IR 05000245/1993021
| ML20059C268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1993 |
| From: | Keinig R, Lusher J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059C224 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-93-21, 50-336-93-15, 50-423-93-17, NUDOCS 9311010072 | |
| Download: ML20059C268 (15) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I
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Docket / Report:
50-245/93-21, 50-336/93-15, 50-423/93-17 Licenses:
DPR-21, DPR-65, NPF-49 Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101-0270
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Facility Name:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1,2, & 3 Waterford, Connecticut
Inspection Dates:
September 21-24,1993 Inspectors:
- Y e6 #dt J usher, Emergen re redn ss Specialist date
. Laughlin, Emer > cy I edness Specialist D. Silk, Emergency Preparedness Specialist S. Boynton, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR/PEPB R. De La Espriella, Resident Inspector, Millstone K. Kolaczyk, Resident Inspector, Millstone c[~
/#-A/hPJ Approved:
R. h [' @ f, E m ency Preparedness Section date Division of Radiatio afety and Safeguards SCOPE Announced inspection of the annual, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise.
RESULTS Overall, the on-site response to this exercise scenario was good. The crew correctly identified, classified and declared the event using the appropriate Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in a timely manner. No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified. Areas for potential improvement identified included communications of conditions to the emergency response facility staffs and use of work control procedures for repair / restoration activities.
931101o072 931021 PDR ADOCK 05000245 PDR O
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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2.
Scenario Planning
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3.
Exercise Scenario........................................ 3 4.
Activities Observed....................................... 3 5.
Exercise Finding Classifications............................... 4 6.
General Findings....................................... 4 6.1 Exercise Control.................................... 4 6.2 Communication of Event Status........................... 4
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Simulator Control Room (SCR)............................... 5 7.1 Simulator Fidelity................................... 5 7.2 Evacuation / Assembly Implementation.......................
7.3 Evacuation Procedure................................. 6
8.
Technical Support Center (TSC)............................... 6 8.1 Use of TSC resources................................. 7 8.2 Familiarization with Equipment........................... 7 9.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
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9.1 Repair Priorities.................................... 8 9.2 Radiological Information at the OSC........................ 8 9.3 Work Control Procedures
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10.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)........................... 9 10.1 Evacuation and Assembly.............................
11.
Corporate Emergency Operations Center (CEOC)...................
11.1 Emergency Condition Upgrading.........................
12.
Overall Response Timing
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items.....................
13.1 Proper Emergency Classification.........................
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13.2 EOF Activation
...................................12 13.3 Minimum EOF Staffing
.............................13 13.4 Shared DSEO Duties................................
13.5 Special Procedures
.................................13 13.6 Classification of Emergency Action Ixvels (EALs)..............
14.
Licensee Critique......................................
15.
Exi t M eeting..........................................
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted The following licensee personnel attended the exit meeting on January 31,1992.
D. Aloi, Senior Scientist, Emergency Preparedness J. Brewer, Operations Manager, Millstone Unit 2 R. Brown, Connecticut Yankee Station Services W. Buck, Connecticut Yankee Senior Emergency Plan Coordinator K. Burgess, Connecticut Yankee EP Coordinator F. Dacimo, Director, Millstone Unit 3 T. Dembeck, Nuclear EP Coordinator J. Doroski, Senior Engineer Millstone Health Physics Support R. Factora, Director, Site Services, Millstone Station J. Hawxhurst, Senior Scientist, Emergency Preparedness P. Luckey, Senior Nuclear Trainer, Training Department E. MacLean, Nuclear Trainer, Emergency Preparedness W. McCance, Millstone Station Emergency Plan Coordinator j
T. Reyher, Emergency Preparedness R. Rodgers, EP Director, Northeast Utilities Service Company j
W. Romberg, Vice President, Nuclear Operation Services A. Saunders, Quality Services Department M. Stein, Consultant
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D. Tailleart. Emergency Preparedness Manager, North Atlantic Energy Service Company A. Tatro, Nuclear Information Program Coordinator J. Watson, Scientist, Emergency Preparedness The inspectors also interviewed and observed other licensee personnel.
2.
Scenario Planning Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on June 24, 1993. The scenario was submitted to the NRC on July 23, 1993. Region I reviewers discussed potential scenario improvements with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on August 3,1993. The final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Imp!cmenting Procedures, and also demonstrated areas previously identified for further review.
