IR 05000255/1994004
| ML18059A930 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1994 |
| From: | Kropp W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18059A928 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-94-04, 50-255-94-4, NUDOCS 9404140134 | |
| Download: ML18059A930 (15) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-255/94004(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 License Nos. OPR-20 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades. Nuclear Generating Facility Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
January 29, 1994, through March 14, 199 Inspectors:
. Approved By:
M. E. Parker 0. G. Passehl K. Salehi J. HJ :is r W. p, Chief Reactor Projecti Section 2A Inspection Summary Date Inspection from January 29, 1994, through March 14, 1994 Report N /94004(0RP)~
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of actions on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, engineered safety feature systems, onsite event follow-up, current material condition, housekeeping and plant cleanliness, radiological controls, safety assessment and quality verification, maintenance, surveillance, fuel handling, and review of licensee reports; Results: Within the eleven areas inspect~d; no violations, or deviations were identifie One unresolved item was identified that pertained to missing separation barriers for reactor protection system (RPS) channels 1 and 3 located in the same cable tray (paragraph 3.c).
- The following is a summary of the licensee's performance during this i nspec.t ion period:
Plant Operations A management change occurred with Michael G. Morris becoming the President and CEO of Consumers Power Compan Robert A. Fenech was named the new Vice President of Nuclear Operation Thomas J. Palmisano was named acting Plant General M~nage *
9404140134 940330 PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
An operator inadvertently started a containment spray pump during a surveillance test. *No spray actuation occurred and -the operator responded appropriately. Operators also responded appropriately to an unexpecte closure of a main turbine governor valve.. The plant was shut down without incident to repair a leaking check valve downstream from the recirculation
. sum Operators performed well during the spent fuel inspection activitie Safety Assessment/Quality Verification The NPAD organization has ~ndergone some organizational change Operations and Engineering team leaders have been fi 11 ed with senior team leaders to
. provide a stronger focus on these two weak area An independent Management Safety Review Board (MSRB) with several non-licensee members is being formulate The kickoff meeting was scheduled for March 17 and 18, 199 Maintenance and Surveillance In genaral, fuaintenance was effectively accomplishe There were no major equipment deficiencie Some long-standing material condition deficiencies*
were identifie Examples included the "A" air start motor for Emergency
. Diesel Generator (EOG) 1-2, and a problem annunciator associated with lube oil level switch LS 1487 on EDG 1-Engineering and Technical Support Good work planning and technical discussions were observed during troubleshooting activities on the main governor valve; however, difficulties in restoring the valv~ back into service indicated the licensee does not have a sound.~nderstanding of main generator digital electro-hydraulic control system operatio Fuel handling activities were conducted in a controll~d and car~ful manne Spent fuel inspections to date have found five leaking fuel rods that are subject to further evaluation and may not be placed into dry storage. A weakness w~s identified in the licensee's follow-up of *a cable separation i~sue for instrument and control cables in the Reactor ~rotection System. *
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumer Company
- R. A. Fenech, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
. *T. J. Palmisano, Acting Plant General Manager R. D. Orosz, Nuclear Engineering & Construction Manage R. M. Rice, Director, NPAD
- D. D. Hice, Nuclear.Training Manager S. Y. Wawro, Acting Operations Manage D. W. Rogers, Safety & Licensing Director
- R. Kas~er~ Maintenance Manager K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Manager
- *H. M. Esch, Acting Administrative Manager J. C. Griggs, Human Resource Director
- H. A. Heavin, Controller
- D. G. Malone, Shift Operation~ Superintendent.
- D. J. Malone, Acting Radiological Services Manager J. H. Kuemin, Licensing Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- M. E. Parker, Senior Resident Inspector
. *D. G. Passehl, Resid~nt Inspector
- Denotes those attendi~g the exit interview conducted on March 14, 199 The inspectors also had discussions with other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and electrical, mechanical and in~trument maintenan~e personnel, and contract security personne.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (Closed)
Severity *level IV violation (255/86032-02(DRS))
b.
