IR 05000245/1993001
| ML20056C125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1993 |
| From: | Keimig R, Limroth D, Galen Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056C124 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-93-01, 50-245-93-1, 50-336-93-01, 50-336-93-1, 50-423-93-01, 50-423-93-1, NUDOCS 9303300118 | |
| Download: ML20056C125 (10) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.: 50-245/93-01: 50-336/93-01: 50-423/93-01
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Docket Nos.: 50-245: 50-336: 50-423 P
License Nos.: DPR-21: DPR-65: NPF-49 Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford. Connecticut 06141-0270 Facility Name:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station. Units 1. 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Berlin and Waterford. Connecticut Inspection Conducted:
January 11-15. 1993 Inspectors:
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D. F. IIrnroth, Senior Reactor Engineer Date 3 /O-93 G. C. 6nith, Senior Physical Security Specialist Date Accompanied By:
N. E. Ervin, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved By:
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J 8-f.:I g. '. Keimig[ChieJ(jfafeguards Section Date D:
Nn of Radiati6tf Safety and Safeguards Areas Inspected: Access
.zation Program Administration and Organization; Background Investigation Elements; Psycnological Evaluations; Behavioral Observation; "Grandfathering,"
Reinstatement, and Transfer of Access Authorization; Temporary Access Authorization; Denial / Revocation of Unesconed Access; Audits; and Records Retention.
e 9303300118 930323 PDR ADDCK 05000245 G
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t Results: The licensee's Access Authorization Program generally provides assurance that individuals who are authorized unescorted access to the station are trustworthy and reliable, and l
do not constitute an undue risk to the health and safety of the public, as a result of their
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unescorted access to the station. Two unresolved items were identified: one related to personnel
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identification and the other related to contractor audits Weaknesses associated with lack of
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definitive acceptance criteria for derogatory information, limited review of credit report l
information in the temporary access authorization review process, and requirements to update
it. formation following interrupted access authorization were also identified. Resolution of l
another item related to the required audit periodicity of background investigation contractors will
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be pursued by the NRC.
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DETAII.S i
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1.0 Backcround On April 25, 1991, the Commission published the Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants,10 CFR 73.56, (the rule), which requires that i
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each licensee authorized on that date to operate a nuclear reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21 implement an Access Authorization Program by April 27,1992, to comply with i
L the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56, and that such program be incorporated into the licensee's Physical Security Plan. The rule requires that licensees establish and maintain l
an Access Authorization Program with the objective of providing high assurance that
individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute
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an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public, including a potential to l
commit radiological sabotage.
i This inspection, conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Temporary
Instruction 2515/116, Access Authorization, assessed the licensee's Access Authorization
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Program and its implementation to determine if the regulatory requirements reflected in its Physical Security Plan, in response to the rule, were being met. The licensee's Physical Security Plan was previously reviewed by the NRC and was found to be acceptable (NRC letter dated May 1,1992).
I The licensee's program that was inspected is also applicable to the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant; however, program implementation was only inspected at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station.
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2.0 Access Authorization Procram
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2.1 Administration and Oreanization The Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Access Authorization Program is
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prescribed by the Security Access Authcrization Manual formulated and
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promulgated by Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO). Responsibility for the implementation of the program is spread among the Manager - System Security, for Northeast Utilities system employees; the Manager, Nuclear Operations Services, for contractors and vendors; the Station Directors, for the administration of security at their respective nuclear facilities; and the Security Managers - Site, for the approval / denial of unescorted access at their respective sites. The inspectors noted that the Manager, System Security, and the Manager, Nuclear Operations Services report to different Executive Vice-Presidents and that no one individual at a manager level has responsibility for the overall program.
The inspectors noted further that there seemed to be a disproportionate distribution of work between the system employees and contractor / vendor portions of the program. The workload associated with contractors / vendors is significantly heavier than that of system employees, with no provision to equalize the workload during peak periods. It was also noted that the Supervisor, Nuclear Access
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Authorization (Contractor / Vendor), who works for the Manager, Nuclear Operations Services, devoted approximately one-half of his time to audits of the contractors and vendors, leaving him somewhat unavailable to oversee the remainder of the contractor access authorization program.
Through interviews, the inspectors determined that personnel. responsible for the administration and implementation of the program elements, including the security technician at the plant who is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of the
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Security Access Authorization Manual have been met prior to granting unescorted access authorization, were generally familiar with their duties.