On September 21,1993, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on the revised scenario.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrupting plant activities.
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Exercise Scenario The scenario included the following simulated events:
The plant was near the end of core life after prolonged operation at high power.
- A small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurred; Leakage exceeded charging pump capacity. (An Alert)
Loss of power to Facility II Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESP) equipment.
- e Spurious sump recirculation actuation signal (SRAS) caused Facility I containment sump valve to open.
- A large break LOCA with high containment pressure backseating the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST) suction, causing loss of safety injection.
Loss of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) barrier and potential loss of the fuel clad
barrier. (A Site Area Emergency)
Injection restor. tion.
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o Core damage termina' ion.
A hydrogen burn caused a Containment pressure spike and containment breach
downstream of the Containment suction valve.
Loss of the Containment, RCS, and fuel clad barriers. (A General Emergency)
Shutting the containment sump suction valve to restore Containment intregity.
Radiological release termination.
- Exercise termination.
4.
Activities Observed The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and the actions of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff. The following activities were observed:
1.
Selection and use of conuol room procedures.
2.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
3.
Direction and coordination of emergency response.
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Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
5.
. Communications /information flow, and record keeping 6.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses 7.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARS).
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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection-9.
Provisions for communicating information to the public 10.
Accident analysis and mitigation.
11.
Accountability of personnel 12.
Post-exercise critique by the licensee 5.
Exercise Finding Classifications Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:
Exercise Streneth: a strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the emergency plan.
Exercise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone, constitute overall response inadequacy.
Area for Potential Imorovement: an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for possible corrective action.
6.
General Findings Activation and use of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). No exercise strengths or weaknesses were observed. The j
following general areas for potential improvement were identified.
6.1 Exercise Control (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-21-01)
During the exercise, the controllers unnecessarily interjected information or freely conversed j
with the exercise players on several occasions.
6.2 Communication of Event Status (IFI 50-245,-336,423/93-21-02)
The Technical Support Center (TSC) Manager's briefings did not keep TSC personnel informed about major plant parameters. For example, TSC personnel were unaware that adequate core cooling had been established one hour after it had been achieved. Also, TSC personnel were informed that Bus 24D was inoperable, but were not informed that this failure rendered one safety train inoperable. Such information could be helpful to TSC personnel unfamiliar with the Unit two electrical system (e.g., Unit I and Unit 3 personnel).
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At approximately 1022, the Operations Support Center Manager (MOSC) did not know what emergency classification the station was in. When he inquired, the Simulator Control Room stated they were in a General Emergency (GE) although the plant was in a Site Area Emergency (SAE) at the time.
On two occasions, the MOSC did not brief the OSC for over an hour.
Also, MOSC announcements were usually quite brief and did not update the OSC staff on current plant conditions, the site emergency classification, the top priorities for the OSC, team deployment, or radiological conditions. The inspector noted that OSC Emergency Plan Operating Procedure EPOP-4419 provided little guidance to the MOSC on periodic announcements. In addition, other than tracking team status, the OSC. did not track plant conditions, emergency classifications, important equipment out of service, and other information and event times that could help OSC personnel and supervisors to maintain a perspective on event conditions.
The Director of Site Emergency Operations (DSEO) did not keep the EOF staff fully apprised of emergency events. He did not brief facility personnel on the public address system, and significant information like facility activation, the SAE declaration, and survey information indicating 5 mr/hr in the EOF was not announced.
7.
Simulator Control Room (SCR)
The SCR crew demonstrated good teamwork in identification of abnormal plant conditions and initiation of responses. For example, the crew identified abnormal Pressurizer pressure and level prior to receipt of alarms for those parameters and, instead of waiting for an automatic reactor trip, the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) ordered a manual reactor trip when it was evident that a trip was imminent. Also, the SCR crew appropriately implemented Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to address plant conditions. The crew kept each other informed of plant status and trends and also used a team approach to diagnosing and resolving operational problems.
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The Shift Supervisor (SS) was the liaison between the board operators and the On-site Director of Site Emergency Operations (ODSEO) throughout the exercise. Informal one-on-one briefings were held by the SRO through the SS to the ODSEO and by the ODSEO through the SS to the SRO.
The SCR crew correctly identified, classified and declared the event using the appropriate Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in a timely manner.
