IR 05000244/1990026
| ML17262A337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1991 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Oliveira W, Sena P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17262A335 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-90-26, IEB-79-24, NUDOCS 9102050064 | |
| Download: ML17262A337 (25) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.:
SO-l90-26 Docket No.:
S0-244 License No.:
DPR-18 Licensee:
Rochester Gas 8 Electric Company 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name:
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Ontario, New York Rochester, New York Inspection Dates:
November 26 - 30, 1990 Inspectors:
W. Oliveira, Reactor Engineer Operational Programs Section Operations Branch, DRS Date Sena, Reactor Engineer Reactor Projects Section 3B, DRP i Aalel Date
.Approved by:
N. J.
Blumberg, Chief, Operatio Programs Section, Operations Branch, DR Date Inspection Summary:
Routine Unannounced Ins ection on November 26-30 1990
'e ort No. SO-244l90-26 Areas Inspected:
Review of the licensee implementation of the Cold Weather Preparation Program initiated by IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-24,
"Frozen Lines,"
which, in part, requested licensees to review their plants to determine that adequate protective measures have been taken to assure that safety-related process, instrument and sampling lines do not freeze during extremely cold weather.
The licensee's corrective actions taken on previously identified items were also reviewed.
9'102050060 9l0126 PDR ADOCK 05000244,,
PDR Ij
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Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
The licensee had revised its cold weather preparation program in March 1990 to require earlier and more in-depth reviews.
This program is well documented, and satisfactorily implemented by trained operations and maintenance personnel.
However, action by the licensee to correct the. inoperable heat trace circuit to the "B" diesel generator fuel oil supply lines as required by the licensee's cold weather preparation program has been untimely.
The licensee expects to complete repairs to the heat trace circuits by August 31, 1991 which is acceptable considering the compensatory action already taken by the licensee.
A followup of corrective actions taken for previously identified items was conducted for Safety System Functional Inspection Report No. 50-244/89-81 and ATWS Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry Inspection Report No. 50-244/90-10.
The licensee's Commitment and Action Tracking System was found acceptable for monitoring NRC and Ginna Station identified item DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted
"S. Adams, Technical Manager
"J. Fischer, Maintenance and Scheduling Manager
"P. Gorski, Mechanical Maintenance Manager
- T. Harding, Modification Support Coordinator
"M. Lilley, Nuclear Assurance Manager, RG8E
"J. St. Martin, Corrective Action Coordinator,
- T. Schuler, Operations Manager
- J. Widay, Superintendent, Ginna Production
"P. Wilkens, Nuclear Engineering Services Department Manager, RG&E
"G. Wrobel, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager, RG5E United States Nuclear Re ulator Commission T. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector N. Perry, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting.
The inspector also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspection.
2.0 Cold Weather Pre arations IP 71714 2. 1 Objective Determine whether the licensee has maintained effective implementa-tion of the program of protective measures for extreme cold weather to which the licensee committed in response to IE Bulletin 79-24.
2.2
~Back round IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-24, dated September 27, 1979, requested licen-sees to review their plants-to determine that adequate protective measures have been taken to 'assure that safety-related process, instrument, and sampling lines do not freeze during extremely cold weather.
In response to IEB 79-24, the licensee's letter of October 30, 1979, reported that instrument and sampling lines are adequately protected within heated buildings.
On December 5, 1980, a
pressure channel (PT-479) for the "B" Steam Generator failed due to freezing in the sensing line.
This incident was repeated on December 11, 1988, when two pressure channels (PT-479 and PT-483) for
"B" Steam Generator failed due to freezing in the sensi'ng line.
A special NRC inspection (50-244/88-26)
was conducted during December ll - 21, 1988, and January 4,
1989, regarding the December 11, 1988-frozen
"B" steam generator pressure sensing line I
A notice of violation (NOV 50-244/88-26-03)
was 'issued regarding failure of the licensee's corrective action.to prevent recurrence of the freezing in the steam generator pressure sensing lines in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," and the Ginna Quality Assurance Manual.