Inadequacies in licensees equipment qualification files concerning
- mainteriance, replacement, surveill~nce tests, and irispections to preserve the environmental qualification of equipmen This violation and unresolved item 255/86032-02 were closed in inspection report 255/9200 The licensee failed to revise periodic activity sheets for lubrication analysis and gearing inspection for 2400 volt motors for which violation 50-255/92004-01 was issued. Violation 86032-02 and unresolved item 86032-02 are considered close (Closed). Severity le~el IV violation (255/88020-04(DRS))
Failure to establish measures to inform the document control center about changes to drawings by modifications to hardwar *
The inspectors reviewed revisions to procedures 9.03 "Facility Change", Revision 7, May 10~ 1989 and procedure 10.44, "Design Document-Control and Distribution", Revision 6, Ma~ 30, 198 These procedure revisions provide adequate controls to assure that
.changes are posted to plant drawing This violation is close {Closed)
Unresolved Item {255/88020-07{DRS))
Different fuse ratings shown on schematics for em~rgency diesel generator 1 and 2 for the same control circuit, 5 FU..
Calculations for the worst case loading of the circuit show a maximum load of 10.6 amp Therefore, either a 15 amp or a 20 amp
. fuse is acceptable for this application. This item is considered resolve {Closed) Unresolved Item {255/88020~02{DRS)*)
e.
Eight terminal block links were left open on TB-8 in the remote*
shutdown pane These terminal block links are spares so their position has no safety sign1ficanc The licensee has various controls river terminal links in active circuits such as tagging, work orders, procedures and temporary modification This item is resolve {Closed) Un~esolved lte~ {255/91002-0l{DRS))
Surveillance test and maintenance procedur~s not developed or implemented for ATW The inspectors verified that the licens~e has developed and implemented procedures for surveillance, test and maintenance of the ATW Procedures implemented are PPS-1-7,
"Anticipated Transient Without Scram {ATWS) Calibration/Functional Test", Revision 0, November 11, 1991 and RPS-1-1, "Anticipated Transient Without Scram {ATWS) End to End Functional Test, Revision 0, December Si 199 This item is re~olved. *
{Clo~ed) Inspection Followup Item {255/93032-0l{DRP))
Review the licen~ee's eval~ation to determine the level of vacuum actually obtained during vacuum drying of the dry fuel casks. *the inspector identified a concern whereby the allowable tolerance rang~ for the instrument used to measure the vacuum pressure for the Palisades' dry fuel storage casks appeared excessive for use at the low pressure values being measure Pressure in the Ventilated Storage Casks {VSCs) may have been as high as 0.1125 psia, almost twice as high as the procedure limit of 0.06 psia.
. Although the exact level of vacuum obtained was not known, the condition was bounded by an engineering analysis assuming a minimum level of vacuum of 0.15 psi The results found the potential fuel oxidation to be negligible, several orders of magnitude below the 0.5 percent fuel failure limit used as the thermal design basis of the VS This IFS item is close **
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identified in this are * Plant Operations (71707, 71710, 93702)
Throughout the most of the period the plant has operated at nearly ful powe A forced outage was entered late this evaluation period due to through wall leakage from a containment sump outlet che~k.valv Otherwise, P~lisades experienced a fairly successful oper~ting run since starting up from the extended refueling outage on November 8, 199 Some significant licensee personnel changes occurred this period:
On January 18, 1994, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Consumers Power Company, Fredrick W. Buckman, resigned to become CEO of Pacificorp in Orego Mi~hael G. Morris, formerly Chief Operating Officer, was elected ~President and CE * *
On February 22, 1994, Consumers Power Company President Michael Morris announced the resignation of David P. Hoffman, Vice President of Nuclear Operation The new Vice President, Robert A. Fenech, was named February 25, 1994, to replace Mr. Hoffma Mr. Morris also announced that Plant General Manager Gerald Slade has been reassigned to another position within Consumers Power Compan Thomas J. Palmisano, Palisades Operations Manager, was named acting Plant General Manager until a permanent replacement is name Operational Safety Verification* (71707)*
. The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated i conformance with the license and regulatory requirements, and that the licensee's management control system was effective in ensuring safe operation of the plan.
On a sampling basis the inspectors verified proper control room staffing and coordination of plant activities; verified operator adherence with prncedures and technical specifications; monitored control room indications for abnormalities; verified that electrical power was available; and observed the frequency of plant and control room visits by station managemen The inspectors reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussinns with control room ope~ators throughout the inspection perio The inspectors observed a number of control ~oom shift turnover The turnovers were.conducted in a professional manner and included log reviews, panel walkdown~i discussions of maintenance and *
surveillance activities in progress or planned, and associated LCO time restrajnts, as applicabl~.
- Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems (71710)
During the inspection, the inspectors selected accessible portions of several ESF systems to verify status. Consideration was given to the plant mode, applicable Technical Specifications, Limiting Conditions for Operation requirements~ and other applicable requirement *
Various observations, where applicable, were made of hangers and supports; housekeeping; whether freeze protection, if required, was installed and operational; valve position and conditions; potential ignition sources; major compone~t labeling, lubrication, cooling, etc.; whether instrumentation was properly installed an functioning and significant process paiameter values were consistent with expected va 1 ues; whether instrume.ntat ion was calibrated; whether necessary support systems were operational; and whether*locally and remotely indicated breaker and valve
- positions agree During the inspection, *the accessible portions* of the following ESF systems were walked down:
Low Pressure Safety Injection
High Pressure Safety Inje.ction
- Auxi 1 i ary Feedwater
. *
Em~rgency Diesel Generator The inspector noted a drawing error in the air start system for the emergency dies~l generators (EDGs}.
The two solenoid valves that supply air to the EDG's air start motors, SV-1479 and SV-1480, are shown normally open on system drawing No. M214 SHT The valves actually are normally closed.* The system engineer-agreed with the observation and initiated a drawing change.* Onsite Event Follow-up (93702)
During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several'
events, som'e of which re qui red prompt not i fi cation of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee and/or other NRC official In each case, the inspectors verified that any required notification was correct and timel The inspectors also verified that the licensee initiated prompt and appropriate action Jan~ary 26, 1994:
During the performance of a surveillance test QO~l, "Safety Injection System," Rev.34, the control room operator was verifying the position of equipment actuated by the simulated safety injection actuation signal (SIAS), and inadvertently started containment spray pump P-54 The operator immediately observed the pump start and stopped the pump within.about one
.second.* No spray flow occurred since containment spray admission valves CV-3001 and CV-3002 remained closed during the tes No damage occurred to valves CV-3001 and CV-3002 since these two valves were satisfactorily cycled and ti~ed during other
surveillance tests performed during the present cold.shutdown conditio *
During performance *of the procedure at step 5.2.9, the control operator verifies the white standby lights are on for the containment spray pumps P-54A and P-54 During this particular test, the control operator placed a ~ortion of his finger on the light during the verification of the white lights being lit. The operator apparently depressed the light too hard and the pump starte *
Procedure Q0-1 did.not address the white light/pushbutton start -
feature for P-548 when the white light was illuminated.* At.no point in the procedure were operators directed to depress the white light/pushbutto Further, the control operator and shift eng1neer performing Q0-1 were not aware that P-548 would start if the white light/pushbutton was depressed. This start feature was*
unique to the containment spray pump The licensee intehded to revise proc~dure Q0-1 to alert operators that the containment spray pumps will start if the white light/pushbutton is i 11 umi nate One other recommended action was to examine the light/push button to determine whether replacement, adjustment, or repair was appropriate. *
The inspector concluded the event was due to a procedure w*eakness.
and operator error.. In addition, a training improvement item was identified regarding the white light/pushbutton operation for the containment spray pump Several operators admitted that they did not know that depressing the white light during the surveillance test would start the containment spray pump The inspector will assess the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions when the licensee event report is issued fo~ this event~
January 28, 1994:
With the plant at 100 percent power, the number 2 governor valve on the main turbine (CV-0572) unexpectedly drifted closed. Operators stabilized the plant at approximately 90 percent power using procedure ONP~l, "L6ss of Load," Re No safety systems actuate *
The licensee worked with the vendor during troubleshooting and repair efforts. The root cause was found to be a malfunctioned main valve positioner card in the turbine digital electro-hydraul ic system (DEH).