7.1 Simulator Fidelity Simulator feedback caused several distractions throughout the exercise. At approximately 0800 the board operators were addressing unexplained low levels in the steam generators (SGs). At about 0830 SG blowdown monitors indicated radioactivity in one SG. At about 0954 operators observing symptoms indicative of a SG tube rupture when main steam line rad monitors alarmed
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and SG-1 level started to increase. At that time, however, the SGs were at a higher pressure than the RCS, making such indications of a tube rupture implausible. At 1100, the time of the hydrogen burn in Containment, Containment pressure indicators went from about 14 psig to 2 psig to 55 psig and then to about 18 psig. The time required to discuss and assess these items detracted from player attention to the actual scenario. Overall, because an actual emergency also can include extraneous and distractive indications, this matter was classified as an inspector observation rather than as an area for potential improvement.
7.2 Evacuation / Assembly Implementation (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-21-03)
Forty minutes after the Alert declaration, the ODSEO was still in charge of the facility's emergency response but had not yet implemented evacuation / assembly for on-site personnel.
The assembly recommendation came from the DSEO in the EOF, and it was not clear that the ODSEO would otherwise have initiated evacuation / assembly actions. Therefore, this matter was
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classified as an area for potential improvement.
7.3 Evacuation Procedure (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-21-04)
When announcing the assembly at about 0816, the SS read a pre-scripted announcement verbatim from EPOP-4412, Evacuation and Assembly.
The announcement included the event classification, the call for ERO personnel to report to their designated area, and for non-essential personnel to stand clear. The evacuation alarm was then sounded.
When the site evacuation was announced at 0908, the SS asked for guidance on whether to use the same announcement paragraph in EPOP-4412 or on how to modify the announcement. In this regard, EPOP-4412 included guidance that evacuees should listen for further instructions, despite the inability to hear the plant public address system after being evacuated. Personnel familiarity with and the appropriateness of EPOP-4412 evacuation provisions was therefore classified as an area for potential improvement.
8.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The Technical Support Center (TSC) was declared operational by the TSC manager at 8:10 pm.
The status of plant safety systems and critical plant parameters were periodically routinely checked through use of the Off-Site Information System (OFIS). Anomalous conditions were investigated. For example, the TSC manager directed the OFIS monitor to investigate why significant core damage was occurring and Containment radiation monitors were reading 70,000 R/ hour while core exit thermocouples were reading 268. L.ater, TSC personnel were informed by exercise personnel that this discrepancy was due to use of the wrong OFIS screen.
TSC personnel reverified the original classification of the event by the control room and frequently rechecked the classification of the event when plant conditions changed. Briefs on
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plant conditions were periodically performed by the TSC manger. An accurate status of plant I
conditions was maintained on the TSC log and status board.
Appropriate action plans were developed to mitigate the event. TSC personnel thought out j
contingency plans to mitigate the event if plant components failed. For example, the TSC
recommended running the Terry Turbine to prove operability in case a motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump should fail.
Use of a fire pump to supply a steam generator was also considered.
j No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for potential l
improvement were noted.
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8.1 Use of TSC resources (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-17-05)
TSC resources could have been better utilized. Specifically, this Unit 2 event included the i
failure of numerous electrical components and required investigation and review by electrical
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I engineers. However, a TSC electrical engineer was tasked with maintaining the TSC status log, i
consuming most of his time and diverting him from reviewing the electrical issues. TSC log maintenance by administrative staff or by a mechanical engineer who was not busy may have been more appropriate in this situation.
l 8.2 Familiarization with Equipment (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-17-06)
The individual tasked with monitoring critical plant parameters using the OFIS terminal was not initially familiar with the use of the system. Guidance on the trending of plant parameters had to be initially supplied to the individual by other TSC personnel.
TSC personnel were unsure of how the telephone conference phone should be used. That phone rang on a routine basis but personnel were unsure if the call was directed to the TSC or another
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party on the conference system such as the OSC or Control Room.
Therefore, it was not j
always answered and TSC personnel thereby may have been deprived of relevant irarmation.
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9.
Operations Support Center (OSC)
l The inspector evaluated the staffing and activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC),
l facility management and control, and the performance of support functions. Overall, the OSC effectively performed all required support functions. No associated strengths or weaknesses were found.
The licensee promptly staffed the OSC, activating it within 39 minutes of declaring the ALERT.