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The inspectors also reviewed in detail the program administrative controls in order to assess their adequacy for implementation of the program. Functional responsibilities were found to be clear and comprehensive. While the Security Access Authorization Manual prescribes goals to be achieved, as opposed to prescribing the methods by which these goals are to be achieved, personnel i
nevertheless demonstrated consistent knowledge of their duties and responsibilities when interviewed by the inspectors.
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2.2 Backcround Investination Elements The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews to determine the adequacy of the program to verify the true identity of an applicant and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history, military service and character and reputation of the applicants prior to granting unescorted access to protected and vital areas. The inspectors
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reviewed the results of the background investigations (bis) of eight system employees and 20 contractor personnel.
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The licensee employs three contractors to conduct background investigations of
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contractor personnel and another for background investigations of system
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personnel.
The scope and depth of these investigations are prescribed in Northeast Utilities' Background Investigation Bid Specifications.
These specifications were reviewed and determined to be comprehensive and to
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adequately prescribe the requisites to satisfy the NRC regulatory requirements.
The reports of the investigations which the inspectors reviewed were found to be in compliance with the bid specifications and provided adequate background information on which to base a determination for access authorization.
The inspectors also reviewed the reports of 15 background investigations used as
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the basis for temporary unescorted access authorization, as permittext by the rule, for contractor personnel.
(The licensee does not use the temporary access authorization provision for system employees). This review disclosed that the background investigation contractors report derogatory information by exception
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L only. Unless derogatory information is developed, the contractor reports only that the background investigation has been completed. Further review of this
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matter and interviews with the Supervisor, Nuclear Access Authorization i
(Contractor / Vendor) revealed that the background investigation contractors had
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not been provided detailed written acceptance criteria for derogatory information;
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however, verbal guidance had been given. Since the temporary unescorted access l
authorization is granted, in part, on the basis of the BI report, the failure to
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provide definitive acceptance criteria is considered a program weakness.
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Interviews with the licensee personnel who screen the credit reports indicated t
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that, while the credit reports typically provide information covering the past five j
to seven years, only information from the most recent year is reviewed for temporary access authorization. NRC Regulatory Guide 5.66, to which the
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j licensee is committed, does not provide for such limited consideration on j
temporary clearances when more extensive information is available. This is l
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considered a weakness and the licensee agreed to review this practice. It should
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be noted that the inspectors also reviewed the reports of several background investigations conducted for permanent access authorization where the temporary j
i clearances had been granted based on the one-year credit report review. The inspectors found no instance in those records where derogatory information using
either the abbreviated or the full credit report review would have been disqualifying for a permanent clearance.
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Records of completed background investigations contained a summary of
information developed during the conduct of the investigation. The inspectors j
determined through interviews and reviews of records that these records were
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reviewed by responsible licensee personnel and, in those cases where questionable I
or derogatory information had been reported, that the licensee had investigated l
and documented the results of those investigations. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the records and found no case where a temporary clearance had been (or should have been) terminated following receipt of the final background investigation.
2.3 Byrholonical Evaluations l
The licensee contracted with three consultants to perform the requisite
psychological evaluations. Two of these consultants, located in proximity to the Millstone and Haddam Neck facilities, are primarily devoted to evaluation of contractor and vendor personnel, while the third, located near the corporate
offices, performs evaluations of system employees. All individuals seeking j
unescorted access to the licensee's nuclear facilities are required to satisfactorily
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complete the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) administered I
by the licensee or the licensee's authorized representative. Test results are
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reviewed by one of the state-licensed psychiatrist / psychologist contractors.
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Should the results of the MMPI identify a psychological abnormality, the
individual is interviewed by the psychiatrist / psychologist.
In the case of
contractor personnel, if an individual is disqualified on the basis of the interview, i
J unescorted axess is denied. Licensee policy requires that all applicants for j
system employment be interviewed by a psychiatrist / psychologist prior to bemg
j employed. In the case of an unfavorable interview result, up to three mterviews
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j may be conducted in order to deterraine acceptability for employment.
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures governing the administration
of the MMPI and interviewed those personnel who administer and proctor the
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tests. The procedures were clear and complete and proctors demonstrated a
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sound knowledge of their duties. The inspectors concluded that this aspect of the l
program was being effectively administered.
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I 2.4 Behavioral Observation
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i The licensee's behaviomi observation program (BOP) was inspected to determine
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supervisors have the awareness and sensitivity to detect changes in behavior i
i which could adversely affect trustworthiness and reliability and to r spon such to j
appropriate licensee management for evaluation and action. The program was s
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instituted as part of, and is an element in common with, the licensee's fitness-for-duty program.
i The inspectors reviewed the licensee's training program associated with the BOP.
