IR 05000244/1990009
| ML17250B208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1990 |
| From: | Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17250B207 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-90-09, 50-244-90-9, NUDOCS 9007100132 | |
| Download: ML17250B208 (35) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No:
Licensee:
Facility:
Dates:
Inspectors:
50-244/90-09 License No.
DPR-18 Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E)
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant May 8 through June 11, 1990 C.
S. Marschall, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna N.
S. Perry, Resident Inspector, Ginna D.
L. Caphton, Senior Technical Reviewer, DRS Approved by:
~C',4~
3c E.
C.
McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
g l~v/9o Date OVERVIEW PLANT OPERATIONS:
Reactor trips on May 10 and June 9 from 88;o'nd 97>< power, respectively, were appropriately responded to by the operators, as was an emer-gency diesel start on June 9.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS:
A health physics technician interfaced with maintenance effectively, indicating organizational competence in the function.
MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE:
Good coordination between maintenance, engineering, and quality control was observed during breaker overcur rent device maintenance.
However, a lack of coordination necessi>ated two post-maintenance tests of a residual heat removal pump.
Two personnel safety issues were noted during quarterly testing of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and were
,brought to the -licensee's attention.
SECURITY:
Fitness-for-duty controls were implemented properly during a back-shift.
ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT:
Licensee identification and 'corrective actions for potential Westinghouse OT2 switch failures were timely and appropriate.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/ UALITY VERIFICATION:
A special 30-day report on overpressure protection system mitigation of a primary plant pressure transient did not identify the root cause and its correction.
Licensee ability to assure that commitments are initially met and subsequently maintained was questioned and will be evaluated further.
Appendix:
RGKE Handouts from 5/21/90 visit by Commissioner Rogers
CONTENTS Plant Operations (71707).
1.1 Control Room Observations..
1.2 Operator Aid Tags.
1.3
CFR 50.72 Reporting Radiological Controls (71707)
2. 1 Implementation of Radiological Controls.
Maintenance/Surveillance (62703, 61726, 92701)
3. 1 Maintenance Observations 3. 1. 1 Preventive Maintenance.
3.1.2 Feedwater Controller Corrective Maintenance...
3.2 Surveillance Observations...........
3.3 Violation 50-244/90-02-01 (Closed).
Secur ity (71707)
4. 1 Fitness-For-Duty Program Implementation 4.2 RG&E Security Manager Meeting with NRC Management
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Engineering/Technical Support (37701, 37828, 71707, 92701)..
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3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 Reported Component Defect Potential Safeguards Switch Failure Control of Modifications.........
Violation 50-244/87-16-01 (Closed).
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8 Safety Assessment/equality Verification (71707, 90713, 92701)
~ 1 Commi ssi oner Visi t.
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6.2 Periodic and Special Reports
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6.3 Written Reports of Nonroutine Events....
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6.4 Unresolved Item 50-244/88-23-02 (Closed).
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Violation 50-244/87-10-02 (Closed).
6.6 Violation 50-244/87-10-04 (Open)...
6.7 Unresolved Item 50-244/88-23-01 (Open).
6.8 Unresolved Item 50-244/88-23-03 (Closed).
6.9 Commitment Tracking.
Administrative (30703).
7.1 Licensee Activities.
7.2 Inspection Hours..
7.3 Exit Meeting.
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DETAILS 1.
Plant 0 erations 1. 1 Control Room Observations The inspectors found that the R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant operated safely and in conformance with license and regul'atory requirements.
Control room staffing was adequate and operators exercised control over access to the control room.
Operators adhered to approved pro-cedures and understood the reasons for lighted annunciators.
The inspectors reviewed control room log books to obtain information con-cerning trends and activities, and observed recorder traces for ab-normalities.
Accessible areas of the plant were toured and plant conditions and activities were observed with no inadequacies identi-fied.
The inspectors verified compliance wit'h plant technical speci-fications and audited selected safety-related tagouts.
Among the operations documents reviewed were:
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-48, concerning flow transmitter FT-2012 found out of calibration.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-49, concerning plant trip from 88<> power on 5-10-90.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-50, concerning temperature module TM-424 out of calibration.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1)
N ~mber 90-51, concerning calibration of undervoltage relays.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-52, concerning high Component Cooling Water discharge pressure.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-53, concerning potential Westinghouse OT2 switch defects.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-54, concerning automatic rod control circuitry.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-55, concerning main condenser vacuum.
I Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-56, concerning Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump differential pressure.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-57, concerning Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Component Cooling Water return valv Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number, 90-58, concerning reactor trip from 97% power on steam flow/feed flow mismatch with low steam generator level.
Ginna Station Event Report (A-25. 1) Number 90-59, concerning auto-initiation of the A Emergency Diesel Generator.
Each Ginna Station Event Report was reviewed to ensure plant person-nel took appropriate corrective action and observed the appropriate Limiting Conditions for Operation.
No inadequacies were identified.
On May 8, 1990, a plant trip occurred from 88% power on low steam generator level with steam flow/feedwater flow mismatch.
A second trip from 97% power on low steam generator level with steam flow/
feedwater flow mismatch occurred on June 9,
1990; an Emergency Diesel Generator auto-initiation also occurred later on June 9,
1990.
The inspectors reviewed operator actions and observed portions of control room actions after the events, and concluded that operator actions were timely, in compliance with Technical Specifications, and demon-strated an ability to safely operate the plant.
(See Detail 3 for addressal of the apparent common cause of these trips.)
1.2 G erator Aid Ta s
During control room observations, the inspectors noted that several operator aid tags provided descriptions of main control board indica-tion not normally expected to be observed.
The tags did not provide recommended actions.
When operations manageme'nt was notified of the lack of information on the tags, the recommended actions were immedi-ately added to the tags.
1.3
CFR 50.72 Re ortin During this inspection period, plant personnel made five reports re-quired by
CFR 50.72.
Inspector review found that the reports were timely and concise, and met regulatory requirements.
2.
Radiolo ical Controls The resident inspectors periodically confirmed that radiation work permits were effectively implemented, dosimetry was correctly worn in controlled areas and dosimeter readings were accurately recorded, access to high radiation areas was adequately controlled, and postings and labeling were in compliance with procedures and regulations.
2. 1 Im lementation of Radiolo ical Controls During maintenance and surveillance activities on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps, described in the Maintenance/Surveillance sec-tion (Detail 3),
a Health Physics (HP) technician monitored activities
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l in the RHR sub-basement.
The inspectors noted that the HP technician was attentive to proper wearing of protective clothing and dosimetry, frequently monitored dose rates, and ensured appropriate measures were taken to prevent the spread of contamination, including closely monitoring step-off pad procedures.
The technician also implemented good ALARA practices, such as ensuring all personnel moved to low dose areas of the RHR sub-basement whenever possible.
The inspectors concluded that the performance of the HP technician was evidence of effective HP technician training and monitoring.
3.
Maintenance/Surveillance 3. 1 Maintenance Observations 3. 1. 1 Preventive Maintenance The inspectors observed portions of various safety-related maintenance activities to assess whether redundant compon-ents were operable, activities did not violate limiting conditions for operation, personnel obtained required ad-ministrative approvals and tagouts before initiating work, personnel used approved procedures or the activity was within the "skills of the trade," workers implemented appropriate radiological controls and ignition/fire preven-tion controls, and equipment was tested properly prior to returning it to service.
Portions of the following acti-vities were observed:
Maintenance Procedure (M)-32.8, Installation and Test-ing of Amptector Overcurrent Devices f~r DB-25, DB-50, and DB-75 Westinghouse Breakers, Revision 18, effective April 20, 1989, observed May 23, 1990.
M-11. 15, RHR Pumps Inspection/Maintenance, Revision 19, effective July 28, 1989, observed for the 'B'HR pump on May 30, 1990.
During the Amptector maintenance, the inspectors noted good involvement by the assigned quality control inspector.
The electricians noted that, after a hole was drilled and tapped for mounting the Amptector actuator, an obstruction made it impossible to mount the actuator as described in the proce-dure.
When it was apparent that a modification was neces-sary in order to install the Amptector device, the elec-tricians immediately called in the construction engineer and, subsequently, the responsible engineer for resolution.
After reviewing modifications performed by Westinghouse and
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I Ginna personnel in the past on similar breakers, the re-sponsible engineer consulted with Westinghouse for resolu-tion of the problem. 'e'stinghouse recommended drilling a hole through the obstruction and usihg a longer bolt to secure the actuator.
Ginna personnel initiated an engi-neering change notice with the proper reviews and documen-tation (see Detail 5.3).
The inspectors concluded that this'activity was performed with good coordination and com-munication between maintenance, engineering and quality control personnel.