References and documentation reviewed during this inspection are listed in Attachment A.
2.3 Pro ram Review C
Administrative Procedure A-54.4.1, "Cold Weather Walkdown," was reviewed.
This procedure is used by auxiliary operators between November 1 through April 1, or as required due to weather conditions.
Procedural requirements include the following:
Identify and inspect the systems susceptible to freezing during weekly plant tours or when directed by the shift supervisor.
Log all A-54.4. 1 designated thermometers in potential cold areas at least once per shift when the outside air temperature falls to 20~F.
Initiate corrective action to increase local area temperature whenever the temperature in potentially cold areas falls below 45'F.
Surveillances are also increased as necessary until the temperature is maintained above 45'F.
In accordance with Operations Procedure 0-6, "Operator and Process Monitoring," auxiliary operators verify the operability of heat tracing and space heaters during. their routine plant tours every four hours.
Fan and window alignments are also inspected by the auxiliary operators to maintain proper room temperature conditions.
Maintenance Procedure M-1306. 1, "Ginna Maintenance Winterization Program,"
was established in accordance with Corrective Action Report (CAR) 1932.
This procedure, issued on September 13, 1989, provides for annual inspection of freeze protection measures prior to commencement of cold weather.
Procedural requirements include the following:
Inspection of heat trace circuits and piping insulation in identified areas susceptible to freezing.
Verification of antifreeze protection for the Technical Support Center diesel, the security diesel, and the diesel fire pump.
Inspection of windows and ventilation supply vents in the Turbine Building, the Screenhouse, and the Intermediate Buildin.4
~Findin s
An auxiliary operator conducted an A-54.4. 1 walkdown for the inspec-tors.
All attributes of procedure A-54.4.1 were satisfactorily addressed and deficiencies such as inoperable space heaters were reported to the Maintenance Department for disposition.
Other defi-ciencies included "holes" in the Feed Pump Room and Turbine Building basement walls; and electrical cords "going through" Turbine Building and Screenhouse windows.
Cold weather preparations observed by the inspectors included:
installation of temporary plywood closures over Intermediate Building vent louvers located on the east wall of the building; energized heat trace circuits for the fire water booster pump; operational checks of unit heaters such as those located in the Diesel Generator (OG)
rooms.
The inspectors observed one corrective maintenance activity in progress generated from deficiencies identified during the A-54.4. 1 walkdown.
The maintenance was performed to Trouble Repor't (TR) No. 9001976,
"Repair of Space Heater Fans in the Turbine Building."
Site Services personnel performing the repairs had the TR in hand and were cogni-zant of the timing of the repairs as well as the necessity of the space heaters for the cold weather winterization effort.
An additional cold weather walkdown was conducted by the inspector in accordance with Maintenance Procedure M-1306. 1.
Piping insulation, space heaters, selected heat tracing devices, window and ventilation openings were observed.
The inspector noted that all deficiencies generated by the 1990 winterization inspection were corrected.
The plywood blanking plates installed over closed windows on the north side of the main feedwater pump room, and the.repaired heat trace circuit No.
5 in the "A" (DG) room were directly observed by the inspector.
No previously unidentified winterization discrepancies were identified by the inspector.
The inspector noted that heat tracing circuits Nos.
6 and 68 for "B" (QG) fuel oil line have been inoperable since October 16, 1989.
(Licensee identified).
Circuit No. 6's located in the "B" DG Room.
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.4 states that "heat tracing is provided to maintain the. fuel oil temperature in the exposed pump suction piping above 400F in the event of loss of heat in the DG Room."
Procedure A-54.4. 1 requires. the temperature of the OG Rooms to be monitored by operators to ensure the temperature remains above 45 F.