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All system employees who work at the nuclear plants are trained to standards l
which meet those necessary for supervisors. Supervisory system personnel are
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provided additional training above and beyond those standards. The licensee
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j provides all contmetor personnel at the plants with BOP training which satisfies j
i minimum requirements for supervisors.
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Interviews of eight personnel, representative of a cross section of system and
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contractor personnel, both supervisory and non-supervisory, indicated that the
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j training program was effective. The inspectors also determined that these persons
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were aware of their responsibility to report arrests to the licensee.
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Additional matters related to behavioral observation are addressed in paragraphs
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2.5
"Grandfatherine." Reinstatement and Transfer of Access Authorization i
I The licensee's records were reviewed to ascertain that personnel who did not
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meet the criteria for "grandfathering", i.e., those who did not have uninterrupted
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j unescorted access authorization for at least 180 days on April 25,1991, had not
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f been granted unescorted access authorization without having satisfied the elements j
of the program.
j The licensee's procedure for reinstatement of access authorization was reviewed.
The procedure provides for reinstatement of unescorted access if the individual's j
unescorted access has not been interrupted for a continuous period of more than j
365 days, if the previous access was terminated under favorable conditions and j
l a sworn notarized affidavit addressing such issues as positive drug test results, j
denial of unescorted access, criminal or statutory offense comiction, etc., has l
been completed. If the individual's access has been interrupted more than 30 but
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less than 365 days, the licensee's program procedure requires that a suitable inquiry (evaluation) be performed. If the individual's access has been interrupted i
for more than 365 days and termination was under favorable conditions, the
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program procedure requires that the background investigation be updated from the l
shorter of the date of the previous investigation or when the last access was held, l
that an MMPI (and an interview with a licensed psychologist / psychiatrist, if j
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l appropriate) be conducted, that an FBI criminal history check be submitted, and j
that fitness for duty testing be successfully completed.
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Additionally, the licensee's program regarding contractors or vendors considered l
such employees who do not visit the facility at least once every 60 days to be i
employees who require infrequent access and for whom unescorted access should
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not be requested. Further, the licensee's program revokes the unescorted access
for those contractor / vendor employees who do not use their badges for a period j
of 60 days. The revocation of unescorted access authorization in such cases is j
considered a strength. In an interview with one Security Manager - Site, it was i
determined that an employee of a contractor that did not have an approved
behavioral observation program, who has been away from a site for more than
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30 but less than 60 days and whose termination of access had not been requested i
I by the contractor, could probably gain unescorted access to the site without having satisfied the above stated suitable inquiry requirement. The Security l
Manager agreed to examine this potential weakness.
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The inspectors also determined that the licensee had procedures established to
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govern receipt of access authorization data from other licensees. However, l
licensee management stated during interviews that they do not avail themselves i
of the option, as permitted in 10 CFR 73.56, to accept transfers of access
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authorization from other licensees.
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i The inspectors reviewed records of access authorizations transferred to other
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licensees and determined that the records were complete and accurate.
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transfer of these records were few and involved only system employees.
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l 2.6 Temporarv Access Authorization l
The licensee stated during interviews that temporary access authorizations are used only for contractor personnel. The inspectors reviewed the temporary access authorization files of numerous personnel and determined that the files reflected
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access authc,rization program requirements having been satisfied prior to the granting of temporary access. However, in an interview, one of the Security Technicians stated that two credit cards were sometimes used to establish identity.
The inspectors noted that neither NRC Regulatory Guide 5.66, to which the j
licensee is committed, nor the licensee's procedures provide for establishing
identity in that manner. This is considered a program weakness. The licensee
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committed to review and clarify this matter. This is an inspector followup item (~ IFI 50-245/93-01-01).
2.7 Denial / Revocation of Unescoded Access c
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for revocation or denial of unescorted access for licensee and contractor personnel and determined that
appropriate measures were in place to satisfy program commitments with respect j
to appeals and review. The review process was being conducted at an appropriate l
management level.
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Records of three contractor personnel whose fingerprint records had been returned
with derogatory information were reviewed. The inspectors concluded that l
adequate review and evaluation of these individuals' records had been conducted i
prior to granting unescorted access authorization.
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The records of two personnel denied access were reviewed. In both cases, the individuals had been notified of their appeal rights; however, neither availed
themselves of this option.