The card was replaced, and after some
- valve*adjustments, the plant was returned to full power on-February 2, 199 February 1, 1994:
The licensee reported a potential problem identified by an NRC Service Water Inspection Team regarding*
seismically qualified instrument lines associated with the component cooling water heat exchanger The sensing lines were used for indicating differential pressure and did not appear to be supported within the support spacing requirements or constructed in accordance with the design specification Subsequent engineering analyses found the tubing was built to design specifications and, therefore,-met the appropriate operability criteria. The licensee retracted the report to the NR February9, 1994:
An NRC Service Water Inspection Team identified two potential single active failures for certain service w~ter and component cooling water configurations that supply lubricati~~ and cooling to the seals on the eng.i neered safeguards pump The details are addressed in NRC Inspection Report 255/94002(DRS)i The inspector will assess the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions when the licensee event report is issued for this event~
February 10, 1994:
During a walkdown of cable trays in the cable spreading room and the IC switchgear room, the licensee discovered that separati6n barriers were missing for reactor protection system (RPS) channels 1 and 3 for cables located.in the same cabl~ *
tra The Final Safety Analysis Report Sectiori 8.5.3.2 requires
- that if channel 1 circuits are routed in the same raceways as channel 3.circuits, then the circuits ~ust be separated by a barrier between the The licensee performed an immediate operability determination and found no operability problem existed.based upon reference of an IEEt paper on cable separation issues (reference IEEE 90 WM 254-3 *
EC) and other internal "engineering aid" document The licensee used those documents to justify operabilit The documents included discussions on low voltage instrument and control cables similar to those in questio The licensee found that under a postulated electrical fault the amount of heat generated would not be enough to affect adjac~nt cables not separated by a barrie As followup of this issue, the inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation and discussed the licensee's operability determinatio In addressing the inspector's concerns, the licensee found that the operability determination may have been incorrect. Although the reasons cited for low voltage instru~ent and control cabling may have been correct for some configurations, the IEEE document referented above and used as a basis for the operability determination did not state that the amount of heat generated would not affect adjacent cables under an electrical faul The effect on the cables due to heat is currently unknown, and the licensee is currently performing an evaluation to
determine this effec The document also indicates separation may be require *
.
-
.
The inspector concluded the licensee's initial analysis was weak, as the licensee is now exploring the possibility that the RPS channels may have been inoperable with the unit at powe Pending the co~pletion of the licensee's analysis, this issue is considered an Unresolved Item (No. 255/94004-0l(DRP)).
February 17, 1994:
The plant commenced a shutdown from full power to repair a through wall le~k found on the recirculation containment sump outlet check valve, CK-ES-316 The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 and declared an Unusual Event in accordance with the emergency pla Following cooldown of the primary syst~m to less than 325 degrees F., the licensee exited from the Unusual Event and Technical Specification 3.0.3..
The plant ended this inspection report period in Cold Shutdown with plans in progress to repair the*leaking check valv The inspector will assess the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions when the licensee event report is issued for this *even Current Material Condition (71707}
- The inspectors performed general plant as well as selected system and component walkdowns to assess the general and specifi material condition of t~e plant, to verify that work requests had been initiated for identified-etjuipment problems, and to evaluate housekeepin Walkdowns included* an assessment of the buildings, com~onents, and systems for proper i~entification and tagging, accessibiliti, fire and s~curity door integrity, scaffolding,**
radiological controls, and any.unusual condition Un~sua1 conditions included but were not limited to water, oil, or other liquids on the floor or equipment; indications of leakage through
- ceiling, walls or floors; loose insulation; corrosion; excessive noise; unusual temperatures; and abnormal v~ntilation and lightin Some improvement was noted tn ov~rall plant material conditio The licensee begati to address lower priority work in the emergency diesel generator and service pump room Also, some improvement was noted in cleaning up the boric acid in the spent fuel pool heat exchanger room, although additional attention is required and planne Boric acid and contamination in and around the engineered safeguards pump skids were a concer Other specific items noted included:
-
Two longstanding maintenance items were observed for Emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) 1-2 that are examples of mi~sed oppo~tunities to correct the deficiencies:
(1) * A work order was written dated April 18, 1993, to replace the "A" air start motor as a preventive
(2)
measure ~gainst excessive starting times of the EO The system engineer stated that a spare motor was
.scheduled to be installed on the EOG during the last refueling outage, but.the opportunity was missed because an o-ring was not availabl The system engineer stated that the motor would be replaced during the next EOG outage this summe No *
operability concern exists with the EO A work order was written dated September 28, 1992, to address a problem annunciator associated with lube oil level switch LS 148 Initial resolution of the problem resided with the Instrument and Control (I&C)
technicians, who had difficulty in repairing the switch, but did not seek outside assistance from the I&E system engineei until about one month ~go.. The cognizant I&C engineer stated h~ had a plan to troubleshoot the problem, which involves checking the wiring configuration, during the next monthly surveillance test on the EO No operability concern exists since operators check lube oil level using the dipstick at least dail *
Water seepage was observed in the west engineered safeguards *
roo The seepage was determined to be ground water based on chemistry analysi The licensee generated a work request and issued a deficiency re~ort to address this ite *
A white precipitate buildup was observed in the auxiliary feedwater pump P-8A catch tray beneath the outboard pump bearin The licensee had earlier noted this phenomenon on both auxiliary feedwater pumps P-8A and P-88 and sent a sample to the Jackson, MI laboratory for chemical analysi The material was found to be composed ~f about 98 percent lead, and was identified with the pump packin Th~
licensee concluded the precipitate was caused by packing wear products mixing with the water around the pump shaf The precipitate has caused no operability concern since no known performance problems exist that are attributable to this precipitate material.. *
Instrument tubing for a pressure gauge for auxiliary*
feedwater pump P-8C in the west safeguards room was bent..