During maintenance on Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
Pump
'B,'he mechanic cleaned, inspected and greased the motor-to-pump coupling, changed pump bearing oil, checked the motor-
'o-pump alignment, and torqued the coupling bolts.
The in-spectors noted two steps in Procedure M-ll.15 which required minor clarifications.
The inspectors also noted that pro-cedure M-11. 15, Step 5.25 requires maintenance personnel to observe the pump in operation, adjust oil level, check for leaks, and take vibration readings.
The actions required by Step 5.25 were planned to be performed in conjunction with PT-2.2M, the RHR system monthly surveillance.
Results and Test (RST) personnel had the lead responsibility for performance of the post maintenance test.
The inspectors noted minor problems with coordination of the post-mainten-ance testing:
R&T personnel ran the RHR pump, obtained the necessary surveillance date, and secured the pump without maintenance personnel being present.
The pump had to be restarted for maintenance personnel to add oil, check for leaks, and take vibration readings.
The inspectors con-sidered the difficulties observed in coordination of the post maintenance test to be minor, and concluded that the RHR maintenance was acceptably performed by knowledgeable maintenance personnel.
Feedwater Controller Corrective Maintenance After the May 10, 1990,plant trip caused by closure of main feedwater regulating valve FRV-A, the inspectors observed parts of the following corrective maintenance.
Maintenance Work Request 90-00954, troubleshooting of Foxboro feedwater flow controller model 62H following a plant trip on May 10, 1990.
Efforts on May 10 to determine the cause of the Foxboro FRV-A controller failure were hampered by intermittent symp-toms.
Controller output was shorted when trouble-shooting began, and then returned.to normal with no apparent action by technicians.
Technicians subsequently reproduced the controller failure by causing two transistors to come into
e physical contact.
The transistors had apparently been placed in close proximity when the leads were slightly bent during previous maintenance; technical personnel concluded the transistors had come into physical contact during plant operation on May 10, causing the controller output to be shorted and FRV-A to close.
The postulated cause of the transistors coming into contact was vibration induced by nearby demineralizer operation, or slamming of the entry door to the relay room.
The transistor leads were straight-ened to prevent future contact of the transistors, the con-troller was placed back in service, and the plant was re-turned to power.
On June 9, the plant tripped from 97% power when the Foxboro FRV-A controller output again caused FRV-A to close.
When the controller was checked while still installed, inputs were nominal and the output was shorted.
The controller was checked on the bench with power and nominal inputs supplied; the output remained shorted for approximately an hour while technicians performed trouble-shooting, then suddenly re-turned to normal for no apparent reason.
The controller was replaced with a spare; the faulty controller was still exhibiting normal output under simulated normal conditions at the close of the inspection period.
Although techni-cians demonstrated to the inspectors that placing the transistors in contact would cause a shorted output, the transistors were not in contact at the time of the failure on June 9, 1990.
The cause of the FRV-A controller failure is still under investigation.
The licensee had determined that the May 10, 1990, con-troller failure was not reportable under
CFR 21, since the suspected cause (touching transistors)
was evidently caused by a previous maintenance activity.
The licensee committed, however, to report the failure to the industry via Nuclear Network.
The licensee will evaluate report-ability of the cause for the June 9,
1990 failure when the cause is determined.
3.2 Surveillance Observations Inspectors observed portions of surveillances to verify proper cali-bration of test instrumentation, use of approved procedures, perform-ance of work by qualified personnel, conformance to limiting condi-tions for operation, and correct system restoration following test-ing.
Portions of the following survei llances were observed:
Periodic Test (PT)-2.2M, Residual Heat Removal System - Monthly, Revision 0, effective February 9, 1990, observed May 30, 199 It ~
~ ee PT-16Q, Auxiliary Feedwater System - Quarterly, Revision 0, ef-fective January 25, 1990, observed June 7,
1990.
Details of the RHR surveillance are discussed in section 3. 1, above.
During observation of PT-16Q, inspectors noted minor deficiencies in the procedure; Results and Test personnel noted the weaknesses and subsequently submitted a procedure change request.
Two personnel safety issues were also identified during performance of PT-16Q:
the inspectors identified an activity which may warrant use of a safety harness, and RET personnel noted oil leaking during the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump run.
Ginna management committed to evaluate the surveillance activity to determine whether safety harness use is
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appropriate, took steps to wipe up excess oil and ensure that it will be wiped up periodically in the future, and evaluate precluding the excess oil condition from recurring.