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i 2.8 Audits
The inspectors reviewed the records of audits of the contractors that performed background investigations for the licensee and of contractors who have an access authorization program accepted by the licensee under provisions of the rule. The audits of the BI contractors were conducted by the Manager - System Security; those of other contractors by the Shared Nuclear Access Authorization Audit Group (SNAAAG). Two audits of the BI contractors conducted within the past 12 months were reviewed and were found to be comprehensive with appropriate inquiries to listed references having been made to provide assurance of the veracity of the investigations. The reports of three audits conducted by SNAAAG l
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were reviewed and were also found to be comprehensive. The plans used in these SNAAAG audits were determined to be all-inclusive and reflected excellent
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pre-planning.
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However, the inspectors' review of the report of one audit conducted by the Supervisor, Nuclear Access Authorization (Contractor / Vendor), revealed that the
audit did not include the contractor's behavioral observation program. When the
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auditor was questioned on this matter, he stated that he believed that, because
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contractor employees are trained in behavioral observation program requirements
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at the plant, the contractors were not required to have their own behavioral i
j observation program. The inspectors explained that, while a licensee may accept j
the results of a contractor's entire unescorted access authorization program or any l
part thereof conducted by a contractor or vendor, the licensee retains the ultimate l
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responsibility for assuring that individuals granted unescorted access to the facility I
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meet the requirements of the unescorted access authorization program.
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If was further explained that the intent of the rule, as stated in paragraph 3 of the
Clarification to the Guidelines, Regulatory Guide 5.66, was that the licensee is expected to ascertain that whatever activities the employee engaged in during his j
or her absence from an approved behavioral observation program would not have
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the potential to affect the employee's trustworthiness and reliability. This position
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is also clarified in NUMARC 91-03, October 1992 (which has not been issued as l
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l a fmal document and to which the licensee is not committed). Part III, B.4 states
that the licensee must ascertain that the activities of the employee during his or
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her absence, if more than 30 consecutive days, would not affect his or her
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J trustworthiness, but if the individual has not been away from a licensee or
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approved contractor / vendor behavioral observation program for more than 30 consecutive days, there is no requirement to ascertain activities nor to do any
suitable inquiry checks. The NRR representative further explained that, if the
licensee chooses to accept portions of a contractor program approved by another (
licensee, or another licensee's audit of a contractor program, the accepting _
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licensee has the responsibility to determine what portions of the contractor
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program were reviewed, approved and audited by another licensee.
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The matter related to not including the contractor behavioral observation program
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in the licensee's audit is an unresolved item (URI 50-245/93-01-02), pending l
action by the licensee to address the incomplete audit.
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i During review of the program administrative controls applicable to audits, the
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inspectors noted that audits of the B1 contractors were not addressed. The
i program managers were queried during interviews as to their understanding of the
requisite periodicity of audits to be conducted of the BI contractors.
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inspectors were informed that the licensee believed the requirement to be a two-
year penodicity; however, as a matter of good practice, they intended to addit i
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considered a program strength.
The initial licensee audit of the program, required by the rule to be conducted
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prior to April 27,1993, had been scheduled for the week of this inspection, but was delayed to avoid the conflict.
2.9 Record Retention
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l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's record retention activities to ensure that required records were being retained for the appropriate duration. The inspectors determined that records were retained appropriately and that the storage facilities provide adequate security to prevent disclosure of personal information to unauthorized personnel.
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3.0 Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted on the morning of January 15,1993, at the corporate j
offices. The below listed personnel were present. During this meeting, the inspectors
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reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.
j In addition to the below listed personnel, other licensee and contractor personnel were
contacted / interviewed in the conduct of the inspection.
i Exit Interview Attendees:
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l R. V. Ahlstrand, Director, Internal Audit and Security G. R. Hallberg, Manager, System Security R. H. Shaffer, Security Agent T. J. Dente, Manager, Nuclear Operations Services
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L. P. Brown, Supervisor, Nuclear Access Authorization (Contractor / Vendor)
1. A. Mitchell, M.D., Sr. Physician, NUSCO P. G. Patton, Licensing Representative, NUSCO i
B. Cook, FFD Administrator
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R. J. Factora, Unit Services Director, Millstone
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T. Weekly, Security Manager, Millstone
M. R. Gelinas, Security Supervisor, Millstone i
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J. Pandolfo, Security Manager, Haddam Neck i
B. Seymour, Security Manager, Seabrook G. House, Processing Supervisor, Seabrook
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