuously occupied access
-
control area (OSC) and may not have sampled air representative of the OSC.
Inplant and OSC survey results were recorded by sur-veyors-and/or OSC delegates and maintained at the coordinator's
-
desk. A status board was established and kept current in the i
access control area.
,
Based on observations during the exercise, the OSC funtion was performed very well.
i.
Post-Accident Sampling The interim system for primary coolant sampling was used during this exercise; the status of-the' permanent system will be examined
.,
during the emergency preparedness implementation appraisal. Two-i primary coolant samples were collected at the sample panel of the reactor building 985' level. The first sample collection, dilution,
~
and gamma isotopic analysis was completed within forty minutes, well within the three hour time limit specified by NUREG-0737 guidance. Actual sample collection, from team dispatch to return, i
i i-
i
._,
_-
.
._ __
,.
_ _.
,
,_
. _. _ _
i
.
was six minutes.
Good health physics practices were implemented,
.
including appropriate protective clothing worn, sample transport in a lead pig, and proper use of survey equipment. Remote hand-ling equipment was used to transfer the unused remainder of the undiluted sample to a lead cask which was stored in an unoccupied area.
Two containment air samples were collected from the interim system.
An alternate emergency route through the radwaste building was taken by the two member team for the second sampling; access to the locked entry door was delayed because the team had the wrong key. Sample collection was timely and anti-contamination clothing and full face respirators were worn.
One stack sample was collected using the permanent system. Sample collection was initiated remotely in the control room; one techn-ician was dispatched to retrieve the particulate and charcoal filter media from the stack. Stack access was delayed as the technician, laden with survey equipment, could not readily unlock the door located in a high radiation area. This indicates a two member survey team was warranted.
A technician dispatched to take a grab air sample on the 935' level of the reactor building failed to take a survey meter into this area.
He claimed he would rely on previous area radiation monitor readings.
Sample analysis was timely; counting equipment was located in the OSC.
j.
Offsite Monitoring Team The offsite monitoring teams, composed of a Health Physics Techn-ician and a driver, initially drove two cars to the EOF to pick up emergency monitoring kits. They then returned to the site and were ordered to perform offsite survey activities at specific pre-determined locations. The teams performed these activities until relieved by survey teams from the Prairie Island facility. They were then ordered to return to the OSC. The team members appeared to be knowledgeable of the offsite areas and their assigned function.
Radio Communications between the teams and the TSC were very good.
The teams made dose rate measurements and took air samples as re-quested.
Samples were returned to the OSC for analysis. Offsite survey teams performed adequately.
6.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on March 3, 1982.
The licensee agreed to address the inspector's concerns stated in Paragraph 4.
Attachment: Exercise Scenario l
_ __
ATTACHMENT 1
.
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT j
EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE I
..
i
1 PART 1: NARRATIVE SUMMARY
.
e e
e O
-.
-
. _ _. _..
. _.
-
. = -..
..n
.,
-
- _
_
_
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT l
EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE i
.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
]
1.
The Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is at full power and full core flow.
,
All station electrical systems are in service or operable except:
.
a.
- 10 bank out of service for major repairs b.
- 11 diesel generator out of service 2.
All plant equipment is in service or available for service except the following:
a.
- 11 CRD pump b.
- 11 Core spray O
3.
Reactor coolant system leakage is.1 GPM
.
$
e e
c:::)
v11
.
t
.
,.-.,,,.. -
- - -
.
, --,.
-..
..-....
-.-.
.- - - --- -
'
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE
/n
'
N.s TIME EVENT SUMMARY T+00:00 Drill is started, initial conditions are given to drill (0730)
participants in the control room.
l T+00:30 While performing required surveillance on #12 diesel (0800)
generator, the engine speed governor fails to control engine speed. The Shift Supervisor should direct a repair crew to check the problem and repair if possible.
The Shift Supervisor should direct the control room operators to start shutting down the reactor in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
The Shift Supervisor should also declare an NUE,
" Notification of Unusual Event", in accordance with procedure A.2-101 Guideline 18.
Procedure A.2-102 should also be initiated. The STA and SEC should be
'-'j called to the control room.
.
..
T+01:00 The repair crew working on #12 diesel generator reports (0830)
that the governor will have to be replaced with a spare from stock.
\\s.s#
V.1.2
- -
-
-
-
- - -
-.
-
- -
.
.. - - -
.
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE
)
v TIME EVENT SUMMARY T+01;15
_.
The I&C crew is doing scheduled surveillance testing (0845)
on the neactor Protection System low reactor water level scram switches and the A reactor protection channel is tripped. A Plant Helper is cleaning in the reactor building adjacent to the B reactor protection instrument rack and accidently trips a switch on the rack. A full scram occurs, however all control rods do not fully insert.
The control room operators obtain a control rod printout and determine that 30 non adjacent control rods have not inserted to position 06 or farther. Control room operators should take corrective actions as described in Operations Manual C.4, page 8 of the Abnormal Operating procedures.