The Manager of the OSC (MOSC) was the first to arrive, and utilized MOSC EPOP-4419 to activate the OSC and ensure it was fully functional. Reliable communications were established with the control room, the Technical Support Center (TSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Health Physics personnel periodically assessed habitability in the OSC and i
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established radiological controls at the OSC entrance. Personnel keyed into and out-of the OSC to maintain continued accountability.
The inspector determined that the MOSC was knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities, and that he exercised good control over the OSC staff. Assistants were assigned to coordinate various OSC functions. The MOSC rapidly assigned personnel to support teams and ensured that these teams were provided with clear instructions prior to being dispatched. Teams i
dispatched from the OSC were briefed, tracked, and debriefed upon their return. Health Physics (HP) briefings were also held with every departing team to provide expected radiological conditions. HP considered exposure limits of personnel in planning team activities and ensured that extensions werv authorized by the Manager of Radiological Consequence Assessment (MRCA', as required. The MOSC was extremely sensitive to the safety of deployed teams, and ensured that they were kept informed of changing radiological conditions. The MOSC also kept the TSC and DSEO informed of support team status.
The OSC provided adequate support to the DSEO, establishing emergency teams to address specific problems in a highly organized manner. OSC task supervisors and the MOSC assigned team members suitable for the expected task, and designated a team leader for each team. An HP technician was assigned to each team. Communications with deployed teams was good.
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for potential improvement were identified.
i 9.1 Repair Priorities (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-17-07)
l The MOSC did not appraise emergency teams of how significant their activity was, or why it was important for certain equipment to be returned to service. The inspector observed briefings for the teams sent to repair Bus 24D, to shut Valve 2-CS-16.1 A, and to vent the Low Pressure Safety Injection LPSI-A and Core Spray CS-A pumps. The teams were not informed of all significant conditions (i.e. loss of all injection capability, containment breach, radioactive release in progress, loss of containment spray capability, etc.). This was evident in the approach to
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i repair Bus 24D and the calling off of the repair team trying to shut 2-CS-16.lA to stop the release (a controller intervened, telling the MOSC to continue efforts to shut the valve).
9.2 Radiological Information at the OSC (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-17-08)
The MOSC did not know that protective actions were recommended by the Manager of Radiological Consequence Assessment (MRCA) to prevent iodine intake by personnel in the OSC or on deployed teams, following the release. Also, radiological survey maps were not provided to the OSC for use in minimizing exposure to emergency team.-
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9.3 Work Control Procedures (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-17-09)
Licensee use of normal work control methods and procedures during repair activities was not evident. In conversations with controllers, the inspector determined that, with the exception of complicated tasks for which the TSC will generate a procedure, most troubleshooting and repair activitics by emergency teams are expected to be performed as " skills of the craft." That practice was assessed as inconsistent with station administrative procedures, potentially dangerous to the safety of personnel and equipment, and likely to adversely impact control of equipment line-ups.
10.
Ernergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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The On-call Director of Site Emergency Operations (DSEO) arrived at the EOF at 0755. He reviewed EPOP-4411, Director of Site Emergency Operations, in preparation for assuming DSEO duties. The DSEO incorrectly stated that the Alert was declared at 0747 (vs. 0733), and that incorrect time was recorded in the DSEO log and on the EOF status board.
The DSEO completed his turnover with the On-site DSEO (ODSEO), assumed control of the station emergency at 0840, and pronounced EOF activation. This information was properly logged but was not announced to EOF staff. The inspector noted that the DSEO told the ODSEO that the EOF was fully staffed at 0829. Lengthy turnover discussions prevented earlier EOF activation.
The DSEO demonstrated good command and control. He conducted regular briefings with his supervisors to review plant conditions and receive updated reports for their areas of responsibility.
He ensured prioritization of repair items in discussions with his staff.
Communications flow to and from other Emergency Response Facilities was found adequate for-emergency control. However, the DSEO did not brief all of the EOF staff to keep them apprised of event status.
The DSEO correctly classified the Site Area Emergency (SAE) and General Emergency (GE).
He continually evaluated plant conditions with respect to Emergency Action Levels to ensure proper classification upgrades. Notifications of State and local agencies were completed in the required time.