Immediate corrective action, such as the installation of temporary space heaters, is to be initiated whenever the Room temperature falls below 45'F.
The inspector reviewed selected cold weather walkdown inspections and verified that "B" DG Room temperature remained greater than
F while the heat trace was inoperabl iO E
Heat trace circuit No.
68 is located along the buried fuel oil supply line from the diesel fuel oil storage tank 1B.
This tank is external to the DG Room and is buried. beneath the frost line. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7. 1(d) requires that "the reactor shall not be maintained critical without two diesel generators ope'rable with onsite supply of 10,000 gallons of fuel available."
Every 31 days, surveillance 4.6. l.a.3 requires verifying that the fuel oil transfer pump can transfer fuel from the storage system to the day tank.
The inspector verified the operability of the fuel oil supply line by reviewing selected surveillance records.
The inspector concluded the fuel supply line remained operable during the 1989 - 1990 winter season; and, the'refore, a minimum of 10,000 gallons of fuel was available.
The inspector discussed the status of the repairs of heat trace circuits Nos.
6 and 68 with cognizant plant personnel.
An engineer-ing evaluation is in progress to replace these circuits with new Raychem heat trace since the original equipment manufacturer no longer provides the replacements.
The licensee expects to complete repairs to the trace circuits by August 31, 1991.
Compensatory
'ctions by the licensee prior to the completion of repairs include:
(1) installing a thermocouple on the fuel oil supply piping associated with heat trace circuit No.
68 by December 7,
1990; (2) revising Proce-dure A-54.4. 1 to include the thermocouple readings in the weekly inspections; and (3) taking priority corrective action to prevent the fuel oil temperature from falling below its cloud point by operating the transfer pump'in the recirculation mode to increase the fuel oil temperature.
The inspector concluded this compensatory action is adequate prior to the installation of new heat tracing.
However, this does identify a weakness in the licensee's winterization program in that corrective action for these deficient heat trace circuits was not timely.
The inspector also reviewed the completed M-1306.1 winterization inspection records for the current year.
Winterization inspections should be completed by November 1, 'in accordance with Procedure M-1306.1.
The 1990 inspection was completed on November 27, 1990, because of the startup of the house heating boiler and Auxiliary Building main exhaust fan problems.
The inspector concluded the delay is of minor safety significance due to the unusually mild weather conditions.
The inspector reviewed the status of Correction Action Report (CAR)
1932 with the Corrective Action Coordinator.
CAR 1932 identified 60 action -items resulting from the 'frozen instrument lines incident (also discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-244/88-26).
Fifty-seven action items have been completed in a timely manner.
Three long term actions involving the adequacy of the HVAC system in the Intermediate Building are beyond the scope of the frozen instrument lines incident.
Actions completed by the licensee for cold weather preparations will minimize the potential for a freezing conditio t>>
p e
The inspector reviewed Engineering's involvement in the cold weather preparation program and verified th'at Engineering had revised their Procedure QE301, "Preparation, Review 8 Approval of Design Input Documents,"
as required (Action Item No.
54 of CAR 1932).
The procedure now includes requirement to address the impact of severe weather conditions when locating equipment in a specific area.
Initial cold weather preparation training (Action Item No.
45 of CAR 1932)
was provided in accordance with lesson glans RAD12C and RSE10S for licensed operators, and lesson plan NAD12C for nonlicensed operators.
Continued training is scheduled annually.
The inspector reviewed the lesson plans and the attendance sheets with the training supervisor.
The operations personnel interviewed were satisfied with their training and the inspector had no further questions.
2.5 A/
C Interface The inspector reviewed QA/QC involvement in the col,d weather prepara-tions effo> t.
QA/QC personnel were involved in the preparation of the station modifications SM-4933. 1 and SM-4933.2 regarding the re-location and replacement of the steam generator
"B" pressure trans-
- mitter tubing for EMR 4933 (Action Item No.
1 of CAR 1932).