3.3 Violation 50-244/90-02-01 Closed This item identified a failure to adequately test the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater steam admission check valves'for operability.
In response, the licensee committed to conduct manual full-stroke exercising of the steam admission check valves during quarter ly sur-veillances until a positive position indication system could be in-stalled.
During observation of PT-16Q, discussed above, the inspec-tors verified the procedure had been changed to require manual full-stroke exercising, and witnessed performance of the step by Results and Test personnel.
Based on the licensee commitment and inspecti r observations, this item is closed.
4.
~Secur it During this inspection period, the resident inspectors verified x-ray machines and metal and explosive detectors were operable, Protected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained, personnel were properly badged for unescorted or escorted access, and compensatory measures were implemented when necessary.
4. 1 Fitness-For-Dut Pro ram Im lementation Periodically during the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed fitness-for-duty documentation to ascertain if procedural controls were properly implemented.
In particular, the documentation was re-viewed during backshift inspection on Saturday, June 9,
1990, to verify that personnel called in for unscheduled work, as a result of the plant trip earlier that day, had benefitted from appropriate fit-ness-for-duty review.
No inadequacies were identifie.2 RG&E Securit Mana er Meetin with NRC Re ional Mana ement On May 21, 1990, the inspectors and the NRC Region I Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, met with the RG&E secur-ity manager.
The security manager updated the status of the security upgrade project and security organizational changes.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.
En ineerin /Technical Su ort 5.1 Re orted Com onent Defect On October 25, 1989, RG&E reported, in accordance with 10 CFR 21, that metallic labels on Foxboro Spec 200 termination modules could be located close enough to the converter input lugs to cause short-ing.
RG&E verified that all installed modules had the Foxboro stand-ard for clearance of greater than 0.06 inch.
Seven spare modules were found in stock with inadequate clearances.
These modules were corrected by locating the label away from the lugs as recommended by Foxboro.
equality control inspectors were advised to inspect for this defect during receipt inspections.
Additionally, Foxboro instituted the use of non-metallic labels.
The inspectors concluded that RG&E's actions regarding the defect were timely and appropriate.
5.2 Potential Safe uards Switch Failures On January 26, 1990, Rochester Gas
& Electric identified that the failure of the Safety Injection (SI) block/unblock switch on the main control board could render some automatic actuation features of both trains of SI inoperable.
The switch identified was a Westinghouse OT2; the potential single failure susceptibility was reported to the NRC by RG&E in Licensee Event Report 89-016, which was also the vehicle for reporting the defect as required by
CFR 21.
LER 89-016 was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-244/90-02.
NRC In-spection Report 50-244/89-17 documented the basis for RG&E's conclu-sion that the potential failure had not rendered SI.inoperable:
the probability for switch failure was low (between 10E-03 and 10E-05 switch failures per year);
the switch plunger was inspected to verify contacts were not in the failed position; safety evaluation concluded that there was no unreviewed safety question; and operator aid tags were used to ensure operators would verify switch contacts were pro-perly made up in the event the SI block/unblock switch was operated.
In addition, an Engineering Work Request was initiated to develop long term corrective action.
Possible solutions include replacing the single switch with two switches, or re'wiring the existing switch The resultant modification is tentatively planned for install,ation in the 1991 outage.
The inspectors concluded that, in this case, actions by site technical support personnel to ensure operability of safety-related equipment were timely and appropriat On May 30, 1990, RG&E determined that six additional Westinghouse OT2 sw'itches on the main control board were susceptible to the failure identified for the SI block/unblock switch.
The switches identified were:
Safety Injection Reset Containment Isolation Reset Containment Spray Reset Containment Vent Isolation Reset Feedwater Isolation Loop A Reset Feedwater Isolation Loop 8 Reset Licensee actions to verify operability of the systems affected by the above switches were identical to the actions taken for the SI block/
unblock switch.
All switches identified have the same low probabil-ity of failure.
Contact positions have been verified, and operator aid tags have been installed to ensure contact position is verified in the event of switch operation.
These switches have been added to the EWR initiated for the SI block/unblock switch for engineering review and modification during the 1991 outage.
Westinghouse has not indicated any intent to make a report to the NRC under
CFR 21.
RG&E intends to update previous reports as required by 10 CFR 21 and
CFR 50.73.
In addition, RG&E plans to update information via the Nuclear Network.