An alert should be declared in accordance with procedure A.2-101, Guideline 12.
Procedure A.2-103 should be initiated at this time.
( ~)
U
.
T+01:30 The maintenance repair team which has been working on the (0900)
- 12 diesel engine governor has replaced the governor with the spare and it works properly.
..
r l
T+01:45 The control room operators have tried various methods (0915)
of inserting control rods into the core and they expect
that all rods will be fully inserted in about 15 minutes.
They are inserting them using the normal drive control l
system.
!
-
C/
V.1.3
,
.
_
-
, - - -
-
-
--
.
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
-
EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE V
TIME EVENT SUMMARY
,
T+02:00 The control room operators succeed in inserting all (0930)
control rods to full "IN" position.
A large break (B Recirc Suction Line) LOCA occurs at this time. Reactor level decreases rapidly, all ECCS Systems come on as they should. Reactor pressure blows down to primary containment causing drywell pressure to increase very rapidly. The HPCI and RCIC Systems shutdown after a few seconds of operation due to the loss of reactor pressure.
Reactor water level is restored to effectively the top of the core and the core is being adequately cooled.
Drywell pressure spiked up to about 42 psig and has decreased to about 30 psig.
'
,
A Site Area Emergency should be declared in accordance with procedure A.2-101.
Procedure A.2-104 should be initiated at this time.
O (
!
s_-
,
T+02:15 The condensate F/D system fails at this time in such a (0945)
way that all flow through the system is lost. The condensate F/D bypass valve fails to open, and both reactor feedwater pumps trip off. A repair crew'should be sent to the condensate F/D system to correct the problem.
T+02:30
- 12 core spray pump trips off line due to a problem at (1000)
the pump breaker. The TSC should direct a repair crew to investigate and repair the breaker problem.
i V.1.4
.
I l
-
._
,_.
. _ _
_,. _ _ REV 1
~
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE h
TIME EVENT SUMMARY T+02:45 Repair crew changes out #12 core spray pump breaker with
~
(1015)
the spare breaker, however the pump does not operate.
A problem exists in the breaker cubicle.
T+03:00 -
A loop LPCI injection valve, M0-2012, closes stopping all (1030)
LPCI flow to the core. Water level starts dropping and the core starts uncovering.
The TSC directs a crew to jumper out the closing signal to the valve and try to re-open the valve.
The emergency may be upgraded to a general emergency due to a loss of all ECCS systems. Procedure A.2-101, Guideline 28.
.
_
T+03:15 The drywell vent valve A0-2386 fails open as indicated by (1045)
its indicator lights on C04. No release is in progress at i
t'.ts time.
The event should be upgraded to a general emergency at this time, in accordance with Procedure A.2-101, Guideline 28.
Procedure A.2-105 should be initiated at this time.
l T+03:30 The crew working on jumpering the closing signal to MO-2012 reports A loop LPCI injection has torqued into the seat and (~"')
will not open from its control switch. They will try to open L__
it from the breaker.
The TSC may direct a repair team to manually open the valve.
.
V.1.5
,
.
G
,
s
.-,
a
,..~
.
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE
TIME EVENT SUMMARY The drywell vent valve to SBGTS A0-2387 indicates that it is not completely closed, it has duel lights (red & green)
on as indicated on C04. The valve is leaking primary containment activity through SBGTS and out the off-gas stack.
The TSC should investigate the possibility of closing either A0-2386 or A0-2387 and stopping the release.
T+03:45 Reactor level continues to decrease as water leaks out (1115)
the break and boils off the core.
L)
T+04:00 The repair crew working on the #12 core spray pump breaker
.
(1130)
reports to the TSC staff that the breaker for #12 core spray pump is repaired. The control room should be given instructions to start the pump and inject water into the core as soon as possible to start core cooling.
.
T+04:15 Drill Stops: Break for lunch (1145)
T+04:15 Drill Resumes (1215)
((y)
V.1.6
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
_.
.
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
,
EMERGENCY PLAN EVALUATION EXERCISE
-
V TIME EVENT SUMMARY T+04:30 The crew working on A loop LPCI injection valve MO-2012 (1230)
have succeeded in opening the valve from the breaker.
The control room starts injecting water ic.to the core from A loop LPCI system. Rx level increases and the core is again effectively cooled and flooded l
T+05:00 The repair crew working on the drywell vent valves A0-2386 (1300)
and A0-2387 have successfully closed A0-2387 and the release to the environment has been terminated.
\\
T+05:15 The crew working on the condensate F/D problem has completed
.
(1315)
their repairs and the system is available for service.
The reactor system has been cooled to less than 212*F.
T+05:30 The windspeed and direction changes resulting in rapid (1330)
plume dispersal.
1330(Time Compression)
The emergency should be downgraded to a Site Area Emergency cr lower.
1 30
-
V.1.7
.
=
_ _____________
_ _ _ _ _ _