QA/QC provided the holdpoints, participated in the PORC reviews, conducted quality verifications of material ordered, monitored the implemen-tation and tests, and signed off the completion of the SMs, Continuing QA coverage wil 1 be provided under the QA Surveillance Program in accordance with Procedure QA 18. 11, "Performance Based Surveillance Program."
These QA survei llances are performed at the completion of the Maintenance Department winterization inspection effort. If warranted by weather conditions or plant system changes, e.g.,
warming trends or changes to the HVAC system, additional surveillance will be conducted.
The first QA Surveillance Report (QASR) No.90-062 was performed at, the end of October 1990 and the inspector discussed the QASR with QA supervision.
QASR No.90-062 was satisfactorily performed and the preliminary draft did not have any deficiencies to report.
The inspectors had no further questions relative to QA/QC's involve-ment in the cold weather preparation effort.
2.6 Conclusions Management continues to adhere to the intent of IE Bulletin No. 79-24 regarding cold weather preparations.
The Ginna Station program is well documented, and satisfactorily conducted and monitored by well trained personnel.
Corrective maintenance is timely with the excep-tion of the DG fuel oil heat trace problem.
No violations or deviati'ons were identifie i
3.0 Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Items 92701 and 92702 3.1 0 en Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-01 The licensee was to evaluate a potential 'loss of cooling water to both diesel engines during or following a seismic event through a
non-safety and non-seismic discharge pipe.
The licensee will evalu-ate this potential risk during it's PRA/Individual Plant Examination (IPE) review that will be completed in the thi rd quarter of 1991.
This item remains open pending the submittal. of the IPE to NRC.
r 3.2 Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-02 The licensee did not have a documented or verifiable process to address safety concerns raised outside the normal engineering process.
For example, when EWR 4805 was issued to replace pressure indicator controller (PIC) No. 629, an analysis recommended that the configuration and IEEE standards be reviewed.
During the normal processing of an EWR, this recommendation would be addressed as par t of the 50.59 process.
However, the problem was resolved by correct-ing the maintenance and calibration procedure and the EWR was never processed by engineering.
The licensee has developed several processes for dealing with this weakness.
Engineering has Procedure QE-1603,
"Documenting and Reporting Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality (PCAQs)."
Ginna Station personnel have Procedure A-1601,
"Corrective Action Report," Procedure A-1603, "Ma'intenance Work Request and Trouble Report," Procedure A-25, "Reporting of Unusual Plant Conditions,"
and Procedure A-52. 12, "Inoperability of Equipment Important to Safety."
The inspectors reviewed the following documents:
Potential conditions PCAQs adverse to quality (PCAQ)90-001, 002, 005, and 006, and their disposition with Engineering personnel.
Anyone can report a
PCAQ to Engineering.
PCAQ 90-001 for example, noted that the spent fuel transfer canal drain piping had not been hydrostatically tested.
Although Engineering determined that the piping is not required to be hydostatically tested, the piping will be tested during'he next outage.
Maintenance work requests from de'ficiencies reported during the cold weather preparation walkdowns and winterizing effort discussed in paragraph 2.4 above.
CAR 1932 for the cold weather preparation walkdowns and winter-izing effort which involved Procedures A-25 and A-1603.
Licen-see Event Report (LER)88-143 dealt with the December 11, 1988 frozen "B" steam generator pressure sensing lines.
This LER drew engineering attention in accordance with Procedures A-25 and A-1603.
CARs 1843, 2009, and 2018 were also reviewe Commitment and Action Tracking System (CATS') Report for the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) Inspection Report 50-244/89-81.
CATS identifies the lead and support departments for each NRC concern.
Based on the review of these documents, the inspectors concluded that the licensee has an adequate process for addressing safety concerns.
This item is closed.
3.3 0 en Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-03 The licensee's evaluation and determination of the adequacy of the vendors calculation for RHR Pump Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) is incomplete.