5.3 5.4 Control of Modifications In conjunction with observation of the Amptector installation dis-cussed in Detail 3. 1 above, the inspectors concluded that the re-quirements of 10 CFR 50.59 had been met for the required modification to the breakers.
Although the responsible engineer was somewhat un-familiar with 10 CFR 50.59, the inspectors noted that he was conver-sant with procedural requirements for modifications and changes to planned modifications resulting from Engineering Change Notices and Field Change Requests.
The inspectors concluded that the require-ments of 10 CFR 50.59 were met through administrative controls, that the responsible engineer was familiar with those controls and imple-mented them rigorously, and that he demonstrated very good safety perspective.
Corporate engineering managers committed to address the lack of familiarity with the regulatory requirement among junior engineers, and to review minor improvements to documentation of modi-fications for the purpose of improved clarity.
Viol at ion 50-244/87-16-01 Cl osed This violation documented failure to identify and correct drawing discrepancies concerning DC fuses during review of a modification to a system containing the fuse The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation, procedural controls for Engineering Work Request 3341, DC Fuse Coordination, and the following drawings:
33013-1936, Sheet 2, Train 'B'C Fuses 33013-756, Sheet 1 of 2, Panel Arrangements, 125V DC System 33013-756, Sheet 2 of 2, 125V DC Panel Arrangements Based on review of the above documents, the inspectors concluded that RG&E immediate and long term corrective actions were adequate to pre-vent recurrence.
This item is closed.
6.
Safet Assessment/
ualit Verification 6. 1 Commissioner Visit On May 21, 1990, NRC Commissioner Rogers visited the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
The commissioner, accompanied by Mr.
R. Cooper, Region I Deputy Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, toured the facility and met with plant and corporate management.
RGEE man-agement presented their plans for improving the security organization and upgrading hardware.
The licensee handouts from the presentation are enclosed with this report.
6.2 Periodic and S ecial Re orts Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specificat'ons 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed.
Inspectors verified that the reports contained information required by the NRC, that test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, and that reported information was accurate.
The following reports were reviewed:
Thirty-Day Special Report:
Use of the Overpressure Protection System to Mitigate an RCS Pressure Transient.
Monthly Operating Report for April 1990.
The inspectors reviewed the 30-day special report dated May 30, 1990 regarding use of the overpressure protection system to mitigate a
reactor coolant system pressure transient and discussed the report with plant management.
Apparent causes of the event were listed in the report, however, the inspectors were unable to extract a clear root cause.
During discussion, plant personnel
.indicated, that fur-ther evaluation will be necessary to determine the root cause as well as appropriate corrective action.
The inspectors concluded that the report was adequate, but could be improved by a clearer statement of the identified root cause, or of the lack of an identified root caus.3 Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events Written reports submitted to the NRC were reviewed to determine whether details were clearly reported, causes were properly identi-fied, and corrective actions, were appropriate.
The inspectors also assessed whether potential safety consequences had been properly evaluated, generic implications were indicated, events warranted on-site follow-up, reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were applic-able, and requirements of 10 CFR 73 had been properly met.
The following LERs were reviewed (Note: date indicated is event date):
90-005,
"Low Safeguards Bus Voltage During Start of "A" Reactor Coolant Pump Causes Automatic Start of the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator," April 25, 1990.90-006, "Isolation of Wrong Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter (Due to Personnel Error) During Maintenance, Causes an Inadvert-ent Safety Injection Actuation," May 5, 1990.
The inspectors concluded that the reports were accurate and met regu-latory requirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.4 Unresolved Item 50-244/88-23-02 Closed Unresolved Item (50-244/88-23-02):
Licensee QA hold items were not segregated.
Procedure No. A-701, Revision 18, "Receipt and Inspec-tion of Material/Parts,"
Paragraph 3.3 delineates requirements for segregating items placed in the QC hold area or designated storage area.
An inspection of the hold an a and interviews with QC person-nel determined that the subject unresolved item has been corrected.
Based on the inspection and interviews, the inspector concluded that the licensee's corrective actions had resolved the subject concern.
6.5 Violation 50-244/87-10-02 Closed The licensee purchased non-safety-related (non-QA) items and upgraded the items for safety-related (QA) applications by issuing an NCR for each item then dispositioning the NCR without objective evidence of an evaluation being accomplished.
The licensee's corrective actions included establishing a procurement engineering group, establishing a revised procurement program, issuing new procedures, and training personnel to implement the revised program and procedure's.