The large break LOCA occurred at 0918. The DSEO initially decided to declare a S AE based on loss of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) boundary and potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. When a rapid pressure drop was evident in Containment at 0926, the DSEO considered a GE, Posture Code Bravo, due to loss of two barriers and potentialloss of the third. The EOF Controller intervened at 0928 and directed the DSEO to declare a SAE, and maintain that classification for at least 45 minutes for off-site scenario control. The DSEO declared a SAE, Posture Code Charlie 2, at 0932. He also directed that a draft message be prepared for a GE, Posture Code Bravo, in anticipation of that classification. The SAE declaration was not announced on the plant public address system or in the EOF.
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At 1100, containment pressure jumped from 14.5 psig to 54 psig, and then decreased rapidly to 18 psig. On-site field monitoring teams immediately observed increased dose rates. At 1105, i
the DSEO correctly declared a GE, Posture Code Alpha, based on loss of all three fission product barriers. He reported this to the Corporate Emergency operations Center (CEOC), but did not inform the EOF of the event until 1114.
The DSEO worked well with his technical staff to aggressively pursue mitigative actions. ' For example, a plan was devised to cross-connect the low pressure safety injection and containment spray systems to provide containment spray while the spray pumps were out of service.
Habitability surveys and air samples were completed in the EOF after the release. No airborne contamination was detected, but facility dose rate was 5 mr/hr. This was discussed at the DSEO briefing for supervisors but was not announced to the EOF staff.
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The following area for potential improvement was identified.
10.1 Evacuation and Assembly (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-17-10)
The ODSEO initiated station evacuation and assembly of site personnel at the Alert level. The SCR announced assembly but did not sound the evacuation alarm. After the DSEO assumed emergency control, he ordered a site evacuation. EPOP-4411, Director ofStation Emergency Operations, directed the DSEO to evaluate plant conditions and determine the need for station evacuation and assembly. EPOP-4412, Evacuation and Assembly, stated that site evacuation could only be initiated after assembly and accountability. Inspectors noted that EPOP-4411 gave no specific guidance on when evacuation was necessary and that the DSEO ordered site evacuation for no apparent reason other than inclement weather. Specification of bases for evacuation was therefore identified as an area for potential improvement.
11.
Corporate Emergency Operations Center (CEOC)
Exercise objectives for the CEOC included the effective demonstration of all communication j
links, the development of protective action recommendations for the public and emergency
workers, analysis of plant conditions and proposed corrective actions, dose assessment, and coordination of radiological monitoring teams.
Overall, performance by the CEOC staff was effective. The CEOC was staffed and activated 38 minutes after the declaration of the Alert, well within the goal of seventy-five minutes.
Communication networks were established between the CEOC and the State EOC, the joint information center, and the on-site emergency response facilities. The Director, Corporate Emergency Response Organization (DCERO) maintained good communications with the CEOC staff through frequent manager meetings and facility briefings. The technical staff provided substantive support to TSC evaluation of plant conditions and corrective actions. The Field
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Team Coordinator effectively directed the field teams dispatched from the EOF to monitor for radiological releases and track the simulated plume.
i The use of potassium iodide for emergency workers was appropriately assessed and implemented by the Corporate Manager of Radiological Consequence Assessment (CMRCA). An initial and an updated protective action recommendation (PAR) were also provided to the DCERO by the CMRCA prior to 11 ; declaration of the General Emergency. The initial PAR was based upon i
the default PAR ft,r a Posture Code Alpha event which recommended the evacuation of the populace within a wo mile radius of the station and five miles downwind. The updated PAR j
was based upon 1:alistic dose assessment from the analyzed source term in containment and recommended exf :nding the evacuation out to ten miles in the downwind direction. These PARS were provided a the Northeast Utilities (NU) representative at the State EOC prior to the declaration of.ne General Emergency. No delay occurred in issuing the PAR to the State when the GE declaration was made.
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The following area for potential
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improvement was identified 11.1 Emergency Condition Upgrading (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-17-11)
Following the large break LOCA the Corporate Manager, Radiological Control Assessment (CMRCA) recognized the potential for a significant release of radioactivity based upon Containment high range radiation monitor readings. The CMRCA also recognized the difficulty in evacuation of the public prior to plume arrival due to adverse meteorological conditions.
However, upgrading the event to a General Emergency and implementing the PAR prior to occurrence of the significant potential release were not actively considered.