The licensee generated a work request to repair or replace the bent tubin *
Standing water on the floor in various areas of the turbine building was note The licensee responded by mopping the
- areas or roping off and posting the areas, as appropriat *Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness (71707)
The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection and prot~ctiori of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matte Observations communicated to the licensee included a spare circuit breaker in the IC switchgear room not secured and yellow plastic
. bags and other material on the floor in the east and west engineered safeguards pump rooms not properly stored~ Radiological Controls (71707)
The inspectors verified that personnel were following healt physics procedures for dosimetry, protectiv*e clothing, frisking,.
posting, etc. and randomly examined radiation protection
instrumentation for use, opera~ility, and calibratio A small. primary c.oolant system (PCS) iodine spike upon plant shutdown indicated the first known presence of a leaking fuel rod in the cor PCS activity had been about 3 percent of the technical specification limit (1.0 microcuries per gram) for dose equivalent iodine (1-131) just prior to plant shutdow No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspectton followup items were identified in this are.
Safety Assessment/Quality Verification (40500 and 92700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's deviation reports (DRs) generated during the inspection period. This was done in an effort to monitor the conpitions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, et DRs were also reviewed to ensure that they were generated appropriately and dispositioned in a manner consistent with the applicable procedure *
The NPAD organization has undergone some organizational change Operations and Engineering team leaders have been filled with Senior Team Leaders to provide a stronger focus on these two weak area An Independent Management Safety Review Board (MSRB) with several non-1 icensee members is being formulate The kickoff meeting is scheduled for March 17 and 18, 199 No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identified in this are.
Mainteriance/Surveillance (62703 & 61726)
' Maintenance Activities (62703)
Routinely, station maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed to as)certa in that they were conducted in accordance with 11 approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification The following items were also considered during this review:
1imiting conditions for operation were met ~hile components or
- syste~s were removed from service; approvals were obtain~d prior to initiating the work; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; and activities were accomplished by qualified personne Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
Troubleshoot and repair the number 2 governo~ valve on the *
main turbine (CV-0572).
The inspector observed good work planriing and technical *
discussions among members of the licensee's staff and the Westinghouse vendo The root cause was found to be a circuit card in the digital electro-hydraulic control system (DEH).
The card was tested and *satisfactorily replaced; however, the* licensee experienced difficulty in returning the governor valve back into service following repair Th licensee has experienced some problems with th~ DEH in the past, and this latest problem indicates that the licensee has not yet gained a sound understanding of how the entire system operate *
Troubleshoot and repair control room alarm chime *
Replace Emer~ency Diesel Generat6r 1-2 control transforme Surveillance A~tivities.. (61726)
During the inspection period, the inspector~ observed technical specification r~quired surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with ade~uate procedures, that*
test instrumentation was calibratep, that results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were revi~wed, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly resolve The inspectors also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following surveillances:
'
DW0-13, "LLRT - Local Leak Rate Tests For Inner and Outer Personnel Air Lock Door Seals," Re The inspector qu~stioned the suitability of the 12 minute test performed on the out~r containment doo Although the
- licensee complied with all associated technical specification surveillance requirements, the basis document to the procedure stated that "Per ANSI/ANS - 56.8, 1987, Type B pressure decay tests sha 11 have a duration. of not less than 15 *minutes fof each test."