A pro-curement steering committee was formed and is actively involved in addressing procurement issues.
The inspector interviewed personnel, sampled the revised procedures, and inspected minutes of the procure-ment steering committee meeting Based upon this inspection, the inspector concluded that the licen-see's revised program and upgraded procurement engineering staffing was adequate to preclude recurrence of this violation.
The licensee stated that a review of the three items in the subject violation would be completed using the revised procedures issued on Hay 23, 1990, and that the evaluation results would be provided to the HRC.
In addition, the licensee will conduct a
sample review of previously installed commercial grade items that have been upgraded to safety-related against the new procurement procedures, to assure that no unidentified problems exist.
6.6 Violation 50-244/87-10-04 0 en Elastomeric 0-rings were excluded from established shelf life con-trols and no engineering evaluation was performed to determine any detrimental effects aging would have on the differing compounds used in the manufacture of the 0-rings.
The licensee's response letter, dated June 19, 1987, took issue with the violation, but the licensee also stated that the issue has been reviewed and a decision has been made to develop a shelf life program which will include the subject 0-rings.
Interim shelf life controls have been put into effect for 0-rings.
The licensee stated that a
comprehensive shelf life program would be developed and implemented.
Licensee management stated that they would provide the new shelf life program's implementation date to the HRC by letter.
The inspector interviewed the manager of the licensee's new procurement engineering group and confirmed that the group was tasked with developing a com-prehensive shelf life program.
This item remains open pending imple-mentation of a comprehensive shelf-life control program.
6.7 Unresolved Item 50-244/88-23-01 0 en The subject item was unresolved pending establishment of a Preventive Maintenance (PM) program and implementing schedule for spare parts.
The inspector interviewed maintenance personnel responsible for scheduling preventive maintenance of spare parts,. reviewed records, and determined that PM of spare par ts is tracked, scheduled, and per-formed routinely.
Administrative procedure (A)-1304, Storage of Mate-rials Requiring Periodic Inspections, Revision 4, requires mainten-ance to implement the program.
Maintenance procedure (M)-1304, Main-tenance Program of Materials in Storage Requiring Periodic Inspection or Maintenance, Revision 3, specifies PH frequencies for equipment in storage.
Procedure A-1303, "Storage and Preservation of Materials and Equipment at Ginna Station," Revision 17, provides instructions for controlling the storage level requirements for gA materials.
The
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manager of the new procurement engineering group stated that a-new PM of spare parts program document would be developed by the procurement engineering group'and completed by September 1,
1990.
The licensee's management representative agreed to provide the com-pletion date information to the NRC staff by letter.
6.8 Unresolved Item 50-244/88-23-03 Closed QA/QC stockroom audits/surveillances lacked sufficient in-depth re-view/verification of stockroom activities, including documentation.
An inspection was made of the stockroom in the basement of the ser-vice building and the receiving area where parts and equipment are
, received, inspected and dispositioned.
The inspector reviewed audit No. 89-52:JO, conducted November 20-22, 1989, and quality control surveillance reports of stockroom activities.
Based upon the inspec-tion of the subject areas and the planned and detailed documented-surveillances and audits, this unresolved item is closed.
6.9 Commitment Mana ement As a result of a previously identified weakness.,
a commitment tracking system was established to track significant items warranting greater than routine management attention, such as NRC Violations, Unresolved Items, Deviations, commitments to the NRC, and other identified con-ditions adverse to quality.
The commitment tracking system contains useful information for each identified item such as the individual responsible for addressing the item, a description of the item, date of origination, and reference documents such as NRC inspection reports and RGEE Corrective Action Reports (CARs).
Howe>>er, for many of the items, no plan exists to address the item unless a
CAR is written.
The inspectors therefore concluded that the Ginna Commitment Tracking System is not an effective management tool.
Moreover, no overall management tool applicable to all significant safety issues estab-lishes action plans with target completion dates for each action.
The lack of such a management tool, and the existence of numerous items on the Commitment Tracking System without action plans or tar-get completion dates indicates a weakness in Quality Verification and warrants increased management attention.
7.
Administrative 7.1 Licensee Activities Reactor trips on May 10 and June 9 due to similar feedwater regulat-ing valve FRV-A controller failures are addressed in Details 1 and
of this repor After the May 10 trip, it was noted that one of the intermediate range detectors was under-compensated.
Because of this, operators manually caused the source range detectors to reenergize.
After apparently correcting the nuclear instrument undercompensation, the reactor was taken critical.
