IR 05000250/1986008
| ML17346B186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/06/1986 |
| From: | Jape F, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17346B185 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-86-08, 50-250-86-8, 50-251-86-08, 50-251-86-8, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8603140220 | |
| Download: ML17346B186 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Dat Signed 3/4'd'-4 Date Soigne Approved by: F.'ape, Sec on C ief Division of Reactor Safety Report Nos.:
50-250/86-08, and 50-251/86-08 Ei Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL, 33102 f
Docket Nos.:
. 50-250 and 50-251
,Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
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Inspection,C ducted:
January 30 -'ebruary 3, 1986 Inspector:
- J. L. Mat is e
SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 39 inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup on IE Bulletin (IEB) 84-03, preparation for refueling, refueling activity and spent fuel pool activity.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. J.
Baker, Plant Manager - FPL
- J. Arias, Jr., Regulatory 5 Compliance Supervisor
- J. Kappes, Maintenance Superintendent
-
FPC J.
Kennedy; Senior Reactor Operator - Operation B. Hart, Licensing Specialist P.
Ross, Mechanical Maintenance R. Earl, gC Inspector R. Longtemp, Mechanical Maintenance B. McCay, Mechanical Maintenance R. Mende, Reactor Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- T. Peebles, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Brewer, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 3, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The insPector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dis-senting comments were received from the licensee.
New items identified during this inspection, are as follows:
50-250, 251/86-08-01, Inspector Followup Item (IFI), Provide supplemental response to IEB 84-03 within 30 days for evaluation.
50-250, 251/86-08-02, ( IFI), Provide Units 3 and 4 annulus gap measurement for review.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.'icensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio Pff 4 Vffe e
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
Followup to IEB 84-03 Florida Power and Light (FP&L) response to IEB 84-03, dated November 23, 1984, described the seal configuration used at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
For a detailed description of seal design prior to Plant Change/Modification (PC/M) 85-94, refer to Inspection Report No. 50-250/85-11.
FPSL concluded that a catastrophic failure of the Turkey Point cavity seal is not con-sidered a credible event because of inherent design differences of that used at Haddam Neck Plant.
As a matter of prudence, engineering at Turkey Point recommended that backup seals be added for extra protection against leakage.
The backup seals were designed to restrict the loss of refueling water upon a postulated fai lure of the Presray inflatable seal.
Turkey Point concurred and PC/M 84-214 was provided on January 24, 1985, by engineering to install the backup seal for Unit 3.
This PC/M was not implemented during the Spring 1985 refueling outage due to the unavailability of materials.
PC/M 85-94 was provided on June 17, 1985, by engineering to install a backup seal for Unit 4.
During the installation of this PC/M, in January 1986, it was discovered that the backup seal was not properly sized.
It was noted that the backup seal surfaces did not contact the support ring and reactor vessel ledge after installation.
The nonconforming condition (Figure 1)
was a dimensional discrepancy between the existing Presray Seal and the annular gap to be sealed between the reactor and refueling cavity.
Power plant engineering reviewed Nonconformance Report (NCR)86-043 and subsequent gC data on the condition of Unit 4 Reactor Cavity Seal Ring.
The NCR disposition provided an interim fix for the nonconforming condition to return the seal to a configuration approaching the original design.
The design concept provided, shown in Figure 2, shows the installation of carbon steel rings which effectively raise the reactor cavity floor elevation and reactor vessel ledge elevation to meet the existing position of the Presray Pneuma-Seal.
The steel rings are nominally 1.5 inches thick, 3.5 inches wide with appropriate radiuses to fit in their allocated positions.
The rings are fabricated of five 72'egments which are spliced together to form a rigid structure.
NCR 86-043 required gC to inspect the seal for seal flange overlap on shim rings.
There were approximately eight areas which showed lack of overlap.
All areas where this was present appeared to be located where pieces were vulcanized together.
ISC then pressurized the seal to 5 psig.
All overlaps with the exception of one area was then corrected.
The remaining unsatisfactory area was 3 inches long with a gap of approximately 1/8" to 1/4".
This area was located at the reactor head stud location number 8.
A new seal was removed from the warehouse and a
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cursory inspection showed similar deformation as the previous seal when in place.
Engineering resolution required annulus side shim plates to be added for acceptable overlap as identified in the interim disposition.
Another rejectable condition identified by the gC inspection report was that upon gC inspection of the refueling cavity backup seal as per item 3 of NCR 86-043 it was noted that approximately 65-70% of the inner radius of the inner backup seal did not meet the requirement specified for inner and outer backup seals overhang onto the shim rings.
Engineering resolution required annulus side shim plates to be added to the shim rings to achieve an acceptable overlap.
Once the shim extensions were added, it was noted by gC that when the Presray Seal was lowered into place to some areas of the seal flange was not contacting the shim rings, however, it appeared to have overlapped.
Further investigation showed that the tapered portion of the seal below the flange was contacting the head of the bolts which retain the shim plates on the shim rings.
Subsequent inspection indicated that little effort was required to compress the seal flange against the shims as originally intended.
Thus, it was concluded that torqueing of the seal ring against the Presray Seal would not adversely affect the seal nor the compression of the seal flange between the seal ring and the reactor vessel ledge floor.