The inspector reviewed the completed procedure with the cognizant system engineer section head.and found the test was performed per the procedure and results met the stated acceptance criteria. The individual stated that the 1 minute duration was satisfactory for the small volume and that the procedure basis document would be revised since ANSI/ANS - 56.8, 1987 was used for guidance only and was not endorsed by NR The inspecto~ checked with a Region III specialist and* found that indeed ANSI/ANS - 56.8, 1987 is not endorsed by NR Further, on the small volume being tested the pressure decay method employed was acceptable (versus using make-up flow)
and for this test,time was not a critical parameter; 12 minutes was sufficient to calculate a leak rate given
. initial and final pressure value The licensee intended to check the other related pro~edures to ensure the basis document ~ccurately reflects procedure requirement *
Q0-20, "Inservice*Test Procedure - Safety Injection Pumps,"
Re *
Q0-1, "Safety Injection System,~ Rev,34
M0~33, riC~ntrol Room Ventilation Emergency Operation,"
Rev.3..
No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identified in this are.
Fuel Handling (42700, 86700)
The inspector monitored the licensee's inspection -0f fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool following commencement of activities for this year's dry fuel storage projec On January 10, 1994, fuel inspecticins began to confirm the identity and verify the integrity of fuel assemblies designated for dry fuel storag As a conservative measure, th licensee has chosen to perform ultrasound examinations (UTs) of spent fuel in addition to visual inspections (VTs).
The UTs are not required by the Certificate of Compliance for storage of the spent fue *
The licensee completed VTs on 101 of about 300 scheduled spent fuel assemblies, and UTs on 259 of about 355 scheduled spent fuel assemblies to dat The VTs are performed in-house by the licensee (CPCo) and UTs are performed by Siemens Power Corp (SPC).
The results of these inspections identifi~d 6 failed rods, 5 fuel rods and 1 poison rod, in
- assemblies that are subject to further evaluation prior to a final decision on whether they will be placed into dry storag Those failed rods.characterized as "gross failures" are not intended to be pl aced into dry storage~ In addition, 15 VTs identified suspect indications
- that will undergo further evaluatio The UTs are scheduled to be complete March -25, 1994, with the VTs on April 22, 199 The actual loading of the dry fuel storage casks is set to begin on May 16,.199 The inspector attended several daily pre-job briefings and the post-job summarie These briefings were well attende The lead project engineer covered the details of the planned activities, discussed the precautions, potentials problems, and contingencie The task responsibilities and expectations were fully addresse There were healthy discusiions of procedures, ~uestions, and exchanges of idea The inspector examined the pr6cedures, inspection ~esults, and r~viewed selected videotapes of VTs performed rin fuel assemblie The inspector evaluated the fuel handling crew's detection methods for failed* fuel rods and damaged spacers. Specific fuel assemblies examined included A-35, H-50, H-41, I-29, -I-67, and 1-68..
The inspector performed a random inspection and review of several videos of the inspection of fuel assemblie The inspector independently noted several apparent defects; either of the fuel rods or associated segments, such a$ bent cap screws, questionable lock wire or even a bent ro The licensee had previously identified these apparent defects, and plan to perfor~ a careful eval~ation of the assemblies prior to assigning them for dry storag The insp~ctor noted good correlation between what the licensee's fuel handling crew identified as questionable defects and subsequent verification by the reactor engineer by reviewing the v_ideo tap The video tape documented the scann~ng of peripheral rods and the spacer The potential for a failed fuel rod being missed by the fuel handling (inspe~ting) crew dur*ing the inspection appeared very slight. However, the licensee's plans to conduct subsequent UT testing of all the used.
fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool which would significantly reduc~
the potential of a failed fuel to be misse *No violations, deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identified in this are.
Report Review During the inspection.period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's monthly operating report for Decem~er, 1993, and January, 199 The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the reporting requirements of TS 6.9.1.C and Regulatory Guide 1.16, "Reporting of Operating information."
No violations~ deviations, unresolved, or inspection followup items were identified in this are ;, * Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they a-re acceptable i terns, violations, or deviation An unresolved item disclosed during the inspectibn is discussed in paragraph 3.£~
9~
Meetings and Other Activities (30703) Management Meetings (30702)
On February 7, 1994, and on Febn1ary 24-25, 1994, the NRC section chief assigned to Palisades toured the Palisades plant and met with licensee management to discuss plant p~rformahce ~nd plant material conditio Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with the li~ensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 during the inspec_tion period and at the conclusion of the inspection on March 14, 199 The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this insp~ction report.. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information
. disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natu~ *
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