Completion of the calculations is scheduled for December 31, 1990.
This item remains open until the calculations are completed and reviewed by NRC.
3.4 Closed Violation 50-244/89-81-04 The licensee failed to test the batteries with a load profile which truly represents the load demand on the battery.
The inspectors reviewed the upgraded battery load profile Design Analysis EWR 3341,'Sizing of Vital Batteries,"
and the revised battery testing proce-dure, for PT-10.3.
The. Design Criteria and the DC Load Change Analy-sis Procedures for the Main Control Board (MCB) Annunciator Alarm for EWR 4756 were also reviewed.
The inspectors were satisfied that the load profile truly represents the load demand on the batteries.
This item is closed.
3.5 Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-05 D
The licensee had not developed an on-line program to capture elec-trical load growth and update affected calculations.
The revised Section 17 in Procedure QE-301, the Electric'al Engineering Design Guide (EDG) 15B, "Design Verification" and EDG -15D, "Electrical Interface Checklist," includes electrical load growth requirements.
The inspectors reviewed these documents and verified their imple-mentation in EWR 4756 regarding the MCB Annunciator Alarm.
This item is closed.
3.6 0 en Violation 50-244/89-81-06 The licensee failed to periodically test the molded case circuit breakers and failed to.establish an acceptance criteria for the undervoltage relay alarms.
The licensee is planning to initiate a trial program next year for periodically testing the molded case circuit breaker s.
This item remains open pending completion of the trial program and commencement of periodic testing of molded circuit breaker n
3.7 Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-07
.
This unresolved item deals with two concerns, i.e., control room d.c.
voltmeter s were not calibrated periodically, and operating informa" tion updates 'for control room use were untimely.
The.inspector verified that the control room d.c. voltmeters were calibrated and the results reported in accordance with Procedure CP-514, "Calibration of Main Control Board D.C. Voltmeters."
These voltmeters will continue to be calibrated annually in accordance with Procedure CP-514 and tracked for recalibration by Procedure A-1105,
"Calibration and/or Test Surveillance Program for Instrumentation/
Equipment of Safety Related Components."
Operating information updates for control room use are now timely.
Engineering Procedure QE-324 and Ginna Station Procedure A-606, both entitled,
"Design Change Request,"
were revised to ensure the time-liness of operating information.
Operating information updates are addressed in Procedure QE-301, "Preparation, Review and Approval of.
Design Input Documents."
Additionally, Training Department Lesson Texts were updated.
These lesson texts were renamed "Training Systems Descriptions,"
stamped
"For Training Purposes Only," and their distribution is controlled by the Training Department to preclude these lesson texts being used in place of the PKIDs.
Tracking changes to the lesson texts are performed in accordance with Procedures 5.5. 1, "Tracking Plant Changes,"
and 5.9, "Training Change Request/Notice."
Based on the review and verification of the above, this item is closed.
3 '
0 en Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-08 The licensee had not evaluated the adequacy and basis of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> seal failure analysis which is one of the conditions for the environ-mental qualification (EQ) study of the RHR pump motor and controls.
The licensee is reviewing the fai lure analysis under the PRA/IPE effort and will submit the results in the third quarter of 1991.
This item remains open pending submit'tal of the results and NRC review.
3.9 Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-09 Incomplete recording of safety relief valve (SRV) test data was attributed to informal test procedures.
Previous examples of data that were not recorded included an additional successful
"pot test",
as-found relief lift setpoints, valve accumulation, and valve capa-city.
The inspector reviewed Ginna Station Procedure ME-281, "Relief Valve Inservice Test Program,"
and Procedure RSSP-12,
"Refueling, Shutdown and Surveillance."
These procedures are in accordance with
l'
0I
ANSI/ASME ON-1-1987.
Test results for SRV 4021 "Auxiliary Feed Pump Suction Relief Valve" and SRV 8608B'Reactor. Overpressurization System Relief Valve" were also reviewed and verified to be in compliance with these procedures.