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Overall Response Timing Unless not applicable (N.A.), the following table lists the times of significant exercise j
occurrences and actions for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (Al), Site Area Emergency (SAE), and General Emergency (GE) classifications,. These include simulated emergency occurrence, recognition, declaration, State and local (S & L) notifications, NRC notification, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) callout, and Emergency Response Facility activation and full staffing. This table shows timely performance by the ERO.
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RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE MILESTONE UE Al SAE GE Occurrence NA 0725 0918 1100 i
Recognition NA 0728 0920 1100 Declaration NA 0733 0932 1105 S & L Notifications NA 0747 0946 1115 NRC Notification NA 0759 NA NA ERO Callout NA 0747 NA NA TSC Activation NA 0810 NA NA TSC Fully Staffed NA 0810 NA NA OSC Activation NA 0812 NA NA OSC Fully Staffed NA 0812 NA NA EOF Activation NA 0840 NA NA EOF Fully Staffed NA 0829 NA NA CEOC Activation NA 0811 NA NA CEOC Fully Staffed NA 0811 NA NA PAR Issued
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Itents 13.1 Proper Emergency Classiucation The DSEO correctly classified this Site Area Emergency and General Emergency (Posture Code A) in a timely manner.
This item was closed based upon this demonstration of proper classification.
13.2 EOF Activation The Manager of Engineering Support completed EOF systems activation and reported that to the DSEO. The inspector had no further questions on this item.
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13.3 Minimum EOF Staffing (IFI 50-245,-336,-423/93-21-12)
The minimum staffing necessary for EOF activation was still not clear. The licensee stated that facility activation was up to DSEO discretion. This issue did not detract from licensee response, but clarification could aid DSEO decision-making. The licensee will review this issue.
13.4 Shared DSEO Duties During this exercise, one person was assigned as DSEO and the decision-making authority was clear. This item was closed.
13.5 Special Procedures During the exercise the TSC drafted a special procedure for lining up an alternate suction to the Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump "A" and sent it by facsimile to the OSC. This item is closed.
13.6 Classification of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) (VIO 50-245,-336,-423/92-07-01)-
Closed.
During walk-through drills conducted in 1992 by the NRC to test the licensee staff's ability to recognize and classify emergencies, there were repeated instances of licensee on-shift and on-duty emergency response personnel inability to properly classify simulated General Emergency conditions.
In the second quarter of 1992 the licensee instituted an effort to emphasize event classifications.
ERO personnel (mainly SSs and DSEOs) who may be required to classify emergency events were given quarterly take-home quizzes consisting of four scenarios, without provision for maintaining quiz security. The classification levels of the scenarios were randomly selected.
These personnel were given approximately two weeks to classify the events described in the scenarios and return their responses for grading. The licensee tracked the responses and recorded the individual scores. A 100% response to the quizzes was achieved during the first j
quarter of 1993. The average quarterly quiz scores for the four units ranged from 71 to 98%,
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with the median quarterly score of about 85%.
The licensee also instituted separate EP training for SROs with ERO responsibilities. The prior method of Licensed Operator requalification training (LORT) testing had not identified specific EP-related weaknesses. For example, an operator could have missed all EP-related questions on their LORT exams but achieve an overall satisfactory score and not be required to take
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remedial EP training to assure the ability to make proper event classifications. The new EP training and tests cover EALs (scenarios) and overall EP information. Thus, EP related weaknesses are identified and remedial event classification training is applied when neede.-
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During requalification examinations conducted in September 1993, the examination required twenty classifications to'be made by 7 Senior Reactor Operators (SROs). During the dynamic simulator examination, all classifications were made correctly. One of the classifications on the simulator was a General Emergency which involved a simulated release via the isolation condenser. The SRO's accuracy in classing events was greater than 90 percent. Based upon the licensee's implementation of the quarterly scenarios and the separate EP training, adequate training in usage of and familiarity with the EALs and related EP procedures is now evident.
This violation is closed.
14.
Licensee Critique On September 24,1993 the NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique. The exercise lead controller and lead controllers for each facility summarized the licensee's observations. The licensee's critique was assessed as thorough and critical, and it identified all of the NRC inspection concerns. No licensee critique inadequacies were identified.
15.
Exit Meeting The inspectors met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the scope and findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings and stated that they would be reviewed for appropriate corrective action.
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