On June 3, control room operators observed control rods automatically withdrawing.
Rod control was placed in manual.
The plant was stabil-ized and rod operability in manual was verified; no limits were ex-ceeded..
At the close of the inspection period the cause of the auto-matic rod withdrawal had not been determined, and rod control remained in manual.
This item is unresolved pending determination of adequacy and timeliness of licensee evaluation and corrective actions (244/90-09-01).
Based on a review of procedures and controlle'd drawings, plant per-sonnel determined on June 8,
1990 that containment isolation valve AOV-745 does not receive a containment isolation signal as required by Technical Specification table 3.6.3. 1.
Operators immediately closed AOV-745, the air-operated component cooling water return valve from the excess letdown heat exchanger, by isolating the air supply to the valve.
Further action is under review by RGEE engineering and licensing personnel.
(After the report period, preliminary informa-tion indicated that the licensee had committed to operate this valve as normally closed, but had not done so.)
This matter i.s unresolved (50-244/90-09-02).
On June 9,
1990, the 'A'mergency Diesel Gene"ator automatically started and closed on its bus due to personnel error during a tagging procedure.
Operator response was assessed as appropriate.
RGKE cor-rective actions on this item were under NRC review at the close of the inspection period.
7.2 Ins ection Hours This inspection involved 164.5 inspection hours, including 15 back-shift and 5.5 deep backshift hours.
7.3 Exit Meetin At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meet-ings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.
In addition, an NRC exit meeting was held for 50-244/90-10 on June 7,
1990, during this inspection perio STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION GINNA NUCLEAR STATION NRC MEETING MAY 21, 1990
ROCKXESTER GAS AND E TRXC CORPORATXON Nuolear OrganLaat=kon
.
tlfS IDENT
<<lift (DflATINGultlccN I.II. VOAEN SENION VICC tAESICENT
'SOOOCTION C ANOINEflINO S.C. SNIIII DIVISION NANACEl WCEEll tACCANTION S.C. ICCIIDI CftANINENT NANACES DOALITT TEAISOIANCC M.L. IkCOV DIVI5ICN IWSQES 5 alllt AAKIINEIR l.l. SINAI DIAECIIN, CKNIaAATC SIOIAZION tlOIECTIOI S.J.
NAZIS KANllfl,ISOCAKTION SISTER 5 SEA VICCS D,I.. rIIOC ILANTNlllOEl 5.N. StECTOC Oftt. IIANACES, tSONCtION DIVISnW T'VAININO C.D. NEIES IIANACES DEIT. NANACES, WCACJS DIVISIONALSEIVICCS ENOIVEISINO lflVICC5 L.I.. INIELITS t.C. MIIEENS CCJT.
NANACCS DCtt. CANES INIDDCNT llSCEIQI C SCIENCE CESESAL NASSTNALNCE S.N. Sat54, &.
L.D. LlRCL ttMOCTION SOIT.
). NIOAT IIANAGCS~ STTOCTIRAL 5 EEAATITOCTION ENDO.
l.O. COCZE ECCAECTIVC ACTI&
J.
SZ. NASTIN IIANAOES~ ICOIANICAL CNOINEES IWI C.C, VOCI SATCTV l. IIEDCNAAQI NANAOES, WCEEAl 511ETT AND EICINSINO O.J.
AOOSEL NAZe tlOC C DINAAET N. SCAN IWIAOES, CAECIS IOIL ENS INTIJ INI C. ~. tOAEEEL EAIIACE tIJNNINO l. NAAanONOA QIVIOSZ SENVICCS SOTT.
T. NIAI
NUCLEAR MISS(ON STATEMENT Our mission is to create and sustain outstanding performance in all aspects of operation, including safety, reliability and economy, in order to maximize the value of Ginna Station to customers, employees and shareholders.
We believe that to be an outstanding performer:
We must protect the health and safety of the community and our employees by setting safe operation as our highest priority.
We must provide a vital, challenging and safe environment for our people; one that provides"opportunity and encourages and-rewards high quahty performance and creativity.
Vle must be a good neighbor, maintaining the support and good willof the public.
We must be efficient, well-managed, disciplined, and maintain high standards of performance.
We must be bold and innovative in the managem'ent of resources and technology, achieving a profitable, competitive and technically superior operation to give the greatest value to our customers, employees and shareholders.