The SRVs were tested in accordance with Procedure ME-281 and the test data were recorded.
This item is closed.
3.10 Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-10 The licensee had not completed verification.of the system operating margins required to support a four hour flooding limit for RHR motors.
Engineering completed a
CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation on January 22, 1990 and the evaluation was reviewed by the inspector.
The Licensee has corrected the flooding limit to two hours and revised the Updated Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) accordingly.
This item is closed.
3.11 Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/89-81-11
,Numerous weaknesses were identified with respect to design documen-tation and calculations.
The licensee's 120 day response letter of September 11, 1990, discussed in detail the long term corrective actions within the Configuration Management and Engineering.Proce-dures Upgrade Programs.
The inspectors verified the implementation of some procedures such as QE-301 for design preparations, reviews, and approvals, QE-1603 for Potential Condition Adverse to Quality (PCAQ) to deal with safety concerns outside the normal engineering process deficiencies, and A-1601 for the Corrective Action Report (CAR) for closure of engineering work packages'eficiencies.
3.12 The licensee established a team to review the SSFI concerns and their results were reported in part in the licensee's 120 day response letter of September ll, 1990.
The review team consisted of experi-enced representatives from Engineering, Nuclear Safety and Licensing, Configuration Management, Document Control and Records Management, Ginna Technical Section, and Nuclear Engineering Services Department.
Concurrently licensee personnel visited two utilities to study their engineering programs.
Lastly, the licensee has a consultant perform-ing an independent assessment of their engineering practices with an expected completion date of February 15, 1991.
Department managers will review the recommendations from the three activities, select/
prioritize, develop/revise, and implement the interim actions and long term corrective actions.
Considering the actions taken and verified, and the actions planned, this item is closed.
Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/90-10-01 There was concern about the loss of independence between the Class 1E RPS system and the non-Class 1E Technical Support Center TSC/ATMS Mitigating System 'Circuitry (AMSAC) systems.
This loss
/
~ 0
of independence occurs when the TSC battery throwover switch is positioned (intertied) to provide TSC/AMSAC power from either of the Class 1E batteries.
During this followup inspection, the inspector reviewed four procedures (one Operations procedure and four Maintenance procedures}
supporting the independence between the TSC/ANSAC and the RPS system, and walked down the systems'
.
The procedures specifically state that:
( 1) plant conditions must be below 40% power level, so as not to arm the AMSAC; (2) Operations personnel oversee and conduct the intertie actions; (3) Maintenance, if required, is performed to an approved work request; and (4) Operations restores AMSAC system to the normal lineup. 'he keys for these switches are in the custody and control of the control room.
Based on the review of the procedures
. and walkdown, independence between the Class 1E/RPS system
'and the non-Class lE TSC/AMSAC system was found acceptable.
This item is
'losed.
3.13 0 en Unresolved Item 50-244/90-10-02 3.14 The licensee failed to separate an ANSAC cable tray from a safety-related cable tray.
The licensee subsequently'nitiated EWR 4885,
"Ginna Circuit Separations".
to evaluate the raceway routings of all electrical field cables installed in the plant.
The evaluation will be completed in November 1991.
This item remains open until the evaluation is completed and reviewed by NRC.
Closed Unresolved Item 50-244/90-10-03 Procedural coverage for manual bypass for the AMSAC, operating bases and intent for ANSAC, daily checks of ANSAC, and training of the operators was lacking.
These NRC concerns were addressed in a
licensee inter-office memorandum of August 30, 1990 from the Tech-nical Manage~ to the Corrective Action Coordinator, and verified by the inspectors.
Corrective actions are as follows:
Operations Procedure 0-6. 13, "Daily Surveillance Log," now includes the AMSAC manual bypass, and the daily operating checks of ANSAC including verifying switch position and status light indication; and Procedure A-52. 12, "Inoperability of Equipment Important to Safety,"
now
.includes AMSAC as equip'ment that is important to safety, but not addressed in Technical Specifications.