Following bolt torqueing in alternating sequence of 150 ft.
lbs., the licensee filled the reactor cavity and recorded the leakage rate to the reactor cavity sump with the reactor cavity at normal level.
Leakage was recorded in Procedure MP 1407.6 for the uninflated pneuma seal at approximately 5 gpm.
Once the pneuma seal was inflated to 25 psig.,
leakage was reduced to approximately 1-2 gpm.
Upon completion of that modification, the licensee committed to provide a
supplemental response to IEB 84-03 within 30 days.
This commitment will be tracked as IFI 50-250, 251/86-08-01, Provide supplemental response to IEB 84-03 within 30 days for evaluation.
The inspector review of the interim fix for the modified reactor cavity seal concludes that the interim fix was acceptable and a catastrophic failure is not a credible event.
However, to evaluate the modified design for future use on Units 3 and 4, the inspector recommended that the licensee provide to NRC measurement of the annulus opening at various locations around the vessel.
This will be tracked as IFI 50-250, 251/86-08-02, Provide Units 3 and 4 annulus opening measurement for review.
Within this area, no violations or deviations were identified.
Refueling Activities (60705, 60710 and 86700)
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Preparation for Refueling On January 30, 1986, the inspector observed preparation for refueling activity for Turkey Point, Unit 4.
The inspector verified that initial preparations and conditions were satisfied prior to core alteration in accordance with licensee and NRC requirements.
The inspector reviewed the following procedures and documents:
OP 1407.21, Refueling Activities Checkoff List
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OP 16204.1, Manipulator Crane and RCC Change Fixture-Periodic Test OP 16304. 1, Spent Fuel Pit Bridge Crane-Periodic Test A
OP 16002.6, Preparations and Precautions for Refueling Fuel Shuffle OP 16000. 1, Limitation and Precautions for Handling Fuel Assem-blies OP 16002.5, Refueling Core Shuffle MP 1407.9, Reactor Vessel - Removal of Upper Internals MP 1407.6, Installation of Reactor Vessel Cavity Seal Ring The above procedures were analyzed for embodiment of the necessary test prerequisites, preparations, instructions, acceptance criteria and technical content.
Defueling critical path schedule was delayed a couple of days primarily due to the problems experience during the installation of the reactor cavity seal ring.
For more details, refer to paragraph 5.
Once the reactor cavity was filled to the normal refueling level, the licensee proceeded to lift the reactor vessel head.
The inspector reviewed Procedure MP 1407.9, Reactor Vessel
- Removal of Upper Internals, to verify that the lifting bolts of the lift rig for the upper guide structure (upper internal) were fully engage prior to lifting the upper internal.
The licensee was aware of the mishap at St. Lucie, when one of the three lifting rig attachments gave way while removing the upper guide structure (UGS) from the reactor vessel.
This placed the UGS in a tilted position with its full weight, approximately 45 tons, dangling over the reactor core.
Turkey Point made an on-the-spot change to Procedure MP-1407.9 to incorporate full thread engagement verification so that the aforementioned problem at St. Lucie would not occur at Turkey Point.
The licensee successfully removed the upper internal and placed it in the designated area.
b.
Defueling Defueling for Unit 4 started February 2, 1986.
Defueling was performed in accordance with Procedure OP 16002.5, Refueling Core Shuffle.
The inspector witnessed defueling from the control room, refueling floor and spent fuel pool.
The inspector observed defueling to verify the following:
( 1)
Direct communication was established between the control room and reactor building.
(2)
Staffing requirements were in accordance with Technical Specifi-cations (TSs).
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Control of personnel access to the spent fuel pool areas.
(4)
Changes to procedures were made in accordance with administrative procedures.
(5)
Licensee maintained good housekeeping in the refueling area.
(6)
Radiological controls were maintained in accordance with approved procedures.
(7)
Appropriate steps and gC hold points were signed off.
An OTSC was made to the refueling core shuffle procedure to add a sign off step for the Plant Nanager - Nuclear, as a verification point to ensure that all seal ring modifications were complete and satisfactory prior to fuel movement.
c.
Spent Fuel Pool Activity The inspector observed fuel handling operations during fuel movement in the spent fuel pool area and reviewed procedures to verify that the following were included in the procedures:
(1)
A limitation on the number of fuel assemblies that can be out of safe geometry locations at the same time.
(2)
Provisions for verifying prior to fuel assembly handling that the spent fuel pool area crane interlock or physical stops will prevent the crane from passing over fuel storage locations.
(3)
Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the spent fuel pool area ventilation system is operable.
(4)
Provisions for verifying that minimum water level requirements are monitored during fuel handling operation.
(5)
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool radiation and airborne radioactivity monitors are operable.
(6)
Provisions for verifying that the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is operable.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
Attachments:
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ATTACHMENTr1 FLORIDAPOWER %LIGHTCOMPANY NUCLEARTRAININGDEPARTMENT TURKEYPOINT NUCLEARPLAN'F TRAININGBRIEF NO. 111 INNER BACK-UP SEAL OUTER BACK-UP SE.AL A-
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Figure X Turkey Point Cavity Seal With Recently Added Back-Up Seals
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