5/31/89
DIYI I F VE YEA OAL *
QUA I BUILD A STRONG COMMITMENT TO QUALITY IN A'LL OUR WORK PUBLIC SAFETY PROMOTE ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC PERSONNEL SAFETY MAINTAIN A SENSITIVE AND RESPONSIVE PROGRAM FOR A SAFE WORK ENYIRONMENT REGULATORY COMPLIANCE.
'EMONSTRATE EXEMPLARY PERFORMANCE IN MEETING REGULATORY COMMITMENTS BE-FLEXIBLE AND DEVELOP RESPONSIVE PLANS TO MEET CHANGING REQUIREMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS EMPLOYEE
-
REALIZE QUALITYAND PROFESSIONALISM IN ACHIEVEMENT EMP LOYEE P ERFORMANCE RELIABILITY MAINTAINDESIGN GENERATING CAPABILITY
.AND HIGH AVAILABILITY OYER THE REMAINING LIFE OF THE PLANT ECONOMY OBTAIN COMPETITIVE TOTAL POWER COSTS BY ACHIEVING THE ABOVE GOALS THROUGH INNOVATION AND TEAMWORK
- FIVE YEAR GOALS ARE NOT LZSTED ZN ORDER OF ZMPORTANCE.
ALL OF TEE GOALS MUST BE ZNTEGRATED ZNTO A BALANCED PROGRAM TO ACCOMPLZSE
.OUR MZSSZON
9 E
I I IA IV A
/
o IMPLEMENT THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPROVED GINNA PERFORMANCE o
DEVELOP FINANCIAL AND MANPOMER RESOURCE PLAN
. TO ACHIEVE MISSION IN 1989 - 1990
l
TEGI LA BASED ON OUR SELF ASSESSMENT QF NEED; PROVIDES DIRECTION ME BELIEYE NECESSARY TO:
o RESOLVE LONG STANDING INDUSTRY ISSUES AT AT GINNA
. o CONYEY MANAGEMENT COMMITMENTTO EXCELLENCE IN OUR NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
'I o
DEYELOP ACTION P LANS, MILESTONES AND RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT IMPROYEMENT o
COMMUNICATE STRATEGY AND GOALS TO KEY NUCLEAR LINE MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES COMPLETED LATE 88, ISSUED MAY 89, REVIEWED BY INPO DUNE 89.
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR DECEMBER 1989.
HAS ACHIEYED A
POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD IMPROYEMENT
.
RGErE CORPORATE COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT o
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC PLAN
.
A SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENT TO IMPROVED GINNA PERFORMANCE o
PROGRAMS INITIATED INCLUDE:
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT Q LIST MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE UPGRADE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE UPGRADE PLANT BETTERMENT 50.59 REYIEM PROCESS
.
. COMMITMENT TRACKING PROCUREMENT UPGRADE RELIABILITYCENTERED MAINTENANCE o
INCREASED 0
M AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE LEVEL o
INCREASED MANPOMER COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT GINNA
Ginna Station Capital Expenditures 1986-'f 992
'0 Millions of 8
30
10
198 B 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
~ ACTUALB E2 BUDGETED March 9, 1980
Ginna O&.M Expenditures 1986-1992
Millions of $
40
20
0 1986 1987 1988
)989
'1990 1991
'l992 March 14, 1SSO
~I AGTUALS E2 BUDGETED Oncludes 42,43,49 I 50)
vrith benefits
j a
Nuclear Staff Complement Plan October 1989 July 1991 800 700 600 500
'400 300 200 100
~j; gl..
<<'p Y
6-1 0--
460 640 545 on ffaHdre~r 690 595 Oct
Jut
Jut
EEI RG8,E Employees
~+
Contractors March 26, 1990
E I R MA AGEME I IA I E
o IMPLEMENT NUCLEAR DIVISION MANPOWER RESOURCE PLAN BY DECEMBER 1990 o
IMPLEMENT 1990 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES o
ENHANCE. CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND SUCCESSION PLANNING WITH NUCLEAR DXVISION SUCCESSION PLANNING EDUCATION AND TRAINING CURRICULUM SUPERVISOR AND PROFESSIONAL SKILLS TRAINING o
ENHANCE QUALITY PERFORMANCE (QA/QC)
EFFECTIVENESS PERFORMANCE BASED SELF ASSESSMENTS NSARB AND
. QA/QC SUBCOMMITTEE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS QUALITY PERFORMANCE OPERATION PLAN FOR 1990