Additionally, training was provided to plant personnel involved with the ANSAC operation.
The inspector reviewed Lesson Plan (LP) 3501C,
and LP 4201C, "Auxiliary Feedwater System."
The LPs satisfactorily address the ANSAC as an importance to safety system, the need for the required daily surveillance log, and the need for the manual bypass for the AMSAC.
Based on the above, all NRC concerns were satisfactorily addressed.
- This item is close f
J
4.0 Mana ement Meetin s
30703
Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspec-tion at the entrance interview on November 26, 1990.
The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the November 30, 1990 exit interview (see paragraph 1 for attendees).
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.
The licensee indicated that no proprietary information was involved within the scope of this inspectio ATTACHMENT A Re uirement IE Bulletin 79-24,
"Frozen Lines" Technical Specifications Procedures Administrative Procedure A-52. 12, "Inoperability of Equipment Important to Safety,
" Revision 9.
A-54.4. 1, "Cold Weather Walkdown," Revision
Operations Procedure 0-6, "Operator and Process Monitoring," Revision
Maintenance Procedure M-1306. 1, "Ginna Station, Maintenance Department, Winterizing Inspection Program,"
Revision 1.
M-38. 14, "lA Station Battery System Maintenance of Repair," Revision
M-38. 15,
"1B Station Battery System Maintenance of Repair," Revision
M-38. 19,
"TSC Battery System Maintenance and/or Repair," Revision
ER-ELEC.2,
"Recovery From Loss of A or B
OC Bus," Revision
Engineering Procedure QE301, "Preparation, Review and Approval of Design Input Documents,"
Revision
QE-1603,
"Documenting and Reporting Potential Conditions Adverse to Quality," Revision
RSSP-12,
"Refeuling Shutdown Surveillance Procedure,"
Revision
Test Procedure PT-10.3, "Station Battery 1A Service Test " Revision
Calibration Procedure CP-514, "Calibration of Main Control Board D.C.
Voltmeters, Devices PG and PA ME-281, "Relief Valve Inservice Test Program Specification -Procedure,"
Revision
Documents Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E) letter of October 30, 1979 NRC Inspection Report 50-244/88-26 of January 24, 1989 NRC Region I letter of May 23, 1989 NRC Inspection Report 50-244/89-16 of January 24, 1990 RGKE letter of June 22, 1989 Corrective Action Report (CAR) 1932,
"Frozen Instrument Lines Almost Resulted in a Plant Trip and Safety Injection" Engineering Work Request (EWR) 4932,
"Adequacy of the HVAC System in the Intermediate Building" Engineering Work Request (EWR) 3341, "Sizing of Vital Batteries" EWR 4756,
"DC Load Change Analysis, Ginna Station MCB, Annunciator Alarm" EWR 4932,
"Adequacy of the HVAC System in the Intermediate Building"
Attachment A
EWR 4933,
"Relocation of the Steam Generator B Pressure Transmitter Tubing" Station Modification (SM) 4933. 1, "Relocation'nd Replacement of the S/G "B" Pressure Transmitter Tubing for EWR 4933" SM-4933.2,
"Removal/Reinstallation of Jet Impingement Shields for S/G "B" Pressure Transmitter Tubing for EWR 4933
'esson Plan (LP) NAD12C, "Cold Weather Walkdown and Inoperability of Non-Safeguards Equipment," Revision
LP RAD12C, "Cold Weather Walkdown and Inoperability of Non-Safeguards Equipment," Revision
LP RSE10S,
"Power Operations With Malfunctions:
Loss of CCW," Revision
LP R3501C,
Revision 8 LP R4201C, "Auxiliary Feedwater System,"
Revision
Trouble Report No. 9001976,
"Repair of Space Heaters in the Turbine Building"